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This  thesis  deals  with  those  general  principles 
of  criminal  law  which  apply  to  most  crimes.  The 
approach  adopted  is  analytical  and  critical:  the 
various  principles  are  discussed  in  general  terms, 
and  an  attempt  is  then  made  to  analyse  the  Scots 
cases  in  the  light  of  the  general  discussion,  and 
to  extract  the  rules  and  principles  implicit  in  them. 
Chapter  1  deals  with  the  formal  definition  of 
'crime',  and  then  considers  the  distinction  between 
crimes  mala  in  se  and  mala  prohibita  as  representative 
of  a  difference  between  the  attitudes  of  the  public 
to  crimes  such  as  murder  and  theft  and  their  attitudes 
to  modern  statutory  offences.  The  chapter  then 
considers  the  exercise  by  the  High  Court  of  its  power 
to  declare  criminal  acts  not  previously  held  to  be  so'. 
Chapter  2  discusses  the  philosophical  problems  which 
are  inherent  in  the  most  common  concepts  used  in  dis- 
cussions  of  criminal  responsibility.  This  is  merely 
an  introductory  and  brief  treatment  intended  to  clear 
the  way  for  the  later  discussions  of  particular 
problems  involving  these  concepts. 
Chapter  3  deals  with  the  concept  of  the  criminal 
act,  or  actus  reus,  and  with  that  of  criminal  conduct. It  distinguishes  between  factors  whose  presence  is 
necessary  to  the  constitution  of  an  actus  reus,  and 
factors  :  hose  presence  may  take  away  its  criminal 
nature  from  what  would  otherwise  be  an  actus  reus. 
It  considers  the  kinds  of  behaviour  which  may  constitute 
criminal  conduct,  and  deals  in  particular  with  criminal 
omissions,  and  the  way  in  which  these  are  restricted 
to  omissions  to  fulfil  pre-existing  legal  duties. 
It  considers  the  problem  of  causality  with  particular 
reference  to  situations  in  which  two  or  more  persons 
acting  independently  contribute  to  the  creation  of  an 
actus  reus.  Finally  it  considers  the  questions  of 
crimes  in  which  the  criminal  conduct  and  the  actus  reus 
occur  in  different  countries. 
Chapter  4  deals  with  the  law  of  art  and  part 
guilt,  and  analyses  it  in  the  light  of  the  principles 
set  out  in  chapter  3.  It  includes  a  discussion  of  3 
modern  unreported  cases  on  the  problem  of  the  criminal 
responsibility  of  the  memoers  of  a  group  for  the  con- 
sequences  of  the  activities  of  the  group. 
Chapter  5  discusses  the  leading  theories  on  attempted 
crimes,  and  then  analyses  the  Scots  cases  in  the  light 
of  the  theories  and  of  the  principles  set  out  in  chapters 
3  and  4.  It  then  considers  the  law  of  conspiracy  and 
incitement,  and  the  effect  of  the  development  of  these 
crimes  on  the  principles  of  attempt. 
Chapter  6  deals  with  mens  rea.  It  distinguishes 
between  wens  rea  as  a  general  reprehensible  disposition, 
and  as  a  subjective  state  required  for  guilt  of  a 
particular  crime.  Parallel  with  this  distinction  it 
distinguishes  between  mental  factors  which  may  operate 
to  mitigate  the  accused's  liability  to  punishment, and  thode  which  may  operate  to  exculpate  him  from 
criminal  responsibility.  It  then  considers  the  con- 
cepts  of  intention,  recklessness,  and  negligence. 
In  the  course  of  this  discussion  it  considers  the  con- 
cept  of,  the  reasonable  man,  and  the  'principles  of 
disfacilitation'  whereby  discrepancies  between  an 
accused's  account  of  his  mental  state  and  the  assumed 
mental  state  of  the  reasonable  man  are  resolved 
against  the  accused  where  acceptance  of  the  accused's 
statement  would  lead  to  his  acquittal  or  to  a  mitigation 
of  punishment,  on  the  ground  that  to  do  otherwise 
would  make  it  too  easy  for  accused  persons  to  secure 
acquittals  or  reductions  in  penalty. 
Chapter  7  deals  with  the  defence  of  error,  with 
the  connection  between  error  and  the  doctrine  of  trans- 
ferred  intent,  and  with  the  meaning  of  'reasonable'  error. 
Chapters  8  and  9  deal  with  the  concepts  of  insanity 
and  diminished  responsibility  respectively,  both  generally 
and  by  way  of  an  analysis  of  the  Scots  cases  on  the 
suujects.  Chapter  9  includes  a  brief  discussion 
of  the  problem  of  the  psychopath. 
Chapter  10  deals  with  the  position  of  intoxication 
in  the  criminal  law,  and,  is  mainly  devoted  to  exhibiting 
the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  -the  present  law. 
Chapters  11,12  and  13,  deal  with  the  pleas  of 
necessity  -  including  coercion  and  superior  orders, 
self-defence,  and  provocation,  respectively.  Self- 
defence  and  provocation  are  dealt  with  by  analysing 
the  law  as  stated  by  Hume  and  comparing  it  with  the 
modern  law,  all  in  the  light  of  -  the  principles  discussed 
in  the  earlier  chapters. 
Chapter  14  deals  with  criminal  negligence,  and 
in  particular  with  the  crime  of  involuntary  culpable 
homicide.  It  distinguishes  culpable  homicide  by persons  lawfully  employed  and  culpable  homicide  by 
persons  unlawfully  employed,  and  criticises  the  rule 
that  wherever  a  person  causes  death  while  unlawfully 
employed  he  is  guilty  of  culpable  homicide. i 
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PREFACE 
This  thesis  deals  with  'the  principles,  doctrines, 
legal  standards,  and  ways  of  reasoning  employed  by 
lawyers  and  judges  in  that  branch  of  the  law  that 
deals  with'  crimes  (cf.  Hall  ?o  Glueck,  p.  46). 
It  is  concerned  with  matters  which  are  common  to  all 
or  to  most  crimes,  and  not  with  those  which  are 
special  to  any  particular  crime.  It  deals  to  a  large 
extent  with  the  law  of  murder  and  of  culpable  homicide 
because  most  of  the  cases  in  which  general  principles 
are  discussed,  especially  those  concerning  criminal 
intention,  or  wens  real  are  cases  of  homicide;  but  it 
is  not  a  treatise  on  the  law  of  homicide. 
In  discussing  the  'ways  of  reasoning'  employed 
in  the  Courts  I  have  tried  to  take  into  account  not 
only  the  explicit  logic  and  rationes  decidendi  of  the 
various  principles  and  decisions,  but  also  the 
implicit  reasons,  sociological,  ethical,  or  even 
personal,  for  their  adoption,  and  the  underlying 
attitudes  they  reveal. 
Discussion  of  the  principles  of  Scots  criminal 
law  is  especially  difficult  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
The  wealth  of  periodical  literature  and  case  law  which 
lies  behind  such  works  as  those  of  Hall  in  America 
and  of  Glanville  Williams  in  England  has  no  counterpart 
in  Scotland.  American  and  English  criminal  law 
often  employ  the  same  terminology  as  does  Scots,  and 
there  is  a  fairly  wide  area  of  agreement  between  their 
ultimate  results  and  those  of  Scots  law,  but  Scots 
criminal  law  has  grown  up  more  or  less  independently 
of  Anglo-American  law,  and  Anglo-American  concepts 
and  cases  must  therefore  be  treated  with  great  care 
when  considering  the  Scots  law.  This  care  is V 
v 
especially  calleu  for  in  dealing  with  Sn7lish  cases 
which  do  not  have  the  same  persuasive  authority  in 
criminal  matters  that  they  have  in  other  branches  of 
law.  I  have  therefore  tried  to  avoid  more  than 
occasional  citation  of  English  authority,  ana  have  indeed 
preferred  to  go  to  American  or  Dominion  cases,  and  to 
Continental  law,  for  examples  of  any  propositions 
I  wish  to  advance  which  are  not  yet  covered  by  a  Scots 
case.  I  have  also  tried  to  avoid  detailed  discussion 
of  problems  which  have  not  yet  arisen  in  Scotland, 
and  to  refrain  from  embarking  on  long  speculative 
discussions  of  matters  on  which  there  is  no  Scots 
authority. 
The  dearth  of  literature  or  authority  in  Scotland 
is  not  due  onli  to  the  fact  that  a  small  country 
offers  fewer  examples  of  criminal  activity  than  does 
a  large  one.  Criminal  law  is  the  Cinderella  of  the 
Scots  legal  system.  There  has  been  no  extended 
discussion  of  its  principles  since  Hume's  Commentaries. 
Alison  merely  repeats  Hume  with  the  addition  of  a 
few  English  cases;  Anderson  is  a  very  brief  treatment 
and  avoids  discussion;  Macdonald  is  little  more  than 
a  convenient  digest,  and  is  confused  and  inaccurate. 
The  only  systematic  modern  treatment  is  that  contained 
in  three  comparatively  short  chapters  of  Professor 
Smith's  volume  on  Scotland  in  the  British  Commonwealth 
series  (T.  B.  Smith,  pp.  695-783). 
The  position  is  not  very  much  better  with 
regard  to  case  law.  Since  1913  there  have  been  very 
few  reports  of  criminal  trials,  so  that  it  is  difficult 
to  know  what  actually  goes  on  in  the  criminal  Courts, 
especially  the  summary  ones.  Before  1927  there 
was  no  appeal  from  conviction  in  the  High  Court,  so 
that,  except  for  occasional  references  by  circuit vi 
Judges  of  particularly  difficult  cases  to  the  High 
Court,  the  cases  before  1927  are  only  decisions  of 
single  Judges.  The  principle  of  diminished 
responsibility,  one  of  Scotland's  few  contributions 
to  British  criminal  jurisprudence,  grew  up  or  at  any 
rate  became  crystallised  mainly  because  one  particular 
Judge  applied  it  in  a  number  of  cases.  This  process 
started  in  1867  -  so  far  as  reported  cases  go  - 
yet  as  late  as  1913  another  Judge  could  deny  the 
existence  of  the  principle  and  leave  the  accused 
without  redress  (Higgins,  1914,  J.  C.  l).  Even  the 
existence  of  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  has  not 
led  to  the  settlement,  or  to  an  authoritative 
discussion,  of  all  the  problems  of  criminal  law  or 
theory  -  there  seems  to  be  a  tendency  to  avoid 
discussion  of  the  meaning  of  words  like  'intention', 
'negligence',  or  'recklessness'.  The  then  Lord 
Justice-General,  Lord  Cooper,  Lord  Keith,  the  Faculty 
of  Advocates,  and  the  Crown  Agent,  all  gave  evidence 
to  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment,  and 
none  could  produce  an  authoritative  definition  of 
murder.  Other  important  questions,  such  as  the 
definition  of  insanity,  have  never  been  dealt  with  by 
the  Appeal  Court,  so  that  the  law  is  unknown  even  to 
those  who  administer  it,  (cf.  infra.  ch.  8).  (It 
should  also  be  noted  that  the  vast  bulk  of  serious 
crime  is  dealt  with  in  Glasgow  Sheriff  Court,  and 
that  cases  there  are  hardly  ever  reported  unless 
appealed.  )  Where  there,  is  no  deci3ion  by  the  Court 
of  Criminal  Appeal  the  law  must-  sti12,  be  sought  in 
such  examples  of  Judge's  ý  charges  as  are  available. 
These  are  of  their  nature  unsatisfactory  sources 
for  general  principles,  being  given  with  the  facts 
of  a  particular  case  in  mind,  and  deliberately vii 
couched  in  non-technical  language  (cf.  Stephen, 
2  H.  C.  L.,  P.  152). 
In  addition  there  is  a  more  fundamental  difficulty, 
one  which  springs  from  the  nature  of  Scots  criminal 
procedure.  The  conduct  of  prosecutions,  the  decision 
whether  or  not  to  prosecute,  or  for  what  crime  to 
prosecute  in  any  case,  lie  almost  entirely  with  the 
Crown  Office.  The  prosecutor  in  any  case  can,  and 
often  does,  accept  a  plea  of  guilty  to  all  or 
part  of  the  indictment,  or  to  a  lesser  crime  than  that 
charged,  such  as  culpable  homicide  on  a  murder  charge, 
or  reset  on  a  charge  of  theft,  or  to-attempting  to 
commit  the  crime  charged  (cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  pp.  754-5, 
776-71).  In  all  these  Nays  the  Crown  Office  can 
materially  alter  the  law  in  practice  while  leaving 
it  unchanged  literally.  For  example,  it  may  once 
have  been  felt  that  to  cease  to  include  adultery 
in  the  catalogue  of  crimes  would  have  offended  the 
upholders  of  conventional  morality,  so  it  is  still 
literally  the  law  of  Scotland  that  at  any  rate  'notour' 
adultery  is  a  crime,  but  nobody  is  ever  prosecuted 
for  it.  In  the  same  way,  rape  was  a  capital  offence 
until  1887,  but  executions  had  ceased  long  before 
(cf.  Sweeney,  (1858)  3  Irv.  109). 
The  clearest  example  of  the  Crown  Office's  control 
over  the  criminal  law  in  modern  times  is  the  practice 
of  accepting  pleas  of  culpable  homicide  in  charges  of 
murder.  (Very  recently  there  have  been  signs  of  a 
decrease  in  this  practice.  )  As  a  result,  the  Courts 
are  deprived  of  many  opportunities  of  pronouncing 
on  the  distinction  between  the  two  crimes,  and  thus 
of  exploring  the  principles  of  provocation,  self-defence, 
diminished  responsibility,  recklessness,  and  so  on. 
it  is  apposite  in  this  connection  to  recall  Holmes' viii 
famous  statement, 
'Take  the  fundamental  question,  what 
constitutes  the  law?  You  will  find  some  text 
writers  telling  you  that  it  is  a  system  of 
reason,  that  it  is  a  deduction  from  principles 
of  ethics  or  admitted  axioms  or  what  not,  which 
may  or  may  not  coincide  witn  the  decisions. 
But  if  we  take  the  view  of  our  friend  the  bad 
man  we  shall  find  that  he  does  not  care  two 
straws  for  the  axioms  or  deductions,  but  that 
he  does  want  to  know  what  the  Iassachusetts 
or  English  Courts  are  likely  to  do  in  fact.  ' 
('The  Path  of  the  Law?,  (1897)  10  H.  L.  R. 
457,461). 
If  Holmes'  friend  lived  in  Scotland  he  would  be  more 
interested  in  what  the  Crown  Office  are  likely  to  do 
in  fact,  than  in  what  the  Courts  are  likely  to  do. 
And  he  would  discover  that  it  is  almost  impossible 
to  find  out  and  to  state  the  principles  on  which 
the  Crown  Office  acts,  and  very  difficult  to  predict 
their  actions.  For  the  decisions  of  the  Crown 
Office  are  in  the  last  resort  administrative  decisions: 
like  those  taken  by  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
considering  the  commutation  of  death  sentences, 
they  may  be  based  on  precedent  and  general  rules 
(R.  C.  para.  49),  but  the  precedents  and  rules  are 
private.  This  system  makes  Scots  criminal  law 
flexible,  and  has  many  practical  advantages,  but  it 
makes  it  very  difficult  to  state  and  discuss  the  law 
from  a  theoretical  standpoint. 
(The  most  important  and  useful  source  of  the 
modern  law  is  contained  in  the  evidence  given  before 
the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment  by  Lord 
Cooper,  Lord  Keith,  the  Crown  Agent,  and  the  Faculty 
of  Advocates,  respectively,  since  this  evidence 
gives  the  principles  on  which  prosecutions  are  brought, 
and  juries  directed  -  of  how  the  living  law  is 
administered.  Unfortunately  the  Royal  Commission  was ix 
concerned  only  with  the  law  of  murder,  and  the 
evidence  deals  with  only  some  of  the  matters  dealt 
with  in  this  thesis.  ) 
As  a  result  of  all  the  above  factors  it  is 
often  very  difficult  to  find  any  starting  point 
for  a  discussion  of  many  questions  of  criminal 
responsibility  in  Scots  law.  Anglo-American  and 
Continental  writers  can  start  with  the  law  as  it  has 
been  laid  down  in  their  respective  countries  and  go 
on  to  discuss  its  value  and  implications  -ä  Scots 
writer  has  to  start  by  groping  towards  a  formulation 
of  the  law  to  be  discussed. 
In  view  of  its  purpose  this  thesis  is  concerned 
to  discover,  analyse,  and  criticise,  the  criminal 
law  of  Scotland  as  it  exists  today.  It  is  not 
concerned  with  the  historical  development  of  the  law, 
as  such,  and  I  have  been  content  to  accept  Hume's 
analysis  of  the  law  of  his  day  without  enquiring 
into  his  sources.  Again,  apart  from  references  to 
a  few  modern  unreported  cases,  the  material  on  which 
the  thesis  is  based  is  more  or,  less  readily  available 
in  published  form.  The  originality  which  is  claimed 
for  the  thesis  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  the  first 
attempt  for  over  a  century  -  since  the  last  edition 
of  Hume  in  1844  -  to  analyse  the  reported  Scots  cases 
in  order  to  derive  from  them  a  systematic  statement 
of  the  law,  and  to  discuss  in  the  light  of  the  Scots 
cases  those  general  principles  and  concepts  of 
criminal  law  which  are  dealt  with  in  relation  to  their 
respective  countries  by  such  writers  as  Glanville 
Williams,  Hall,  Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  and  Schänke-Schröder, 
to  whose  works  frequent  reference  is  made  in  the  text. S 
I  am  indebted  to  Professor  D.  M.  Walker,  Q.  C. 
for  reading  a  draft  of  the  thesis,  and  for  his  criticisms 
and  suggestions  regarding  its  form  and  substance; 
and  also  to  the  permanent  officials  of  the  Crown 
Office,  and,  more  especially,  those  of  the 
Justiciary  Office,  for  information  regarding  recent 
and  current  law  and  practice. xi 
List  of  abbreviations 
(other  than  those  relating;  to  recognised  law  reports) 
Alison  2'rinciples  and  Practice  of  the 
Criminal  Law  of  ý11cotland,  by  A. 
Alison  (2  vols.:  vol.  i, 
Principles,  .  din.,  18  2;  vol.  ii, 
Practice,  Edin.,  1333). 
Anderson  The  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  by 
A.  M.  Anderson,  2nd  ed.  (Edin.,  1104). 
Beccaria  An  Essay  on  Crimes  and  Punishments, 
by  1,1arquis  Beccaria,  ýth  ed.  in 
English  (London,  1804  . 
Bell's  Notes  A  Suppleiiient  to  Hume's  Comnieataries 
on  the  Law  of  Scotland  respectin 
Crimes,  oy  B.  R.  Bell  (idin.,  1i44). 
Bentham  Introduction  to  the  Principles  of 
Lorals  and  Legislation,  by  J. 
Bentham,  ed.  W.  Harrison  (Oxford, 
1946  -  published  with  A  Fragment  of 
Government). 
Burnett  A  Treatise  on  various  Branches 
of  the  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland, 
by  J.  Burnett  (Edin.,  1611). 
C.  P.  Code  Penal  Francais,  Libr.  llalloz, 
47th  ed.  (Paris,  1950). 
D.  Digesta  Justiniani,  ed.  Th.  tommsen 
(2  vols.,  Berlin,  1870). 
Donnedieu  de  Trite  de  Droit,,,  Crirlinel  et  de 
Vabres  Legislation  Penale  Comparee,  by  H. 
Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  3rd  ed.  (Paris, 
1947). 
Gl.  Villiaras  Criminal  Law:  The  General  Part,  by 
Glanville  L.  Nilliams  (London, 
1953). 
Hall  GeAeral  Principles  of  Criminal  Law, 
by  J.  Hall  (Indionopolis,  1947). xii 
Hall  and  Glueck  Cases  and  Materials  on  Criminal  Law 
by  L.  Hall  and  S.  Glueck  (St.  Paul, 
Minn.,  1940). 
Hume  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of 
Scotland  respecting  Crimes,  by 
Baron  Hume,  4th  ed.,  by  B.  R.  Bell 
(2  vols.  Edin.,  1844). 
Kenny  Outlines  of  Criminal  Law,  by  C.  S. 
Kenny,  17th  ed.,  by  J.  W.  C.  Turner 
(Cambridge,  1958). 
Macaulay  Notes  on  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  by 
Lord  Macaulay,  References  are  to 
The  Collected  Works  of  Lord 
Macaulay,  ed.  Lady  Trevelyan,  Vol. 
VII  (London,  1875). 
Macdonald  A  Practical  Treatise  on  the  Criminil 
Law  of  Scotland,  by  J.  H.  A.  Macdonald, 
Lord  Kingsburgh,  5th  ed.,  by  J. 
Walker  and  D.  J.  Stevenson  (Ellin., 
1948). 
Mackenzie  The  Laws  and  Customs  of  Scotland 
in  Matters  Criminal,  by  Sir  G. 
Mackenzie,  2nd  ed.  (Ellin.,  1699). 
Maclaurin  Arguments  and  Decisions  in 
remarkable  Cases  before  the  High 
Court  of  Justiciary  and  other 
Supreme  Courts  in  Scotland  by 
Mr.  Maclaurin  (Edin.,  17745. 
Mental  Abnormality  Mental  Abnormality 
L.  Radzinowicz  and 
(London,  1944). 
Modern  Approach  The  modern  Approac] 
ed.  L.  Radzinoviicz 
(London,  1945). 
and  Crime,  ed. 
J.  W.  C.  Turner 
to  Criminal  Lair 
and  J.  J.  C.  Turner 
N.  E.  D.  A  New  English  Dictionary  on  Historical 
Principles,  ed.  J.  H.  A.  I.  Iurray 
(Oxford,  1888-1933). 
Nich.  Ethics  The.  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  trans. 
J.  A.  K.  Thomson  (Penguin  Books,  1955). xiii 
R.  C.  Report  of  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment,  1949-53,  Cnd.  8932 
(London,  1953). 
R.  C.  Evid.  ý  iIinutes  of  Evidence  before  Royal 
Commission  on  Capital  Punishment 
(London,  1949-51). 
Report  of  Royal  Report  of  the  Royal  Coxams.  ssion 
Commission  on  Draft  appointed  to  consider  the  law 
Code,  1879  Relating  to  Indictable  Offences 
with  an  Appendix  containing  a 
Draft  Code  embodying  the  Suggestions 
of  the  Commissioners,  1879,  C.  -2345  (London,  1879). 
Renton  and  Brown  Criminal  Procedure  according  to 
the  Law  of  Scotland,  by  R.  W.  Renton 
and  H.  H.  Brown,  3rd.  ed.  ,  by  F.  C. 
Watt,  (Edinburgh,  1956). 
Salmon  d  Salmon  d  on  Jurisprudence,  llth  ed. 
by  G1.  L.  Williams  (London,  1957). 
Sayre  A  Collection  of  Cases  on  Criminal 
Law,  by  F.  B.  Sayre  (Rochester, 
N.  Y.,  1927).. 
Schbnke-Schroder  Strfifgesetzbuch:  Kommentar,  by  A. 
Schonke,  8th  ed.,  by  H.  Schrader 
(Munich  and  Berlin,  1957). 
T.  B.  Smith  The  British  Commonwealth, 
The  Development  of  its  Laws  and 
Constitutions,  Vol.  Is  The  United 
Kingdom:  Scotland,  by  T.  B.  Smith 
(London,  1955). 
Stephen,  2  H.  C.  L.  History  of  the  Criminal  Law,  by 
Sir  J.  F.  Stephen,  Vol.  II  (London, 
1883). 
SchwStGB  Swiss  Criminal  Code  (Schweizerische 
Strafgesetzbuch,  ed.  P.  Thormann 
and  A.  von  Overbeck  (Zurich,  1940). 
StGB  German  Criminaý  Code  (Strafgesetzbuch), 
printed  in  Schonke-Schroder  (supra). 
Cr.  L.  Rev.  Criminal  Law  Review xiv 
J.  Cr.  Sc.  Journal  of  Criminal  Science. 
Jur.  Rev.  Juridical  Review. 
H.  L.  R.  Harvard  Lave  Review. 
L.  Q.  R.  Law  Quarterly  Review. 
iI.  L.  R.  Modern  Law  Review. 
Scots  criminal  cases,  other  than  those  originally 
summary  prosecutions,  are  cited  by  the  nahe,  and  after 
1887  the  surname,  of  the  accused,  and  the  relevant 
volume  of  the  Justiciary  Reports.  Unreported 
cases  are  cited  by  the  name  or  surname  of  the  accused, 
and  the  place  and  date  of  trial.  I  am  indebted 
to  the  Depute-Clerks  of  Justiciary  for  their  help 
in  tracing  unreported  cases,  and  their  kindness  in 
making  the  papers  in  them  available  to  me.  I  am  also 
indebted  to  them  and  to  the  senior  permanent  officials 
of  the  Crown  Officials  for  helpful  information  and 
discussions. 
Where  several  references  are  given  for  a  case, 
the  one  used  is  cited  last. 
References  and  footnotes  have  been  placed  between 
brackets  in  the  text. 1 
Chapter  1:  Crime  in  General 
The  definition  of  'Crime 
Crime,  Criminal  Law,  and  Criminal  Procedure. 
The  terms  'crime'  and  'criminal  law'  are  well- 
known  but  it  is  not  easy  to  give  a  comprehensive  defin- 
ition  of  them,  or  to  state  clearly  the  difference 
between  criminal  and  civil  law.  The  now  repealed 
Summary  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  of  1864  (21  &  28 
Vict.,  c.  53,  s.  28)  divided  the  jurisdiction  of  summary 
courts  into  civil  and  criminal,  and  described  the 
criminal  jurisdiction  as  that  where  'the  Court  shall 
be  required  or  shall  be  authorized  to  pronounce 
Sentence  of  Imprisonment  against  the  Respondent,  or 
shall  be  authorized  or  required  in  case  of  Default  of 
Payment  or  Recovery  of  a  Penalty  or  Expenses,  or  in 
case  of  Disobedience  to  their  Order,  '. -to  grant  Warrant 
for  the  Imprisonment  of  the  Respondent  for  a  Period 
limited  to  a  certain  Time,  at  the  Expiration  of  which 
he  shall  be  entitled  to  Liberation'.  This  Act  was 
repealed  by  the  Summary  Jurisdiction  (Scotland)  Act 
1908  (8  Edw.  VII,  c.  65),  and  neither  that  Act  nor  its 
successor  the  Summary  Jurisdiction  (Scotland)  Act,  1954 
(2  &3  Eliz.  II,  c.  48),  defines  civil  or  criminal 
procedure,  although  both  are  concerned  mainly  with 
criminal  procedure. 
The  later  acts  do,  however,  define  the  term  'offence', 
and  follow  the  1864  Act  in  laying  stress  on  the  treat- 
ment  of  the  offender.  An  offence  is  'an  act,  attempt 
or  omission  punishable  by  law'  (1908  Act,  s.  2;  1954 
Act,  s.  77).  This  definition  does  not  indicate  the 2 
type  of  punishment  envisaged,  and  does  not  specifically 
require  the  possibility  of  imprisonment  desiderated  in 
1864.  This  may  be  because  the  number  of  offences 
normally  dealt  with  by  fining  the  offender  has  greatly 
increased  since  1864,  or  may  be  merely  because  every 
fine  now  carries  with  it  the  possibility  of  imprison- 
ment  in  default  of  payment  (1954  Act,  s.  48,  re-enacting 
s.  47  of  the  1908  Act). 
There  are  difficulties  in  rega_ding  the  possibility 
of  imprisonment  as  the  decisive  factor.  The  requirement, 
specifically  made  in  1864,  that  the  imprisonment  must 
be  for  a  fixed  period,  would  serve  to  distinguish 
criminal  imprisonment  from  civil  imprisonment  for 
contempt  of  court;  but  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any- 
thing  contradictory  in  the  idea  of  a  crime  for  which 
the  offender  cannot  be  imprisoned,  or,  indeed,  punished 
at  all  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word.  Many 
convictions  are  not  in  fqct  followed  by  punishment,  but 
by  other  forms  of  treatment,  such  as  absolute  discharge, 
or  probation  (Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act,  1949, 
12,13  &  14  Geo.  VI,  c.  94,  Part  I;  cf.  T.  B.  Smith, 
p.  703).  These  methods  of  treatment  can,  it  is  true, 
follow  only  on  conviction  for  behaviour  which  is  punish- 
able  in  the  conventional  ways,  but  if  a  class  of 
criminal  acts,  such  as  sexual  offences,  or  all  first 
offences,  were  to  cease  to  be  punishable  and  come 
always  to  involve  some  other  form  of  treatment,  they 
would  not  therefore  cease  to  be  crimes.  If  they  were 
dealt  with  in  the  criminal  courts,  by  the  processes 
of  criminal  law,  they  would  still  oe  regarded  as 
crimes.  It  seems  therefore  that  'crime'  must  be 
defined  independently  of  the  manner  in  which  the  offender 
is  dealt  with;  but  that  the  definition  will  probably 
have  to  take  into  account  the  procedure  by  which  he  is 3 
dealt  with. 
A  definition  of  criminal  law  as  the  subject  matter 
of  criminal  procedure,  or  in  terms  of  the  jurisdiction 
of  criminal  courts,  is  not  wholly  satisfactory.  Its 
apparent  circularity  is  not  of  -,  reat  importance; 
criminal  prodedure  and  the  criminal  courts  can  be 
defined  without  reference  to  their  subject  matter. 
The  memoers,  offices,  and  proceedings  of  the  High  Court 
of  Justiciary  can  be  defined  more  or  less  ostensibly  - 
they  can  be  shown  to  anyone  who  wishes  to  see  them, 
and  the  same  is  true  of  the  Sheriff  Court  although 
the  differences  between  civil  and  criminal  courts  and 
procedure  are  not  so  obvious  there.  The  difficulty 
is  caused  by  certain  anomalous  matters  which  are  not 
criminal,  but  are  dealt  with  by  the  criminal  courts. 
Appeals  from  the  Small  Debt  Court,  for  example,  are 
heard  by  judges  of  the  High  Court,  wearing  criminal 
robes,  sitting  in  criminal  courtrooms,  aided  by  the 
permanent  officials  of  the  Justiciary  Office,  although 
they  are  governed  by  a  peculiar  procedure  (Small  Debt 
(Scotland)  Act,  1837,7  Will.  IV  &1  Vict.,  c.  41,  s.  31). 
Appeals  against  imprisonment  for  contempt  of  a  civil 
court  may  be  dealt  with  by  the  High  Court,  perhaps 
because  of  the  analogy  with  criminal  imprisonment, 
though  such  imprisonment  is  not  a  criminal  matter 
(cf.  Graham  v.  Robert  Younger,  Ltd.,  1955  J.  C.  28). 
The  jursidiction  of  summary  courts  to  deal  with 
statutory  penalties  and  certain  orders  ad  factum 
praestandum  has  also  created  difficulty  (1954  Act, 
s.  l  cf.  Renton  &  Brown,  173-4).  (The  case  of  James 
Dunlop  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Calder,  1943  S.  C.  49  is  an  example 
of  an  anomaly  created  by  the  interaction  of  various 
statutory  enactments  and  repeals  as  a  result  of  which 4 
the  only  a'opeal  from  the  order  by  a  court  of  summary 
jurisdiction  removing  a  checker  from  his  position  in 
a  coal  mine  is  by  the  criminal  procedure  of  a  stated 
case,  though  the  procedure  for  removal  'is  more 
analogous  to  civil  than  criminal  proceedings'  at  p.  58). 
The  distinguishing  feature  of  criminal  .  aw  is 
often  said  to  oje  the  interest  taken  by  the  State  in 
crime.  The  State  has,  of  course,  an  increasing  interest 
in  many  forms  of  civil  litigation  such  as  actions  to 
recover  taxes.  But  if  we  combine  the  interest  of  the 
State  with  the  use  of  criminal  procedure  it  is  possible 
to  arrive  at  a  definition  which,  while  it  is  by  no 
means  perfect,  is  sufficient  for  most  purposes.  The 
state  as  prosecutor  in  a  criminal  trial  is  normally 
distinguishable  from  the  State  as  pursuer  in  a  civil 
action.  Definition  in  terms  of  the  State  as  prosecutor 
is  made  easy  in  Scotland  by  the  extreme  rarity  of 
private  prosecutions,  though  these  remain  anomalous. 
Almost  all  prosecutions  in  Scotland  are  at  the  instance 
of  the  State,  either  in  the  person  of  the  Lord  Advocate, 
the  official  public  prosecutor  at  common  law  and  in  many 
statutory  offences,  or  of  his  deputies,  or  in  the 
person  of  a  'prosecutor  in  the  public  interest'  (1954 
Act,  s.  '/`7)  such  as  a  factory  inspector  or  an  official 
of  the  Customs  and  Excise  Department  (cf.  Renton  & 
Brown,  p.  199).  The  criminal  law  is  probably, 
therefore,  sufficiently  defined  as  that  branch  of  the 
law  which  deals  with  those  acts,  attempts,  and 
omissions,  of  which  the  State  may  take  cognisance  by 
prosecution  in  the  criminal  courts  (cf.  Hall  &  Glueck, 
p.  46). 5 
The  formal  nature  of  crime. 
The  definition  offered  makes  no  reference  to  the 
content  of  the  criminal  law,  or  to  the  factors  which 
determine  which  acts  are  made  crimes.  It  is  a  purely 
formal  definition  applying  only  to  the  criminal  law  as 
it  is,  without  reference  to  what  it  should  be,  or  to 
why  it  is  as  it  is.  It  embodies  the  view  that  murder 
and  selling  drinks  outside  licensing  hours  are  both 
crimes  for  the  same  reason  -  they  are  forbidden  by 
the  criminal  law.  'The  criminal  law  is  the  formal 
cause  of  crime.  Without  a  criminal  code  there  would 
be  no  crime...  questions  involved  in  the  formulation 
or  amendment  of  a  criminal  code  can  be  stated  as  what 
crimes  do  we  wish  to  cause'  (J.  Michael  and  M.  Adler, 
Crime,  Law  and  Social  Science,  p.  2).  Thereis  no 
criminal  code  in  Scotland,  and  the  criminal  law  may 
still  be  capable  of  extension  by  judicial  decision 
(see  infra,  fp.  l7(L))  but  the  declaration  as  criminal  by  a 
Court  of  an  act  not  formerly  so  characterised  is  not 
in  this  regard  different  from  the  enactment  by  a  legis- 
lature  of  an  addition  to  the  criminal  code.  Both 
Court  and  legislature  will  be  influenced  by  various 
moral  and  social  considerations,  but  the  act  once 
made  criminal  will  be  criminal  because  it,  has  been  so 
made  by  Court  or  legislature  and  not  because  it  is 
immoral  or  antisocial,  or  because  of  whatever  other 
reason  moved  the  Court  or  legislature  to  make  it 
criminal.  'Acts  are  criminal  not  because  they  are 
harmful,  but  oecause  they  are  deemed  harmful  by  those 
who  make  or  interpret  the  law'  (M.  R.  Cohen,  Reason  and 
Law,  p.  25).  The  criminal  law  is  amoral  in  itself, 
however  immoral  or  moral  any  of  its  provisions  may  be. 
'The  criminal  quality  of  an  act  cannot  be  discerned 
by  intuition;  nor  can  it  be  discovered  by  reference 
to  anv  standard  but  one_  in  the  net  nrohibited  with 6 
penal  consequences.  Morality  and  criiinality  are 
far  fron  coextensive;  nor  is  the  sphere  of 
criminality  necessarily  part  of  a  more  extensive  field 
covered  by  morality  -  unless  the  moral  code  necessarily 
disapproves  all  acts  prohibited  by  the  State,  in  which 
case  the  argument  moves  in  a  circle'  (Proprietary 
Articles  Trade  Association  v.  A-G  for  Canada,  [19311 
A.  C.  310,  Lord  Atkin  at  p.  324). 
Crimes  and  offences. 
The  definition  offered  makes  no  distinction  within 
the  class  of  acts  which  the  State  may  prosecute. 
Scots  law  has  two  common  terms  for  criminal  acts: 
'crime'  and  'offence'.  But  the  terms  are  not  clearly 
distinguished,  and  indeed  are  often  used  interchangeably 
(cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  "702),  and  even  statutory  uses  and 
definitions  are  unhelpful. 
The  Interpretation  Act  of  1889  (52  &  53  Vict.,  c.  63, 
s.  28)  tried  to  use  them  to  translate  into  Scots  legal 
language  the  rigid  English  distinction  between  felonies 
and  misdemeanours,  but  did  so  very  confusedly.  'Felony' 
was  defined  as  '  high  crime  and  offence'  and  misdemeanour 
as  'offence'. 
The  Prevention  of  Crimes  Act,  1871  (34  &  35  Vict., 
c.  112)  designated  certain  types  of  conduct  as  'crimes' 
and  defined  an  'offence'  as  'any  act  or  omission  which 
is  not  a  crime  as  defined  by  this  Act,  and  is  punishable 
on  indictment  or  summary  conviction'  (s.  20).  Section 
7  of  the  Act  makes  it  punishable  for  certain  persons 
to  be  found  in  certain  places  'about  to  commit  ...  any 
offence  punishable  on  indictment...  '.  In  Strathern  v. 
Padden  (1926  J.  C.  9)  the  accused  was  charged  under 
section  7  with  being  found  about  to  commit  one  of  the 
acts  designated  as  crime.  It  was  held  that  the  term 
'offence'  in  section  7  included  acts  defined  by  the  Act / 
as  crimes.  Lord  Sands  said  that  the  term  'offence' 
had  been  intended  by  the  legislature  for  'something 
waich  was  not  so  serious  as  crime  but  which  could  be 
punished  on  indictment  or  summary  conviction...  Every 
crime  is  an  offence,  out  every  offence  is  not  a  crime' 
(at  p.  14).  The  word  'offence'  is  used  in  this  way 
in  ordinary,  and  often  in  legal,  language,  out  there 
is  no  rule  for  using  the  two  terms,  and  no  list  of 
crimes  or  offences. 
The  two  terms  are  not  even  consistently  used  to 
denote  greater  and  lesser  breaches  of  the  criminal  law. 
'Crime'  is  defined  by  the  Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland) 
Act,  1887  (50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  1),  in  a  fashion  more 
poetic  than  precise,  as  including  'high  crime  and 
offence,  felony,  crime  and  offence,  offence  and  mis- 
demeanour'.  The  Summary  Jurisdiction  Act  of  1954 
(2  &3  Eliz.  II9  c.  48,  s.  4)  has  a  section  headed 
'Certain  crimes  not  to  be  tried  in  inferior  courtm 
of  summary  jurisdiction',  which  goes  on  to  list  'the 
following  offences:  -  (a)  murder,  culpable  homicide, 
roboery,  rape  ...  '  (s.  4(2)(a)). 
The  reason  for  this  confusion  is  just  that  the  two 
terms  do  not  have  any  effective  difference  in  meaning; 
the  general  rules  of  the  criminal  law  apply  to  all 
breaches  of  criminal  law,  whether  they  are  described 
as  crimes  or  as  offences. 
Mala  in  se  and  mala  prohibita 
The  view  that  all  breaches  of  the  criminal  law  are 
formally  equal  is  not  held  by  the  only  modern  Scottish 
textbook  on  the  subject  (Macdonald,  p.  1).  Macdonald 
restricts  himself,  as  he  is  entitled  to  do,  to  crimes 
punishable  by  death,  or  by  imprisonment  without  the  option 8 
of  a  fine.  But  he  goes  on  to  say  of  the  offences  thus 
excluded  that  'Many  such  of.,:  'ences  are  not  truly  crimes, 
being  made  punishable  to  secure  the  health  or  comfort 
of  the  community'  (Macdonald,  p.  1).  The  criminal 
law  is  regarded  as  divisible  into  two  sections;  one 
deals  with  'true'  crimes,  like  murder,  roboery,  and  rape, 
while  the  other  is  concerned  with  what  are  commonly 
called  public  welfare  offences.  These  latter  are 
offences  created  by  statute  and  designed,  not  directly 
to  preserve  life  or  property,  or  even  public  order,  but 
to  ensure,  for  example,  that  only  clean  food  will  be 
sold  to  the  public,  or  that  there  will  be  an  equal 
distribution  of  certain  commodities  in  times  of  scarcity. 
The  'true'  crime  is  thought  of  as  something  evil  in 
itself  -  malum  in  se,  while  the  public  welfare 
offences  are  not  thought  of  as  evil  or  immoral,  but 
as  being  at  nest  only  technically  crimes,  punishable 
because  they  are  forbidden  by  statute  -  male  prohibita. 
The  legal  validity  of  the  distinction. 
The  division  of  crimes  into  these  two  classes  is 
a  very  old  one  in  the  history  of  criminal  theory  and 
must  oe  considered  in  any  study  of  criminal  law,  although 
it  has  been  condemned  by  modern  writers  as  untenable 
and  unfortunate  in  its  effect  (see  Hall,  pp.  292-8), 
and  has  been  described  as  'unscientific  and  fallacious' 
(Kenny,  para.  17);  and  the  outlook  it  represents  is 
more  the  concern  of  the  sociologist  than  of  the  lawyer. 
Mala  in  se  and  natural  law.  The  distinction 
is  not  of  importance  to  the  lawyer  because  its  terms 
are  so  vague  as  to  be  unusable.  The  idea  of  malum  in  se 
is  not  a  legal  idea  at  all,  but  a  moral  one.  It 
belongs  to  the  era  of  natural  law  theories  when  certain 
rights  and  duties  were  regarded  as  absolute,,  and  a 
necessary  part  of  any  valid  system  of  law.  (cf.  ZV. 
Friedmann,  Legal  Theory,  3rd  Edn.  Pt.  2).  Certain 9 
acts  were  thought  of  as  being  absolutely  and 
immutably  bad,  since  they  were  contrary  to  the  'law  of 
nature'.  These  acts,  it  was  thought,  must  oe  proscribed 
by  any  society,  and  might  therefore  be  treated  by  any 
society  as  punishable,  even  if  there  were  no  specific 
law  against  them.  This  view  has  not  merely  become 
outdated  because  of  the  great  growth  in  the  number 
and  scope  of  statutory  offences;  it  is  untenable  in 
itself.  There  is  probably  no  act  which  is  absolutely 
and  universally  bad.  'Deliberate  killing  is  not 
always  murder;  sexual  intercourse  by  force  and  without 
the  victim's  consent  is  nog  always  rape;  the  taking 
of  another's  property  without  his  consent  is  not  always 
theft;  as  witness  the  legally  justifiable  killing  of 
a  condemned  criminal  by  an  executioner,  the  exposure 
of  Australian  aboriginal  women  to  sexual  attack  for 
violation  of  the  sexual  code,  or  the  seizure  of  an 
allegedly  immoral  book  by  a  customs  officer'  (A.  Morris, 
'The  Concept  of  Crime'  in  Criminology,  ed.  Vedder, 
Koenig  and  Clark,  p.  22).  Such  acts,  are  however, 
fairly  generally  agreed  to  be  criminal,  unless 
there  are  special  circumstances  removing  their 
criminality.  Once  we  pass  from  such  basic  crimes  we 
find  that  ideas  of  what  acts  are  wrong  vary  from  society 
to  society,  and  from  time  to  time.  Hume  pointed  out 
that  the  'general  spirit'  of  the  criminal  law'will  always 
in  some  measure,  be  bent  and  accommodated  to  the  temper 
and  exigencies  of  the  times;  directing  its  severity 
against  those  crimes  which  the  manners  of  the  age 
breed  a  direct  abhorrence  of,  or  which  the  present  con- 
dition  of  the  people  renders  peculiarly  hurtful,  in 
their  consequences  to  private  or  public  peace'  (Hume,  i.  2). 
It  must  also  be  remembered  that  there  may  be  acts 
which  are  abhorred  by  a  society,  and  yet,  for  one  reason 
or  another,  are  not  made  crimes.  The  criminal  law  does 10 
not  include  even  all  the  local  and  contemporary  mala 
in  se  of  any  time  and  place.  It  is  not  a  crime  in 
Scotland  to  refuse  to  pay  your  debts,  or  to  trade  as 
a  prostitute,  or  to  commit  adultery  (though  this  was 
once  criminal). 
Common  law  crimes  and  statutory  crimes.  The  use 
of  the  phrase  mala  prohibita  to  descrije  crimes  not  nala 
in  se  suggests  that  the  distinction  is  between  crimes 
made  illegal  by  statute  and  crimes  recognised  as  wrong 
by  the  common  law.  But  tree  sug,  estion  that  all  common 
law  crimes  are  mala  in  se,  and  all  statutory  ones  not 
mala  in  se,  will  not  bear  even  cursory  examination. 
The  moral  attitudes  to  incest  are  not  dissimilar  in 
Scotland  and  in  England,  and  indeed  incest  is  considered 
wrong  in  almost  every  society.  The  Scots  act  of  1567 
(c.  15)  which  makes  incest  criminal  may  be  regarded  as 
merely  declaratory,  especially  as  it  incorporates  the 
18th  chapter  of  Leviticus.  But  incest  was  not  a  crime 
in  England  until  1909  (Punishment  of  Incest  Act,  1908, 
8  Edw.  VII,  c.  45).  Moreover,  incest  between  bastard 
relations  is  not  criminal  in  Scotland  where  incest  is 
almost  a  common  law  crime  (Alison,  i.  565),  but  is 
criminal  in  England  where  the  crime  is  statutory 
(Sexual  Offences  Act,  1956,4  &5  Eliz.  II,  c.  69,  ss. 
10-11  re-enacting  the  Punishment  of  Incest  Act,  s.  3). 
'True'  crimes  and  public  welfare  offences. 
The  distinction  between  crimes  mala  in  se  and 
crimes  only  mala  prohibita  cannot  be  dismissed  summarily 
simply  by  pointing  out  its  inconsistencies.  It  has 
persisted  because  it  forms  a  convenient  way  of  focussing 
a  widespread  and  persistent  attitude.  This  attitude 
is  shown  in  an  insistence  that  certain  types  of  conduct 
punished  by  the  law  do  not  deserve  to  be  called  crimes, 11 
and  that  those  who  behave  in  such  a  way  do  not  deserve 
to  be  classed  as  criminals.  The  first  meaning  of 
'crime'  given  in  the  New  English  Dictionary  is  'An 
act  punishable  by  law,  as  being  forbidden  by  statute 
or  injurious  to  public  welfare.  (Properly  including 
all  offences  punishable  by  law,  but  commanly  used  only 
of  grave  offences)'.  It  is  the  common  usage  which 
is  important  here,  and  it  approximates  more  closely  to 
the  dictionary's  second  definition,  'More  generally: 
an  evil  or  injurious  act;  an  offence,  a  sin;  esp. 
of  a  grave  character'.  The  typical  crime  is  a  dastardly 
act  causing  hurt  to  someone  in  his  person  or  his  property, 
perpetrated  by  a  rogue  or  a  ruffian.  In  the  words 
of  the  old  Scots  indictments  a  crime  is  something 
which  'by  the  laws'  of  this  and  of'  every  other  well- 
governed  realm'  note  the  suggestion  of  maluni  in  se 
'is  of  an  heinous  nature,  and  severely  punishable'. 
The  problem  of  the  trivial  offence.  This  usage 
breaks  down  when  faced  with  the  modern  law.  The  words 
'crime'  and  'criminal'  seem  out  of  all  proportion 
excessive  when  applied  to  petty  statutory  offences  like 
parking  one's  car  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  street. 
Common  usage  revolts  at  saying  even  that  'it  is,  for 
purposes  of  technical  classification,  no  less  a  crime 
to  be  without  an  ashbin  of  the  pattern  prescribed  by 
the  County  Council  than  to  blow  up  the  Houses  of  Parliament' 
(C.  K.  Allen,  Legal  Duties,  p.  240).  The  law  itself 
recogziises  this  problem.  'There  is  a  particular 
reluctance  to  use  the  expressions  "crime"  and  "criminal" 
with  reference  to  summary  offences.  This  is  because 
of  the  strongly  emotive  nature  of  those  words  which 
makes  then  unsuitable  for  minor  transgressions.  Statutes  >c 
creating  summary  offences  use  the  less  condemnatory 
term  "offence".  '  (Glanville  Williams,  'On  the  Definitio  n 
of  Crime'  in  (1955)  Current  Legal  Problems,  p.  107,  at 
n.  111).  Someone  who  commits  a  crime  is  a  criminal. 12 
but  someone  who  commits  an  offence  is  only  an  offender, 
which  is  much  less  reprehensible.  Most  people  today 
are  prepared  to  admit  that  they  might  oe,  or  even 
have  been,  offenders,  but  would  be  indignant  at  the 
suggestion  that  they  were  criminals. 
The  problem  of  the  respectable  offender.  The 
matter  is  more  serious  than  one  of  linguistic  hyperbole, 
of  using  the  steamroller  word  'crime'  to  crush  the 
peanut  of  the  parking  offence.  A  man  who  steals  six- 
pence  may  be  regarded  as  a  true  criminal,  and  a  man 
who  cheats  the  income  tax  of  8100  as  perfectly 
respectable.  The  attitude  represented  by  the 
distinction  between  the  two  types  of  crimes  is  important 
because  it  resents  public  welfare  offences  being  treated 
as  crimes.  In  this  context  'public  welfare  offences' 
covers  all  offences  which  it  is  still  considered 
respectable  to  commit.  Though  the  denotation  of  the 
term  will  vary  with  the  person  using  it,  it  would  fairly 
generally  be  thought  of  as  including,  for  example, 
smuggling,  failing  to  pay  one's  national  insurance 
contrioutions,  dealing  in  at'any  rate  certain  types 
of  black  market,  driving  a  motor  car  without  a  licence. 
The  crux  of  the  matter  is  a  breakdown  in  rapport 
between  public  opinion  and  the  law.  It  is  not  so 
much  a  question  of  the  seriousness  or  triviality  of 
the  respectable  offences  as  of  their  being  somehow 
different  in  kind  from  the  basic,  'old-fashioned' 
crimes.  And  the  result  of  this  difference  is  tat  they 
are  committed  by  respectable  people.  So  long  as  respect- 
able  people  cqn  do  a  thing  without  thereby  losing  their 
respectability,  it  will  be  difficult  to  regard  that 
thing  as  a  'crime'.  This  attitude  may  even  affect 
offences  which  would  be  considered  'true'  crimes  if 
committed  in  non-respectable  circumstances  by  what  a 
past  generation  might  have  described  as  'members  of 13 
the  criminal  classes'.  The  law  itself  allows  much 
greater  carelessness  on  the  part  of  motorists  without 
charging  them  with  culpable  homicide  than  it  does  on 
the  part  of  housebreakers,  or  than  it  did  in  the  19th 
century  on  the  part  of  engine-drivers  (cf.  Paton, 
1j36  J.  C.  19;  Wm.  Paton  and  Richd.  M4'Nab,  (1845)  2 
Broun  525;  see  infra  Ch.  l4).  And  even  when  charges 
of  culpable  homicide  are  brought  against  motorists 
convictions  are  difficult  to  obtain.  Juries  feel 
in  such  cases  that  'There,  but  for  the  grace  of  God, 
go  we';  and  they  also  feel,  as  defending  counsel 
emphasise,  that  it  would  be  unfair  to  convict  the 
careless  motorist  of  culpable  homicide,  because  to  do 
so  is  to  brand  him  as  a  'killer',  albeit  only  as  a 
killer  by  negligence.  The  legislature  has  recently 
recognised  this  state  of  affairs  and  has  c--eated  the 
statutory  offence  of  killing  someone  by  careless  driving 
(Road  Traffic  Act,  1956,4845  Eliz.  II,  c.  6'/,  s.  8), 
in  the  hope  that  juries  who  are  unwilling  to  convict 
of  the  common  law  crime  will  be  prepared  to  convict 
of  the  statutory  offence,  an  offence  which  carries  with 
it  a  maximum  penalty  as  high  as  that  normally  awarded 
when  juries  do  convict  motorists  of  culpable  homicide. 
Culpable  homicide  has  special  features,  but  in 
the  public  welfare  offences  generally,  the  difficulty 
is  that  they  are  crimes  which  the  community  as  a  whole 
does  not  consider  'criminal'.  There  will  perhaps 
always  be  groups  of  people  who  do  not  consider  it 
reprehensible  to  commit  certain  crimes,  who  even 
consider  it  laudable  to  do  so.  For  example,  at  one 
time  the  Mormons  committed  bigamy  as  a  religious  duty 
(cf.  Reynolds  v.  U.  S.,  (1878)  98  U.  S.  145),  and  many 
religious  and  political  groups  have  considered  it 
laudable  to  break  laws  discriminating  against  them; 
on  a  lower  moral  level  groups  like  soldiers  or 14 
dockworkers  (see  H.  Mannheim,  Group  Problems  in  Crime 
and  Punishment,  ch.  2)  may  consider  certain  forms  of 
dishonesty  as  permissiole,  or  even  as  something  in 
which  they  are  entitled  to  engage.  But  the  public 
welfare  offences  present  us  with  theproblem  of  a  group 
of  many  heterogeneous  offences  which  are  not  considered 
reprehensible  by  the  bulk  of  the  community,  including 
those  people  who  are  looked  on  as  'pillars  of 
respectability'. 
The  moral  attitude  to  crimes. 
The  main  reason  for  the  distinction  between  the 
true  crimes  and  the  respectable  offences  is,  it  is 
submitted,  that  the  latter  are  too  different  in  content 
from  the  former  to  attract  the  same  moral  disapproval. 
Murder,  robbery,  rape,  and  the  like,  present  simple 
and  easily  appreciated  moral  situations,  We  are  all 
glad  of  protection  against  marauders,  we  all  disapprove 
of  rape,  we  all  sympathise  with  the  old  lady  who  has 
her  bag  snatched  by  a  young  hooligan.  As  Hume  the 
philosopher  pointed  out,  sympathy  with  the  victim  is 
to  a  large  extent  the  basis  of  our  moral  disapproval 
of  the  criminal  and  his  misdeeds  (cf.  Hume,  Treatise 
on  Human  Nature,  III9  iii,  2).  The  origin  of  such 
sympathy  is  an  imaginative  identification  with  the  victim; 
in  Shelley's  phrase,  'the  great  instrument  of  moral 
good  is  the  imagination'.  We  disapprove  of  assault 
because  we  know  what  it  would  be  like  to  be  assaulted, 
and  can  imagine  the  victim's  pain.  This  imaginative 
identification  becomes  very  difficult  when  the  victim 
is  not  an  individual,  and  where  it  is  difficult  to  see 
where  the  pain  or  loss  is  being  suffered.  The 
typical  'true'  crimes  are  crimes  against  individuals, 
their  persons,  property,  or  even  honour.  Imaginative 15 
sympathy  with  the  needs  of  the  State,  or  of  a  bank, 
is  difficult,  and  it  is  almost  impossiole  to  feel  this 
sympathy  with  a  town  plan  or  with  the  purpose  of  an 
export  control  order,  especially  as  these  may  deprive 
particular  individuals  in  whom  we  are  interested  of 
their  property  or  livelihood.  Instead  there  can 
only  ue  a  reasoned  view,  arrived  at  after  an  irate  ectual 
appreciation  of  the  situation,  that  the  law  is  worthy 
of  approval.  (I  am  not  concerned  here  with  the  problem 
of  the  morally  bad  law,  out  with  a  law  which  is  ex 
hypothesi  worthy  of  approval.  )  Many  people  are  not 
capable  of  making  this  appreciation,  and  even  those  who 
are,  are  not  affected  by  it  as  strongly  as  by  their 
instinctive  feelings  about  the  simple  crimes.  And 
the  longer  the  chain  of  reasoning,  the  weaker  the  final 
reaction. 
We  are  used  to  the  idea  of  stealing  from  a  bank, 
but  this  is  sufficiently  like  stealing  from  an  individual 
for  us  to  be  able  to  carry  over  our  disapproval  of 
stealing  to  stealing  from  a  bank.  When  we  apply  our 
minds  to  the  similarities  between  stealing  from  a  bank 
and  from  an  individual  we  feel  that  stealing  from  a 
bank  is  a  'true'  crime.  But  if  we  consider  instead 
that  the  theif  may  be  in  dire  need  of  the  money,  that 
the  bank  will  not  notice  an  odd  few  hundred  pounds, 
that  the  bank  will  be  insured  against  theft,  and  that 
it  can  always  print  new  notes  anyway,  this  clarity  is 
somewhat  dimmed.  And  if  the  bank  is  defrauded  and  not 
robbed,  the  initial  analogy  will  lose  some  of  its  force  - 
cheating  is  not  on  the  whole  considered  to  be  as  bad 
as  stealing,  just  because  it  is  more  complicated  and 
less  brutal. 
(The  tendency  to  concentrate  on  the  individualistic 
nature  of  crime  is  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Foster 16 
-  1)32  J.  C.  /-  where  it  was  held  that  a  wife  who  forged 
her  husband's  name  on  a  cheque  toad  com.  iittea  a  crime 
against  him,  in  the  same  way  as  if  she  had  stolen  money 
from  his  pocket.  The  Court  seized  on  this  idea  of 
individual  los.  _  in  order  to  invoke  the  rule  allowing  a 
hush,  --lud  to  give  evidence  against  his  wife  if  she  is 
charged  with  a  crime  against  him,  and  not  even 
defending  counsel  seems  to  have  taken  the  point  that 
the  crime  was  really  one  against  the  bank  wnich  would 
presumably  be  liable  to  credit  the  husband's  account 
with  the  amount  of  the  forged  cheque.  ) 
People  who  would  neither  rob  nor  cheat  a  bank  will 
cheerfully  cheat  the  Inland  Revenue,  or  the  Customs  and 
Excise  Department.  ýCf.  on  this  aspect  of  the  matter,  E.  H. 
Sutherland,  'White  Collar  Crime',  in  'Criminology',  ed. 
Vedder,  Koenig,  and  Clark,  p.  172.  )  This  is  at 
least  partly  because,  as  Hume  pointed  out,  'the  imagination 
is  more  affected  by  what  is  particular  than  what  is 
general...  we  sympathise  moie  with  persons  co:.  tiguous 
to  us,  than  with  persons  remote  from  us'(Hume,  off.  cit. 
III9  iii,  l).  1e  are  coved  more  by  the  sight  of  one 
beggar  on  our  doorstep  than  by  the  thought  of  the 
starving  millions  of  India. 
The  ;  ap  need  not  be  spatial,  it  can  also  be 
consequential,  as  is  illustrated  by  our  attitude  to 
Revenue  offences.  People  who  regularly  give 
crumbs  to  birds  may  not  regard  themselves  as  criminals 
if,  in  days  of  rationing,  they  manage  to  persuade 
their  grocer  to  give  them  more  than  their  ration  of 
butter;  grocers  who  would  not  hurt  a  fly  may  sell 
unhygienicI  food  without  feeling  that  they  are  criminals; 
people  who  pay  their  debts  punctiliously  may  bask 
in  the  approval  of  their  equally  punctilious  friends 
as  they  tell  how  they  smuggled  watches  t.  zrougn  the 
Customs  to  give  to  their  daughters  for  Christmas.  Such 17 
people  view  their  acts  in  isolation,  and  do  not  consider 
their  consequences  on  society  in  general,  or  what  would 
happen  if  everyone  behaved  as  they  do  -  if  indeed 
they  consider  their  acts  at  all  from  the  moral  point 
of  view. 
This  failure  in  public  response  to  parts  of  the 
criminal  law  is  not  something  new,  brought  into  being 
by  modern  public  welfare  regulations.  It  seems  in 
one  form  or  other  to  be  inherent  in  any  complex  society, 
which  suggests  that,  at  any  rate  in  the  modern  world, 
the  existence  of  public  welfare  offences  may  be  almost 
as  universal  and  necessary  as  that  of  'true'  crimes. 
Beccaria,  writing  in  1775,  said  of  smuggling,  'This 
crime  being  a  theft  of  what  belongs  to  the  prince,  and 
consequently,  to  the  nation,  why  is  it  not  attended  with 
infamy?  I  answer,  that  crimes,  which  men  consider 
as  productive  of  no  bad  consequences  to  themselves,  do 
not  interest  them  sufficiently  to  excite  their 
indignation.  The  generality  of  mankind,  upon  whom 
remote  consequences  make  no  impression,  do  not  see 
the  evil  that  may  result  from  the  practice  of  smuggling, 
especially  if  they  reap  from  it  any  present  advantage' 
(Beccaria,  pp.  133-4). 
It  is  because  public  welfare  offences  do  not  excite 
moral  indignation  that  they  do  not  bring  social  disgrace 
to  those  who  commit  them.  These  people  do  not  consider 
themselves  criminals;  if  anything,  they  consider  the 
law  itself  to  be  'criminal',  and  indignation  is 
directed  against  the  law  which  makes  the  crime,  and  not 
against  the  crime.  And  when  they  seek  a  basis  for 
their  attitude  the  offenders  may  turn  to  the  distinctio  n 
between  maluni  in  se  and  malum  prohibitum.  This 
distinction  does  not  reflect  a  difference  in  legal 18 
quality  but  in  public  attitudes,  and  as  such  it  is  one 
which  the  legislator  must  bear  in  mind.  To  c?  eate  a 
large  number  of  offences  which  do  not  excite  moral 
indignation  may  weaken  general  respect  for  the  law  and 
weaken  the  feeling,  based  in  part  on  the  coincidence 
of  the  basic  crimes  with  moral  prohibitions,  that  it 
is  morally  wrong  to  disobey  the  criminal  law.  The 
absence  of  public  indignation  may  also  make  it  inexped- 
ient  to  punish  public  welfare  offences  in  the  some  way 
as  other  crimes  are  punished,  even  if  it  is  necessary 
to  make  them  offences.  For  'By  inflicting  infamous 
punishment,  for  crimes  that  are  not  reputed  so,  we 
destroy  that  idea  where  it  might  be  useful'  (Beccaria, 
p.  139),  and  courts  may  moderate  their  sentences 
accordingly. 
On  the  other  hand,  punishing  public  welfare  offences 
in  the  same  way  as  other  crimes  may  not  lead  to  the 
other  crimes  being  thought  less  infamous,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  lead  the  public  to  regard  the  public  welfare 
offences  as  serious  matters,  and  to  feel  indignant  about 
them.  Such  a  change  in  attitudes  may  presently  be 
taking  place  with  regard  to  certain  road  traffic 
offences  such  as  reckless  or  drunken  driving.  These 
matters,  however,  are  the  concern  of  the  legislator, 
the  sociologist,  and  the  penologist,  rather  than  of 
the  legal  theorist. 
The  declaratory  power  of  the  High  Court. 
In  Scotland,  however,  the  legal  theorist  cannot 
ignore  questions  of  criminal  legislation  altogether. 
For  the  High  Court  of  Justiciary  still  retains  a  power 
to  create  new  crimes,  or  at  least  to  extend  the  scope 19 
of  old  crimes,  and  so  long  as  it  does  so,  the  way  in 
which  this  power  is  exercised  must  be  consicered. 
The  power  was  described  by  Hume  as  'an  inherent  power... 
to  punish...  every  act  which  is  obviously  of  a  criminal 
nature'  (Hume,  i.  12),  and  its  continued  existence 
has  been  specifically  re-asserted  in  comparatively 
recent  times  (.  na'den,  1934  J.  C.  105,  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
Aitchison  at  p.  109;  cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  pp.  700-1,704-7). 
General  objections  to  the  exercise  of  the  declaratory 
power. 
There  are  a  number  of  objections  to  any  exercise 
of  such  a  power.  These  objections  have  greater 
practical  force  when  directed  against  the  c--eation 
of  public  welfare  offences  than  when  directed  against 
the  creation  or  extension  of  crimes  thought  of  as 
mala  in  se  and  generally  regarded  with  moral  disapproval. 
(i)  The  principle  of  legality  -  nulla  poena  sine 
lege.  The  main  objection  is  that  the  exercise  of  the 
power  infringes  on  the  principle  that  no-one  should  be 
punished  for  an  act  which  was  not  legally  proscribed 
at  the  time  he  did  it.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
accused  should  have  known  the  act  was  criminal  if  in 
fact  it  was  recognised  by  the  law  as  criminal,  so  that 
the  accused  could  have  known  it  had  he  enquired  - 
from  this  point  of  view  the  principle  of  legality  is  a 
corollary  of  the  maxim  ignorantia  juris  neminem  excusat. 
The  principle  probably  also  requires  that  each  crime 
should  be  capable  of  fairly  precise  definition,  so 
that  its  application  to  any  particular  set  of  facts  can 
be  seen  clearly.  A  man  contemplating  a  course  of 
action  is  entitled  to  due  notice  of  the  fact  that  it  is 
criminal;  otherwise  it  is  unfair  to  punish  him  for  having 
broken  the  law.  The  fiction  that  the  Courts  merely 
discover  what  has  always  been  the  law  is  here  disregarded 20 
in  favour  of  the  reality  of  judicial  legislation; 
and  indeed  the  fiction  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
called  in  aid  by  the  Court  to  justify  its  exercise  of 
the  power.  The  principle  of  legality  requires  that 
penal  legislation  should  not  be  retrospective,  but  the 
decisions  of  Courts  are  always  retrospective. 
The  principle  of  legality  has  great  force  when 
applied  to  administrative  offences,  social  regulations, 
and  the  like.  It  has  much  less  cogency  when  applied 
to  acts  which  arouse  wide  and  strong  disapproval.  A 
good  part  of  the  strength  of  the  principle  rests  on 
the  assumption  that  had  the  accused  known  his  act  was 
criminal,  he  would  not  have  acted  as  he  dia;  that  he 
acted  in  the  belief  that  he  was  not  breaking  the  law, 
or  at  least  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  he  was. 
This  may  be  said  plausibly  of  a  crime  like  celebrating 
a  clandestine  marriage  which  involves  'no  injurious 
consequences  to  person  or  property,  and  constitutes  no 
distinct  or  palpable  violation  of  public  morals' 
(John  Ballantyne,  (1859)  3  Irv.  352,  Lord  Inglis  at  p. 
360),  and  which  is  not  'so  grossly  immoral  and 
mischievous  on  the  face  of  it,  that  no  man  can  fairly 
be  ignorant  of  its  nature,  or  ...  settled  by  a  course 
of  experience,  and  become  notorious,  that  such  is 
its  nature'  (Bernard  Greenhuff,  (1838)  2  Sw.  236, 
Lord  Mackenzie  at  p.  268).  But  the  argument  rings  a 
little  hollow  when  advanced  by  a  man  charged  with  violating 
the  chastity  of  a  sleeping  woman,  or  with  bribery. 
There  might  be  legal  systems  in  which  these  acts  are 
not  criminal,  but  an  accused  person  can  hardly  be  heard 
to  say  he  thought  tiiere  was  nothing  wrong  with  them; 
he  should  at  least  have  enquired  before  committing  them. 
The  weakness,  and.  indeed  the  danger,  of  the  principle  of 
nulls  poena  can  be  seen  when  it  is  used,  as  it  has  been, 21 
to  attack  the  propriety  of  the  conviction  of  Nazi 
leaders  for  acts  condemned  as  utterly  evil  by  all 
civilised  societies,  and  indeed  characterised  as  'crimes 
against  humanity'. 
(ii)  The  danger  of  turning  the  law  into  a  politmal 
instrument.  There  is  a  fear  that  if  the  Courts  have 
wide  powers  to  declare  criminal  acts  which  are  'materially 
dangerous  to  public  welfare',  the  law  may  become  an 
arbitrary  instrument  of  political  power.  If  it  were 
the  law  that  any  act  thought  by  the  Court  to  be 
contrary  to  public  welfare  was  ipso  facto  criminal, 
the  position  would  not  be  very  different  from  that  in 
totalitarian  countries  where  Courts  may  declare  an 
act  unlawful  if  it  is  'socially  dangerous'  (Russian 
Penal  Code,  1926,  referred  to  in  Hall,  p.  42)  or  con- 
trary  to  the  'Gesundes  Volksempfindung'  (German  Act  of 
June,  28,1935,  see  Hall,  p.  42).  This  fear  is  perhaps 
not  of  practical  importance  in  a  parliamentary 
democracy  with  an  independent  judiciary.  It  is  seldom 
expressed  because  it  is  hardly  felt,  but  it  underlrs 
the  almost  instinctive  dislike  of  a  system  which  dis- 
regards  the  principle  of  legality.  And  it  is  perhaps 
worth  remembering  that  the  High  Court  declared  combin- 
ations  of  workmen  to  be  illegal  in  1813  (Arthur  Ferrier, 
16,  March,  1813,  Hume,  i.  496)  after  a  series  of 
differences  of  judicial  opinion,  only  thirteen  years 
before  Parliament  declared  them  legal  (6  Geo.  N.,  c.  129 
s.  4;  cf.  Hume,  i.  496-'l). 
(iii)  The  usurpation  of  the  function  of  Parliament. 
Where  there  is  a  parliamentary  democracy  the  main  objection 
to  the  power  is  that  it  constitutes  a  usurpation  by 
the  Court  of  the  functions  of  Parliament.  The  common 
law  today  has  evolved  sufficiently  to  include  all  the 
major  crimes,  the  graviora  delicta  (cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  705), 22 
and  complex  matters  of  social  control  are  better  dealt 
with  by  a  Parliament  guided  by  a  Government  with 
access  to  relevant  information  not  available  to  the 
Courts,  and  with  the  right  of  an  elected  sovereign 
body  to  impose  restrictions  on  the  citizen's  activities. 
Conversely,  even  where  acts  are  generally  recognised 
as  wrong  and  worthy  of  public  disapproval  and  punishment 
there  may  be  reasons  for  not  making  them  crimes.  'If 
Parliament  is  not  disposed  to  provide  punishments  for 
acts  which  are  upon  any  ground  objectionable  or 
dangerous  the  presumption  is  that  they  belong  to  that 
class  of  misconduct  against  which  the  moral  feeling 
and  good  sense  of  the  community  are  the  best 
protection'  (Report  of  Royal  Commission  on  the  Draft 
Code,  1879,  p.  10). 
The  legal  position  of  the  declaratory  power. 
The  present  position  of  the  power  of  the  High 
Court  to  declare  acts  to  be  criminal  is  not  altogether 
clear.  The  best  academic  opinion  is  that  it  is  confined 
to  the  condemnation  of  any  new  way  that  may  be  discovered 
of  committing  a  recognised  crime  (see  T.  B.  Smith, 
p.  701;  W.  A.  Elliott,  'Nulla  Poena  sine  Lege', 
(1956),  Jur.  Rev.  22).  An  example  of  this  might  be 
the  commission  of  murder  by  hypnotising  someone  to 
throw  himself  into  a  river,  or  of  theft  by  housebreaking 
by  the  use  of  electronic  devices  to  open  the  house  and 
extract  the  property.  Judicial  dicta  ho  ver  tend 
to  assert  the  continued  existence  of  the  rower  in  the 
form  desc  -ribed  by  Hume  (e.  g.  Ste,  supra),  and  to 
punish  acts  which  have  a  'tendency  to  corrupt  public 
morals,  and  injure  the  interests  of  society'  (Greenhuff, 
supra,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Boyle  at  p.  261;  of.  Martin, 
1956  J.  C.  l). 23 
The  difference  between  recognising  a  new  mode  of 
committing  an  old  crime,  and  creating  a  new  crime,  is 
often  largely  one  of  degree,  but  some  modern  examples 
of  the  exercise  of  the  declaratory  power  have  important 
affinities  with  creation.  Where  the  old  crime  is  some- 
thing  specific  and  easily  defined,  like  theft  by 
housebreaking,  there  is  little  difficulty  in  deducing 
that  a  particular  set  of  facts  constitutes  a  form  of 
committing  it,  without  seeming  to  create  a  new  crime. 
To  decide  that  it  is  not  housebreaking  to  enter  by 
using  a  key  found  in  the  lock,  but  th6't  it  is  house- 
breaking  to  use  a  false  key  (see  Macdonald,  pp.  26-9) 
requires  nothing  more  revolutionary  than  the  exercise 
of  logical  deduction.  This  is  merely  interpretation 
of  the  meaning  of  'housebreaking'.  But  where  the 
'old'  crime  is  descrioed  in  very  general  terms  as,  for 
example,  'shamelessly  indecent  conduct'  (M'Laughlan  v. 
Boyd,  1934  J.  C.  19),  the  decision  that  a  certain  type 
of  conduct  falls  under  the  definition  is  not  so  much 
a  question  of  logic  as  of  public  policy,  or  of  the  moral 
attitude  of  the  members  of  the  High  Court. 
The  present  position  of  the  declaratory  power  can 
best  be  evaluated  by  way  of  a  consideration  of  the  leading 
cases  on  the  topic,  from  1838  to  1956. 
The  case  of  Greenhuff.  The  classic  case  on  the 
declaratory  power  is  that  of  Bernard  Greenhuff,  decided 
in  1838  (2  Sw.  236).  The  charge  was  of  keeping  a 
public  gaming  house,  and  the  High  Court  held,  by  a 
majority,  Lord  Cockburn  dissenting,  that  this  was  a 
crime,  as  being  something  'tending  to  corrupt  public 
morals  and  injure  society'  (Lord  Justice-Clerk  Boyle  at 
p.  261),  and  as  an  example  of  an  act  'mala  in  se  by 
the  laws  of  God  and  morality'  (Lord  Meadowbank  at  p.  262). 24 
The  most  interesting  and  important  judgement  is  that  of 
Lord  Cockburn,  and  his  dissent  has  been  regarded  as 
expressing  the  modern  law  (T.  B.  Smith,  loc.  cit.  ). 
Not  the  least  important  thin.  about  it  is  that  it  was 
given  at  all.  That  the  High  Court  should  solamnly 
condemn  as  criminal,  immoral,  socially  injurious,  and 
malum  in  se,  an  act  which  one  of  their  own  number  did 
not  think  should  be  a  crime,  clearly  showed  the  danger 
of  the  declaratory  power.  This  division  of  opinion, 
following  as  it  did  on  the  legalisation  by  Parliament 
of  workmen's  combinations  which  the  High  Court  had 
declared  illegal  (cf,  supra,  )  must  have  brought  the 
exercise  of  the  declaratory  power  into  some  disrepute, 
and  made  the  Court  very  chary  of  using  it  in  future. 
Workmen's  combinations  at  least  had  conjured  up  the  spectre 
of  Jacobinism,  but  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
people  who  had  lived  in  Regency  Edinburgh  Society 
regarded  gambling  with  any  great  moral  indignation: 
nor  was  it  clear  why  public  gambling  should  be  malum  in 
se  and  private  gambling  innocuous. 
Greenhuff  was  an  example  of  social  regulation  by  a 
majority  of  the  Judges  of  the  High  Court,  interfering 
with  the  business  and  pleasure  of  the  people  in  the  name 
of  God  and  morality.  As  the  body  of  Parliamentary 
legislation  grew,  so  did  the  force  of  Lord  Cockburn's 
view  that  the  Court  should  confine  the  exercise  of 
the  declaratory  power  to  facts  falling  'within  the 
spirit  of  a  previous  decision  or  within  an  established 
general  principle'  (at  p.  2'/4).  Although  the  general 
principles  invoked  have  sometimes  been  rather  wide 
the  Courts  have  in  the  main  followed  this  course. 
In  a  parliamentary  system  like  the  British  there  is 
little  scope  for  judicial  regulation  of  social  conditions 
of  the  kind  which  has  affected  American  racial  and  labour 25 
laws  (2f,  W.  A.  Elliot,  op.  cit.  ).  Exercises  of  the 
declaratory  power  have  been  wider  in  the  20th  century 
than  in  the  19th  century  after  Greenhuff,  but  they 
have  not,  with  the  possible  exception  of  the  case  of 
M'Laughlan  v.  Boyd  (1934  J.  C.  19),  been  concerned  with 
general  social  issues. 
The  19th  century  cases.  The  most  important  post- 
Greenhuff  case  is  that  of  Wm.  Fraser  in  1847  (Ark.  280), 
in  which  the  accused  contrived  to  have  sexual  inter- 
course  with  a  woman  by  pretending  to  be  her  husband. 
He  was  charged  with  'Rape;  as  also  Assault  with  intent 
to  ravish;  as  also  Fraudulently  and  Deceitfully 
Obtaining  Access  to  and  having  Carnal  Knowledge  of  a 
married  Woman  by  pretending  to  be  her  husband'.  All 
the  judges  were  satisfied  that  this  act  though  'hitherto 
..  unknown  in  the  annals  of  this  Court'  (Lord  Medwyn  at 
p.  307),  was  a  crime.  The  only  difference  of  opinion 
was  whether  it  was  rape  or  fraud,  and  the  majority 
of  the  Court  held  that  it  was  fraud.  The  circumstances 
are  more  like  rape  than  fraud,  (Parliament  later 
declared  them  to  be  rape  -  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act, 
1885,48  &  49  Vict.  c.  69,  s.  4)  and  one  would  expect 
them  to  be  treated  either  as  a  way  of  committing  rape 
or  as  a  new  crime.  The  Court,  however,  were  in  a 
dilemna.  They  were  unwilling  to  characterise  the 
accused's  actings  as  rape  because  rape  was  then,  at 
any  rate  technically,  a  capital  crime,  and  they  were 
unwilling  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  death  penalty. 
But  they  did  not  want  to  create  a  new  crime,  because 
they  accepted  Lord  Cockburn's  view  that  'we  are  not 
entitled  to  create,  or  to  aggravate,  crimes,  by  fanciful 
analogies  or  speculative  expediency'  (at  p.  307).  The db 
analogy  between  Fraser's  actiiugs  and  fraud  ;  Lay  be  thought 
to  be  mole  fanciful  than  that  with  rape,  but  the  Court 
relied  on  the  principle  that,  'Any  deceit  that  injures  and 
violates  the  righ  .3  of  another,  is  clearly  punishable' 
(Lord  Cockburn  at  p.  312).  In  the  result,  Fraser 
was  convicted  of  what  was  at  least  a  new  species  of 
fraud,  and  was  sentenced  to  twenty  years'  imprisonment 
(Ark.  329),  In  this  :  ray  the  difficulties  were  reconciled  - 
no  new  crii.  Le  was  created,  no  extension  was  made  of  the 
scope  of  the  death  penalty,  and  Fraser  received  his 
just  deserts. 
The  case  shows  the  Court's  reluctance  to  declare 
an  act  criminal  just  because  of  its  immorality,  even  wnere 
the  honour  of  an  individual  has  been  injured  in  a  way 
clearly  accepted  by  society  as  malum  in  se,  as  a  proper 
case  for  punishment.  The  Court  chose  fraud  rather  than 
rape  as  the  crime,  not  because  fraud  is  a  less  specific 
crime,  nor  because  to  declare  sometaing  a  type  of 
fraud  is  less  like  creating  a  new  crime  than  to 
declare  it  a  type  of  rape,  but  because  they  did  not 
wish  to  convict  Fraser  of  a  capital  offence. 
A  similar  problem  arose  in  the  case  of  Chas.  Sweenie 
in  ld563  (3  Irv.  109)  where  the  charge  was  of  rape  or  of 
'wickedly  and  feloniously  having  carnal  knowledge  of  a 
woman  whm  asleep  and  without  her  consent'.  This  is 
now  called  'clandestine  injury  to  women'  (Macdonald, 
p.  120;  Grainger  and  Rae,  1932  J.  C.  40,41),  but 
this  crime  was  not  created  in  Sweenie.  For  the  same 
reasons  as  applied  in  Fraser  (supra)  the  majority 
of  the  Court  refused  to  regard  the  facts  as  amounting  to 
rape.  They  did  not,  however,  say  that  they  formed  a 
new  crime;  they  said  instead  that  they  were  a  way 
of  committing  an  old  one,  although  they  were  not  over- 
happy  about  which  old  one,  and  safeguarded  themselves 2'7 
by  saying  that  the  facts  could  be  brought  within  the 
scope  of  more  than  one  known  crime  (Lord  Deas  at  p.  146, 
Lord  Justice-General  M'Neill  at  p.  154).  On  the  whole, 
the  Court  seemed  to  think  it  was  a  form  of  indecent 
assault  (Lord  Justice-Clerk  at  p.  138,  Lord  Justice- 
General  at  p.  154),  but  did  not  consider  the  argument 
that  an  indecent  assault  involving  penetration  was  rape. 
In  two  other  cases  the  Court  took  the  view  that 
the  declaratory  power  was  exercisea'ole  only  where  there 
was  shown  to  be  injury  to  person  or  property.  In  John 
Ballantyne,  in  1859  (3  Irv.  352),  they  refused  to  regard 
the  celebrating  of  a  clandestine  marriage  as  a  common 
law  crime,  since  it  involved  no  such  injury.  In  Geo. 
Hohnes  and  Edmund  Lockger  ((1869)1  Coup.  221)  it 
was  held  to  be  a  common  law  crime  to  'open,  intercept 
or  detain'  a  letter  in  the  post.  This  decision  may 
be  debateable,  but  it  proceeded  on  the  view  that  the 
crime  was  'a  breach  of  the  law  of  property',  as 
well  as  of  a  'law  of  society  requiring  that  [Post  Office 
communications]  should  be  sacred  in  the  name  of  delivery' 
(at  p.  237).  Language  like  'the  protection  of 
communications  entrusted  to  the  Post  Office  is  of  the 
highest  importance  to  society'(ib.  )  does,  however, 
foreshadow  the  broader  approach  of  some  of  the  more 
modern  cases. 
The  20th  century  cases.  The  continued  existence 
of  the  declaratory  power  has  been  asserted  in  recent 
tines  (Sugden,  1934  J.  C.  105,  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
Aitchison  at  p.  109;  Martin  and  Ors.,  1956  J.  C.  1), 
but  the  power  has  not  been  used  explicitly  to  create  new 
crimes  or  extend  old  ones.  On  the  contrary,  there  are 
cases  in  which  the  Court  expressly  refused  to  exercise 
the  power.  In  Semple  (1937  J.  C.  41)  the  Court 
refused  to  create  the  cri.  -Ue  of  administering  abortifaciats 28 
to  a  non-pregnant  woman  with  intent  to  cause  an  abortion 
holding  that  to  delcare  even  such  obviously  immoral 
conduct  to  be  criminal  would  be  to  usurp  the  function 
of  the  legislature.  In  Quinn  v.  Cunningham  (1956 
J.  C.  22)  the  Lord  Justice-General  observed  that  it 
was  for  Parliament  and  not  the  Courts  to  make  it  a 
crime  to  ride  a  pedal  cycle  recklessly  (at  p.  25  - 
Parliament  did  make  it  criminal  in  the  Road  Traffic 
Act,  1956,4  &5  Eliz.  II,  c.  6'/,  s.  ll).  Finally, 
in  Martin  and  Ors.  (1956  J.  C.  1),  Lord  Cameron 
explicitly  stated  that  in  treating  an  attempt  to 
defeat  the  ends  of  justice  by  arranging  the  escape 
of  a  prisoner  from  a  working-party  outside  the  prison 
walls  as  criminal,  he  was  not  exercising  the  declaratory 
power. 
Despite  this  strong  body  of  authority  there  are 
a  number  of  cases  in  which  what  was  done  was  tantamount 
to  an  exercise  of  the  power,  although  technically 
the  power  was  not  exercised  (most  of  the  cases  started 
as  summary  complaints),  and  no  explicit  reference  was 
made  to  it.  Apart  from  the  cases  of  Strathern  v. 
Seaforth  (1926  J.  C.  100)  and  M'Laughlan  v.  Boyd 
(193+  J.  C.  19),  the  cases  concern  offences  against 
the  administration  of  justice,  and  the  Courts 
have  dealt  with  the  conduct  brought  before  them  by 
treating  it  as  a  form  of  the  crime  of  hindering  the 
course  of  justice,  although  there  are  suggestions  in 
some  of  the  cases  that  the  crime  of  which  the  conduct 
was  an  example  was  an  even  vaguer  one  -  something 
like  the  crime  of  acting  contrary  to  the  public  interest. 
It  is  submitted  that  hindering  the  administration  of 
justice  is  not  a  crime,  but  a  quälity  of  certain  acts 
which  may  make  them  criminal,  and  that  accordingly  in 29 
declaring  conduct  to  be  criminal  because  it  possesses 
this  quality  the  Court  are  in  effect  creating  new 
crimes.  To  declare  acts  criminal  merely  because  they 
are  contrary  to  the  public  interest  would,  of  course, 
go  much  further  than  this,  and  would  clearly  constitute 
an  interference  with  the  function  of  the  legislature; 
it  would  also  go  much  further  than  the  ratio  of  Greenhuff 
(supra)  which  requires  the  conduct  to  be  clearly 
immoral,  and  would  give  the  High  Court  power  to 
declare  acts  mala  prohibits  which  were  not  even  alleged 
by  the  Court  to  be  mala  in  se. 
Strathern  v.  Seaforth.  This  case  (1926  J.  C.  100) 
is  the  clearest  example  of  the  exercise  of  the  power 
in  this  century  although  the  power  was  not  referred 
to  by  any  of  the  Judges  in  the  case.  (The  case  was 
referred  to  by  Lord  Aitchison  in  Sugden  -  1934  J.  C.  105, 
109  -  as  an  exercise  of  the  power.  )  The  accused 
had  taken  another  person's  motor  car  away  clandestinely 
and  in  the  knowledge  that  the  owner  would  not  have 
permitted  him  to  do  so,  but  with  the  intention  of 
returning  it  after  a  short  while  -  i.  e.  without  any 
intention  of  stealing  it.  Defence  counsel  argued 
that  the  facts  constituted  furtum  usus,  a  recognised 
type  of  conduct  which  was  not  criminal  by  the  law  of 
Scotland  (cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  746),  but  the  Court  did 
not  rely  on  the  analogy  with  furtum  usus  and  did  not 
decide  whether  furtum  usus  was  a  crime  in  Scotland. 
The  decision  that  the  facts  constituted  a  crime  did 
not  depend  on  their  being  a  species  of  theft  at  all, 
but  simply  on  the  necessity  of  stopping  people  from 
behaving  as  the  accused  had  done  -  i.  e.  very  nearly 
on  the  ground  that  such  actings  were  contrary  to  the 
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public  interest,  or  at  any  rate  the  interest  of  car 
owners  l  ',  As  Lord  Alness  said,  'In  these  days  when 
one  is  familiar  with  the  circumstances  in  which  motor 
cars  are  openly  parked  in  the  public  street,  the  result 
[of  holding  that  the  facts  did  not  constitute  a  crime] 
would  be  not  only  lamentable  but  also  absurd.  I  am 
satisfied  that  our  common  law  is  not  so  powerless  as 
to  be  unable  to  afford  a  remedy  in  circumstances  such 
as  these'  (at  p.  102).  This  decision  anticipated 
section  28  of  the  Road  Traffic  Act,  1930  (20  and  21 
Geo.  V,  c.  43),  a  fact  Which  may  be  regarded  as 
a  justification  of  the  decision,  or  as  an  indication 
that  the  Courts  were  usurping  the  function  of  Parliament. 
It  is  true  that  the  offence  was  one  against  property, 
but  the  facts  can  hardly  be  said  to  constitute  a  new 
way  of  committing  an  old  offence  -  if  it  was  not  a 
crime  to  borrow  a  horse  and  cart  without  the  owner's 
permission,  and  no  authority  was  produced  in  Strathern 
to  suggest  that  it  was,  to  make  it  a  crime  to  borrow 
a  car  without  permission  was  to  create  a  new  crime. 
No  doubt  the  car-borrowing  involved  stealing  the 
petrol  used  on  the  'joy-ride'  (cf.  Lord  Hunter  at 
p.  102)  but  that  was  not  mace  part  of  the  charge. 
M'Laughlän  v.  Boyd.  In  this  case  (1934+  J.  C.  19) 
there  were  two  groups  of  charges,  both  arising  out 
of  homosexual  conduct.  The  first  consisted  of  charges 
of  indecent  assault,  and  as  to  these  there  is  no 
dispute  -  indecent  assault  is  clearly  a  crime,  or 
rather  a  recognised  aggravation  of  assault.  The 
second  group  consisted  of  charges  of  using  'lewd, 
indecent  and  libidinous  practices'  by  'seizing'  the 
other  man's  hand  and  'placing  it'  on  the  accused's 
private  parts.  The  language  even  of  this  second 31 
group  is  suggestive  of  assault,  as  is  that  of  the 
Lord  Justice-General,  Lord  Clyde,  in  denying  that  it 
is  the  law  that  'indecent  conduct  committed  by  one 
person  upon  another  only  constitutes  a  crime  when 
the  victimo...  is  below  the  age  of  puberty'  (at  p.  22). 
But  the  decision  that  the  charges  in  the  second  group 
were  relevant  and  constituted  common  law  crimes  was 
reached  by  adopting  a  statement  in  Macdonald  that  'all 
shamelessly  indecent  conduct  is  criminal'  (Lord 
Justice-General  at  p.  22.  The  passage  appears 
in  the  first  -  1867  -  edition  of  Macdonald,  so 
that  it  can  be  said  that  M'Laughlan  did  nothing  new. 
But  Macdonald  gave  no  authority  for  the  statement). 
Although  the  facts  constituted  an  offence  under 
the  Criminal  Law  Amendment  Act,  1885  (48  &  49  VicL, 
c.  69,  s.  ll),  this  was  not  regarded  as  evidence  of  their 
criminality;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  argued  that  the 
creation  of  the  statutory  offence  showed  that  the 
behaviour  was  not  criminal  at  common  law.  The 
existence  of  the  statutory  offence  may,  however, 
have  made  it  easier  for  the  Courts  to  regard  the 
accused's  behaviour  as  criminally  indecent. 
The  only  other  reference  to  authority  was  to 
Hume's  'broad  definition  of  crime  -a  doleful  or  wilful 
offence  against  society  in  the  matter  of  "violence, 
dishonesty,  falsehood,  indecency,  irreligion'll 
(Lord  Cýyde  at  p.  23;  Hume,  i.  22),  which  is  no  more 
than  a  description  of  the  characteristics  of  the  specific 
acts  which  are  (or,  rather,  were  in  Hume's  day) 
regarded  as  criminal.  It  does  not  follow  from 
the  fact  that  all  crimes  are  offences  against  society 
in  one  of  the  ways  listed  (assuming  that  this  is  the 
case)  that  any  offence  against  society  in  one  of  these 
ways  is  a  crime. 32 
M'Laughlan  is  open  to  the  objections  that  it  is 
a  usurpation  of  the  function  of  Parliament,  and  that 
its  ratio  is  so  wide  as  to  infringe  the  principle  of 
legality.  It  is  true  that  indecent  conduct  arouses 
moral  indignation,  but  it  is  notorious  that  there  is 
no  general  agreement  on  what  forms  of  sexual  behaviour 
are  indecent.  Nor  is  it  clear  what  'shamelessly' 
means;  the  question  of  the  publicity  or  privacy 
of  the  behaviour  was  not  considered  in  M'LauRhlan, 
and  'shamelessly'  can  only  be  considered  as  an 
opprobrious  epithet:  it  means  no  more  than  that  the 
conduct  shocks  the  Judges  so  much  that  they  will  not 
tolerate  it.  'Shamelessly  indecent  conduct'  is  'conduct 
which  is  so  indecent  that  the  High  Court  will  not 
tolerate  it'.  But  it  is  impossible  to  know  just 
what  conduct  the  High  Court  will  tolerate.  There  has, 
for  example,  been  no  recorded  prosecution  for  lesbianism, 
and  such  behaviour  is  not  thought  to  be  criminal,  but 
it  could  be  described  as  shamelessly  indecent:  it 
was  described  in  1811  as  being  'a  crime  so  infamous 
that  it  never  before  was  heard  of  in  this  country' 
(Woods  &  Pirie  v.  Gordon,  1811,  Moncrieff  Papers  - 
a  slander  action). 
A  recent  Royal  Commission  has  recommended  that 
conduct  such  as  that  in  M'Laughlan  when  occurring 
privately  between  consenting  adults  should  not 
be  punishable  (Report  of  Royal  Commission  on  Homosexual 
Offences  and  Prostitution,  1957.  Cmd  247,  para.  355(i). 
This  recommendation  was  made  after  prolonged 
investigation  and  consideration;  M'Laughlan  was 
decided  after  a  short  debate  in  which  none  of  the  wider 
issues  was  discussed.  This  indicates  the  unsuitability 
of  dealing  with  such  matters  by  means  of  judicial 33 
decision.  If  the  recommendation  becomes  law  what 
will  be  the  effect  on  LI'Laughlän?  If,  as  is  not 
impossible,  Parliament  merely  repeals  section  11  of 
the  1885  Act  without  any  specific  reference  to  the 
common  law,  will  conduct  which  Parliament  considers 
should  not  be  punishable  remain  a  crime  at  common  law 
because  three  Judges  thought  it  was  shamelessly 
indecent? 
Offences  against  the  administration  of  justice. 
In  Logue  (1932  J.  C.  3)  it  was  held  that  to  brine  a 
member  of  a  licensing  Court  was  to  commit  the  crime 
of  bribing  judicial  officials.  It  hardly  needed  the 
declaratory  power  to  do  this,  since  all  that  was  necessary 
was  to  show  that  a  licensing  Court  was  a  judicial 
body,  but  the  Lord  Justice-General  described  the 
crime  as  'an  offence  against  the  course  of  public 
justice',  a  very  wide  description,  which  sets  the 
tone  for  the  later  cases. 
In  Dalton  (1951  J.  C.  76)  the  accused  tried  to 
persuade  someone  to  refrain  from  giving  the  police 
certain  information  which  would  have  incriminated  the 
accused.  The  charge  was  brought  as  one  of  attempting 
to  pervert  the  course  of  justice,  and  the  Court 
had  no  doubt  that  the  facts  -  an  attempt  to 
eliminate  or  destroy  evidence  -  amounted  to  this  crime. 
'Perverting  the  course  of  justice'  is  not  so  vague 
as  'acting  contrary  to  the  public  interest',  but  it 
is  vaguer  than  'bribing  a  judge':  it  is  not  so  much  a 
specific  crime  as  the  name  of  a  group  of  crimes  of 
which  bribery  of  a  judge,  and  suppression  of  evidence, 
are  particular  examples.  The  commonest  crime  in  this 
class  is  subornation  of  perjury,  and  the  facts  in 
Dalton  can  be  regarded  as  a  form  of  subornation. 34 
They  represent  a  considerable  extension  of  that  crime 
however,  from  persuading  someone  to  give  false 
evidence  on  oath  to  persuading  someone  to  refrain 
from  giving  information  to  the  police.  This  extension 
may,  it  is  submitted,  be  an  over-simplification,  if 
only  because  there  is  a  distinction  between  giving 
false  evidence,  and  not  giving  evidence  at  all  - 
omissions  are  always  less  clearly  punishable  than  acts. 
Dalton  was  at  least  an  example  of  an  attempt  to 
pervert  justice,  and  it  can  hardly  be  douoted  that  it 
is  proper  for  the  Courts  to  punish  all  such  endeavours. 
Two  other  modern  cases,  it  is  submitted,  go  much  further 
than  Dalton,  and  shift  the  emphasis  from  the  perversion 
of  justice  to  the  vaguer  idea  of  acting  contrary  to 
the  public  interest,  although  still  in  connection  with 
statements  to  the  police.  In  neither,  nor  in  Dalton. 
was  any  explicit  reference  made  by  the  Court  to  the 
declaratory  power. 
In  Kerr  v.  Hill  (  1936  J.  C.  75)  the  accused  was 
charged  that  he  falsely  represented  to  the  police 
officers  that  a  'bus  belonging  to  a  particular 
company  had  knocked  someone  down,  and  'did  cause 
officers...  maintained  at  the  public  expense  for  the 
public  benefit  to  devote  their  time  and  services  in 
the  investigation  of  said  false  story...  and  did  temp- 
orarily  deprive  the  public  of  the  services  of  said 
officers  and  did  render  the  lieges  and  particularly 
drivers  [of  the  company  in  question)liable  to  suspicion 
and  accusations  of  driving  recklessly'.  Lords 
Morison  and  Fleming  treated  the  case  as  an  example 
of  the  established  crime  of  making  false  accusations, 
although  no  individual  was  named  by  the  informer,  and 35 
no  information  was  given  that  any  crime  had  been 
committed,  merely  that  someone  had  been  knocked  down  by 
a  'bus.  Lord  Clyde  proceeded  on  a  wider  ground..  pie 
said,  'Great  injury  and  damage  may  be  caused  to  the 
public  interest,  which  is  mainly  to  be  regarded,  by 
a  false  accusation'  (at  p.  '%5).  Tue  essence  of  the 
crime  was  said  to  be  'that  the  criminal  authorities  were 
deliberately  sot  in  motion  by  a  malicious  person  by 
means  of  an  invented  story'(at  p.  76). 
The  presence  of  malice  cannot  be  regarded  as 
crucial;  lawful  actin,  ns,  however  malicious,  are  not 
criiainal.  In  Gray  V. 
- 
Morrison  (1954  J.  C.  31)  there 
was  no  malice,  and  indeed  there  can  hardly  have  been  a 
less  heinous  offence  in  the  history  of  the  common  law. 
Gray  was  visiting  a  friend,  and  to  save  the  friend 
the  trouble  of  driving  him  home  said  falsely  that 
he  had  a  cycle  with  him  which  he  had  left  outside. 
His  friend  insisted  on  accoiapanying  him  to  the  cycle, 
and  on  discovering  its  absence  suggested  that  they 
should  report  the  matter  to  the  police.  Gray  was 
caught  in  his  own  toils,  and  agreed  to  report  it. 
He  accused  no  one,  and  said  he  did  not  wish  any  action 
to  be  taken  or  investigations  made.  As  a  result  of 
his  social  faux  pas  Gray  was  charged  that  he  did  'cause 
officers  ...  maintained  at  the  public  expense  for  the 
public  benefit,  to  devote  their  time  and  service  in 
the  investigation  of  the  said  false  story  told  by  you 
and  did  temporarily  deprive  the  public  of  the 
services  of  said  officers  and  did  render  the  lieges 
liable  to  suspicion  and  to  accusations  of  theft'.  Gray 
pleaded  guilty  and  appealed  only  against  his  sentence 
of  fourteen  days'  imprisonment  which  was  re  duce  dto  a 
fine.  In  disposing  of  the  appeal,  Lord  Cooper,  the 36 
Lord  Justice-General,  said,  'I  have  no  doubt  that... 
an  offence  within  the  sense  of  Kerr  v.  Hill  was  committed'. 
He  also  explained  that  'the  gravamen  of  the  charge  is... 
the  delioerate  setting  in  notion  of  the  police 
authorities  by  an  invented  story'  (at  p.  34).  The 
form  of  the  indictments  in  Gra  and  Kerr  with  all 
their  bureaucratic  pomposity  suggests  that  in  the  eyes 
of  the  authorities  the  gravamen  of  the  crime  was  wasting 
the  time  of  public  officials,  and  Gray  opens  the  door  to 
making  that  a  crime,  not  as  a  statutory  offence,  but 
as  a  common  law  crime.  More  importantly,  the  dicta 
in  Kerr  and  in  Gray  suggest  that'the  High  Court  is 
prepared  to  declare  acts  criminal  on  the  vague  ground 
that  they  are  contrary  to  the  public  interest. 
The  distinction  between  creation  and  extension 
can  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  case  of  Martin  and 
Ors.  (1956  J.  C.  1).  The  charge  was  of  absconding  from 
lawful  custody  and  attempting  to  defeat  the  ends  of 
justice,  the  facts  that  the  three  accused  formed 
a  plan  to  effect  the  escape  of  one  of  them  who  was 
undergoing  a  prison  sentence,  while  he  was  in  a  working- 
party  outside  the  prison  walls.  This  could  have  been 
dealt  with  as  an  extension  of  the  recognised  crime  of 
prison-breaking  by  interpreting  'prison'  as 
including  any  place  where  a  prisoner  was  under  lawful 
custody  (cf.  Prisons  (Scotland)  Act,  1952,15  &  16  Geo. 
VI,  and  1  Eliz.  II,  c.  61,  s.  12(b)),  but  Lord  Cameron 
rejected  this  approach.  He  pointed  out  that  prison 
breaking  was  not  libelled,  and  that  Hume  and  Alison 
both  deal  with  prison-breaking  as  a  species  of  the 
genus  of  offences  against  the  course  of  justice  (cf. 
Hume,  i.  401,  Alison,  i.  555).  He  quoted  Alison's 
statement  that  prison-breaking  is  'a  violation  of  the 
order  and  course  of  justice,  and  a  direct  infringement 
of  regulations  essential  to  the  peace  and  well-being 3'1 
of  society'  (Alison,  loc.  cit.  ),  and  went  on  to  say, 
'What  is  libelled  in  this  indictment  is  very  plainly 
an  attempt  to  hinder  the  course  of  justice  and 
frustrate  its  ends  by  seeking  to  assist  a  sentenced 
criminal  to  escape  or  evade  the  penalty  of  his  crime. 
That  is  an  offence  against  public  order  and  against 
the  course  of  justice...  what  is  libelled  here  is 
but  one  species  of  a  well-recognised  and  undoubted 
genus  of  crime'  (at  pp.  2-3). 
To  treat  an  act  as  a  species  of  a  genus  of  crime 
is  not,  it  is  submitted,  the  same  as  to  treat  it  as  a 
new  way  of  committing  on  old  crime.  Hypnotising 
someone  to  drown  himself  would  be  a  crime  because  it 
would  be  a  new  way  of  committing  murder,  not  because 
it  would  be  a  species  of  the  genus  of  crimes  against 
the  person:  it  is  a  sub-division  of  murder,  not  an 
independent  species  of  crime  like  rape,  or  assault. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  correct  approach  in  Martin 
would  have  been  by  way  of  the  crime  of  prison-breaking 
which  Alison  regards  as  an  independent  crime  and  not 
just  as  a  way  of  committing  the  crime  of  infringing 
the  well-being  of  society  (Alison,  i.  ch.  xxvii),  and  that 
Lord  Cameron's  argument  jumps  a  vital  logical  step 
in  passing  directly  from  offences  against  public  order 
to  the  particular  facts  libelled.  This  step  is 
hinted  at  in  the  indictment  which  talks  of  'defeating 
the  ends  of  justice  by  escaping  from  legal  custody', 
and  was  made  more  explicit  in  the  earlier  case  of 
Turnbull  (1953  J.  C.  59)  which  charged  the  accused  with 
effecting  an  escape  from  lawful  custody  to  the  hindrance 
of-the  course  of  justice.  (The  accused  pleaded  guilty 
so  that  the  question  here  considered  was  not  discussed.  ) 38 
Conclusion.  It  is  submitted  that  to  declare 
something  criminal  because  it  is  an  'infringement  of 
regulations  essential  to  the  well-being  of  society' 
and  at  the  same  time  to  deny  that  one  is  exercising 
the  dedlaratory  power  of  'innovation  cr  extension' 
(Martin,  supra,  at  p.  4)  is  contradictory.  To 
treat  the  infringement  of  such  regulations  as  a  crime 
is  to  commit  a  type-fallacy  -  it  is  not  a  crime,  it 
is  rather  a  quality  of  actions  which  makes  them  proper 
subjects  of  punishment.  Alison  recognised  this  when, 
immediately  after  the  passage  quoted  oy  Lord  Cameron 
he  added,  'It  has,  accordingly,  always  been  regarded 
as  a  point  of  dittay  by  our  common  law'  (Alison,  i. 
555)"  In  other  words  prison-breaking  is  a  crime 
because  it  infringes  the  order  of  society,  it  is 
not  an  example  of  the  crime  of  infringing  the 
order  of  society.  In  declaring  any  behaviour  to  be 
criminal  because  it  infringes  this  order,  the  Court 
is  acting  in  the  same  way  as  a  legislature  which 
declares  such  behaviour  criminal  for  the  same  reason; 
it  is  doing  much  more  than  extend  the  meaning  of  a  known 
crime  by  means  of  interpretation. 
It  is  true  that  in  doing  so  the  Courts  are 
restricting  themselves  to  cases  'within  an  already 
recognised  principle'  (T.  B.  Smith,  p.  701),  but  the 
principle,  it  is  submitted,  is  one  of  politics  or 
sociology,  rather  than  of  law.  If  danger  to  public 
order  is  enough  to  make  an  act  criminal,  there  is  no 
need  for  the  body  of  law  exemplified  by  Fraser{  (184'/) 
Ark.  280))  and  Sweenie  ((1858)  3  Irv.  109),  which  is 
concerned  to  discover  if  the-facts  of  a  case  fall 
under  the  head  of  one  specific  crime  or  another,  if 
indeed  there  is  any  need  to  have  specific  crimes  at  all. 
The  attitude  suggested  by  Martin  is  wider  than  that  of 39 
Hume  who  says  the  Courts  may  punish  'acts  obviously 
of  a  criminal  nature'  (Hume,  i.  12).  This  may  be 
circular,  but  'obviously  criminal'  does  suggest 
restriction  to  crimes  similar  to  the  basic  crimes 
against  person  or  property.  So  does  the  later  19th 
century  attitude  which  is  summed  up  by  Lord  M'Laren's 
observation  in  Coutts  ((1899)  3  Adam,  50,59)  that  'By 
a  new  crime  is  meant...  a  crime  consisting  in  some 
mode  (hitherto  unknown)  of  dealing  unlawfully  with 
the  person  or  property  of  another'. 
It  must  be  added  that  there  is  in  fact  no  sign 
of  any  dangerous  setting  up  by  the  Court  of  itself 
as  the  guardian  of  public  interest;  its  bark  in  this 
matter  is  worse  than  its  bite,  and  even  its  bark  is 
not  very  explicit.  But  the  practice  of  exercising  the 
declaratory  power  while  not  appearing  to  do  so,  -  and 
indeed  disclaiming  the  intention  of  doing  so  -  by 
confusing  specific  crimes  with  the  groups  to  which  they 
belong,  or  with  the  reasons  for  their  being  made  crimes, 
is  logically  objectionable  and  contains  in  itself  the 
seeds  of  abuse,  seeds  which  will  of  course  remain 
infertile  so  long  as  this  reasoning  is  restricted  to 
cases  like  Martin  which  do  not  call  for  use  of  the 
power  at  all. 40 
Chapter  2:  Responsibility  in  General 
This  chapter  deals  in  a  general  way  with  the  more 
important  of  the  concepts  which  are  employed  in 
discussions  of  criminal  responsibility.  It  does  not 
present  a  philosophy  of  responsibility,  nor  does  it 
discuss  all  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  use  of 
words  like  'responsible',  'voluntary',  and  so  on. 
It  is  only  a  brief  and  rather  superficial  introduction 
in  order  to  clear  the  ground  for  the  analysis  of  the 
law  which  follows.  It  is  important  that  lawyers 
should  appreciate  the  philosophical  and  linguistic 
difficulties  and  backgrounds  of  the  words  they  use, 
and  this  chapter  is  an  attempt  to  sketch  these  in. 
Legal  and  moral  responsibility 
The  ascription  of  responsibility. 
The  concept  of  responsibility,  as  used  in  the 
law,  is  not  a  simple  characteristic  of  persons  as, 
for  example,  are  whiteness,  and  height,  or  even  drunken- 
ness.  Its  use  in  sentences  like  'He  is  a  responsible 
person',  'He  is  a  man  in  a  position  of  responsibility', 
or  'The  judgment  of  responsible  men',  is,  for  our 
purposes,  a  secondary  one.  When  a  man  is  referred 
to  as  responsible  in  that  way,  he  is  being  pointed  out 
as  the  sort  of  man  who  is  capable  of  weighing  up  the 
various  factors  in  a  situation,  of  sizing  up  alternatives, 
of  acting  dispassionately  and  with  a  proper  appreciatio  n 
of  all  the  complexities  and  consequences  of  the  situation. 
In  this  sense,  'responsible'  is  a  word  of  praise,  and 
refers  to  a  quality  of  character.  A  responsible  man 41 
is  one  who  is  not  irresponsible,  flighty,  prejudiced, 
or  mad.  This  use  is  clearly  distinct  from  the  use  of 
the  word  in  sentences  like,  'Who  is  responsible  for 
this  accident?  '  Being  a  responsible  person  in 
the  secondary  sense  is  like  being  wise,  or  careful, 
or  angry,  it  involves  having  a  particular  disposition, 
being  a  certain  type  of  man;  being  responsible  for 
an  accident  is  something  quite  different. 
The  responsibility  of  A  for  a  situation  S,  can 
only  be  decided  by  a  consideration  of  the  character- 
istics  of  S-  which  may  include  A's  actions  and  state 
of  mind  -  and  is  quite  independent  of  his  responsibility 
for  Si,  unless  S  and  Si  are  causally  connected.  The 
man  who  is  responsible  for  setting  a  house  on  fire  may 
be  responsible  therefore  for  the  consequent  death  of 
its  inhabitants,  but  this  responsibility  is  quite 
separate  from  his  responsibility  for,  say,  a  motor 
theft  committed  by  him  some  years  earlier.  Responsibility 
refers  to  a  particular  situation.  'In  this  situation, 
seeing  that  the  car  was  going  too  quickly,  andthe  lorry 
was  on  the  wrong  side  of  the  road,  both  drivers  are 
responsible  for  the  accident',  is  a  typical  responsibility 
statement. 
Responsibility  for  an  accident  is  not,  however,  a 
characteristic  of  the  situation  in  the  same  way  as  is 
driving  at  40  miles  an  hour,  or  failing  to  keep  a  proper 
look-out.  Two  observers  can  agree  about  all  the  factual 
characteristics  of  a  situation,  inducting  the  state 
of  mind  of  the  actors,  and  can  agree  that  their  review 
of  the  facts  is  exhaustive,  and  yet  disagree  about  the 
responsibility  for  the  situation,  without  either 
feeling  that  he  is  contradicting  himself  (cf.  A.  J.  Ayer, 
'On  the  Analysis  of  Moral  Judgments'  in  Philosophical 
Essays,  p.  231).  For  responsibility  is  something 42 
additional  to  the  facts  of  the  situation;  it  is  not 
one  of  them,  nor  is  it  something  logically  deducible 
from  them.  To  say  'A  is  raspoý,  sible  for  S'  is  not 
to  describe  A  or  S,  or  any  part  of  S;  it  is  to 
ascribe  to  A  responsibility  for  S.  This  ascription 
is  made  after  reviewing  the  facts  of  S  in  the  light  of 
certain  principles  of  responsibility,  but  A's 
responsibility  is  not  one  of  the  facts  of  S. 
The  amorality  of  legal  responsibility. 
The  principles  of  responsiöilit;  may  be  such  that 
responsibility  for  a  given  situation  can  be  decided 
in  advance.  If  a  teacher  singles  out  one  boy  in  his 
class,  and  says  'I  am  going  out  of  the  room  and  I  shall 
hold  you  responsible  for  any  noise  there  iiiay  be  in  lay 
absence',  he  is  making  knwon  his  decision  to  ascribe 
responsibility  to  that  boy  for  an;  v  noise,  whatever  the 
circumstances  of  the  noisy  situation,  and  however  little 
that  boy  had  to  do  with  it,  or  however  unable  he  was 
to  prevent  it.  It  is  not  meaningless  or  contra- 
dictory  to  say  to  someone,  'I  know  you  are  in  no  way 
to  blame  for  this  situation,  but  I  am  going  to  hold 
you  responsible  for  it  none  the  less',  however  morally 
reprehensible  such  an  attitude  may  be.  And  a  person 
can  himself  assume  responsibility,  in  advance,  as  Judah 
did  for  the  safety  of  Benjamin  (Gen.  43,8-9).  Such 
arbitrary  ascriptions  of  res-oonsibilit,  -ý  can  be  made 
into  rules.  The  rules  of  a  school  : gay  say  that  in 
any  disturbance  the  senior  boy  present  will  be  held 
responsible,  the  rules  of  an  army  may  say  that  a  part- 
icular  officer  is  responsible  foi  the  cleanliness  of 
a  particular  barrack  room.  If  then,  there  is  a 
disturbance,  or  if  the  barrack:  room  is  dirty,  the 
headmaster,  or  commanding  officer,  may  mete  out 
the  appropriate  punishment  to  the  person  declared  by 43 
the  rules  to  be  responsible,  however  lacking  that  person 
may  have  been  in  moral  blame  for  the  situation. 
Legal  responsibility  rests  in  the  last  resort 
on  the  same  basis  as  that  of  the  senior  boy  or  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  barrack  room  in  the  above 
examples.  Whether  or  not  it  is  a  good  thing  for  a 
legal  system  to  hald  a  man  responsible  for  his  wife's 
debts,  his  partner's  contracts,  or  his  servant's 
carelessness,  there  is  no  logical  objection  to 
its  doing  so.  Statements  of  responsibility  are  not 
statements  of  fact,  and  are  not  true  or  false. 
'The  senior  boy  in  any  class  is  responsible  for  all 
noise  made  by  the  class'  is  a  statement  of  intention, 
of  the  rule-maker's  intention  to  hold  the  senior  boy 
responsible  for  any  noisy  situation.  Particular 
applications  of  the  rule  such  as  'A  is  responsible  for 
the  noise  made  last  Tuesday',  are  only  true  or  false 
in  the  sense  that  if  A  was  the  senior  boy  in  the  class 
which  made  the  noise  the  rule  is  being  properly  applied, 
while  if  he  was  not,  it  is  being  improperly  applied. 
What  is  true  is  that  the  school  rules  make  the  senior 
boy  responsible,  and  we  cannot  go  on  to  ask  if  he 
is  'truly  responsible'.  He  may  not  be  legally  or 
morally  responsible,  but  he  will  be  responsible 
under  the  school  rules.  In  the  same  way  a  person 
will  be  legally  responsible  for  a  particular 
situation  if  the  appropriate  legal  rule  properly 
gpplied  to  the  situation  results  in  his  being  regarded 
as  responsible,  and  this  will  be  so  whether  or  not 
the  rules  of  morality,  or  religion,  or  any  other 
principles  or  rules,  also  regard  him  as  responsible 
in  the  given  situation. 44 
Responsibility  and  liability.  Despite  the 
above  it  remains  true  that  'responsibility'  is'  often 
used  to  mean  moral  responsibility,  and  also  that 
legal  responsibility  often  coincides  with  moral 
responsibility.  In  view  of  this  it  would  rEobably 
be  advantageous  not  to  use  the  term  'responsioility' 
at  all  in  a  legal  context,  but  to  talk  instead  of 
liability  or  amenability  to  law,  or  of  punishability, 
or  to  use  some  other  concept  which  does  not  possess 
the  moral  overtones  of  'responsibility'.  The  most 
suitable  word  is  'liability',  so  that  'criminal 
responsibility'  would  be  replaced  by  'liability  to 
legal  punishment'.  Such  a  usage  would  clarify  the 
discussion  of  certain  problems,  such  as  those  of  the 
relationship  between  insanity  and  criminal  responsibility, 
and  of  the  problem  of  responsibility  for  certain 
statutory  offences  which  may  be  committed  quite 
independently  of  any  moral  culpability. 
There  are,  however,  two  reasons  for  not  adopting 
the  proposed  usage,  and  for  continuing  to  talk  of 
responsibility  in  legal  contexts.  The  first  is  that 
'responsibility'  is  syntactically  more  convenient  than 
'liability'.  A  person  who  is  'liable'  must  always 
be  liable  to  something,  such  as  a  penalty.  We  can 
say  that  'A  is  responsible  for  S',  but  we  cannot  say 
that  'A  is  liable  for  S'  without  adding  to  what  it  is 
that  he  is  liable.  'Responsible'  is  a  shorthand  way 
of  saying  'liable  to  be  called  to  account'  (N.  E.  D.  ). 
There  is  also  a  sense  in  which  'liability'  can  be  used 
to  mean  something  secondary  to  'responsibility', 
If  A  kills  X  out  of  premedtated  malice,  and  B  kills  Y 
as  the  result  of  gross  provocation,  each  is  responsible 
for  the  death  of  his  victim,  but  A  is  liable  to  more 45 
severe  punishment  than  B.  This  usage  may  or  may 
not  be  logically  impeccable,  but  again,  it  is  syn- 
tactically  convenient. 
The  second  reason  is  simply  a  matter  of  convention. 
There  is  no  fixed  usage,  but  'responsibility'  seems 
more  common,  especially  among  Judges,  and  it  is  en- 
shrined  in  the  phrase  'diminished  responsibility' 
although  an  abnormality  of  mind  resulting  in  mitigation 
of  punishment  would  be  more  accurately  described  as 
'diminished  liability  to  punishment'.  (Mr.  J.  'I.  C. 
Turner  talks  of  'responsibility'  in  his  1958  edition 
of  Russell  on  Crimes,  and  of  'liability'  in  his  1958 
edition  of  Keany's  Outlines  of  Criminal  Law.  Glanville 
Williams  talks  of  'legal  responsibility'  -  G1.  Williamq, 
para.  10  -  and  both  he  and  Professor  T.  B.  Smith  talk 
of  'vicarious  responsibility'  -  G1.  Williams,  ch.  8; 
T.  B.  Smith,  p.  708  -  so  that,  on  the  whole, 
'responsibility'  seems  more  common.  The  Homicide  Act 
of  1957  -5  and  6  Eliz.  II,  c.  11,  s.  2  -  adopts  the  term 
as  well  as  the  concept  'diminished  responsibility' 
and  talks  also  of  'mental  responsibility'.  ) 
Accordingly,  while  emphasising  that  the  ascription 
of  responsibility  by  the  criminal  law  is  logically 
independent  of  moral  responsibility,  or  blameworthiness, 
I  shall  use  the  word  'responsible'  instead  of  'liable 
to  punishment'  or  'liable  to  be  called  to  account  by 
the  criminal  law',  though  I  shall  try  to  avoid  using 
the  word  at  all,  so  far  as  possible. 
The  moral  nature  of  the  criminal  law.  The  rules 
regarding  responsibility  in  the  common  law  of  crimes 
rest  in  fact  almost  entirely.  on  moral  ideas  of  praise 
and  blame.  The  general  rule  in  criminal  law  is  that 
the  person  who  is  legally  responsible  for  any  situation 
is  the  person  who  is  to  blame  for  it.  Thus  while 
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to  an  employer  for  all  his  servant's  actings  in 
the  course  of  his  employment,  even  if  they  are  criminal, 
unknown  to  the  employer,  and  contrary  to  his  interest 
(e.  g.  Lloyd  v.  Grace,  Smith  dc  Co.  9{1912]  A.  C.  716), 
the  criminal  law  only  makes  the  employer  responsible 
at  common  law  where  he  can  be  said  to  be  morally 
responsible,  for  example,  because  of  his  failure  to 
deal  with  a  situation  whose  dangerous  potentiality 
was  known  to  him  (cf.  Paton  and  M'Nab,  (1845)  2  Broun 
525,534).  'Penal  law  is  concerned  with  social 
harms  which  include  moral  culpability  as  an  essential 
element  whereas  torts  deal  with  individual  damage  which 
need  not  have  been  effected  by  morally  culpable 
conduct'  (Hall,  p.  213).  Accordingly,  at  common  law, 
Who  was  criminally  responsible?  '  usually  means  'Who 
was  to  blame?  ':  there  is  'no  idea  of  a  crime  without 
guilt  in  the  mind  of  the  criminal'  (John  Grant  and 
Ors.,  (1848)  J.  Shaw,  1'/,  Lord  Cockburn  at  p.  111). 
The  moral  nature  of  the  common  law  of  crimes  is  not 
a  matter  of  logical  necessity  or  of  the  definition 
of  crime,  but  is  a  matter  of  fact,  and  of  social 
policy.  The  common  law  has  this  moral  quality  because 
one/.  -of  its  functions  is  to  represent  the  moral 
outlook  of  the  community,  and  to  inflict  punishment 
where  that  moral  outlook  considers  punishment  to  be 
appropriate.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  law  cannot 
create  crimes  and  ascribe  criminal  responsibility  quite 
independently  of  moral  guilt;  such  ascriptions  are 
often  made  in  statutory  crimes,  and  are  sometimes  made 
by  the  common  law  itself.  But  because  of  the  close 
connection  between  the  common  law  of  crime  and  ordinary 
moral  judgments  it  is  justifiable  to  ask  in  such  cases, 
not,  of  course,  whether  the  person  held  responsible  is 47 
'truly'  so,  or  has  'really'  been  guilty  of  a  crime,  but 
whether  the  criminal  law  ought  to  depart  from  ordinary 
moral  standards;  and  it  is  also  justifiable  to  criticise 
any  rule  of  the  criminal  law  from  the  standpoint  of 
ordinary  morality  in  order  to  determine  if  the  rule  is 
good,  while  conceding  that  it  is  in  fact  a  rule  of  law. 
Voluntary  actions 
The  minimum  requirement  of  moral  responsibility 
is  that  a  man  can  be  held  responsible  for  a  situation 
only  where  it  has  been  caused  or  contributed  to  by 
his  acts  or  omissions:  a  man  cannot  be  blamed  for 
something  he  did  not  do.  This  is  not  a  sufficient 
requirement,  but  without  it  there  can  be  no  question 
of  moral  responsibility  at  all.  A  man  is  responsible 
only  for  his  own  acts  or  omissions,  but  he  is  not 
responsible  for  all  of  them;  in  particular  he  is  only 
responsible  for  such  of  them  as  are  voluntary. 
Voluntariness  is  best  treated  as  a  negative 
quality,  involving  the  absence  of  whatever  factors  are 
regarded  as  preventing  an  act  from  being  regarded  as 
voluntary.  The  person  who  claims  that  a  particular 
act  is  voluntary  does  not  have  to  prove  that  it  was; 
it  is  for  the  person  who  says  that  the  act  was  involuntary 
to  point  to  the  presence  of  one  of  the  factors  which 
exclude  voluntariness.  'To  say  that  a  man 
acted  voluntarily  is  in  effect  to  say  that  he  did  some- 
thing  when  he  was  not  in  one  of  the  conditions 
specified  in  the  list  of  conditions  which  preclude 
responsibility'  (Nowell  Smith,  Ethics,  p.  292). 
These  conditions  have  usually,  since  the  time  of 
Aristotle,  been  treated  under  two  headings:  compulsion 
and  ignorance. 48 
Compulsion. 
Whether  or  not  compulsion  is  present  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  exclude  voluntariness  is  a  question  of 
degree  in  every  case.  Clearly  if  A's  hand  is  gripped 
by  a  person  much  stronger  than  he,  and  placed  on  a 
tri  ;  ger  and  so  moved  as  to  fire  a  gun,  and  A  is  unable 
to  resist  the  compulsion,  the  shoting  is  not  A's 
voluntary  actions,  and  he  is  not  morally  responsible 
for  any  resultant  injuries.  The  shooting  is  not  in 
any  important  sense  the  act  of  A  at  all,  it  is  the 
act  of  the  person  who  placed  A's  finger  on  the  trigger  - 
A  is  only  an  innocent  agent,  no  more  involved  in  the 
crime  than  is  a  postman  who  delivers  a  parcel 
containing  poison  or  a  time  bomb.  But  if  someone 
signs  a  discharge  or  opens  a  safe  because  there  is  a 
gun  in  his  back  and  he  is  afraid  for  his  life,  the 
position  is  not  so  clear.  His  act  is  not  perhaps 
indisputably  voluntary,  but  he  does  choose  to  sign 
the  deed  or  open  the  safe,  in  a  way  that  A  cannot  be 
said  to  choose  to  fire  the  gun. 
This  difficulty  was  recognised  clearly  by  Aristotle 
in  his  treatment  of  compulsion.  He  said, 
'An  act,  it  is  thought,  is  done  under 
compulsion  when  it  originates  in  some  external 
cause  of  such  a  nature  that  the  agent  or 
person  subject  to  the  compulsion  contributes 
nothing  to  it.  Such  a  situation  is  created, 
for  example,  when  a  sea  captain  is  carried 
out  of  his  course  by  a  contrary  wind  or 
by  men  who  have  got  him  in  their  power.  But 
the  case  is  not  always  so  clear.  One  might 
have  to  consider  an  action  performed  for 
some  fine  end  or  through  fear  of  something 
worse  to  follow.  For  example,  a  tyrant 
who  had  a  man's  parents  or  children  in  his 
power  might  order  him  to  do  something 
dishonourable  on  condition  that.,  if  the 
man  did  it,  their  1liyes  would  äe  spared; 
otherwise  not.  In  such  cases  it  might 
be  hard  to  say  whether  the  actions  are 49 
voluntary  or  not....  Such  actions  partake  of 
both  qualities,  though  they  look  more  like 
voluntary  than  involuntary  acts.  For  at 
the  time  they  are  performed  they  are  the 
result  of  a  deliberate  choice  between 
alternatives.  '  (Nich.  Ethics,  III,  1,  pp.  '/7-8). 
Aristotle  reaches  the  tentative  conclusion  that 
'an  action  is  compulsory  only  when  it  is  caused  by 
something  external  to  itself  which  is  not  influenced 
by  anything  contributed  by  the  person  under  compulsion' 
(ib.  pp.  'r9-80).  This  restricts  the  sphere  of 
compulsion  to  cases  like  that  of  the  woman  physically 
compelled  to  squeeze  the  child  she  is  carrying,  because 
of  an  assault  made  on  her  (cf.  Hugh  Mitchell,  (1856) 
2  Irv.  488),  or  the  careful  driver  who  loses  control 
of  his  car  because  of  the  sudden  attack  of  a  swarm  of 
bees.  (cf.  Hill  v.  Baxter,  [1958)  1  Q.  B.  2/7,283). 
Such  cases  are  extreme,  audit  is  possible  to  speak 
of  them  as  cases  where  the  compelled  person  does  not 
act  at  all.  In  one  case,  for  example,  it  was  held 
that  a  van  driver  whose  van  was  blown  by  the  wind  into 
a  lamp-post  was  not  guilty  of  accidentally  damaging 
the  lamp-post,  because  the  damage  had.  not  been  caused 
by  his  actings  at  all.  (liogg  v.  Macpherson,  1928  J.  C.  15). 
This  sort  of  compulsion  need  not  be  physical, 
but  may  be  mental,  though  cases  of  the  latter  are  even 
rarer  than  cases  of  the  former,  and  usually  involve 
states  akin  to  insanity  such  as  the  automatic  action 
of  the  subject  of  an  epileptic  fugue.  Compulsion 
in  such  a  case  would  probably  have  to  be  so  great  as 
to  deprive  the  subject  of  the  power  to  form  the  intention 
of  doing  the  act  which  constituted  or  caused  the  crime, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  such  a  situation 
short  of  unconsciousness  on  the  part  of  the  subject 50 
of  the  compulsion.  In  the  case  of  State  v.  Nargashian 
((1904)  26  R.  I.  299,  Hall  &  Glueck,  p.  368)  an  attempt 
was  made  on  behalf  of  an  accused  charged  with  murder 
to  show  that  such  a  state  might  be  created  by  fear. 
The  Court  held  that  while  such  a  situation  was  conceivable 
in  a  case  of  general  panic,  there  was  no  compulsion 
so  long  as  the  subject  of  the  alleged  compulsion  had 
'sufficient  power  of  mental  action  to  put  his  own  chances 
of  safety  against  the  life  of  an  innocent  thitd  person' 
(Hall  and  Glueck,  p.  371,  per  Stiness,  C.  J.  ). 
Choice  of  alternatives.  It  is  clear  from  what  Aristotle 
says,  and  from  the  observations  quoted  from  the  case 
of  Nargashian  (supra),  that  in  practice  the  important 
problem  raised  by  the  relation  of  compulsion  and 
voluntary  action  is  that  of  'deliberate  choice  of 
alternatives'.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  deal  with 
this  problem  by  distinguishing  between  acts  which  are 
'merely  voluntary'  and  acts  which  are  the  result  of 
free  choice,  and  regarding  only  the  latter  as  voluntary 
actions  for  the  purpose  of  ascribing  responsibility. 
'A  man  who  is  threatened  acts  "voluntarily"  in  the 
sense  that  he  chooses  to  do  what  he  does;  but  he  does 
not  act  "freely";  on  the  contrary  the  man  with  the  gun 
obliges  him'  (Nowell  Smith,  2  .  cit.  p.  209).  But 
many  actions  done  under  obligation  are  regarded  as 
free  actions.  Orestes  was  'obliged'  to  kill  his 
mother  by  his  sense  of  honour  and  duty,  but  his  act 
was  surely  a  free  one.  Any  motive  can  be  spoken  of 
as  obliging  the  agent  if  it  is  strong  enough,  but  the 
fact  that  an  action  is  motivated  does  not  mean  that  it 
is  unfree,  unless  we  are  to  say  that  no  actions  are 
free,  in  which  case  the  whole  discussion  becomes 
meaningless.  Even  the  man  who  acts  under  threat  of 51 
death  acts  as  the  result  of  choice,  and  the  choice  is 
free  in  the  sense  that  he  could  have  chosen  otherwise  - 
he  could  have  chosen  to  die.  Some  systems  of  law 
consider  this  choice  sufficiently  free  to  entitle 
them  to  punish  a  man  who  chooses  to  kill  another 
rather  than  die  himself,  and  it  cannot  be  said  that 
there  is  anything  illogical  about  their  attitude, 
whatever  its  social  or  humanitarian  value. 
That  is  important  in  such  situations  is  not  the 
strength  of  the  compulsion,  but  the  relative  value 
of  the  alternatives.  he  solution  is  not  found  by 
way  of  considering  the  mental  state  of  the  agent,  but 
by  considering  the  objective  situation,  and  deciding 
whether  the  objective  action  in  this  situation  is 
to  be  regarded  as  something  wrong  at  all.  The  agentis 
regarded  as  having  a  free  choice,  and  his  duty  is  to 
choose  the  lesser  of  the  two  evils  before  him,  and  so 
to  preserve  the  greater  value.  There  may  be  opposing 
values  involved  and  the  agent  must  then  make  a  rough 
calculation  and  choose  that  course  of  action  which 
preserves  the  greater  value  -  the  standard  and  measure 
of  value  being  taken  as  that  employed  by  the  person 
to  whom  the  agent  is  accountable.  The  question 
is  not  'Was  the  agent  responsible  for  what  he  did?  ' 
but  'Was  what  he  did  wrong?  '. 
This  is  a  very  difficult  qubstion  to  answer. 
Theoretically  perhaps  the  law  could  lay  down  a  calculus 
which  would  enable  us  to  discover  which  was  the  greatest 
value  capable  of  being  preserved  in  any  situation,  but 
the  law  does  not  in  fact  do  so,  andleaves  us  more  or 
less  to  rely  on  ordinary  moral  ideas.  Thereare 
some  cases  where  the  moral  answer  is  clear  -  life  is 
more  valuable  than  banknotes,  a  leg  more  valuable  than 
a  toe  -  but  there  is  no  generally  accepted  hierarchy 
of  values.  Relative  values  change  from  time  to  time, 52 
and  place  to  place.  It  is  difficult,  for  example, 
to  accept  unquestioningly  today  the  assumption  of 
Isabella  in  Measure  for  Measure  that  her  chastity  was 
more  valuable  than  her  brother's  life.  Values  are 
often  incommensurate  -  how  are  we  to  measure  the 
policeman's  duty  to  keep  order  against  his  life: 
or  equal  -  one  man's  life  against  another's.  There 
is  no  mathematical  solution  to  these  problems,  and 
in  practice  the  answer  is  not  found  by  calculating 
values.  Rather,  some  principle  is  regarded  as  of 
overriding  value  in  difficult  situations,  though  it 
may  not  be  regarded  as  so  where  the  choice  is  easy. 
The  principle  may  be  a  legal  one,  like  that  of  not 
taking  the  law  into  one  's  own  hands,  or  it  may  be  a 
religious  one,  like  that  of  self-sacrifice,  or 
resignation  to  the  will  of  God.  Such  a  principle 
will  be  applied,  for  example,  to  decide  what  is  the 
right  action  in  a  situation  where  a  man's  only  chance 
of  survival  is  to  kill  someone  else;  but  it  is  not 
likely  to  be  regarded  as  overriding  where  the  choice 
before  the  agent  is  between  committing  perjury 
and  sacrificing  the  life  of  his  child,  or  stealing  a 
fire-extinguisher  and  seeing  his  house  go  up  in  flames. 
The  principle  of  self-sacrifice  is  of  special 
importance  when  it  is  used  to  decide  which  of  two  lives 
iis  to  be  saved.  It  means  that  from  the  point  of  view 
of  the  agent  his  own  life  is  always  of  less  value 
than  anyone  else's,  though  to  a  third  party  both 
lives  may  be  of  equal  value.  A  person  therefore  is 
never  justified  in  killing  another  in  order  to  save 
himself,  though  he  may  be  justified  in  killing 
him  to  save  a  third  party. 
Another  point  of  general  importance  is  that  the 
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may  be  itself  an  important  value.  If  robbers  enter 
a  bank  and  ask  a  customer  to  help  them,  andthre  aten 
to  kill  him  if  he  refuses,  the  customer  need  only 
weigh  the  relative  value  of  his  own  life  and 
the  bank's  property  (the  general  duty  to  obey  the  law 
can  be  discounted  here  since  it  applies  to  everyone). 
But  a  bank  servant  or  a  policeman  in  such  a  situation 
would  also  have  to  consider  the  value  involved  in 
carrying  out  his  duty  to  his  employer  or  his  special 
duty  to  maintain  the  law  as  a  policeman.  It  is 
submitted  that  the  distinction  between  the  customer  and 
the  bank  servant  or  policeman  is  a  significant  and 
important  one;  and  it  is  an  indication  of  the  advantage 
of  the  'choice  of  value'  approach  to  the  problem  that 
it  brings  out  the  distinction  which  would  be  lost  if 
the  only  question  at  issue  were  the  physical  or 
psychological  effectiveness  of  the  compulsion 
involved. 
Ignorance. 
There  is  a  sense  in  which  a  man  who  is  ignorant 
of  what  he  is  doing  can  be  said  to  be  acting 
involuntarily:  certainly  his  choice  of  action  is 
not  relevant  to  the  true  situation.  The  man  who  kills 
his  maidservant  believing  her  to  be  a  burglar  has 
not  chosen  to  kill  her;  the  man  who  pulls  the  trigger 
of  a  gun  he  did  not  know  was  loaded  has  not  chosen  to 
fire  the  gun.  -  Whether  or  not  these  acts  are  called 
voluntary  is  a  linguistic  question,  but  their  blame- 
worthiness  is  affected  in  an  important  way  by  the  element 
of  ignorance  -  they  are  unintentional.  Indeed,  they 
may  not  even  be  negligent,  unless  the  agent's 
ignorance  is  in  itself  the  result  of  negligence.  The 
postman  who  delivers  a  parcel  containing  poisoned  short- 
bread  has  not  done  so  intentionally  if  he  knows  nothing 54 
of  the  poison;  and  he  has  not  done  so  negligently 
unless  it  is  part  of  his  job  to  examine  all  parcels 
he  delivers.  Whether  it  is  reasonable  to  say  that 
though  he  delivered  the  parcel  voluntarily  he  did 
not  deliver  its  poisoned  contents  voluntarily,  is  a 
question  of  usage.  What  is  important  is  that  anyone 
making  a  moral  judgment  on  his  responsibility  for 
delivering  the  poison  cannot  ignore  the  fact  of  his 
ignorance. 
Intention  and  motive 
Intent  ion 
The  objective  approach.  Intention  is  normally 
thought  of  as  a  state  of  mind.  A  intends  to  do  X 
when  he  sets  before  his  mind  the  idea  of  X  not  merely 
in  order  to  contemplate  it,  but  as  a  first  step  in  the 
process  of  bringing  it  into  effect.  But,  apart  from 
confessions,  the  only  way  we  can  discover  another  man's 
intentions  is  by  observing  what  he  in  fact  does. 
If  his  actions  make  sense  when  regarded  as  directed 
towards  a  particular  result,  we  say  that  he  intended 
that  result,  and  that  all  the  actions  directed 
thereto  were  intentional.  Actions  which  do  not  appear 
to  form  part  of  a  series  leading  up  to  a  particular 
result  -.  o  not  appear  to  be  intentional:  accidents  are 
not  led  up  to.  'Dressing  carefully  "makes  sense" 
as  a  preliminary  to  going  to  the  City,  but  not  as  a 
preliminary  to  being  knocked  over  by  a  bicycle'.  (J.  A. 
Passmore,  'Intentions'  in  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian 
Society,  (1955)  Supp.  Vol.  xxix,  p.  132.  I  owe  the 
arguments  set  out  in  this  paragraph  to  Mr.  Passmore's 
article).  On  this  view,  'A  intends  to  do  X'  means 
only  that  if  A's  actions  are  observed,  they  will  be  seen 
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can  be  seen  or  .,  Is  intentions  is  this  series.  In  the 
sas,  ie  way  'A  played  that  game  of  chess  cleverly' 
can  be  said  to  mean  only  that  his  moves  were  the  moves 
vw.  aich  mi;  ceht  have  been  expected  to  lead  to  victory 
(cf.  G.  Ryle,  The  Concept  of  Mind,  -eassiml)'.  . 7e  do 
not  see  a  series  of  brain-:  notions  which  are  A  intending, 
or  A  thinking  intelligently  about  bhe  game  of  chess. 
On  this  view  the  statement  that  a  man  is  presuiaed 
to  iutena  the  natural  consequences  of  his  actions  is 
hardly  more  than  a  tautology.  It  is  not  an  arbitrary 
rule  about  what  people  are  to  be  deemed  to  intend,  or 
what  will  be  regarded  as  evidence  of  their  intentions. 
It  does  not  rest  on  the  ground  that  the  best  evidence 
of  a  man's  intentioas  is  to  be  found  in  his  behaviour, 
or  even  that  that  is  the  only  evidence;  but  on  the  ground 
that  there  is  no  meaningful  description  of  intention 
except  in  terms  of  external  behaviour.  Accordingly 
it  would'  be  self-contradictory  to  say  'A's  actions 
necessarily  led  up  to  x  but  A  did  not  intend  x'. 
The  subjective  approach.  The  extreme  objective 
view  has  serious  difficulties.  It  suggests  that  a  man 
knows  less  about  his  own  intentions  than  do  the  people 
who  watch  his  actions.  It  means  that  no  credence  can 
ever  be  given  to  a  confession  which  indicates  that  the 
confessor's  intentions  were  other  than  the  intentions 
spelled  out  from  observation  of  his  actions.  In  fact, 
however,  we  do  pay  attention  to  confessions,  though 
we  use  objective  behaviour  as  a  test  of  the  credibility 
of  a  confession.  On  the  objective  view  the 
confession  is  irrelevant;  on  the  subjective  view 
it  is  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  way  of  discovering 
a  man's  intentions.  But  there  is  a  trap  lurking 56 
here  of  a  kind  which  occurs  in  a  number  of  places 
in  the  criminal  law.  It  is  no  use  recognising  the 
subjective  nature  of  intention,  and  the  value  of 
confessions,  if  at  the  same  time  we  refuse  to  believe 
any  confession  whose  content  conflicts  with  the  result 
we  have  obtained  by  objective  observation.  Listening 
to  confessions  and  examining  objective  behaviour  are 
two  different,  one  might  almost  say  contradictory, 
ways  of  discovering  a  man's  intentions,  and  once  it 
is  allowed  that  a  confession  can  provide  the  best 
evidence  of  intention  even  where  it  conflicts  with  the 
inferences  drawn  from  objective  behaviour,  the 
objective  test  cannot  be  used  as  a  final  test  of 
the  truth  of  the  confession.  We  cannot  say  'This 
is  an  honest  man,  I  would  be  prepared  to  believe  any- 
thing  he  says;  but  I  am  not  prepared  to  act  on  that 
belief  because  what  he  says  contradicts  the  inferences 
I  have  drawn  from  observing  his  behaviour'.  The 
confessor's  objective  behaviour  is  certainly  a  factor 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  judging  of  the  credibility 
of  his  confession  -  but  if  the  man  convinces  us  that  he 
is  telling  the  truth  this  conviction  must  prevail 
over  any  inconsistencies  we  may  feel  exist  between 
the  confession  and  the  objective  behaviour.  Otherwise 
there  would  be  no  point  in  listening  to  the  confession 
at  all,  and  the  possibility  of  accurate  introspection 
would  be  denied. 
Subjective  and  objective  right. 
Utilitarianism  and  deontology.  One  of  the  basic 
conflicts  in  moral  philosophy  is  that  between  those  who 
consider  that  the  rightness  of  an  action  is  to  be  deter- 
mined  by  reference  to  its  consequences,  so  that  a  man's 57 
duty  is  to  Droduce  the  greatest  possible  good  in  a 
given  situation;.  and  those  who  consider  that  the  right- 
ness  of  an  action  is  to  be  determined  by  reference 
to  he  motive  of  the  agent,  to  whether  it  is  done  out 
of  a  sense  of  duty,  or  from  some  other  good  motive, 
or  from  a  bad  motive.  Philosophers  who  hold  the  first 
view  are  often  called  Utilitarians,  and  those  who  hold 
the  second,  Deontologists.  The  two  views  are  also 
sometiý:  ies  referred  to  as  Effolgsethik  and  Gesinnungsethik 
respectively,  i.  e.  as  ethics  devedding  on  results,  an  d 
ethics  depending  on  the  agent's  intentions  (cf. 
.  M.  11acKinnon,  A  Study  in  Ethical  Theory,  pass  .  ). 
The  law,  which  is  concerned  with  the  ordering  of 
society,  is  naturally  mainly  utilitarian  in  outlook. 
It  is  more  interested  in  the  results  of  an  action 
than  in  the  motives  which  prompted  it.  The  man  who 
ppys  his  debts  out  of  a  fear  of  the  consequences  has 
performed  his  legal  duty  just  as  much  as  the  man  who 
pays  them  out  of  a  belief  that  it  is  right  to  do  so. 
And  it  follows  that  to  fail  in  one's  intentions  is  to 
fail  in  one's  duty.  If  I  have  a  legal  duty  to  return 
a  book  to  a  friend  this  uuty  is  not  fulfilled  merely 
by  my  posting  the  book,  if  in  fact  it  does  not  as.  -rive 
at  my  friend's  house.  If  a  carelessly  despatched  book 
arrives  tnere  is  no  duty  to  send  an,  _)ther, 
but  if  a  care- 
fully  despatched  book  fails  to  arrive,  there  may  still 
be  a  duty  to  provide  a  replacement  (cf.  W.  D.  Ross,  The 
Right  and  the  Good,  ch.  2,  esp.  pp.  45-6). 
But  though  the  law  is  generally  utili-tarian,  the 
criminal  lai=a  is  so  closely  bound  up  with  ordinary 
morality  that  it  contains  many  deontological  features 
which  also  exist  in  ordinary  moral  thinking.  The 
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inflicting  punishment,  and  in  doing  this  ordinary  people 
look  not  only  to  the  results  of  actions  but  also  to 
their  motives.  The  man  who  has  done  his  best,  it  is 
felt,  should  not  be  blamed  because  his  efforts  have  been 
frustrated;  and  the  man  who  meant  no  ill  is  not  to  be 
blamed  because  his  actions  turned  out  badly.  For  the 
deontologist  it  is  the  road  to  Heaven,  and  not  to  Hell, 
which  is  paved  with  good  intentions.  This  emphasis 
on  motive  leads  to  the  view  that  actions  performed  from 
a  good  motive  are  of  greater  value  than  actions  performed 
from  a  bad  one,  even  though  the  results  are  the  same. 
To  do  'the  right  act  for  the  wrong  reason'  (T.  S. 
Eliot,  Murder  in  the  Cathedral,  Part  I)  is  not,  on  this 
view,  to  have  done  one's  duty;  but,  and  this  is 
more  important,  to  do  the  wrong  deed  for  the  right 
reason  may  be  regarded  as  something  praiseworthy  because 
it  exemplifies  the  good  motive  involved. 
This  is,  of  course,  a  gross  over-simplification 
of  the  deontological  position,  but  it  shows  up  the 
important  difference  between  Erfolgsethik  and  Gesinnung- 
sethik,  and  the  subjective  bias  of  deontology.  (see 
Ross  op.  cit.,  and  H.  A.  Prichard,  Moral  Obligation, 
esp.  ch.  2).  The  utilitarian  and  deontological 
attitudes  stem  respectively  from  Greek  and  Hebrew 
thought,  and  the  conflict  between  them  underlies  most 
European  moral  thinking. 
Subjective  and  objective  right.  To  treat  motive  as 
all-important  leads  to  very  peculiar  results.  It  can 
lead  to  the  view  that  the  fanatic  who  puts  his  children 
through  the  fire  to  Moloch  not  from  a  desire  to  hurt  them 
but  because  he  considers  it  his  religious  duty  to  do  so, 
is  a  morally  good  man,  who  has  performed  an  unpleasant 59 
act  conscientiously,  and  therefore  cannot  be  treated 
as  blameworthy  or  punishable,  however  wrong  the  action 
may  be  when  judged  objectively.  The  objectively 
right  act  is  that  act  which  the  omniscient  observer 
would  judge  to  be  right.  It  cannot,  however,  be 
a  man's  duty  to  do  what  is  objectively  right,  because, 
since  he  is  not  omniscient,  he  cannot  know  what  is 
objectively  right.  And  it  is  axiomatic  that  there  is 
no  duty  to  do  the  impossible.  Therefore,  it  is  argued, 
a  man's  duty  is  merely  to  do  what  is  subjectively 
right,  what  he  thinks  right;  and  so  long  as  he  does 
that,  he  cannot  be  blamed. 
The  strength  of  this  argument  liesin  the  fact  that 
conscientiousness  is  admittedly  regarded  as  a  virtue. 
We  admire  the  faithful  adherent  of  a  religion  in  which 
we  ourselves  do  not  believe.  To  do  what  you  think 
right  is  generally  to  acquit  yourself  well;  other 
people  may  feel  they  would  have  done  otherwise,  but 
will  not  blame  you  for  what  you  did.  'He  acted 
properly,  according  to  his  lights'  is  a  judgment  of 
praise.  Despite  this,  the  argument  leads  to  such 
gross  paradoxes  that  it  must  be  rejected,  at  least 
in  the  mundane  sphere  of  the  criminal  law.  For 
it  involves  saying  that  the  concentration-camp  guards, 
the  medieval  heresy-hunters,  the  ancient  Moloch 
worshippers,  are  praiseworthy  if  they  p  erf  orme  d 
their  abominations  in  the  sane  belief  that  it  was 
right  to  do  so.  It  is  much  more  likely  that  one's 
judgment  on  such  people  will  be  that  their  belief 
that  they  were  doing  right  makes  them  more  and  not 
less  evil  than  those  who  did  the  same  things  out  of 
fear  of  the  consequences  of  refusing  to  do  them. 60 
Errors  of  fact  and  of  morals.  The  paradoxes 
are  at  least  partly  the  result  of  a  failure  to  distinguish 
between  the  factual  and  moral  elements  in  a  situation. 
If  this  distinction  is  made  it  can  be  said  that  a  man's 
duty  is  to  do  what  would  be  objectively  right  if  the 
situation  were  as  he  believed  it  to  be.  If  a  man 
cuts  off  another's  head  in  the  belief  that  it  is  a 
block  of  wood,  he  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  killing  him. 
In  the  same  way,  a  man  who  mistakenly  believes  that 
he  is  being  attacked  is  entitled  to  retaliate  in  self- 
defence.  (cf.  Owens,  1946  J.  C.  119).  The  act  of 
retaliation  would  remain  objectively  wrong,  and  so  the 
victim  would  be  entitled  to  defend  himself  against 
it  in  turn.  What  the  retaliator  does  is  wrong  and 
unjustified,  but  he  is  excusable  and  not  blameable 
for  doing  it  -  see  infra  pm)  But  a  mistake  regarding 
moral  values  is  irrelevant.  If  a  man  believes 
that  it  is  right  to  kill  all  redheaded  women,  it  is 
still  his  duty  not  to  kill  then,  and  he  will  be  blame- 
worthy  if  he  does  kill  any  of  them.  The  man  who  acts 
under  an  error  of  fact  cannot  be  blamed  for  the  results 
of  his  error,  unless,  of  course  the  mistake  is  itself 
blameworthy,  for  his  act  was  done  in  error,  and  therefore 
unintentionally.  But  the  man  who  deliberately  does 
what  is  wrong  is  blameworthy,  even  if  he  thought  he 
was  doing  right,  because  he  intended  to  do  what  he  did. 
'If  a  man  does  something  because  he  does  not  think  it 
wrong  he  cannot  plead  that  he  did  not  choose  to  do  it, 
and  it  is  for  choosing  to  do  what  is  in  fact  wrong, 
whether  he  knows  it  or  not,  that  a  man  is  blamed'  (Nowell 
Smith, 
, 
op.  cit.,  p.  294). 
Whether  or  not  this  argument  is  conclusive  in  the 
field  of  moral  philosophy,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is 
one  the  law  must  recognise  as  sound  for  its  own  purposes. 61 
It  is  clear  that, 
'...  obligations  of  social  morality  need  not  depend 
on  the  agent's  thought  about  the  situation... 
...  the  obligation  arises,  not  from  any 
completely  "objective"  facts,  i.  e.  facts  which 
need  not  be  cognised  by  anyone,  but  from  the 
thoughts  of  society,  i.  e.  of  most  people  in 
the  society  concerned... 
...  If  I  told  a  creditor  that  his  moral 
claim  to  have  his  bill  paid  was  overborne 
because,  in  my  opinion,  my  child's  claim 
to  a  new  coat  was  stronger,  he  would  not 
agree  that  my  udgment  determined  the  status 
of  his  claim' 
(D. 
D.  Raphael,  Moral  Judgment, 
pp.  135-9). 
Any  other  attitude  would  lead  to  anarchy,  to  a 
state  in  which  every  man  was  his  own  lawmaker,  who  could 
disobey  any  law  he  thought  wrong,  and  do  any  illegal  act 
he  thought  right. 
In  Reynolds  v.  U.  S.  ((1878)  98  U.  S.  145)  a  Mormon 
who  was  charged  with  bigamy  pleaded  in  defence 
that  it  was  his  religious  duty  to  marry  more  than  one 
wife.  In  rejecting  the  plea  Waite,  C.  J.  said, 
If  the  defendant,  under  the  influence 
of  a  religious  belief  that  it  was  right, 
deliberately  married  a  second  time,  having  a 
first  wife  living,  the  want  of  consciousness 
of  evil  intent  -  the  want  of  uhderstanding 
on  his  part  that  he  was  committing  a  crime  - 
did  not  excuse  him  (at  p.  162)... 
Every  act  necessary  to  constitute  the 
crime  was  knowingly  done  and  the  crime  was 
therefore  knowingly  committed.  Ignorance 
of  a  fact  may  sometimes  be  taken  as  evidence 
of  a  want  of  criminal  intent,  but  not  ignorance 
of  law.  The  only  defence  of  the  accused  in 
this  case  is  his  belief  that  the  law  ought 
not  to  have  been  enacted.  '  (at  p.  167). 62 
Intention  and  Motive 
Motive  as  a  form  of  intention.  It  follows  from 
the  above  that  the  law  disregards  motive  in  considering 
whether  or  not  a  particular  agent  is  guilty  of  a  crime; 
so  long  as  there  is  present  an  intention  to  do  the  act 
prohibited  by  the  law,  it  does  not  matter  with  what 
motive  it  was  done.  It  is  a  crime,  for  example,  to  send 
threatening  letters  to  someone,  even  if  it  was  all 
meant  as  a  joke,  so  long  as  the  letters  were  sent 
intentionally,  i.  e.  with  the  intention  of  sending  them, 
though  there  was  no  intention  to  cause  any  fear, 
or  do  any  harm  at  all  (Eliz.  Edmiston,  (1866)  5  Irv. 
219,222). 
I  have  used  the  word  'intention'  and  not  'motive' 
with  reference  to  the  doing  harm  in  order  to  show  the 
difficulty  of  distinguishing  between  motive  andintention. 
A  motive  can  often  be  described  in  terms  of  intention, 
and  for  some  jurists  motive  is  just  a  special  sort  of 
intention.  Salmond  divides  intention  into  what  he 
calls  'immediate'  and  'ulterior'  intent,  the  former 
relating  to  the  act  itself,  and  the  latter  to  the  object 
for  which  the  act  was  done,  e.  g.  to  alarm,  or  for  a  joke, 
and  he  calls  the  ulterior  intent  motive  (Salmond,  para. 
137).  In  this  way  the  objects  of  intention  and  the 
object  of  motive  are  seen  as  parts  of  a  sequence  of  the 
means-ehd  type;  a  man  intends  the  means  which  lead  to 
the  end  chosen  by  his  motive. 
The  application  and  the  difficulties  of  Salmond's 
view  can  be  seen  by  considering  the  following  sequence. 
A  buys  a  bottle  of  poison  and  a  bottle  of  port;  he 
puts  the  poison  into  the  port,  takes  the  poisoned  port 
to  his  aunt's  house,  pours  her  a  glass  of  it  which  she 
drinks,  and  kills  her;  A  inherits  a  fortune  and  retires 63 
to  a  house  in  Majorca  on  which  he  has  long  set  his 
heart.  If  in  considering  this  sequence  we  stop  at 
the  purchase  of  the  poison,  we  can  say  that  A's 
intention  was  to  purchase  the  poison,  and  his  motive 
to  kill  his  aunt,  inherit  her  fortune,  and  retire  to 
Majorca.  If  A  is  tried  simply  for  buying  poison, 
assuming  that  to  be  in  itself  a  crime,  the  relevant 
intention  would  be  to  buy  poison,  and  the  later 
'intentions'  be  regarded  as  motive,  and  so  as  irrelevant. 
If  it  is  a  crime  to  buy  poison,  it  is  a  crime  to  do 
so  whether  one  does  it  to  kill  an  aunt  or  to  improve 
one's  complexion.  But  if  A  is  tried  for  killing  his 
aunt,  his  intention  will  be  taken  to  be  that  of  killing 
her,  and  only  the  desire  to  inherit  her  money  and  retire 
to  Majorca  will  be  regarded  as  motive.  Motive  so 
defined  is  any  intention  which  succeeds  in  time  of 
proposed  realisation  the  intention  to  commit  the  crime 
charged.  It  is,  so  to  speak,  the  post-ultimate 
intention,  and  is  irrelevant. 
A  similar  analysis  can  be  made  in  the  case  of 
crimes  requiring  a  special  intention.  In  a  charge  of 
'buying  poison  with  intent  to  kill'  the  last  relevant 
intention  would  be  the  intention  to  kill,  and  all 
subsequent  intentions  would  be  classed  as  irrelevant 
motives. 
Motive  as  something  other  than  intention.  Balmond's 
analysis  of  motive  makes  the  concept  unnecessary  and 
deprives  it  of  any  indep2ndQ4t  meaning.  On  his 
view  motive  is  just  a  word  used  for  certain  intentions 
in  given  situations:  and  the  use  varies  from  situation 
to  situation,  so  that  what  is  motive  in  situation  S- 
a  charge  of  buying  poison  -  mal  not  be  motive  in  situation 
S1  -a  charge  of  murder.  Moreover  the  variation  is 64 
subjective  in  the  sense  that  it  depends  on  the  stand- 
point  from  which  the  sequence  of  events  is  viewed. 
But  there  is  a  meaning  of  motive  which  is  not 
satisfactorily  translateable  into  terms  of  intention. 
Motive,  in  this  sense,  is  a  compelling,  or  at-any  rate, 
a  propelling,  psychological  factor.  A  man  who 
sacrifices  his  child  from  religious  motives  need  not 
have  any  ulterior  intention,  need  not  wish  to  bring 
about  any  state  of  affairs  following  the  sacrifice 
of  the  child.  Psychological  motives  can  sometimes  be 
translated  into  intentions,  but  the  translations  are 
rarely  satisfactory.  'His  motive  was  greed'  does 
not  mean  quite  the  same  as  'His  intention  was  to  inherit 
money';  'His  motive  was  jealousy'  is  only  tortuously 
translateable  into  'His  purpose  was  to  achieve  that 
peace  of  mind  which  he  could  obtain  only  by  the  death 
of  his  rival'.  To  regard  all  motives  as  being  so 
translateable  is  to  ignore  the  possibility  that  an 
act  may  be  done  intentionally  without  any  regard  to 
consequences  whatever.  The  atheist  materialist  who 
fulfils  an  unimportant  promise  made  to  a  dead  friend 
does  so  from  a  motive  -  the  desire  to  keep  his 
promise,  or  affection  and  respect  for  his  friend  - 
but  he  does  not  do  so  with  any  ulterior  intention. 
Motive  in  this  sense  is  something  different  from 
intention.  It  is  not  something  connected  with  a 
particular  action  making  it  intentional  in  the  sense 
of  providing  a  goal  to  which  it  can  be  seen  to  be 
directed.  It  is  a  psychological  state  which  explains 
a  man's  actions,  and  his  intentions,  by  reference  to 
their  source  and  not  to  their  purpose.  It  is  something 
more  fundamental  than  ulterior  intention,  and  indeed 
we  ask  of  a  man's  ulterior  intention,  'Why  did  he  want 
that?  ',  and  answer  in  terms  of  his  psychological 65 
make-up.  We  can  ask  'Why  did  he  want  a  house  in  Majorca 
anyway?  ',  and  as4wer  in  terms  of  his  pleasure-loving 
character. 
A  system  which  does  not  accept  that  bad  means  may 
be  justified  by  being  directed  to  good  ends  can  ignore 
motive  in  the  sense  of  ulterior  intention.  But  ifmotive 
is  thought  of  as  the  psychological  origin  of  action  and 
ulterior  intention  alike,  it  cannot  be  ignored,  except 
by  a  wholly  utilitarian  ethic.  And  motive  in  this 
sense  is  taken  into  account  in  our  everyday  judgments, 
and  also,  to  some  extent,  in  the  law.  Responsibility 
for  an  action  in  the  sense  of  legal  guilt  is  independent 
of  motive,  but  the  treatment  of  the  convicted  person 
may  be  influenced  by  the  view  taken  of  his  motive. 
A  good  motive,  or  even  the  absence  of  a  bad  one, 
may  be  regarded  as  a  mitigating  factor,  although  it 
can  never  exculpate  the  wrongdoer  from  responsibility 
for  his  intentional  act.  It  is  for  this  reason  for 
example,  that  euthanasia  is  regarded  as  culpable 
homicide  and  not  as  murder  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper, 
Q.  5428). 
Acts  and  consequences. 
Intentional  and  unintentional  acts. 
Intention,  as  Bentham  observed,  may  regard  either 
an  act  itself  or  its  consequences.  He  went  on  to  say, 
'The  act  may  very  easily  be  intentional 
without  the  consequences;  and  often  is  so  ...  But  the  consequences  of  an  act  cannot  be 
intentional,  without  the  act's  being  itself 
intentional  in  at  least  the  first  stage. 
If  theact  be  not  intentional  in  the  first 
stage,  it  is  no  act  of  yours:  there  is 
accordingly  no  intention  on  your  part  to 
produce  the  consequences;  that  is  to  say, 
the  individual  consequences.  All  there  can 
have  been  on  your  part  is  a  distant  intention 
to  produce  other  consequences,  of  the  same 66 
nature,  by  some  act  of  yours  at  a  future 
time:  or  else,  without  any  intention,  a 
bare  wish  to  see  such  an  event  take  place.  ' 
(Bentham,  VII,  2-5). 
This  is  clear  and  fairly  simple.  I  may  intend  to  kill 
A,  but  if  B  kills  him  before  I  can  do  anything,  then 
his  death  is  not  intentional  on  my  part,  because  it 
is  not  connected  with  any  intentional  act  of  mine. 
I  have  not  killed  him  intentionally,  because  I 
have  not  killed  him  at  all. 
All  that  is  involved  in  saying  that  an  act  is 
intentional  is  that  it  is  deliberate  and  conscious, 
and  not  something  done  unthinkingly.  (Cf.  S.  Hampshire 
and  H.  L.  A.  Hart,  'Decision,  Intention  and  Certainty', 
in  Mind,  (1958)  Vol.  67,  p.  1,  where  they  say,  'In 
any  ordinary  narrative  describing  ordinary  actions 
done  in  normal  circumstances  it  would  be  pointless 
to  say  that  a  person  did  these  things  intentionally; 
for  normally  there  is  a  fulfilled  presumption  that  if 
a  person  does  something  he  does  it  intentionally'  - 
at  pp.  6-7).  If  A  deliberately  presses  a  switch 
meaning  to  put  on  an  electric  fire,  and  forgets  that 
because  of  the  state  of  the  wiring,  this  will  fuseall 
the  lights  in  the  house,  he  has  intentionally  pressed 
the  switch,  but  has  not  intentionally  fused  the  lights. 
On  the  other  hand  if  he  reaches  up  to  a  shelf  to  take 
down  a  book  and  accidentally  brusihes  against  the  switch 
and  puts  it  on,  he  has  neither  put  on  the  switch  nor 
fused  the  lights  intentionally;  all  he  hs  done 
intentionally  is  to  stretch  up  to  the  shelf. 
Whether  he  is  responsible  in  either  case  for  fusing 
the  lights  depends  on  the  rules  for  responsibility  for 
the  unintended  results  of  one's  actions,  -  but  whatever 
these  rule's,  their  application  to  the  above  situations 6'J 
must  have  reference  to  the  intentional  act  in  each 
situation,  and  may  therefore  lead  to  defferent  results 
in  each  situation.  The  relevant  series  of  events  must 
always  start  with  the  intentional  act,  since 
responsibility  for  the  consequences,  if  any,  will 
depend  on  their  being  the  consequences  of  an  intentional 
act.  (This  idea  is  expressed  in  the  American  Law 
Institute's  Model  Penal  Code,  s.  2.01  of  Art  2  of 
w:  lich  is  as  follows:  'A  person  is  not  guilty  of  an 
offence  unless  his  liability  is  based  on  conduct  which 
includes  a  voluntary  act  or  the  omission  to  perform 
an  act  which  it  was  physically  possible  to  perform.  '  - 
see  S.  Prevezer,  'English  Criminal  Law  Reform  and 
the  American  Penal  Code',  (1958)  Current  Legal 
Problems,  p.  58,  at  p.  J3.  ) 
The  distinction  between  an  act  and  its  conseauences 
is  not  a  definite  one.  The  sphere  of  the  act  may  be 
confined  to  the  very  minimum  -a  motion,  or  more 
commonly  a  group  of  related  motions,  of  a  part  or 
parts  of  the  body,  but  this  is  so  trivial  as  to  be 
useless.  Once  the  sphere  of  the  act  is  extended 
beyond  this,  however,  there  is  no  definite  point  at 
which  the  act  can  be  said  to  end  and  its  consequences 
begin.  For  example;  A  raises  his  hand,  lifts  a  gun, 
places  his  finger  on  the  trigger,  points  the  gun,  fires 
it,  kills  a  woman,  and  enables  her  heir  to  inherit 
a  fortune,  her  husband  to  remarry,  and  her  creditors 
to  obtain  payment  of  their  debts.  Is  the  firing  of 
the  gun  act  or  consequence?  Is  the  killing  act  or 
consequence?  The  similarity  to  the  problems  of  immediate 
and  ulterior  intent  is  obvious;  any  point  in  the  series 
may  be  regarded  as  the  consequence  of  what  went  before, 
although  there  does  come  a  point  at  which  what  happens 
is  so  far  removed  from  the  original  bodily  motion  that 68 
it  will  not  be  treated  as  act  at  all,  but  only 
as  consequence. 
Abstract  discussions  of  the  distinction  "between 
act  and  consequence,  either  in  general,  or  in  the 
context  of  particular  examples,  are  fruitless 
exercises  in  logic-chopping.  From  the  point  of  view 
of  responsibility  the  most  important  thing  is  to  know 
where  the  consequences  of  an  action  end,  so  that  we  may 
know  how  far  responsibility  for  the  consequences  of  the 
act  extends;  it  is  not  usually  so  important  to  know 
where  the  consequences  begin.  The  important  points 
are  the  point  at  which  the  series  of  intentional  acts 
ends,  and  the  point  at  which  the  relevant  series  of 
consequences  ends  (cf.  infra,  u&). 
Causality. 
Causality  and  responsibility.  The  delimitation 
of  the  extent  of  the  consequences  of  an  act  seems 
prima  facie  to  be  a  scientific  exercise  in  causality. 
But  the  question  of  responsibility  for  what  follows  on 
an  intentional  action  cannot  be  decided  by  a  purely 
causal  enquiry.  The  decision  whether  or  not  Y  is  to  be 
regarded  as  a  consequence  of  X  depends  on  whether  the 
person  who  did  X  is  to  be  treated  as  responsible  for  Y; 
and  not  vice  versa.  'The  object  of  a  civil  enquiry 
into  cause  and  consequence  is  to  fix  liability  on 
some  responsible  person..  The  trial  of  an  action 
for  damages  is  not  a  scientific  inquest  into  a  mixed 
sequence  of  phenomena..  It  is  a  practical  enquiry' 
(Weld-Blundell  v.  Stephen,  [1920]  A.  C.  956,  Lord  Sumner 
at  p.  986);  the  same  is  true  of  a  criminal  trial. 
There  is  a  multitude  of  causes  for  any  given  event 
and  a  multitude  of  effects  follows  on  any  given  cause. 
'One  is  but  repeating  a  commonplace  if  one  repeats 69 
that  many  causes  have  some  place  in  the  sequence  of 
events  which  lead  to  a  result  or  follows  Lord  Shaw 
in  saying  that  "causation  it  not  a  chain  but  a  net" 
(Leyland  Shipping  Co.  v.  Norwich  Union  Fire  Insurance 
Ltd.  19181  A.  C.  350,369).  The  question  always  is 
how  far  back  one  is  justified  in  going  or  how  wide 
a  net  one  must  envisage'  (Stapley  v.  Gypsum  Mines  Ltd. 
119533  A.  C.  663,  Lord  Porter  at  p.  61/6). 
Moreover,  events  exist  on  different  planes,  and 
can  be  regarded  from  different  points  of  view, 
in  different  'universes  of  discourse'.  Choice  of  the 
relevant  cause  or  effect  depends  on  the  purposes  of  the 
person  making  the  choice:  different  people  give 
different  causes  for  the  same  effect.  An  engineer  may 
ascribe  a  collision  at  sea  to  a  fault  in  the  Ship's 
engine  structure,  a  Board  of  Trade  official  to  a  failure 
to  make  the  proper  routine  inspection,  a  mate.  orologist 
to  bad  weather,  a  metallurgist  to  metal  fatigue,  an 
astrologer  to  the  star  under  which  the  captain  was  born, 
and  so  on.  There  is  a  strong  tendency  for  people  to 
ascribe  effects  to  causes  in  which  they  have  a  special 
interest,  and  this  is  important  from  the  point  of  view 
of  responsibility,  because  it  often  results  in  the 
ascription  of  events  to  causes  constituted  by  actions 
forbidden  by  the  ascriber.  Such  situations  are  common 
in  everyday  life.  For  example:  a  father  lends  his 
son  the  family  car  to  go  to  a  party;  but  stipulates 
that  the  son  will  return  hone  directly  and  not  drive 
any  girls  home  first.  The  boy  , disobeys  this 
stipulation  and  takes  a  girl  home.  On  his  own 
ultimate  return  hometiw.  rds  he  is  involved  in  a 
collision  which  is  not  due  to  his  fault.  The  father 
may  well  insist  that  the  accident  was'due  to  the  boy's 
disobedience  of  his  orders.  If  the  boy  points  out 1/0 
the  illogicality  of  this,  it  will  be  easy  enough 
for  the  father  to  show  that  this  was  a  cause  of  the 
accident,  since  if  the  son  had  come  straight  home  he 
would  not  have  been  at  the  place  of  the  accident  when 
it  happened,  and  so  it  would  not  have  happened  -  and 
the  father  may  consider  this  sufficient  to  enable  him 
to  hold  the  boy  responsible  for  the  accident  as  a 
consequence  of  his  disobedience. 
If  the  father  is  a  lawyer  he  may  try  to  reinforce 
his  argument-by  saying  that  the  boy's  wrongful  act 
of  disobedience  was  a  sine  aua  non  of  the  accident. 
And  so  it  was;  but  so  also  were  many  other  factors 
in  the  situation  as,  for  example,  that  the  father 
lent  the  boy  the  car,  or  indeed  that  the  father  ever 
begot  his  son,  and  so  on  in  a  regression  which  if  not 
infinite  can  at  least  be  taken  back  to  the  bounds  of 
living  memory.  The  father  stops  at  the  son's 
disobedience  not  because  this  has  any  special  causal 
status,  but  because  he  is  interested  in  enforcing  his 
prohibition  against  the  boy  taking  girls  home  in  the  car, 
and  he  hopes  to  do  so  and  to  prevent  the  infringement 
of  any  similar  future  prohibition  by  pointing  to  the 
accident,  and  by  whatever  disciplinary  measures  he  may 
take  against  the  boy  for  getting  involved  in  the 
accident  'as  a  result  of  his  disobedience'.  (If 
anyone  were  to  take  the  view  that  this  example  is 
childish,  and  the  father's  attitude  too  stupid  to 
merit  consideration,  I  would  be  in  full  agreement. 
But  the  father's  attitude  is  fundamentally  that  of  the 
law  of  Scotland  regarding  certain  forms  of  culpable 
homicide  -  see  infra 
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The  special  position  of  human  causes.  Another 
important  common  tendency  in  the  ascription  of  causes, 
and  one  which  often  leads  to  results  similar  to  those 
reached  by  picking  out  prohibited  acts,  is  the  tendency 
to  ascribe  an  event  to  a  cause  we  are  Able  to  influence. 
As  Professor  Collingwood  pointed  out,  the  cause  is 
'the  thing  I  can  put  right',  and  giving  the  following 
example:  - 
'If  my  car  "conks  out"  on  a  hill...  If  I 
had  ueen  a  person  who  could  flatten  out  hills 
by  stamping  on  them,  Eal  passer-by  would 
have  been  right  to  call  my  attention  to  the 
hill  as  the  cause  of  the  stoppage;  not 
because  the  hill  is  a  hill,  but  because  I 
can  flatten  it  out...  If  I  find  that  I  can 
get  a  result  by  certain  means,  I  may  be  pretty 
sure  that  I  should  not  be  getting  it  unless 
a  great  many  conditions  were  fulfilled; 
but  so  long  as  I  get  it  I  do  not  mind  what 
these  conditions  are...  For  any  given  person, 
the  cause  of  a  given  thing  is  that  one  of 
its  conditions  which  he  is  able  to  produce 
or  prevent'  (R.  G.  Collingwood,  'On  the  so- 
called  Idea  of  Causation',  Proceedings  of 
Aristotelian  Society,  1937-8,  p.  85,  at 
pp.  91-2). 
Since  the  purpose  of  the  criminal  law,  or  of  any 
system  of  punishment,  is  to  influence  human  beings, 
human  causes  are  naturally  of  particular  importance 
to  it  -  they  are  what  it  can  put  right,  or  at  any  rate 
what  it  is  supposed  to  be  able  to  put  right.  Human 
actions  are  also  of  special  importance  as  causal 
factors  because  they  are  gegarded  as  themselves 
uncaused.  This  is  a  necessary  inference  from  the 
doctrine  of  freewill;  and  without  some  form  of  that 
doctrine,  however  restricted,  there  can  be  no  moral 
responsibility  in  the  sense  of  praise  or  blame.  'In 
the  commonsense  notion  of  causation  a  deliberate  human 72 
action  has  a  special  status  as  a  cause  and  is  not 
regarded  in  its  turn  as  something  which  is  caused' 
i  (Hart  and  Honore,  'Causatio.  i  in  the  Law',  (1956) 
, /2  L.  Q.  R.  58,  '71),  and  Courts  often  insist  tnat  the 
law  is  not  concerned  with  metaphysical  ideas  of 
causation  but  only  with  commousense  views  (see,  e.  g., 
Stapley  v.  Gypsum  Mines  Ltd.,  [1953]  A.  C.  663, 
Lord  Reid  at  p.  681 
There  is,  therefore,  a  tendency  to  ignore  remoter 
agencies,  human  or  not,  and  to  take  the  cause  as  being 
the  human  agency  nearest  the  event  in  question. 
Human  actions  are  regarded  as  breaking  any  chain 
of  causation,  and  as  starting  a  new  series,  'caused' 
by  the  human  intervention.  An  example  of  this 
within  very  small  compass  is  the  typical  case  of  a 
motor-car  knocking  down  a  careless  pedestrian  who 
then  sues  the  motorist  for  causing  her  injury.  In 
M'Lean  v.  Bell  (1932  S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  21),  which  was  such 
a  case,  it  was  said  that, 
'In  one  sense,  but  for  the  negligence  of 
the  pursuer  (if  she  was  negligent)  in  attempting 
to  cross  the  road,  she  would  not  have  been 
struck;  and,  as  matter  simply  of  causation, 
her  acts  formed  a  necessary  element  in  the 
final  result,  since  without  them  no  accident 
could  have  occurred.  The  decision,  however, 
oß  the  case,  must  turn  not  simply  on  causation, 
but  on  responsibility.  The  pursuer's 
negligence  may  be  what  is  often  called  a 
causa  sine  qua  non,  yet,  as  regards 
responsibility,  1t  becomes  merely  evidential 
or  matter  of  narrative,  if  the  defender 
acting  reasonably  could  and  ought  to  have 
avoided  the  collision'(Lord  Macmillan  at  p.  29). 
The  key  phrase  is  'could  and  ought  to  have  avoided'. 
It  is  because  he  ought  to  have  avoided  the  accident 
that  the  search  for  a  cause  can  stop  at  the  driver  - 
we  have  found  someone  who  ought  to  have  done  otherwise V3 
than  he  did,  and  who,  had  he  done  otherwise,  could 
have  prevented  the  accident:  we  have  found  someone 
to  blame,  someone  responsible. 
Consequences  and  foresight. 
The  extent  of  the  consequences  of  a  given  action 
for  which  the  agent  will  be  responsible  may  be  limited 
in  four  different  ways.  A  man  may  be  blamed  (1) 
only  for  the  intended  results  of  his  action;  or 
(2)  only  for  results  he  foresaw;  or  (3)  for  results 
which  were  foreseeable,  i.  e.  which  the  average  man 
would  have  foreseen;  or  (4)  for  all  the  consequences 
directly  or  naturally  following  on  his  act.  The 
criteria  of  foresight  and  of  foreseeability  are 
each  capable  of  being  subdivided  into  foresight  and 
foreseeability  of  a  result  as  possible,  or  as  probable. 
There  is  probably  no  moral  theory  or  criminal  law 
which  holds  a  man  responsible  for  all  the  natural 
consequences  of  his  acts,  but  a  man  is  not  regarded 
as  responsible  for  something  which  happens  after 
his  act,  even  if  it  was  intended,  unless  it  was  at 
least  a  natural  consequence.  If  a  savage  sticks  pins 
into  the  effigy  of  his  enemy  with  the  intention  of 
killing  him,  and  his  enemy  dies  soon  afterwards, 
no  system  which  disbelieved  in  sympathetic  magic 
would  hold  the  savage  responsible  for  the  death.. 
(cf.  Bentham,  VIII,  2-5,  supra). 
Foresight  and  foreseeability  are  both  independent 
of  intention.  A  driver  in  a  hurry  may  see  the  like- 
lihood  of  a  collision,  but  at  the  same  time  have  no 
intention  of  causing  one,  and  desire  to  do-'all  he  can 
to  avoid  one.  Foresight  and  foreseeability  can  be 
distinguished  as  being  subjective  and  objective  criteria 
respectively;  but  the  distinction  is  not  zo  simple 74 
as  that  between  subjective  and  objective  intention. 
For  there  is  a  difference  between  foreseeability, 
and  something  which  can  be  descrijed  as  objective 
foresight.  Subjective  foresight,  what  the  agent 
a(tually  foresaw,  can  only  be  certainly  known  by  means 
of  a  credible  confession  from  the  agent  himself;  but 
we  may  objectively,  by  regarding  what  a  man  does, 
come  to  a  conclusion  as  to  what  he  actually  foresaw. 
And  this  may  not  be  the  same  as  -,:  chat  we  regard  as  fore- 
seeable.  There  is  nothing  very  unusual  in  saying 
that  people  do  not  always  foresee  the  obvious  results 
of  their  actions;  but  the  obvious  results  would  be 
regarded  as  foreseeable.  We  may  therefore  conclude 
from  an  examination  of  his  actions  that  a  man  did  not 
in  fact  foresee  a  particular  consequence  which  was 
foreseeable  -  and  this  conclusion  may  or  may  not 
accord  with  what  the  man  himself  says  he  foresaw. 
Foreseeability  is  a  general  concept,  independent 
of  the  particular  agent  involved  in  any  situation. 
It  may  be  defined  by  reference  to  the  statistically 
probable,  or  to  what  an  independent  observer  thinks 
he  would  have  foreseen,  or  to  what  a  judge  thinks 
the  agent  ought  to  have  foreseen.  On  any  of  these 
views,  what  the  agent  foresaw,  whether  this  is 
discovered  objectively  or  subjectively,  is  irrelevant. 
The  criterion  of  foresight  means  that  a  man  isresponsible 
for  what  he  in  fact  foresaw,  or  for  what  he  is  deemed 
to  have  foreseen.  The  criterion  of  foreseeability 
means  that  he  is  held  responsible  for  , 7hcatt  he  could  and 
ought  to  have  foreseen.  For  the  only  way  in  which  a 
moral  system  like  the  common  law  can  blame  a  man  for 
something  he  did  not  do,  is  by  showing  that  he  had  a 
duty  to  do  it;  and  so  failure  to  foresee,  and  to  take Y5 
the  precautions  such  foresight  would  have  shown  to  be 
necessary,  is  only  blameworthy  where  there  is  a  duty 
to  foresee. 
Punishment  and  responsibility 
Theories  of  Punishment. 
Theories  of  punishment  fall  into  two  main  groups  - 
retributive,  and  the  rest  -  corresponding  to  the  deon- 
tological  and  utilitarian  groups  of  moral  theories. 
The  retributive  theory  finds  the  justification  for 
punishment  in  a  past  act,  a  wrong  which  requires 
punishment  or  expiation.  Its  'object  all  sublime... 
is  to  make  the  punishment  fit  the  crime'.  The  other 
theories,  reformative,  preventive,  and  deterrent, 
all  find  their  justification  in  the  future,  in  the 
good  that  will  ue  produced  as  a  result  of  the 
punishment.  If  it  will  do  no  good  to  punish  someone, 
then  on  utilitarian  principles,  there  is  neither  right 
nor  duty  to  punish  him,  however  terrible  his  crimes. 
Utilitarian  theories.  The  weakness  of  utilitarian 
theories  has  in  their  failure  to  distinguish  punishment 
from  any  other  example  of  the  infliction  of  pain.  If 
the  only  justification  for  punishment  is  future  good, 
then  the  lunatic  who  is  put  in  an  asylum  is  being 
punished  as  much  as  the  prisoner  in  gaol,  and  his 
punishment  is  more  justifiable  than  that  of  the  prisoner, 
since  the  consequent  good  is  probably  greater,  and  is 
certainly  more  apparent.  Again,  on  the  deterrent 
theory,  which  is  the  most  important  Utilitarian 
theory  of  punishment,  the  important  thing  isto  punish 
the  apparently  guilty,  because  it  is  punishment  of  the 
apparently  guilty  which  deters  others  from  committing 
crimes.  It  would  be  proper  to  punish  an  innocent  man V6 
who  appeared  to  be  guilty  since  failure  to  punish  the 
apparently  guilty  has  a  deleterious  effect  on  a  policy 
of  deterrence,  since  it  makes  it  look  as  if  crimes 
can  be  committed  with  impunity. 
'The  Utilitarian  theory,  taken  alone,  requires  us 
to  say,  with  Samuel  Butler's  Erewhonians,  that  sickness 
is  a  crime  which  deserves  the  punishment  of  medicine. 
It  also  requires  us  to  say  when  "it  is  expedient  that 
one  man  should  die  for  the  people",  thathe  deserves 
this  as  a  punishment'  (D.  D.  Raphael,  Moral  Judgment, 
p.  70).  It  was  this  disregard  for  the  right  of  the 
individual  against  the  community  that  led  to  Kant's 
vehement  opposition  to  any  form  of  utilitarian  theory 
of  punishment.  'Juridical  punishment',  he  said,  'can 
never  be  administered  merely  as  a  means  for  promoting 
another  Good  either  with  regard  to  the  Criminal  himself 
or  to  Civil  Society,  but  must  in  all  cases  be  imposed 
only  because  the  individual  on  whom  it  is  inflicted 
has  committed  a  Crime.  For  one  man  ought  never  to 
be  dealt  with  merely  as  a  means  subservient  to  the 
purpose  of  another.  '  (Kant,  Philosophy  of  Right, 
trans.  W.  Hastie,  p.  195). 
The  retributive  theory.  The  retributive  theory  also 
faces  serious  difficulties.  Punishment  involves 
the  infliction  of  pain,  and.  pain,  in  itself,  is  evil. 
Its  infliction  requires  justification,  and  to  justify 
it  solely  by  reference  to  a  prior  infliction  of  evil 
by  the  person  punished,  is  rather  like  trying  to  make 
a  white  out  of  two  blacks.  What  good,  it  may  be  asked, 
does  it  do  to  hang  a  murderer?  It  only  leaves  you 
two  dead  men  instead  of  one.  'The  suffering  caused 
by  the  punishment  is,  considered  by  itself,  an  evil, 
and  ought  to  be  inflicted  only  for  the  sake  of  some '/? 
preponderating  good'  (Macaulay,  p.  455);  and 
it  is  very  difficult  to  see  what  good  is  provided  on 
the  retributive  theory.  There  is  perhaps  one 
positive  good  so  provided  -  this  is  that  punishment 
expresses  and  canalises  the  moral  indignation  of  the 
community;  and  that  it  thus  operates  as  a  re-assertion 
of  the  law  that  has  been  broken.  To  leave  an  act 
unpunished  may  be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  condoning 
it,  for  the  connection  between  crime  and  punishment 
is  a  very  close  and  fundamental  one  in  theordinary 
conscience.  It  is  just  because  the  utilitarian 
theories  ignore  this,  and  so  ignore  the  factor  of 
desert,  that  they  are  unsatisfactory.  And  it  is 
because  it  clings  so  strongly  to  the  concept  of 
desert  that  the  retributive  theory  retains  its 
strength  and  its  popular  appeal  in  spite  of  its 
futility. 
A  compromise  theory.  It  is  possible  to  adopt 
a  theory  which  stands  midway  between  retribution  and 
utility,  and  combines  the  best  features  of  both.  We 
can  accept  the  view  that  a  man  'must  first  be  found 
guilty  and  punishable  before  there  can  be  any  thought 
of  drawing  from  his  Punishment  any  benefit  for  himself 
or  his  fellow-citizens'  (Kant,  loc.  cit.  )  and  at  the 
same  time  decline  to  punish  him  unless  some  good  will 
result.  Thus,  punishment  of  someone  who  has  done  no 
wrong  can  never  be  justified,  and  the  connection 
between  punishment  and  desert  is  maintained;  but 
punishment  of  someone  who  deserves  punishment  can  only 
be  justified  on  the  utilitarian  ground  that  some  good 
will  come  of  the  punishment,  and  the  form  of  punishment 
must  therefore  be  chosen  by  reference  to  the  possible 
production  of  good.  (See  W.  G.  Maclagan,  'Punishment '18 
and  Retribution',  in  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV  (1939) 
p.  281). 
The  law  tends  to  combine  retribution  and 
deterrence.  It  takes  the  view  that  wrongdoers 
'ought  to  be  punished  with  the  pains  of  law,  to  deter 
others  from  committing  the  like  crimes  in  all  time 
coming'  as  the  old  indictments  used  to  say,  and 
it  assumes  that  punishment  has  this  effect;  but  it 
only  punishes  people  whom  it  regards  as  guilty  of  a 
crime,  and  it  moderates  its  punishment  when  there  are 
factors  present  which  diminish  the  criminal's  guilt. 
(cf.  Kirkwood,  1939  J.  C.  36;  M'Lean,  (18'76),  3  Coup. 
334).  Even  where  the  purpose  of  legal  punishment  is 
preventive  rather  than  deterrent,  as  in  preventive 
detention,  or  reformative,  as  in  corrective  training, 
the  law  still  requires  the  commission  of  a  criminal 
act  as  a  necessary  preliminary  to  punishment.  It 
requires,  indeed,  for  preventive  detention,  not  merely 
a  criminal  act  on  the  occasion  of  the  punishment, 
but  a  series  of  prior  convictions  followed  by 
more  usual  forms  of  punishmeit.  It  is  true  that  a  man 
may  be  sentenced  to  eight  years'  preventive  detention 
for  stealing  a  bundle  of  laundry,  but  he  must  have 
stolen  the  bundle,  and,  in  addition,  he  must  have 
been  previously  convicted  on"the  statutory  number 
of  occasions  (e.  g.  Churchill,  1952,  J.  C.  6-  the 
accused  in  fact  had  forty  previous  convictions). 
Punishment  and  freewill. 
So  long  as  punishment  is  considered  retributive 
to  any  extent,  so  long  as  itis  bound  up  with  the  concept 
of  desert,  it  can  only  be  inflicted  for  an  act  freely 
done;  desert  presupposes  freedom.  In  the  classic '/9 
Kantian  phrase,  'I  ought  implies  I  can';  a  man 
cannot  be  blamed  for  something  he  could  not  help 
doing,  or  for  failing  to  do  the  impossible. 
The  problem  of  freewill  is  probably  insoluble 
on  the  metaphysical  level,  and  its  application  in  every- 
day  judgments  involves  many  paradoxes.  Thus,  a  man 
is  punished  only  when  he  could  have  done  otherwise 
than  he  in  fact  did,  when  his  action  stemmed  from  his 
free  choice;  but  we  punish  him  in  the  hope  that  by 
so  doing  we  can  influence  his  future  actions  and  those 
of  other  free  agents.  Fortunately  the  legal 
problem  is  simpler  than  this.  'The  ethical  question 
is  not  the  metaph:  sical  one,  whether  the  human  will 
as  such  is  or  is  not  obsolutely  uncaused,  but  rather 
how  to  discriminate  properly  between  those  who 
should  and  those  who  should  not  be  held  accountable 
for  legally  progibited  acts.  And  here  the  prevailing 
ethical  conscience  today  seems  to  recognise  a  common 
sense  distinction  between  voluntary  and  involuntary 
acts,  and  generally  holds  that  no  one  should  be 
punished  for  any  act  in  which  his  will  did  not 
enter'  (M.  R.  Cohen,  Reason  and  Law,  p.  29). 
The  question,  of  course,  is  what  acts  do  we 
recognise  as  voluntary,  as  'free'.  'Freedom'  is  a 
vague  word  and  can  mean  free  from  anything,  but  for 
legal  purposes  we  can  say  that  it  means  free  from  any 
influence  which  cannot  be  affected  by  punishment. 
The  thief  who  steals  from  greed  acts  freely  because 
his  tendency  to  give  way  to  the  influence  of  his 
greed  can  be  countered  by  the  threat  of  punishment 
which  will  provide  him  with  a  motive  of  fear  to  set 
against  his  greed.  But  the  kleptomaniac  who  steals 
because  he  is  diseased  does  not  act  freely,  since 
punishment  cannot  affect  the  mania  which  causes  hin 
to  steal.  Whatever  the  metaphysical  or  even  ethical 80 
difficulties,  it  seems  that  the  law  can  and  indeed 
must  accept  Nowell-Smith's  view  that  'A  man  is  not 
punishable  because  he  is  guilty;  he  is  guilty  because 
he  is  punishable,  that  is  to  say,  because  some  useful 
result  is  supposed  to  accrue  from  punishing  him' 
('Freewill  and  Responsibility'  in  Mind,  Vol.  5'/, 
(1948),  pp.  45,  at  p.  -58),  provided,  of  course,  that 
we  remember  that  he  must  also  be  guilty  in  the  sense 
of  having  committed  a  criminal  act.  The  result  is 
that  punishment  can  only  be  inflicted  for  a  free 
and  blameworthy  act,  but  that  an  act  is  only 
considered  to  be  free  and  blameworthy  if  it  is  capable 
of  being  affected  by  punishment. 
Self-determinism.  This  view  of  guilt  and 
freedom  must  be  considered  in  the  light  of  the  theory 
of  self-determinism.  This  is  the  theory  that  a  man's 
actions  are  all  ultimately  determined  by  his  character 
and  are  therefore  not  free.  A  man  is  not  responsible 
for  his  character,  it  is  argued,  because  it  is  some- 
thing  with  which  he  is  born,  or  at  any  rate  which  depends 
on  hereditary,  environmental,  and  other  factors  beyond 
his  control.  A  man  acts  as  he  does  because  he  is 
the  sort  of  person  he  is,  and  he  cannot  help  being  the 
sort  of  person  he  is.  It  may  be  that  some  facets 
of  his  character  are  corrigible  while  others  are  not, 
but  the  very  corrigibility  of  any  facet  depends  itself 
on  the  sort  of  man  he  is  -  some  people  are  so  made 
that  they  can  be  cured  of  a  tendency  to  steal  or  drink, 
others  are  so  made  that  they  cannot  be  cured  of  such 
tendencies.  And  of  course  the  man  who  is  constitution- 
ally  incapable  of  being  cured  of  a  vicious  tendency 
does  not  act  freely  when  he  succumbs  to  the  promptings 
of  that  vice.  (The  theory  is  fully  expounded  in 81 
W.  D.  Ross,  the  Foundations  of  Ethics,  ch.  10). 
This  theory  cannot,  it  is  submitted,  be  adopted, 
though  it  emphasises  an  important  aspect  of  certain 
problems,  particularly  that  of  addiction  which  will  be 
dealt  with  shortly  (infra,  3.2  ).  It  depends  on  a 
peculiar  use  of  language,  which  distinguishes  between 
a  man  and  his  'character'  which  is  sometimes  referred 
to  as  his  'universe  of  desires'  because  it  is 
the  result  of  a  balance  of  all  his  inborn  desires. 
It  sees  men  spending  their  lives  fighting  a  hopeless 
battle  with  their  desires.  The  man  born  with  only  a 
weak  desire  to  do  his  duty  or  to  be  kind,  and  a  strong 
desire  to  be  selfish  or  cruel,  will  always  choose 
to  perform  the  more  selfish  or  cruel  of  two  possible 
actions:  and  since  he  cannot  help  being  selfish  or 
cruel  he  cannot  be  blamed  for  his  choice.  But  this 
dichotomy  between  a  person  and  his  character  is  a 
surprising  one,  and  contrary  to  ordinary  usage.  For 
a  man  is  his  character,  the  sum  of  his  conflicting 
desires,  and  when  we  judge  the  man,  it  is  his  character 
that  we  are  judging.  It  may  sound  meaningful  to  say 
'Is  a  man  to  be  blamed  for  his  dispositions?  ',  but  this 
apparent  meaningfulness  beings  to  disappear  if  we  ask 
'Can  he  be  blamed  for  his  desires?  ',  and  disappears 
completely  when  we  ask  'Can  he  be  blamed  for  his 
character,  for  being  himself?  '.  We  do  in  fact 
praise  a  man  for  being  kind,  blame  him  for  being 
selfish.  It  is  just  when  an  action  is  'in  character' 
that  we  feel  happiest  about  judging  it.  Where  an 
action  is  'out  of  character'  vie  do  not  hail  it  as  an 
example  of  free  choice,  we  try  to  see  what  external 
circumstances  caused  the  man  to  act  in  such  an 
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uncharacteristic  way. 
But  though  it  does  not  make  sense  to  say  ''Twas 
not  Hamlet  wronged  you,  but  his  character',  it  does 
make  sense  to  say  ''Tvias  not  Hamlet  wronged  you,  but 
his  madness'  (cf.  Hamlet,  V.  2).  This  is  because 
of  the  distinction  between  moral  and  non-moral 
characteristics,  which  is  the  distinction  between  what 
is  corrigible  and  punishable,  and  what  is  not;  and 
it  is  a  distinction  which  ultimately  the  self- 
determinist  cannot  make.  The  stupid  are  not  blamed, 
the  wicked  are;  punishment  may  curb  wickedness, 
it  will  notincrease  knowledge.  '71e  might  therefore 
say  that  moral  traits  of  character  are  just  those 
traits  that  are  known  to  be  amenable  to  praise  or 
blame;  and  this  would  explain  why  we  punish  idle  boys 
but  not  stupid  ones,  thei4ves  but  not  kleptomaniacs, 
the  sane  but  not  the  insane'  (Nowell  Smith,  Ethics, 
p.  304). 
The  problem  of  addiction.  Actions  which  spring 
from  a  diseased  state  of  mind  would  thus  be  regarded 
as  punishable  only  if  (a)  the  agent  could  be  considered 
responsible  for  his  condition  -  the  requirement  of 
desert;  and  (b)  the  disease  was  amenable  to 
punishment  -  the  requirement  of  utility.  These  are 
probably  two  sides  of  the  same  coin  -  we  should  not 
attribute  an  action  to  disease  if  we  thought  the 
agent  responsible.  But  the  phenomenon  of  addiction 
presents  awkward  problems  from  whatever  side  of  the 
question  it  is  approached.  The  addict  is,  by 
definition,  unable  to  control  his  craving,  and  so 
might  be  said  not  to  be  responsible  for  anything  he  does 
as  a  result  of  the  craving,  or  of  the  effects  of  any 
drug  for  which  he  craves.  Nor  will,  punishment  cure 
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But  his  condition  may  be  the  result  of  his  own 
earlier  actings,  so  that  he  can  oe  said  to  have  made 
himself  an  addict.  His  addiction  was  at  one  stage 
a  habit,  and  it  may  be  said  that  persons  are 
responsible  for  their  habits.  Aristotle  defined  the 
good  man  as  a  man  addicted  to  goodness.  'Moral  goodness' 
he  said,  'is  the  child  of  habit..  the  moral  virtues  we 
acquire  by  first  exercising  them..  we  become  just  by 
performing  just  actions,  temperate  by  performing  temp- 
erate  actions,  brave  by  performing  brave  actions... 
We  find  legislators  seeking  to  make  good  men  of  their 
fellows  by  making  good  behaviour  habitual  with  them' 
(Mich.  Ethics,  II,  I,  p.  ß.  55).  So  the  habit  of 
doing  good  acts  is  something  praiseworthy  and  to  be 
encouraged,  the  habit  of  doing  evil  something  to  be 
blamed  and  discouraged.  But  there  comes  a  stage, 
at  any  rate  in  the  case  of  the  drug  addict,  when 
punishment  is  unable  to  discourage  the  habit.  At  that 
stage  there  are  two  ways  of  judging  the  situation. 
On  the  one  band  the  addict  can  be  thought  of  as  being 
himself  to  blame  for  his  addiction.  'There  was  a  time 
when  he  need  not  have  been  ill:  but  once  he  let  him- 
self  go  the  opportunity  was  lost'  (ib.  III9  5,  p.  91). 
He  is  therefore  to  blame  for  his  addiction,  and 
punishable,  if  only  in  order  to  deter  others  from 
allowing  themselves  to  degenerate  into  a  comparable 
state.  But  on  thec,  other  hand,  once  a  person  has 
become  an  addict,  he  is  no  longer  capable  of 
controlling  his  addiction;  he  is  not  to  blame  for 
taking  the  drink  or  drugs  he  now  takes  because  he 
cannot  help  taking  them.  And  punishment  will  not 
help  or  deter  him  or  anyone-else  in  his  kind  of  state. 
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habit  that  a  man  cannot  break  however  hard  he  tries. 
But  these  are  not  culpable  states  simply  because, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  case  in  the  past,  he  cannot 
now  avoid  them'  (Nowell  Smith,  op.  cit.  p.  265).  To 
punish  him  now  for  those  earlier  indulgences  from  which 
he  could  have  refrained  seems  futile,  and  suggests 
a  failure  to  cope  with  or  recognise  the  true  situation. 
Another  objection  to  punishing  the  fifty-year  old 
alcoholic  for  the  drinks  he  took  at  the  age  of  thirty 
is  that  when  he  drank  at  thirty  he  had  no  intention 
of  becoming  an  alcoholic,  and  probably  did  not  fore- 
see  the  possibility  of  his  becoming  one.  It  is  very 
difficult  to  find  the  occasions  when  he  was  not  yet 
an  alcoholic  but  should  have  realised  that  unless 
he  stopped  drinking  he  would  soon  become  one.  The 
nearer  he  comes  to  the  stage  of  addiction,  the  clearer 
it  is  that  he  may  become  one  -  and  the  more  difficult 
for  him  to  stop  the  habit. 
Addiction  is  the  type  case  for  those  situations 
in  which  a  man  voluntarily  puts  himself  into  a  condition 
in  which  he  is  incapable  of  free  action,  and  then  does 
something  criminal.  The  problem  is  always,  can  the 
subsequent  crime  be  punished  because  the  agent  himself 
created  the  situation  in  which  he  lost  his  freedom, 
because  he  was,  so  to  speak,  responsible  for  his  own 
irresponsibility,  or  is  he  to  be  treated  as  the 
irresponsible  person  he  has  become?  If  punishment 
is  only  to  be  directed  to  the  original  free  act  which 
made  him  irresponsible,  we  must  ask  the  further  question 
whether  he  can  be  treated  as  responsible  for  the  later 
act  as  a  consequence  of  his  free  act,  and  the  answer 
to  this  depends,  of  course,  on  the  causal  criterion 
adopted,  on  whether,  for  example,  he  foresaw  that 85 
drinking  cheap  red  wine  might  make  him  so  violent 
that  he  would  hit  someone  with  a  bottle. 86 
Chapter  3:  The  Criminal  Act 
The  actus  reus 
It  is  axiomatic  that  before  there  can  be  a 
conviction  for  crime  there  must  have  been  created 
a  situation  forbidden  by  the  criminal  law  -  and  for 
each  crime  there  is  an  appropriate  forbidden 
situation.  The  forbidden  situation  is  known  as 
the  actus  reus,  which  has  been  defined  as  'such  result 
of  human  conduct  as  the  law  seeks  to  prevent'  (J.  MC. 
Turner,  'The  Mental  Element  in  Crimes  at  Common  Law', 
in  Modern  Approach,  p.  195  at  p.  196).  What 
constitutes  the  actus  reus  of  any  particular  crime 
can  only  be  discovered  by  reference  to  the  definition 
of  that  crime.  A  criminal  charge  must  set  out 
facts  which  amount  to  a  situation  forbidden  by  law, 
and  if  it  fails  to  do  so  because  of  the  omission  of 
an  essential  factor,  it  is  funditus  null,  since  it 
lacks  the  minimum  requirement  for  conviction. 
However  wicked  a  man's  intentions  may  be  he  is 
guilty  of  no  crime  if  he  has  brought  about  no  actus 
reus.  A  soldier  who  aims  at  his  sergeant  and  kills 
an  enemy  instead  has  not  committed  murder,  the  man 
who  intends  to  steal  an  umbrella  from  a  cloakroom 
and  takes  his  own  by  mistake  has  not  commited  theft 
(cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para.  '/). 
The  concept  of  the  actus  reus 
The  actus  reus  of  any  crime  can  be  positively 
defined,  at  least  to  some  extent.  There  must,  for 87 
example,  be  the  killing  of  a  human  being  before  there 
can  be  homicide.  This  positive  definition  may  include 
certain  attendant  circumstances,  so  that  the  crime  is 
the  production  of  S  in  circumstances  C,  and  not  merely 
the  production  of  S.  For  example,  the  infliction 
of  'cruel  and  barbarous  usages'  is  not  per  se  a 
crime  (Watt  v.  Kerr,  (1868)  1  Coup.  123);  nor  is  it 
a  crime  merely  to  make  threats  (Kenny,  1951  J.  C.  104); 
but  in  the  appropriate  circumstances  these  things 
may  be  an  essential  part  of  an  actus  reus. 
The  case  of  M'Kenzie  v.  Whyte  ((1864)  4  Irv.  5/0) 
is  an  example  of  an  act  neutral  in  itself,  which  may 
or  may  not  be  criminal,  depending  on  circumstances. 
The  charge  was  that  the  accused  'did  wickedly  and 
feloniously  expose  their  persons  in  an  indecent  and 
unbecoming  manner,  and  did  take  off  their  clothes  and 
expose  themselves....  in  a  state  of  nudity,  to  the 
annoyance  of  the  lieges'  without  further  specification 
of  circumstances,  and  it  was  held  to  be  a  bad  charge. 
Lord  Neaves  pointed  out  that  'A  woman  may  be  suckling 
her  child  by  the  roadside  under  circumstances  which  to 
some  may  constitute  indecent  exposure  of  her  person. 
A  female  at  a  ball  or  in  a  ballet  may  be  so  dressed 
as  to  fall  under  a  similar  imputation'  (at  p.  573),  but 
in  these  cases  there  is  no  crime.  Indecent  exposure 
in  itself  may  be  'for  laudable  and  innocent  objects' 
(Lord  Justice-Clerk  Inglis  at  p.  576),  and  is  only 
criminal  if  it  happens  in  circumstances  calculated  to 
outrage  public  decency.  This  circumstance  is  therefore 
part  of  the  positive  definition  of  the  actus  reus 
of  indecent  exposure. 
The  concept  of  actus  reus  is  also  a  'defeasible' 
one.  (On  defeasible  concepts  see  H.  L.  A.  Hart,  'The 88 
Ascription  of  Responsibility  and  Rights',  Proceedings 
of  Aristotelian  Society,  =1948-9,  p.  171).  That  is 
to  say,  the  ictus  reus  of  a  crime  may  be  described 
by  a  sentence  of  the  kind  'bringing  about  a  situation 
S  unless  in  circumstances  Cl  or  C2  or  ...  '.  The 
situation  prohibited  by  law  must  be  brought  about 
in  the  absence  of  circumstances  which  would  constitute 
a  legal  excuse.  The  killing  of  a  human  being  is 
the  'Type-situation'  for  homicide  (see  G.  L.  Radbruch, 
'Jurisprudence  in  the  Criminal  Law',  (1936)  18  J.  Comp. 
Leg.  and  Int.  Law,  p.  212,  at  p.  221),  but  killing  a 
human  being  is  not  homicide  if  done  in  certain 
privileged  circumstances,  such  as  those  surrounding  a 
judicial  execution,  or  those  of  self-defence.  The 
difference  between  a  'defeasing'  circumstance  like 
this  and  a  positive  requirement  such  as  one  that 
indecent  exposure  to  be  criminal  gust  occur  in  circum- 
stances  calculated  to  outrage  decency,  is  this  - 
indecent  exposure  is  not  criminal  if  certain  other 
circumstances  are  absent;  killing  a  human  being  is 
criminal  unless  certain  other  circumstances  are 
present.  For  an  indictment  to  be  good  it  must  set 
forth  an  actus  reus,  i.  e.  a  prima  facie  crime.  It  is 
irrelevant  merely  to  libel  exposure  because  this 
is  not  a  prima  facie  crime,  and  it  is  necessary  to 
libel  also  the  circumstances  which  make  it  criminal. 
It  is  relevant  to  libel  the  killing  of  a  human  being, 
since  this  is  prima  facie  a  crime,  and  it  is  unnecessary 
to  set  out  the  absence  of  any  'defeasing'  circumstance. 
Actus  reus  and  wens  rea.  The  most  important 
'defeasing  circumstance  is  the  absence  of  a  criminal 
state  of  mind,  of  mens  rea  (for  the  concept  of  mens  rea 
see  infra  the  maxim  actus  non  sit  reus  nisi 89 
mens  sit  rea  is  proverbial.  Taken  literally  it  means 
that  it  is  improper  to  call  any  situation  an  actus  reus 
unless  it  was  created  with  mens  rea;  but  it  is  possible 
and  convenient  to  treat  the  lack  of  mens  res  as 
different  from  the  presence  of  any  other  'defeasing' 
factor.  The  term  'actus  reus'  can  then  be  used  for 
situations  which  would  be  criminal  were  they 
accompanied  by  mens  rea;  a  term  is  necessary  for  all 
the  objective  or  external  ingredients  of  a  crime, 
and'actus  reus'  is  the  obvious  one  to  use. 
Although  the  absence  of  mens  rea  will  normally 
prevent  the  conviction  of  the  creator  of  the  actus  raus, 
it  does  not  prevent  the  objective  act  or  situation 
being  regarded  as  criminal  for  other  purposes;  it 
may  still  be  a  crime,  albeit  an  'unenforceable  crime' 
so  far  as  the  person  who  lacks  mens  rea  is  concerned. 
A  man  who  forces  someone  else  to  perform  a  criminal 
act  cannot  plead  in  answer  to  a  charge  of  instigating 
the  other  to  commit  the  crime  or  of  assisting  him 
in  the  crime,  that  no  crime  was  committed,  because 
the  act  was  done  under  duress,  and  that  therefore 
he  must  be  acquitted.  (R.  v.  Bourne,  (1952)  36  Cr.  App. 
Rep.  125).  (There  seems  no  reason  to  suggest  that 
a  different  result  would  have  been  arrived  at  in 
Scotland.  The  facts  were  that  the  accused  forced 
his  wife  to  have  intercourse  with  a  dog). 
There  are  some  crimes  which  have  a  mental  element 
as  part  of  their  positive  definition.  The  best  example 
of  such  a  crime  is  theft,  which  is  the  'felonious  taking 
of  the  property  of  another  for  lucre'  (Hume,  i,  57; 
Alison,  i.  250).  If  the  taking  is  not  felonious 
there  is  no  theft,  just  as  there  is  no  theft  if  there 
is  no  taking.  'Felonious'  is  not,  however,  a  helpful 
word,  and  it  obscures  the  distinction  between  crimes 90 
like  theft  which  require  a  specific  intention,  and 
other  common  law  crimes  which  require  only  a  more 
general  criminal  state  of  mind.  If  theft  is  treated 
as  a  crime  requiring  a  specific  intention,  if  it  is 
defined  as  'taking  the  property  of  another  for  lucre' 
or  'taking  the  property  of  another  with  the  intention 
of  retaining  it',  then  where  a  lunatic  or  a  child  of 
seven  takes  with  that  intention  there  will  be  an 
actus  reus,  and  anyone  receiving  the  property  in  the 
knowledge  of  how  it  was  taken,  will  be  guilty  of 
resetting  stolen  property.  But  if  a  sane,  or  an  insane, 
person  takes  goods  with  the  intention  of  returning 
them  after  use,  there  is  no  theft  at  all.  Whenever  a 
crime  is  defined  by  reference  to  a  special  intention, 
that  intention  can  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  actus 
reus,  and  not  of  the  mens  rea. 
Criminal  conduct 
The  need  for  a  voluntary  act. 
The  actus  reus  must  be  brought  about  by  some  form 
of  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  accused,  whether  an  act 
or  an  omission  to  act.  There  is  involved  in  the  concept 
of  conduct  a  certain  minimal  mental  element.  The 
act  must  be  voluntary  in  the  sense  that  itmust  proceed 
from  the  independent  volition  of  the  accused  who 
must  be  an  active  particiapant  in  the  creation  of 
the  actus  reust  he  must  be  an  agent,  and  not  a  mere 
passive  instrument.  Attempts  to  analyse  the  concept 
of  an  act  are  as  futile  as  are  attempts  to  distinguish 
an  act  from  its  consequences.  It  is  sufficient  to  refer 
to  part  of  the  argument  in  the  famous  case  of  Hales  v. 
Petit  ((1562)  1  Plow.  253,  quoted  in  R.  E.  Megarry, 
Miscellany-at-Law,  p.  231)  which  inspired  the  grave- )1 
digger's  exposition  of  the  1av:  '  of  suicide  in  Hamlet. 
It  is  as  follows:  i  ýý 
tine  act  consists  of  three  parts.  The 
first  is  the  imagination,  which  is  a  reflection 
or  ý.  tediation  of  the  mind,  whether  or  no  it  is 
convenient  for  hiii  to  destroy  himself,  and 
what  way  it  can  be  done.  The  second  is  the 
resolution,  weich  is  a  determination  of  the 
mind  to  destroy  ýaimself,  and  to  do  it  in 
this  or  that  particular  way.  The  third  is 
the  perfection,  which  is  the  execution  of 
what  the  i.  iind  has  resolved  to  do.  And  this 
perfection  consists  of  two  parts,  viz., 
the  beginning  and  the  end.  The  beginning 
is  the  doing  of  the  act  which  causes  the 
death,  and  the  end  is  the  death,  which  is 
only  a  sequel  to  the  act.  ' 
In  other  words,  the  actus  reus  must  be  preceded  oy 
an  act,  the  criminal  conduct,  and  the  act  must  include 
a  consideration  of  the  proposed  course  of  action  and 
a  resolution  to  carry  it  out. 
Somnambulistic  acts.  The  requirement  of  a 
resolution  to  carry  out  the  criminal  conduct 
means  that  unconscious  actings  cannot  consi.  itute 
criminal  conduct  -  whether  or  not  they  can  be  called 
acts  in  a  general  sense,  they  are  not  acts  for  the  nur- 
poses  of  the  criminal  lave.  'Such  as  commit  any  crime, 
whilst  they  sleep,  are  compared  to  infants,  and 
therefore  they  are  not  punisht'  (Mackenzie,  I,  6). 
This  is  almost  certainly  still  the  Law  of  Scotland, 
but  the  only  case  on  the  subject,  that  of  Simon  Fraser 
in  1878  (4  Coup.  70),  is  very  unsatisfactory.  Fraser 
killed  his  daughter  while  in  a  state  of  somnambulism 
in  w:  iich  he  believed  her  to  be  a  wild  beast  attacking 
him.  The  case  is  thus  complicated  by  the  presence 
of  a  delusion,  but  no  case  of  mistake  was  put  forward 
by  the  defence,  and  the  possible  defence  of  insanity 92 
was  side-stepped  by  Lord  Moncrieff,  the  Lord  Justice- 
Clerk,  who  said  to  the  jury, 
'The  question  whether  a  state  of 
somnambulism  such  as  this  is  to  be  considered 
a  state  of  insanity  or  not  is  a  matter  with 
which  I  think  you  should  not  trouble  yourselves. 
It  is  a  question  on  which  medical  authority 
is  not  agreed.  ' 
His  Lordship  went  on  to  tell  the  jury  that  their  best 
course  would  be  to 
'find  that  the  panel  killed  his  child, 
but  that  he  was  in  a  state  in  which  he  was 
unconscious  of  the  act  which  he  was  committing 
by  reason  of  the  condition  of  somnambulism 
and  that  he  was  not  responsible'  (pp.  75-6). 
The  jury  found  as  directed  and  the  case  was 
adjourned.  Fraser  then  gave  an  undertaking  to 
sleep  alone  in  future,  and  at  the  resumed  diet 
the  case  was  dealt  with  by  the  following  interlocutor: 
'In  respect  the  Counsel  for  the  Crown 
does  not  move  for  sentence,  and  in  respect 
that  the  panel  has  come  under  certain 
obligations  satisfactory  to  Crown  Counsel, 
the  Court  deserted  the  diet  simvliciter 
against  the  panel  and  dismissed  him  from 
the  Bar'. 
The'terms  of  this  interlocutor  suggest  that 
Fraser  was  convicted  and  was  guilty,  but  that,  as  an 
act  of  administrative  discretion,  the  Crown  accepted 
his  undertaking  and  declined  to  move  for  sentence. 
Yet  the  jury  held  that  he  was  not  responsible,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  their  verdict  can  be  read 
as  anything  other  than  as  an  acquittal,  or  how  the 
Crown  could  have  had  any  locus  to  move  for  sentence 
at  all.  The  verdict  and  interlocutor  between  them 
make  it  impossible  to  say  on  precisely  what  grounds 
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The  simplest  interpretation  of  Fraser  is  that 
he  was  not  guilty,  and  that  the  reason  for  his  lack 
of  responsibility  was  that  the  death  of  his  daughter 
was  not  the  result  of  any  act  of  his,  since  what 
he  did  he  did  unconsciously.  The  question  of 
insanity  did  not  arise  because  his  unconsciousness, 
unlike  that  of,  for  example,  persons  in  epileptic 
fugues,  was  not  the  result  of  mental  disease,  but 
of  sleep,  and  because  his  delusion  was  not  an  insane 
delusion  but  a  bad  dream.  If  Fraser  is  to  be  said 
to  have  acted  at  all,  it  must  be  conceded  that  he 
acted  involuntarily,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  refuse 
to  accept  in  Scotland  Stephen's  view  that  'no 
involuntary  action,  whatever  effects  it  may  produce, 
amounts  to  a  crime...  I  do  not  know  indeed  that  it 
has  ever  been  suggested  that  a  person  who  in  his  sleep 
set  fire  to  a  house  or  caused  the  death  of  another 
would  be  guilty  of  arson  or  murder'  (Stephen,  2  H.  C.  L. 
p.  100). 
A  comparable  situation  arose  in  South  Africa 
in  the  case  of  R.  v.  Dhlamini  (C1955(1J  S.  A.  L.  R.  120) 
where  the  accused  had  been  dreaming  that  he  was 
defending  himself  from  an  assault  when  he  half-awoke, 
and  mechanically,  without  volition  or  intention, 
stabbed  a  man  kneeling  beside  him  with  a  knife.  He 
was  acquitted  by  a  simple  verdict  of  not  guilty. 
Hypnotic  acts.  The  sane 
persons  acting  under  hypnosis, 
have  not  volundarily  submitted 
hypnosis.  Glanville  Williams 
because  a  hypnotised  person  is 
the  hypnosis  cannot  affect  his 
arguments  apply  to 
at  any  rate  where  they 
themselves  to  the 
takes  the  view  that 
not  unconscious, 
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it  may  be  a  relevant  fact  to  be  considered  in 
mitigation  of  sentence.  (G1.  Williams,  para.  5). 
But  the  crux  of  the  matter  is  whether  the  act  in 
question  is  voluntary,  or  merely  automatic,  and  the 
act  of  the  hypnotised  person  is  automatic  -  he  may 
be  regarded  as  simply  the  instrument  of  the  hypnotiser. 
His  position  can  be  perhaps  compared  to  that  of  a 
mentally  weak  person  who  is  'coerced'  into  taking 
part  in  a  crime  by  someone  having  influence  over  him. 
(Cf.  Wm.  Ross  and  Robt.  Robertson,  (1836)  1  Sw.  195). 
He  is  less  than  an  innocent  agent,  and  more  like  a 
robot  controlled  by  the  hypnotist.  Whether  or  not 
a  person  can  in  fact  be  hypnotised  into  doing  something 
repggnant  to  his  ordinary  nature  is  a  question  of 
medical  fact,  but  even  the  person  generally  not  averse 
from  killing  cannot  be  said  to  kill  voluntarily 
if  in  a  particular  instance  he  was  completely  under 
the  hypnotist's  control. 
There  is  no  law  on  the  subject  in  Scotland. 
It  would,  however,  be  reasonable  to  adopt  the  view 
that  where  'the  patient  was  entirely  deprived  of  control 
over  his  actions  it  would  seem  consonant  with  principle 
to  hold  that  the  acts  done  by  him  were  the  acts  rather 
of  the  hypnotiser  than  of  himself'  (W.  T.  S.  Stallybrass, 
IA  Comparison  of  the  General  Principles  of  Criminal 
Law  in  England  with  the  "Progetto  Definitivo  di  un 
Nuovo  Codice  Penale"  of  Alfred  Rocco'  in  Modern 
Approach,  p.  390,  at  p.  403);  andthis  view  is  in 
fact  taken  by  french  law  (cf.  Donnedieu  de  Vabres, 
p.  202). 
The  type  Qf  act  necessary. 
There  is  no  precise  limitation  On  the  type  of 
act  necessary  or  sufficient  to  constitute  criminal 
conduct  -  any  conscious  human  action  may  be  enough 95 
in  the  particular  circumstances  of  a  given  case. 
Perhaps  the  only  general  requirement  is  that  there  must 
be  a  fairly  specific  act,  or  course  of  action.  Such 
a  requirement  is  necessary  because  the  actus  reus 
must  be  seen  to  be  causally  connected  with  the 
conduct,  and  to  have  been  caused  by  an  act  of  the 
accused.  For  this  reason  'we...  leave  unpunished 
those  various  modes  of  unkindness,  ingratitude, 
treachery,  and  oppression,  by  which,  iii  too  many 
instances,  the  heart  and  health  are  broken,  and  the 
sufferer  is  conducted  to  the  grave,  by  a  longer 
and  more  painful  passage'  (Hume,  i.  189),  But 
any  type  of  act  is  sufficient,  provided  it  is  sufficiently 
specific.  Words,  for  example,  are  as  much  acts 
as  are  deeds,  and  indeed  some  crimes,  like  fraud  or 
blackmail,  are  usually  committed  almost  entirely 
by  the  medium  of  words.  To  kill  a  person  with  a 
weak  heart  by  deliberately  sending  him  a  telegram 
containing  the  false  news  of  a  dreadful  occurrence 
would  surely  be  murder  if  the  shock  in  fact  killedhim. 
Hume(ib.  190-1)  and  Macdonald  (pp.  92-3)  both 
consider  that  it  is  mu5der  to  give  material  perjured 
evidence  which  lead  to  conviction  and  execution 
for  a  capital  crime,  although  both  stress  the  difficulty 
of  proving  such  a  charge.  There,  seems  no  reason  why 
this  should  not  be  so,  although  there  is  English 
authority  to  the  contrary  (see  Kenny,  para.  13); 
indeed  Biblical  law  specifically  makes  such  conduct 
criminal  (D,  eut.  19,16-20).  In  such  cases  intention, 
act,  and  causal  connection  with  the  actus  reus  are 
all  present;  the  intervening  actors  such  as  the  judge, 
jury,  and  hangman,  are  merely  innocent  agents  of  the 
perjurer. 96 
Omi  q.  inna_ 
Crimes  of  omission  and  crimes  of  commission  by 
omission.  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  at  the  out- 
set  between  crimes  of  omission  on  the  one  hand,  and 
crimes  of  commission  conmited  by  means  of  omission, 
on  the  other.  (The  distinction  is  known  in  French 
law  as  that  between  delfts  d'omission  and  delits  de 
commission  par  omission  -  Donnedieu  de  Yabres,  p.  70, 
and  in  German  as  that  between  true  (echt)  and  false 
(  unecht)  omissions  -  Schänke-Schröder,  p,  26). 
The  first  class  covers  all  those  crimes  which 
consist  of  a  failure  to  do  something,  such  as  failing 
to  register  the  birth  of  a  child,  or  failing  to  s:!,  itch 
on  one's  car  lights  at  lighting-up  time.  Here  the 
omission  is  a  crime  in  itself,  and  there  are  no 
difficulties  of  principle. 
In  the  second  group  it  is  not  the  omission  but  its 
consequence  which  is  criminal,  and  the  consequence  is 
a  crime  of  commission.  To  commit  homicide  by 
refraining  from  feeding  a  child  is  to  commit  a  crime 
of  commission  by  means  of,  so  to  speak,  an  'act  of 
omission',  and  not  to  commit  a  crime  of  omission. 
It  is  only  in  certain  cases  that  the  failure  to  do 
something  involves  guilt  of  a  crime  of  commission. 
Omissions  and  negative  acts.  The  special 
problems  of  omissions  only  arise  where  the  criminal 
consequence  is  not  intended.  Where  it  is  intended 
the  omission  is  really  an  act,  a  negative  act,  and  is 
in  the  same  position  as  any  other  act.  The  doing  of 
A  can  almost  always  be  described  as  the  failure  to  do 
not-A,  and  vice  versa.  To  starve  someone  is  to  refrain 
from  giving  him  food,  but  the  omission  to  feed,  if 
done  with  the  intention  of  causing  death,  is  as  much 
an  act  as  firing  a  gun.  To  fail  to  give  a  diabetic 9'1 
his  insulin  because  one  is  too  lazy  to  do  so, 
or  because  one  does  not  think  it  is  one's  business 
to  do  so  is  just  an  omission,  but  to  fail  to  give  h:  La 
it  because  one  wishes  to  kill  him,  is  an  act.  So, 
for  example,  all  the  following  are  acts,  and  not 
omissions:  -  to  place  a  man  in  a  cell  with  a  homicidal 
lunatic  in  order  that  he  should  be  killed;  to  expose 
a  child  with  the  intention  of  leaving  him  to  die  of 
exposure  (Hume,  i.  190);  to  put  one's  wife  into 
a  closet  and  keep  her  there  without  food  until  she 
dies  (Geo.  Fay,  (184'1)  Ark  397). 
Negligent  conduct  also  falls  into  this  category. 
To  do  something  carelessly  by  reason  of  a  failure 
to  carry  out  the  appropriate  precautions  is  to 
commit  a  careless  act,  rather  than  an  omission,  and  such 
situations  belong  to  the  category  of  negligent 
behaviour  rather  than  to  that  of  omissions. 
Pure  omissions.  It  is  important  to  distinguish 
the  above  cases  from  cases  of  'pure'  omission,  because 
it  is  only  in  certain  restricted  circumstances  that 
a  'pure'  omission  is  regarded  as  criminal  conduct. 
'Not  to  prevent  an  event,  which  it  is  obligatory  to 
prevent,  is  equivalent  to  causing  it'  (W.  T.  S.  Stally- 
brass,  o_o.  cit.,  at  p.  392),  but  where  there  is  no 
such  obligation,  there  is  no  criminal  responsibility 
for  failure  to  prevent  the  event.  This  is  taut- 
ological  -  there  is  only  a  duty  to  prevent  something 
if  there  is  an  obligation  to  prevent  it.  And  the 
law  can  only  have  regard  to  legal  obligations  -  it 
does  not  enforce  the  obligations  of  morality  unless 
these  have  been  adopted  as  legal  obligations.  In 
law,  a  man  is  not  his  brother's  keeper,  and  is  not 
obliged  to  act  like  the  good  Samaritan.  (It  is  not 98 
clear  how  far  this  sort  of  criminal  responsibility 
for  omissions  goes,  but  in  theory  it  should  be 
commensurate  with  liability  under  the  civil  law. 
The  criminal  law  duty  to  prevent  cannot  be  based 
on  the  criminal  law,  but  it  must  be  based  on  a 
legal  duty;  accordingly  it  must  be  co-extensive  with 
the  duties  imposed  by  the  civil  law.  Where  therefore 
there  is  a  civil  law  duty  to  do  something,  any 
failure  in  that  duty  which  results  in  the  creation 
of  an  actus  reus  should  be  treated  as  if  it  were  an  act.  ) 
There  is  not  even,  it  is  submitted,  a  legal  duty 
ýo  prevent  the  commission  of  a  crime.,  and  to  stand  by 
and  watch  one's  friends  committing  a  theft,  is  neither 
in  itself  theft,  nor  a  separate  crime  of  omission. 
In  Geo.  Kerr  and  Ors.  ((1871)  2  Coup.  335),  a  number 
of  men  were  engaged  in  the  rape  of  a  woman;  one  of 
their  friends  stood  by  and  watched  the  crime  but  took 
no  part  in  it;  he  was  acquitted.  Lord  Ardmillan 
declined  to  'attempt  to  decide  the  general  question... 
whether  a  man  is  particens  criminis  who  sees  a  crime 
committed  and  passes  by  or  looks  on  without  doing 
anything'  (at  p.  337),  but  the  law  seems  to  be  that 
he  is  not,  and  that  he  is  not  guilty  of  a  separate 
crime  of  his  own  either.  Kerr  is  supported  by  the 
older  case  of  Taylor  and  Smith  (2  Feb.  180'/,  Burnett, 
p.  270),  where  a  surgeon's  apprentice  who  watched 
his  friend  kill  a  child,  and  then  himself  took  the  body 
to  his  master,  was  acquitted  of  killing  the  child. 
If  watching  one's  friends  commit  a  crime  is  not 
criminal,  it  must  follow  that  merely  to  pass  by 
strangers  who  are  committing  a  crime  is  not  criminal 
either. 
There  are  four  types  of  situation  in  which  there 
may  be  a  legal  duty  to  prevent  an  event,  so  that  failure 99 
to  do  so  is  equivalent  to  bringing  about  that  event 
by  an  act.  Generally  speaking  the  'omitter'  will 
only  be  guilty  of  a  crime  of  negligence  since  he  did 
not  intend  to  bring  about  the  actus  reus,  but  there 
may  be  circumstances  in  which  the  omission  is  so 
blatant  that  he  will  be  treated  as  if  he  had 
intended  it,  and  so  where  death  is  involved  may  be 
guilty  of  murder  and  not  merely  of  culpable  homicide. 
The  four  types  of  situation  are: 
(1)  Where  the  omission  follows  on  a_pEior_dangerous 
act.  It  is  probably  the  law  of  Scotland  that  where 
a  person  by  his  actings  has  created  a  situation  of 
danger,  he  has  a  duty  to  do  what  he  can  to  avert  the 
danger  he  has  created.  (Cf.  Schänke-Schröder,  p.  29  - 
Wer  durch  seine  Tätigkeit  die  Gefahr  des  Eintritts  des 
Erfolges  herbeigefürt  hat,  ist  verpflichtet,  den 
Erfolg  zu  verhindern).  Once  a  surgeon  has  started 
to  operate  upon  a  patient  he  cannot  just  stop  halfway 
leaving  the  patient  open  on  the  table  -  if  he  does  so 
and  the  patient  dies  as  a  result,  the  surgeon  will  be 
responsible  for  the  death.  This  will  be  so  whether 
the  operation  was  conducted  in  pursuance  of  a  contract, 
or  out  of  mere  benevolence,  since  in  either  case  the 
surgeon  has  started  something  which  it  is  dangerous 
to  leave  unfinished,  and  has  in  fact  left  it  unfinished. 
(cf.  G1.  Williams,  para  2;  Holmes,  Common  Law,  p.  278). 
There  is  very  little  Scots  authority  on  this 
matter,  but  two  cases  do  bear  on  the  question.  The 
first  is  that  of  Peter  M'RTanimy  and  Peter  Higgins 
((1947)  Ark.  321),  where  a  lodging  house  keeper 
discovered  that  one  of  his  guests  had  typhoid.  In 
order  to  prevent  the  spread  of  infection,  the  keeper 
and  a  friend  carried  the  invalid  out  of  the  house 100 
without  his  consent,  took  him  to  Glasgow,  and  left 
him  in  the  street  where  he  lay  until  a  policeman 
took  him  to  hospital  where  he  died.  In  these 
circumstances  the  accused  were  charged  with  culpable 
homicide.  They  were  charged  specifically  as  persons 
entrusted  with  the  custody  of  the  accused,  but  it  is 
submitted  that  this  quiification  was  unnecessary, 
since  even  if  the  principal  accused  had  not  been 
the  deceased's  landlord  it  would  have  been  a  crime 
for  him  to  remove  the  accused  from  his  room  to  the 
street.  To  put  someone  in  the  street  and  leave 
him  there  is  quite  different  from  refusing  to  render 
aid  to  someone  you  happen  to  pass  by  while  he  is  lying 
ill  in  the  street. 
To  treat  the  fact  that  the  deceased  was  a  lodger 
with  the  accused  as  the  ratio  decidendi  is  either  too 
narrow  or  too  wide.  It  is  too  narrow  if  it  means 
that  only  a  lodging-house  keeper  is  guilty  of  a 
crime  if  he  removes  a  sick  person  from  a  sheltered 
to  an  exposed  place  and  leaves  him  there;  it  is  too 
wide  if  it  means  that  a  landlord  has  a  duty  to  look 
after  the  health  of  his  lodgers.  It  is  submitted 
that  it  is  not  the  law  that  a  hotel  manager  who  allows 
a  sick  guest  to  linger  in  his  room  and  die  is  guilty 
of  homicide  because  of  his  failure  to  provide  the 
deceased  with  medical  assistance,  or  even  to  enquire 
as  to  his  health.  (The  charge  of  culpable  homicide 
was  dropped  in  Id'P.  Manimy  because  it  was  thought  that 
the  deceased  would  have  died  of  the  typhoid  anyway 
and  that  the-accused  had  therefore  not  caused  his 
death;  and  the  accused  pleaded  guilty  to  removing 
him  from  his  bed  and  to  cruelly  treating  and  deserting 
him.  )  It  is  true  that  in  passing  sentence  Lord  Hope, 101 
the  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  referred  to  the  fact  that  the 
principal  accused  was  in  the  business  of  keeping  a 
lodging-house  for  profit,  but  however  relevant  that 
may  have  been  to  the  accused's  moral  duty,  or  to  the 
question  of  sentence,  it  was,  it  is  submitted, 
irrelevant  to  his  legal  responsibility. 
The  other  case  is  that  of  M'Phee  (1935  J.  C.  46) 
where  the  accused  was  charged  with  punching  and  kick- 
ing  a  woman,  and  thereafter  exposing  her  'while  in  an 
injured  and  unconscious  condition  to  the  clemency 
of  the  weather'.  This  was  held  to  be  a  relevant 
charge  of  murder,  but  the  accused  was  convicted  of 
culpable  homicide  because  he  had  no  deliberate 
intention  of  killing  her  by  exposure.  Again,  the 
exposure  was  criminal,  because  it  was  the  creation 
by  the  accused  of  a  situation  of  danger,  followed 
by  a  'washing  of  his  hands'  of  the  consequences. 
The  accused  was  responsible  for  the  death,  not  just 
because  it  was  a  consequence  of  his  initial  assault, 
but  because  having  assaulted  the  accused  he  left 
her  in  a  dangerous  condition,  a  condition  he  had 
himself  created. 
(In  both  these  cases  the  accused's  prior 
dangerous  act  was  a  criminal  one,  but,  as  the  example 
of  the  surgeon  shows,  this  is  not  necessary;  it  is 
enough  that  it  should  be  dangerous.  A  recent  South 
African  civil  case  is  of  interest  in  this  connection. 
A  fishing  boat  broke  down,  and  after  drifting  for 
some  days,  foundered,  and  the  crew  were  killed. 
The  widow  of  one  of  the  fishermen  sued  the  owner  of 
the  boat  who  was  the  owner  of  a  fishing  fleet  -  for 
damages  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  and  she  succeeded 102 
in  her  action.  One  of  the  grounds  of  judgment  was 
that  in  providing  the  fishermen  with  a  boat  for  fishing 
the  owner  had  engaged  is  an  activity  which  was  potentially 
noxious  to  others,  and  that  accordingly  he  had  a  duty 
to  try  to  prevent  the  danger  which  occurred  by 
taking  steps  to  rescue  the  crew,  so  that  his  omission 
to  initiate  rescue  operations  amounted  to  an  act  of 
negligence  -  Silous  Fishing  Corporation  (Pty)  Ltd.  v. 
Mawesa,  [1957(2]  . 3.  A.  L.  i.  256.  The  case  is  complicated 
by  the  fact  that  although  the  plaintiff  was  not 
employed  by  the  owners  he  was  regarded  by  the  Court 
as  engaged  on  a  joint  enterprise  with  them,  out  it 
does  seem  to  provide  authority  for  the  view  that  the 
creator  of  a  danger  is  liable  for  omitting  to  take 
precautions  to  prevent  it.  ) 
(2)  ',  dhere  these  is  a  personal  relationship  involved. 
The  most  obvious  example  of  such  a  duty  is  that  of  a 
parent  towards  his  children.  A  father  who  stands  by 
and  watches  someone  kill  his  children  may  be  guilty 
of  their  homicide  because  of  his  failure  to  prevent 
their  death,  while  a  stranger  who  stood  by  would  be 
free  of  guilt.  In  the  Australian  case  of  R.  v.  Russell 
((19  )  39  Argos  Law  Reps.  76)  it  was  alleged  that  a 
father  had  pushed  his  wife  and  children  into  a  pond 
and  murdered  them.  The  accused  said  that  after  a 
quarrel  with  him  his  wife  had  thrown  the  children  and 
herself  into  the  water.  A  direction  by  the  trial  Judge 
that  the  father  could  be  convicted  of  the  manslaughter 
of  the  children  even  if  he  had  not  in  any  way 
encouraged  his  wife  to  kill  them,  but  had  merely  stood 
by,  was  upheld  by,  the  Appeal  Court.  The  father 
vies  also  convicted  of  killing  his  wife,  but  this 
conviction  was  sustained  on  the  ground  that  the  jury 
were  entitled  to  find  that  he  had  actively  participated 103 
in  his  wife's  death,  and  the  majority  of  the  Court 
distinguished  between  the  position  with  regard  to  the 
wife  and  that  with  regard  to  the  children  in  this 
connection. 
The  essence  of  the  matter  in  this  type  of  omissio  n 
is  the  legal  relationship  between  the  accused  and  the 
deceased.  As  the  Commission  appointed  to  consider  English 
Criminal  law  in  1839  said,  '...  where  death  has  been 
occasioned  by  the  omission  to  discharge  the  legal 
obligation  imposed  by  some  civil  relation  existing 
between  the  deceased  and  some  other  person...  the 
particulars  of  the  civil  rights  and  liabilities  of 
parties  so  circumstanced  becomes  absolutely  essential 
to  the  determination  of  the  criminal  responsibility 
of  the  accused'  (Fourth  Report  of  Her  Majesty's 
Commissioners  on  Criminal  Law,  Parl.  Papers,  1839, 
xix,  p.  235,  p.  Vii).  The  importance  of  the  legal 
relationship  was  stressed  in  the  American  case  of 
People  v.  Beardsley  ((1907)  150  Mich.  206,  Hall  and 
Glueck,  p.  159)  where  a  man  was  charged  with  killing 
his  mistress  by  allowing  her  to  take  poison  tablets 
when  he  was  in  a  position  to  stop  her  doing  so  by 
taking  the  tablets  away  from  her.  It  was  said  there 
that  'Seeking  for  a  proper  determination  of  the  case... 
by  the  application  of  the  legal  principles  involved, 
we  must  eliminate  from  the  case  all  consideration  of 
meremoral  obligation,  and  discover  whether  respondent 
was  under  a  legal  duty  towards  [the  deceased'  at  the 
time  of  her  death...  which  required  him  to  make  all 
reasonable  and  proper  effort  to  save  her;  the 
omission  to  perform  which  duty  would  make  him 
responsible  for  her  death'  (Hall  and  Glueck,  at  p.  164). 
In  the  absence  of  any  such  duty  the  prisoner's 
conviction  was  quashed.  Beardsley  suggests  that  there 104 
would  have  been  a  'duty  of  care'  had  the  parties 
been  married,  while  Russell  suggests  that  the  duty 
does  not  extend  to  spouses;  but  this  is  only  a 
difference  as  to  the  civil  rights  involved,  and  not 
a  difference  in  approach  to  the  problem  of  criminal 
liability  for  omissions. 
(3)  Where  thereis_an  express  contract.  The 
position  in  such  cases  is  that,  in  the  words  of  the 
English  Draft  Code  of  1879,  'Every  one  who  under- 
takes  to  do  any  act  the  omission  to  do  which  is  or  may 
be  dangerous  to  life,  is  under  a  legal  duty  to  do 
that  act,  and  is  criminally  responsible  for  the 
consequences  of  omitting  without  lawful  excuse 
to  discharge  that  duty'  (Report  of  Royal  Commission 
on  Draft  Code,  18'19,  Draft  Code,  s.  164).  This 
section  of  the  Code  is  concerned  with  homicide, 
and  most  of  the  cases  deal  with  homicide,  but 
there  is  no  reason  in  principle  to  confine  the  law  of 
omissions  to  homicide.  The  passive  acquiescence 
by  a  nurse  in  the  theft  of  a  child  in  her  charge 
might  in  certain  circumstances  amount  to  theft  on 
her  part,  as  it  might  make  her  art  and  part  with  the 
thieves.  The  obvious  case  of  a  breach  of  contract 
which  would  be  regarded  as  criminal  is  the  failure 
by  persons  in  charge  of  the  sick  to  fulfil  their  duties. 
A  surgeon  cannot  be  convicted  of  homicide  for  refusing 
to  operate  on  someone,  but  a  surgeon  who  enters  into  a 
contract  to  perform  a  necessary  operation  and  then 
fails  to  do  so,  may  be  guilty  of  homicide  if  the 
patient  dies  as  a  result  of  his  failure  (cf.  Macaulay, 
p.  494). 
The  contractual  obligation  may  arise  either  from 105 
a  contract  with  the  victim,  or  from  a  contract 
with  a  third  party,  such  as  a  sick  person's  relation, 
or  a  charitable  organisation,  or  the  State  itself. 
Macaulay  gives  the  following  example  of  an  'official' 
duty  failure  to  perform  which  may  be  criminal: 
'A  omits  to  tell  Z  that  a  river  is  swollen 
so  high  that  Z  cannot  safely  attempt  to  ford 
it,  and  by  this  omission  voluntarily  causes 
Z's  death.  This  is  murder,  if  A  is  a  person 
stationed  by  authority  to  warn  travellers  from 
attempting  to  ford  the  river.  It  is  not 
murder  if  A  is  a  person  on  whom  Z  has  no  other 
claim  than  that  of  Humanity'  (ib.  p.  495). 
(Cf.  R.  v.  Smith  (1869)  11  Cox77.  C.  210; 
R.  y.  Pittyioo  , 
(1902  19  T.  L.  R.  37). 
Cases  of  this  kind  are  rare  in  Scotland,  but 
there  are  at  least  two  examples.  In  the  case  of  Thos. 
L'Iitý  (Dec.  15  and  26  1698,  Hume,  i.  39V)  a 
magistrate  who  declined  to  assist  a  messenger-at-arms 
who  had  been  attacked  by  a  crowd  and  deprived  of  his 
prisoner,  was  convicted  of  being  art  and  part  in  the 
crowd's  deforcement  of  the  messenger.  Hufe  points 
out  that  'this  sort  of  tacit  encouragement  would  not, 
however,  be  reputed  an  accession  in  the  case  of  any 
ordinary  person',  and  cites  the  case  of  Francis 
Duguid  (Dec.  1,1673,  ib.  )  in  which  a  charge  of  de- 
forcement  against  a  father  who  did  not  stop  his  sons 
rescuing  his  son-in-law  from  a  messenger  was  held  to 
be  irrelevant. 
A  somewhat  more  modern  example  is  the  case  of 
Wm.  Hardie  ((184'1)  Ark.  247).  The  accused  was  an 
Inspector  of  Poor  who  was  charged  with  the  culpable 
homicide  of  a  woman  whose  application  for  poor  relief 
he  had  ignored,  and  who  had  died  of  want  as  a  result. 
The  charge  was  held  relevant,  but  was  not  proceeded 
with.  (A  similar  question  arose  in  the  case  of 
71m.  Gray,  (1936)  1  Sw.  328,  but  was  not  dealt  with. 106 
Gray  was  an  engine  driver  who  was  charged  with  culpable 
homicide  because  of  the  death  of  someone  he  had  allowed, 
contrary  to  the  regulations  of  the  company,  to  travel 
on  the  tender  of  his  engine.  The  indictment  was 
challenged  because  it  omitted  to  charge  any  act 
committed  by  the  accused.  It  was  also  argued  that 
as  railway  employees  were  allowed  to  travel  on  the 
tender,  what  the  accused  had  allowed  was  not  dangerous, 
and  that  his  duty  to  members  of  the  public  was  the  same 
as  that  to  his  fellow-employees.  The  case  was  dropped 
by  the  Crown  before  the  Court  gave  judgment  on 
relevancy.  ) 
(4)  Duties  arising  fron  the  imvosition  of_a_legal 
obligation.  In  certain  circumstances  -  other  than 
those  where  there  is  a  permanent  legal  relationship  such 
as  that  of  parent  and  child  -  the  law  imposes  an 
obligation  because  of  the  relationship  of  the  accused 
to  the  victim.  The  classic  example  of  this  is  the 
English  case  of  R.  v.  Instan  ([1893]  1  Q.  B.  450). 
There  the  accused  lived  alone  with  her  bedridden  aunt; 
for  ten  days  she  gave  her  aunt  no  food  and  called  for 
no  medical  attention;  the  aunt  died  as  a  result. 
The  accused  was  convicted  of  manslaughter.  Lord 
Coleridge,  C.  J.  purported  to  decide  the  case  on  the 
ground  that  the  accused  had  failed  in  a  moral  duty  to 
take  care  of  her  aunt,  and  said  that  'A  legal  common 
law  duty  is  nothing  else  than  enforcing  by  law  of  that 
which  is  a  moral  obligation  without  legal  enforcement' 
(at  p.  453).  This,  however,  is  unnecessarily  wide, 
and  confuses  law  and  morality.  (Or  else  it  is 
tautologous  and  only  says  that  any  moral  duty  which  has 
been  made  a  legal  duty  as  well,  is  a  legal  duty.  ) 
A  better  ratio  for  Instan  is  that  where  people  related 
as  were  the  accused  and  the  deceased  live  in  the 107 
circumstances  in  which  they  lived,  the  law  imposes 
an  obligation  -  perhaps  because  it  implies  an  undertaking  - 
on  the  healthy  person  to  look  after  the  invalid. 
Hall,  who  is  a  staunch  upholder  of  the  moral 
nature  of  the  criminal  law,  points  out  that  Lord 
Coleridge's  equation  of  law  and  morality  does  not 
represent  the  law  properly.  Hall  says, 
'Although  this  hypothesis  is  persuasive, 
it  is  also  evident  that  it  is  not  a  sufficient 
explanation  of  the  case-law.  For  example,  an 
expert  swimmer  might  be  the  only  person  to 
see  a  child  drowning.  He  would  thus  ow 
that  he  was  the  only  one  who  could  resuce  the 
child  and  he  should  certainly  feel  obliged 
to  save  him.  How  can  such  a  situation  be 
differentiated  from  one  identical  with  it  - 
except  that  the  by-stander  is  the  child's 
father?....  The  essential  difference,  it  is 
suggested,  inheres  not  in  the  moral 
obligation,  but  in  the  mores,  in  the  public 
attitudes  regarding  the  respective  parties; 
and  these,  in  turn,  are  influenced  by  the 
relationship  of  the  parties  respectively 
to  the  child'.  (Hall,  p.  2/5). 
The  reference  to  public  mores  may  seem  at  first  sight 
to  be  out  of  place  in  a  discussion  of  legal  and  not  of 
moral  obligation.  But  once  it  is  conceded  that  the 
obligation  may  be  implied  from,  or  imposed  in,  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  we  must  ask,  'In  what 
circumstances  does  the  law  impose  such  a  duty?! 
and  this  may  depend  on  public  attitudes,  since  the 
decision  whether  or  not  to  impose  a  duty  in  any  given 
case  will  be  influenced  by  the  normal  reaction  of  society 
to  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
The  answer  to  the  question  is  by  no  means  clear, 
but  it  can  be  said  with  some  confidence  that  the 
criminal  law  does  not  recognise  a  duty  to  take  steps 
to  prevent  harm  to  anyone  'who  is  in  law  my  neighbour', 
in  the  "eme  sense  that  he  is  'so  closely  affected  by  my 108 
act  that  I  ought  reasonably  to  have  him  in  contemplation 
as  being  so  affected  when  I  am  directing  my  mind  to  the 
acts  or  omissions  which  are  called  in  question' 
(Donoghue  v.  Stevenson,  1932  S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  31,  Lord 
Atkin  at  p.  44).  Of  course,  the  civil  law  does 
not  go  as  for  as  this  either  -  it  is  not  e.  g. 
an  actionable  wrong  to  fail  to  render  assistance  to  a 
stranger  in  need.  As  Hall  puts  it,  'WWe  have  not  yet 
reached  the  point  of  believing  that  everyone  is 
morally  obliged  to  be  his  brother's  keeper;  or,  at 
least,  that  is  not  believed  sufficiently  to  be  given 
implementation  by  the  criminal  lave'  (Hall,  p.  2/5). 
The  law,  as  it  stands,  is  generally  regarded  as 
unsatisfactory,  since  it  refuses  to  punish  people  who 
are  morally  guilty  of  great  callousness.  There  is 
mjch  to  be  said  for  Bentham's  view  that,  'The  limits 
of  the  law  on  this  head  seem,  however,  to  be  capable 
of  being  extended  a  good  deal  farther  than  they  seem 
ever  to  have  been  extended  hitherto'  (Bentham,  XVII,  9). 
This  contention  gains  force  from  the  examples  Bentham 
gives,  which  are  as  follows: 
'A  woman's  head-dress  catches  fire:  water 
is  at  hand:  a  man,  instead  ofassisting  to  quench 
the  fire  looks  on,  andlaughs  at  it.  A  drunken 
man,  falling  with  his  face  downwards  into  a 
puddle,  is  in  danger  of  suffocation:  lifting 
his  head  a  little  on  one  side  would  save  him: 
another  man  sees  this  and  lets  him  lie.  A 
quantity  of  gunpowder  lies  scattered  about 
a  room:  a  man  is  going  into  it  with  a  lighted 
candle:  another,  knowing  this,  lets  him  go  in 
without  warning.  Who  is  there  that  in  any 
of  these  cases  would  think  punishment  misapplied?  ' 
(ib.  ). 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  difficulty  in  extending 
the  law,  firstly,  because  of  the  principle  that  the 
criminal  law  should  be  construed  narrowly,  and  secondly, 109 
because  of  the  difficulty  of  setting  limits  to  the  duty 
to.;  protect  others.  Bentham  sug  vests  that  'where  the 
person  is  in  danger'  it  should  be  'made  the  Duty  of 
every  man  to  save  another  from  mischief,  when  it  can 
be  done  without  prejudicing  himself'  (ib.  ).  His 
examples  concern  cases  where  the  victim  can  be  saved 
easily,  without  exertion  by,  or  danger  to,  the  rescuer, 
and  where  it  is  clear  that  a  slight  intervention  will  be 
sufficient.  And  any  extension  of  the  criminal  law 
would  probably  have  to  be  limited  by  these  considerations: 
'La  loi  penale  n'impose  pas  l'heroisme'  (Donnedieu  de 
Vabres,  p.  '/4).  But  in  fact  the  law  has  not  even 
gone  the  length  of  constructing  a  system  of  obligations 
restricted  by  these  requirements  -  indeed  there  seems 
to  be  no  law  at  all  on  the  matter  in  Scotland,  although 
Instan  (supra)  would  probably  be  followed.  It  seems 
clear  that  the  duty  would  be  restricted  to  situations 
in  which  only  two  persons  were  involved  -  i.  e.  to 
cases  where  the  accused  should  have  saved  the  victim 
from  some  natural  danger  -  and  would  not  extend  to 
cases  of  preventing  someone  else  from  harming  the 
victim.  But  even  so,  the  law  would  be  very  vague, 
and  it  would  be  an  objection  to  it  that  it  would  be  very 
difficult  for  the  potential  rescuer  to  know  whether  or 
not  his  failure  to  rescue  would  lay  him  open  to  a  charge 
of  homicide.  This  would  be  very  hard  on  him,  and  it 
would  be  unfair  to  ask  him  to  weigh---up  the  situation 
and  decide  on  his  legal  duty  under  the  same  penalty  for 
failure  as  is  imposed  on  an  assailant  for  the-fore- 
-seeable  consequences  of  his  assault  -  conviction  for 
culpable  homicide.  The  result  of  this  argument  is 
that  in  order  to  achieve  certainty  the  law  may  have  to 
forbear  from  punishment  in  certain  cases,  such  as  those 
quoted  by  Bentham,  in  which  punishment  would  be 
unexceptionable.  The  position  is  summed'by  Macaulay,. 110 
who  apologises  in  his  Notes  on  the  Indian  Penal  Code 
for  the  leniency  of  the  law,  and  explains, 
'We  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  made 
more  severe  without  disturbing  the  whole  order 
of  society.  It  is  true  that  the  man  who, 
having  abundance  of  wealth,  suffers  a  fellow 
creature  to  die  of  hunger  at  his  feet  is  a 
bad  man,  a  worse  man,  probably,  than  many  of 
those  for  whom  we  have  provided  very  severe 
punishment.  But  we  are  unable  to  see  where, 
if  we  make  such  a  man  legally  punishable,  we 
can  draw  the  line.  If  the  rich  man  who 
refuses  to  save  a  beggar's  life  at  the  cost 
of  a  little  copper  is  a  murderer,  is  the  poor 
man  just  one  degree  above  beggary  also  to  be 
a  murderer  if  he  omits  to  invite  the  beggar  to 
partake  his  hard-earned  rice?... 
The  distinction  between  a  lemal  and  an 
illegal  omission  is  perfectly  plain  and 
intelligible;  but  the  distinction  between  a 
large  and  a  small  sum  of  money  is  very  far 
from  being  so,  not  to  say  that  a  sum  which 
is  small  to  one  man  is  large  to  another'  (Macaulay, 
p.  496). 
Instan  (summa)  suggests  that  the  law  is  prepared 
to  go  farther  than  I'Iacaulay,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  it 
will  go  much  farther;  it  should  also  be  remembered 
that  the  position  in  Instan  was  very  like  that 
between  nurse  and  patient,  and  that  the  actual  relation- 
ship  of  aunt  and  niece  made  the  accused's  conduct 
appear  even  more  heinous  than  if  it  had  been  that 
of  nurse  and  patient. 
(Some  European  codes  have  adopted  a  compromise 
solution  which  allows  them  to  take  into  account 
situations  like  those  posited  by  Bentham  without  relaxing 
their  attitude  to  crimes  of  commission  by  omission. 
They  do  this  by  creating  a  new  crime  of  omission  - 
the  crime  of  failing  to  render  help  or  prevent  a  crime 
where  this  can  be  done  'par  action  immediate,  sans 
risque  pour  lui  ou  pour  les  siens'  -  C.  P.  Art.  63, 111 
Ordonnance  de  25  Juin  1945.  This  applies  both  to  the 
prevention  of  crime  and  to  the  giving  assistance  to 
someone  in  danger  caused  other  than  by  criminal 
conduct  -  it  would  apply,  for  example,  to  a  doctor 
refusing  to  treat  a  dangerously  sick  man  -  Donnedieu  de 
Vabres,  p.  `13.  Art.  330c  of  the  German  Penal  Code 
imposes  a  similar  duty  -  see  Schänke-Schröder,  pp.  1113-'1. 
Failure  to  obtemper  these  provisions  is  not  by  itself 
equivalent  to  an  act  of  commission  should  the  person 
in  danger  die.  ) 
The  problem  of  causation 
Whether  the  accused's  conduct  takes  the  form  of  an 
act  or  of  an  omission  it  must,  of  course,  be  shown  to 
have  caused  the  actus  reus  in  question.  A  discussion 
of  causation  is  thus  inevitable,  although  such 
discussions  are  rarely  fruitful.  Questions  of  legal 
causations  are  closely  linked  to  questions  of  legal 
responsibility,  but  it  is  possible  to  examine  the 
difficulties  of  legal  causation  in  terms  of 
causal  factors  as  well  as,  if  not  rather  than,  in  terms 
of  responsibility,  and  I  propose  to  attempt  such  an 
examination. 
The  causal  series 
The  objective  standpoint:  direct  causation.  From 
the  objective  point  of  view  everything  that  follows  from 
a  given  act  is  caused  by  that  act.  Other  causes,  of 
course,  will  also  operate  -  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
the  cause  of  any  event  -  but  the  act  taken  as  the 
beginning  of  the  series  is  a  cause  of  all  that  follows 
from  it.  Starting  from  a  given  act  there  can  be  traced 
a  sequence  that  is  never  broken;  it  may  gather  into 
itself  factors  which  themselves  can  be  traced  back  to 112 
an  act  outside  the  series,  but  itis  not  broken  by  these 
factors,  it  is  merely  joined  by  them.  The  intervening 
factors  are  merely  additional  links  in  the  final 
series,  a  series  which  is  not  something  subsisting  from 
all  time,  but  something  which  is  continually  coming 
into  being  and  expanding  as  it  meets  and  joins  other 
series,  rather  like  a  tributary  running  into  a  river 
and  then  being  joined  by  later  tributaries.  (Meta- 
phors  are  of  course  inexact  and  misleading,  but  they  are 
inevitable  if  this  question  is  to  be  discussed  in 
language  and  not  in  mathematical  symbols.  )  The 
series  can  be  described  only  insofar  as  it  has 
been  completed  at  the  time  of  description,  and  when  so 
described  it  can  always  be  described  as  unbroken. 
The  only  distinction  which  can  be  made  objectively 
is  that  between  direct  and  indirect  consequences  of  the 
given  act.  Anything  which  can  be  traced  back  to  an 
act  may  be  said  to  be  a  consequence  of  it,  but  it  may 
not  be  a  direct  consequence.  Where  the  consequences 
of  an  act  are  sought,  and  there  enters  the  sequence 
something  not  itself  traceable  to  that  act,  later  events 
in  the  series  may  be  described  as  indirect  consequences 
of  the  act.  If  a  man  receives  a  wound  which  becomes 
septic,  and  leads  to  bloo1  poisoning  of  which  he  dies, 
his  death  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  wound.  (6f 
course,  it  could  be  said  that  even  in  the  simplest  and 
shortest  series  external  factors  enter  the  sequence, 
but  for  legal  purposes  it  is  possible  and  indeed 
necessary  to  deal  in  rather  broad  terms)  But  if,  while 
in  hospital  being  treated  for  the  wound,  he  catches 
typhoid  from  his  neighbour  and  dies,  his  death  is 
not  a  direct  consequence  of  his  wound.  It  is  a 
consequence  of  it  -  what  caused  him  to  catch  the  typhoid 
was  being  in  hospital,  inter  alia,  and  that  was  a  direct 
consequence,  because  the  typhoid  was  not  caused  by  the 113 
wound,  but  entered  the  sequence,  so  to  speak,  from  the 
outside,  with  a  causal  history  independent  of  the 
wound.  This,  again,  is  by  no  means  logically 
impeccable  -  the  existence  of  the  hospital  itself 
is  an  outside  factor  -  but  there  is  a  rough  distinction 
and  it  is  a  distinction  which  is  used  in  legal 
reasoning  about  direct  and  indirect  causation. 
The  subjective  standpoint:  foreseeable  consequences. 
From  the  stan  d_>oint  of  the  person  who  pe  rf  o:  i  me  d  the 
original  act  the  series  of  consequences  may  be  regarded 
as  breakable.  It  is  broken  when  "jhat  in  fact  occurs 
contains  elements  absent  from  the  ideal  sequence  in  the 
mind  of  the  agent.  Objectively  there  is  no  broken 
sequence  if  a  football  player  kicks  a  ball  which  is 
deflected  into  the  grandstand  by  hitting  a  goalpost: 
there  is  a  simple  sequence  of  events  -  kick,  flight  of 
ball,  contact  with  goalpost,  and  subsequent  deflection, 
all  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  dynamics.  And  if 
this  was  what  the  player  expected  to  happeno  there  is 
no  break  in  the  subjective  series  either.  But  if  the 
player  expected  the  ball  to  move  in  a  way  unaffected 
by  the  post,  he  can  say  that  the  contact  with  the  post 
broke  the  causal  series.  Where  the  subjective  or  'ideal' 
series  is  taken  as  that  intended  by  the  agent,  any 
unintended  event  will  break  it;  where  it  is  taken  as 
that  foreseen  by  the  agent, 
., 
or  as  that  which  was 
foreseeable,  any  foreseen  or  foreseeable  event, 
respectively,  will  break  the  sequence,  -  and  so  on. 
Causality  in  the  criminal  law. 
The  first  condition  that  must  be  satisfied  before  A 
can  be  yield  legally  responsible  for  an  actus  reus,  R, 
is  that  A  must  have  caused  R,  in  whatever  sense  the  law 
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itself  in  the  form  -  is  Ra  legally  relevant 
consequence  of  A's  act?  This  is  a  causal  question 
and  should  be  answered  by  reference  to  causal  criteria; 
it  is  logically  prior  to  the  question  -  is  A  to  be 
punished  by  the  law  for  having  caused  R?  There  is 
clearly  nothing  inconsistent  in  saying  that  R  was  the 
consequence  of  A's  act,  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  word 
'consequence',  but  that  A  should  not  be  punished  for 
having  caused  R-  there  may  be  any  number  of  factors 
present  which  operate  to  relieve  A  of  criminal 
responsibility  for  R,  he  may  have  acted  justifiably, 
or  in  error,  or  insane,  and  so  on.  In  fact,  however, 
the  law  regards  'A  caused  R'  and  'A  is  legally 
responsible  for  R'  as  equivalent,  provided  no  'defeasing' 
factors  are  present  in  the  case:  'A  caused  R'  is 
equivalent  to  'A  is  prima  facie  responsible  for  R'.  As 
a  result  R  will  not  be  regarded  as  a  legally  relevant 
consequence  of  A's  act  unless  A  is  to  be  held 
legally  responsible  for  R;  and  if  A  is  to  be  held 
responsible  for  R,  he  will  be  held  to  have  caused  R. 
The  law  makes  use  of  a  number  of  causal  criteria 
of  which  the  most  important  ard  directness,  foresee- 
ability,  and  remoteness.  These  criteria  may  produce 
different  results  in  the  same  case,  and  the  choice 
of  criterion  may  therefore  b,  -  decisive  of  the  result. 
Unfortunately  there  are  no  general  rules  governing  the 
choice  of  criterion  in  any  case  or  class  of  cases.  In 
fact  what  often  happens  is  that  the  choice  of  criterion 
is  preceded  and  governed  by  a  decision  as  to  whether  or 
not  A  is  to  be  made  responsible  for  R.  There  must 
of  course  be  an  initial  judgment  that  R  is  in  some  sense 
a  consequence  of  A's  act,  but  once  that  has  been  made, 
the  decision  whether  or  not  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
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by  the  decision  whether  or  not  A  is  to  be  punished  for 
R.  Once  the  responsibility  decision  has  been  made, 
the  criterion  which  will  lead  to  the  equivalent 
causal  result  is  chosen,  so  that  it  can  be  shown 
that  R  was  indeed  a  legally  relevant  consequence  of  A's 
act.  Whether  or  not  A  is  legally  responsible  for  R 
cannot  be  logically  decided  before  it  is  decided 
that  R  is  a  legally  relevent  consequence  of  A's  act, 
and  this  must  be  determined  by  causal  criteria  - 
but  the  particular  criterion  used  to  make  this 
decision  is  chosen  by  reference  to  A's  moral 
responsibility,  or  perhaps  to  an  instinctive  decision 
about  his  legal  responsibility,  which  is  later 
rationalised  by  using  the  appropriate  causal  criterion 
so  as  to  make  it  appear  that  the  verdict  was  reached  by 
means  of  causal  reasoning,  and  not  by  the  Judge's 
views  as  to  the  fittingness  of  punishing  A.  (Cf.  O.  C. 
Jensen,  The  Nature  of  Legal  Thinking,  Part  IT,  passim.  ) 
Before  dealing  with  particular.  cases  it  may  be 
useful  to  say  something  about  the  criteria  used  by 
the  criminal  law  in  making  causal  judgments  or  in 
providing  causal  explanations  for  its  judgments,  and 
about  the  factors  which  influence  the  way  in  which 
these  criteria  are  used. 
ui2_  Directness.  The  application  of  this 
criterion  means  that  A  is  regarded  as  having  caused  R, 
and  so  as  being  legally  responsible  for  R,  if  R  is  a 
direct  consequence  of  A's  conduct.  In  order,  therefore, 
to  escape  responsibility  for  any  given  consequence  of 
his  actings,  A  must  show  that  they  are  only  indirect 
consequences  of  what  he  has  done.  That  is  to  say,  he 
must  show  that  another  causal  factor  intervened  in  the 
causal  series  betteen  his  act  and  R,  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  render  R  only  an  indirect  consequence  of  his  act. 116 
It  is  in  determining  whether  a  given  event  is  such  a 
factor  that  there  is  room  for  rationalisation  -  whether 
or  not  a  given  factor  is  regarded  as  'breaking'  the  causal 
chain  may  well  de-end  on  whether  or  not  it  is  desired 
to  punish  A  for  R.  Where  the  intervening  factor  is  a 
voluntary  human  action  it  is  called  a  novus  actus 
interveniens,  but  events  other  than  voluntary  human 
actions  may  also  operate  to  interrupt  the  sequence  of 
direct  causation. 
In  dealing  with  the  situation  created  by  an 
apparent  novus  actus  interveniens  or  otherapparently 
interruptive  factor  the  law  makes  use  of  the  criterion 
of  foreseeability,  so  as  to  make  A  responsible  in  some 
circumstances  for  the  indirect  sequences  of  his 
actings.  The  intrusion  of  the  criterion  of  fore- 
seeability  is  dictated  by  moral  considerations  and  the 
criterion  itself  is  essentially  a  moral  one,  depending 
as  it  does  on  the  view  that  A  can  only  be  blamed  for 
what  he  ought  to  have  foreseen.  If  then,  the  inter- 
vening  event  is  one  that  he  ought  to  have  foreseen  it  will 
not  be  regarded  as  interrupting  the  causal  sequence; 
on  the  contrary  it  will  be  regarded  as  itself  some- 
thing  for  which  A  is  responsible  since  he  ought  to  have 
foreseen  it,  and  so  subsequent  events,  even  if  attribut- 
able  to  the  intervening  factor,  rather  than  to  A's  act, 
will  be  laid  to  A's  door.  In  Steel  v.  Glasgow  Iron  and 
Steel  Co.  (1944  S.  C.  237)  the  defenders  negligently 
allowed  one  of  their  wagons  to  run  down  a  slope;  S, 
one  of  their  employees,  saw  the  wagon  and  tried  to 
stop  it;  in  doing  so  he  was  injured.  He  sued  the 
defenders  who  pleaded  that  his  intervention  constituted 
a  novus  actus  interveniens,  but  the  Court  held  that 
Steel's  action  was  foreseeable,  and  that  his  injuries 
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allowing  the  wagon  to  run  away.  Again,  in  Haynes  v. 
Harwood  (  [1935]  1K  .  B.  146),  a  policeman  who  ran  out  of 
a  police  station  i,  to  the  street  in  order  to  stop  a 
runaway  horse-van  and  as  injured  by  the  van,  recovered 
damages  from  the  person  responsible  for  the  horse's 
bolting;  and  in  State  v.  Glover  ((19>2)  330  Mo.  709, 
Hall  and  Glueck,  p.  104)  a  man  who  set  fire  to  his 
property  in  order  to  defraud  his  insurers  was  convicted 
of  the  homicide  of  a  fireman  who  was  killed  ,  -chile  try- 
ing  to  put  out  the  fire.  In  all  these  cases,  a  voluntary 
human  act,  soraetiiing  prima  facie  likely  to  constitute 
a  novus  actus  interveniens,  and  to  set  up  a  new  independent 
causal  series  of  its  own,  so  to  speak,  was  regarded  as 
foreseeable  and  as  'caused'  uy  the  defender,  because  the 
act  of  the  intervener  was  not  blameworthy  but  indeed  commend- 
able,  and  because  the  situation  as  a  whole,  and  so  the 
ultinate  result,  could  be  traced  back  to  a  wrongful  act 
by  the  defender. 
What  is  in  issue  in  this  use  of  foreseeability 
need  not  be  the  foreseeability  of  R  as  a  result  of  A's 
act,  but  only  the  foreseeability  of  the  intervention. 
If  A  shoots  B  through  the  head  it  is  foreseeable  that 
death  will  result,  but  if  B  is  in  fact  killed  by  a  bomb 
explosion  on  his  .  -iay  to  hospital,  his  death  will 
probably  not  be  regarded  as  a  legally  relevant 
consequence  of  the  shooting.  In  such  a  situation  A 
is  morally  responsible  for  B's  death,  and  B's  death  is 
a  consequence  of  A's  act,  but  the  law  may  adopt  the  view 
that  B  was  in  fact  killed  by  the  bomb  and  not  by  A,  and 
if  the  . comb  explosion  was  unforeseeable,  the  result  would 
be  A's  acquittal  (cf.  H.  L.  A.  Hart  and  A.  M.  Honore, 
'Causation  in  the  Law',  (1956)  72  L.  Q.  R.  58,404; 
D.  9.2.15(1);  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  1097;  Homan  v.  Bentinuk 
Collieries,  [194J  1  All  E.  R.  588,  Lord  Liacdermott  at 
p.  601;  infra,  128). 118 
(ii)_  Foreseeability_  The  criterion  of  fore- 
seeability  may  oe  used  as  an  exclusive  criterion,  as 
well  as  being  used  in  co.  inection  with  the  criterion 
of  directness  and  the  concept  of  the  novus  actus 
interveniens.  If  it  is  the  only  criterion  applied, 
A  will  be  legally  responsible  for  only  the  fore- 
seeable  results  of  his  actions;  but  difficult 
questions  may  arise  as  to  whether  he  is  responsible  for 
foreseeable,  or  intended,  results,  -iich  occur  in  an 
unforeseeable  or  unintended  way,  as  where  A  inflicts 
a  fatal  wound  on  3,  but  B 
-dies 
because  someone  else  also 
inflicts  a  fatal  wound  on  him  soon  afterwards,  or 
because  he  is  improperly  treated  by  the  doctors.  Where 
R  is  itself  foreseeable,  and  particularly  where  it  is 
the  result  A  intended,  the  Courts  are  reluctant  to 
exclude  A's  responsibility  because  R  actually  occurred 
in  an  unforeseen  way,  but  they  may  sometimes  do  so  by 
applying;  the  criterion  of  directness  (see  infra,  /J,?  ). 
When  one  reads  legal  textbooks,  especially  those 
dealing  with  civil  negligence,  one  gets  the  impression 
that  foreseeability  is  the  legal  criterion  (see  e.  g. 
Glegg,  The  Law  of  Reparation  in  Scotland,  4th  ed.,  pp.  3'/- 
45),  but  it  is  difficult  to  substantiate  this  feeling, 
at  any  rate  so  far  as  criminal  law  is  concerned. 
The  criterion  is  the  one  most  in  accord  with  moral 
feeling,  and  the  law  tends  to  its  adoption,  so  to 
speak,  but  it  does  not  in  fact  adopt  it  by  any  means 
universally. 
(iii)  Remoteness.  This  is  at  once  the  most  difficult 
and  the  mod  'useful'  of  the  criteria,  because  it  is  the 
vaguest.  It  is  accepted  in  Scots  law  that  mere 
remoteness  in  time  is  irrelevant  -  the  fact  that  the 
victim  lingers  for  a  long  time  before  dying  of  the 
wound  inflicted  by  the  accused  does  not  affect  the 
latter's  legal  responsibility  for  his  death  (Hume,  i.  185). 119 
There  must  probably  be  a  novus  actus  interveniens 
before  responsibility  is  affected.  The  effect  of 
remoteness  is  to  make  it  easier  to  regard  a  subsequent 
event  as  a  novus  actus  interveniens,  since  it  can  be 
said  that  the  original  act  had  spent  its  effect  at 
the  time  of  the  intervention,  so  that  the  latter  must 
be  regarded  as  the  substantial  or  effective  cause  of  R. 
Conversely,  the  idea  of  remoteness  can  be  used  to 
exclude  what  might  otherwise  be  regarded  as  a 
novus  actus  interveniens  on  the  ground  that  it  occurred 
when  the  effect  of  the  accused's  act  was  still  operative. 
In  R.  v.  Smith  (Cl959)  2  W.  L.  R.  623)  the  accused 
assaulted  a  fellow-soldier;  the  doctor  made  a  wrong 
diagnosis  and  applied  an  improper  remedy,  and  the  victim 
died.  In  upholding  the  accused's  conviction  for 
murder,  and  distinguishing  the  case  from  one  in  which 
improper  treatment  had  followed  on  a  stab  wound  from 
which  the  victim  had  recovered  to  a  considerable  extent 
at  the  time  of  the  impropriety,  and  in  which  the  accused 
had  been  acquitted  (R.  v.  Jordan,  (1956)  40  Cr.  App. 
Rep.  152),  Lord  Parker  said  that 
'...  if  at  the  time  of  death  the  original 
wound  is  still  an  operating  cause  and  a  sub- 
stantial  cause,  then  the  death  can  properly 
be  said  to  be  the  result  of  the  wound, 
albeit  that  some  other  cause  of  death  is  also 
operating.  Only  if  it  can  be  said  that  the 
original  wound  is  merely  the  setting  in  which 
another  cause  operates  can  it  be  said  that  the 
death  does  not  result  from  the  wound...  only 
if  the  second  cause  is  so  overwhelming  as  to 
make  the  original  wound  merely  part  of  the 
history  can  it  be  said  tht  the  death  does  not 
flow  from  the  wound'  (Lord  Parker,  C.  J.  at  p.  628). 
Lord  Parker's  language  is  in  the  main  untechnical, 
and  his  use  of  words  like  'substantial'  and  'overwhelming' 
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logical  concepts  at  all,  but  'weigh'  the  causes 
in  some  vague  scale,  andregard  the  'heaviest'  as  the 
cause.  This  is  probably  what  we  in  fact  do  when  we 
judge  untrammelled  by  such  pseudo-logical  or  pseudo- 
legal  concepts,  as  directness,  novus  actus  interveniens 
and  the  rest.  What  we  are  after  is  just  the  'most 
important'  cause,  and  in  such  a  search  remoteness  Is 
of  great  importance.  But  remoteness  in  this  sense 
means  something  other  than  place  in  a  temporal 
sequence  -  if  A  shoots  B  and  the  operating  surgeon's 
hand  slips  and  causes  B's  death  in  the  sense  that  B, 
who  would  probably  have  died  anyway,  dies  immediately 
following  the  cut  caused  by  the  surgeon,  it  can  be 
said  that  the  important,  or  effective,  or  substantial,, 
cause  of  death  was  A's  act,  and  not  the  surgeon's 
'trivial'  error.  This  way  of  thinking,  of  course, 
may  lead  us  to  take  the  view  that  the  substantial  cause 
is  the  most  violent  act  in  the  series,  and  so  to 
require  some  'overwhelming'  intervention  as  a 
novus  actus  interveniens.  This  in  itself  is  unsttis- 
factory:  it  might  mean  that  if  B  was  killed  by  a 
bomb  explosion  on  the  way  to  hospital  A  would  be  acquitted, 
but  if  he  were  killed  in  an  accident  caused  by  a  slight 
error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  the  ambulance  driver, 
A  would  be  convicted. 
Finding  someone  to  blame.  In  considering  the 
influence  of  responsibility  on  causal  judgments  it  is 
important  to  distinguish  between  cases  where  an  act 
by  A  is  followed  by  an  act  by  B,  and  those  where  A's 
act  is  followed  by  an  event  other  than  a  human  action. 
In  the  first  case  the  important  question  may  well  be 
whether  A  or  B  is  to  be  blamed  for  the  criminal  result. 
In  the  second  case,  the  only  alternatives  are  to  blame 
A  or  to  blame  no-one.  If  no-one  is  blamed,  then  the 121 
actus  reus  goes  unpunished,  society  is  deprived  of 
its  victim,  anä  the  law  lases  an  opportunity  of 
pursuing  its  policy  of  deterrent  punishment. 
It  is  easier  to  acquit  A  if  his  criminal  act  is  followed 
by  the  criminal  act  of  B,  than  if  it  is  followed  by  a 
non-criminal  act  of  B,  or  by  a  non-human  event. 
Takingyour  victim  as  you  find  him.  The  most 
generally  accepted  rule  in  this  part  of  the  law  is  the 
rule  that  pre-existing  factors  in  the  condition  of  the 
victim  are  irrelevant  -  that  an  assailant  must  take 
his  victim  as  he  find  him  (Robertson  and  Donoghue, 
Edinburgh  High  Court,  28-30  Aug.  1945,  unrepd., 
Judge's  Charge,  p.  17;  Rutherford,  1947  J.  C.  1  -  the 
rule  is  criticised  infra,  L..  ßµ  ).  The  state  in  which 
the  victim  is  found  is  regarded  as  irrelevant,  and 
the  foreseeability  that  such  might  be  his  condition 
does  not  come  into  the  matter  at  all.  To  take  an 
example  from  civil  law,  if  a  dog  bites  a  boy  who  is 
predisposed  to  meningitis  so  that  the  boy  catches  the 
disease  fron  the  bite,  the  death  is  regarded  as  having 
been  caused  by  the  bite  (M'Donald  v.  Smellie,  (1905) 
5  F.  955). 
This  rule  seems  to  be  firmly  entrenched  in  the  law, 
and  it  owes  its  strong  position  to  two  factors.  The 
first  is  that  it  seems  reasonable  to  say  that  it  is 
just  as  criminal  to  kill  a  weak  old  man  as  to  kill  a 
healthy  young  one.  The  law  goes  on  from  there  to  say 
that  therefore  it  is  as  bad  to  kill  a  haemophilic  by 
sticking  a  pin  into  him,  as  it  is  to  kill  a  normal 
person  by  sticking  a  knife  into  him,  even  if  the 
assailant  was  ignorant  of  the  haemophilia.  By. 
this  paralogism  the  law  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that 
the  physical  condition  of  the  victim  is  always  irrelevant. 122 
The  second  reason  is  that  we  tend  to  think  of 
causal  factors  as  set  out  in  a  temporal  sequence, 
and  to  reward  the  last  cause  as  the  most  important. 
The  haemophilia  precedes  the  pin  prick,  and  is  there- 
fore  disregarded  as  a  cause  of  death,  since  it  has  been 
followed,  or  'superseded'  by  the  prick.  This  , aas  once 
the  view  taken  by  the  civil  law  which  in  seeking  the 
cause  of  an  accident  discarded  anything  which  had  become 
a  'static  factor'  by  the  time  the  accident  occurred. 
In  the  classic  case  of  Davies  V.  Mann  ((1842)  10  M.  &  W. 
546)  a  carriage  was  carelessly  driven  into  a  donkey 
whose  owner  had  carelessly  left  it  in  a  dangerous 
place.  The  donkey  owner's  carelessness  was  discarded 
as  a  cause  of  the  accident  because  the  donkey  was 
there  first,  and  its  presence  had  become  a  static  feature 
of  the  situation  by  the  time  the  carriage  ran  into  it. 
The  position  is  even  stronger  when  the  static  condition, 
be  it  a  brick  wall  or  a  predisposition  to  meningitis, 
is  not  itself  the  result  of  negligence.  The  civil 
law  no  longer  aDDproache  s  causal  problems  in  this  way 
and  the  rule  that  an  accident  is  caused  by  the  person 
with  the  'last  opportunity'  of  avoiding  it  has  been 
described  as  'a  fallacious  test,  because  the  efficiency 
of  causes  does  not  depend  on  their  proximity  in  point 
of  time'  (Davies  v.  Swan  Motor  Co.  (Stivansea)  Ltd., 
[1949)  2  K.  B.  291,  Denning,  L.  J.  at  p.  321;  cf.  Owners 
of  the  'Boy  Andrew'  v.  Ownerz  of  the  'St.  Rognvald',  194'/ 
S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  70). 
The  solution  adopted  by  the  civil  law  is  to  apportion 
liability  among  the  various  persons  who  have  by  their 
negligence  contributed  to  the  accident  (Law  Reform 
(Contributory  Negligence)  Act,  1945,8  &9  Geo.  VI, 
c.  28,  s.  l),  but  this  solution  can  hardly  be  used  in 
criminal  law:  there  is  certainly  no  precedent  for 123 
apportioning  guilt  among  persons  who  have  contributed 
independently  to  the  creation  of  an  actus  reus.  A 
man  is  either  guilty  of  killin  another,  or  he  is  not, 
he  cannot  be  half-guilty  of  killing  him,  or  guilty  of 
half-killing  him.  It  may  be,  however,  that  if  the 
punishment  for  murder  were  not  fixed,  such  an  apportion- 
ment  would  be  possible,  and  at  least  it  could  be  reflected 
in  the  sentences  imposed.  But  it  would  represent  a 
radical  alteration  in  the  attitude  of  Scots  law,  which 
does  not  even  allow  of  the  degrees  of  guilt  represented 
in  England  by  guilt  as  principal  in  first  or  second 
degree,  guilt  by  accession,  and  guilt  of  aiding  and 
abetting  (cf.  Kenny,  ch.  5).  The  criminal  law,  it 
appears,  must  either  hold  that  all  those  who  have 
contributed  to  the  crime  by  their  criminal  conduct 
are  guilty  of  that  crime,  or  must  fix  on  one  actor  and 
treat  him  alone  as  guilty. 
Because  of  this,  temporal  sequence  remains 
important  in  criminal  law,  but  it  dos  not  follow  that 
unless  the  last  assailant  is  guilty  of  homicide  his 
act  cannot  be  a  novus  actus  interveniens.  Suppose  A 
wounds  C  so  as  to  render  him  allergic  to  a  particular 
drug,  and  the  doctor  who  attends  C  prescibes  this  drug, 
and  goes  on  prescribing  it  although  he  discovers  or 
ought  to  have  discovered  C's  allergy,  and  C  dies 
because  of  the  combined  effect  of  the  wound  andthe 
drug.  The  question  whether  the  doctor  is  guilty  of 
culpable  homicide,  and  the  question  whether  the  doctor's 
behaviour  constitutes  a  novus  actus  interveniens 
are  two  separate  questions.  The  doctor's  behaviour 
may  be  the  'legal  cause'  of  C's  death,  operating  as 
it  did  on  C's  static  condition,  and  at  the  same  time 
it  may  not  be  proper  for  the  law  to  punish  the  doctor. 
In  the  same  way,  if  A  wounds  C  so  as  to  render  him 124 
peculiarly  susceptible  to  punches  on  the  jaw,  and  B 
cores  along  and  punches  him  on  the  jaw  and  kills  him, 
the  law  could  be  altered  so  as  to  allow  of  B's 
acquittal  on  the  ground  that  death  was  not  a  foreseeable 
result  of  his  punch  and  that  accordingly  he  lacked 
the  necessary  mans  rea  for  culpable  homicide,  without 
abandoning  the  rule  that  B's  act  is  a  novus  actus 
interveniens  which  prevents  C's  death  being  regarded 
as  a  direct  consequence  of  A's  act,  and  so  exonerates 
A  from  guilt  of  homicide.  It  is  contended  therefore 
that  it  is  not  inconsistent  to  object  to  the  rule  that 
an  assailant  takes  his  victim  as  he  finds  him  when  it 
operates  to  convict  an  assailant  of  homicide  where 
death  was  not  a  foreseeable  result  of  his  actings,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  accept  that  the  assailant  caused 
the  death,  and  that  the  assault  is  therefore  a  novus 
actus  interveniens.  This,  of  course,  would  involve 
a  separation  of  causation  and  responsibility,  while 
the  law  is  prone  to  equqte  the  two. 
Can  two  people  commit  one  murder?  Assuming  that 
Scots  law  accepts  the  rule  that  the  last  assailant  is 
guilty  of  murder,  the  next  question  is,  can  an  earlier 
assailant  also  be  guilty  of  murder?  Where  the  two 
assaults  are  simultaneous,  or  almost  so,  the  answer 
is  probably  yes.  If  A  and  B  simultaneously  shoot  at  C 
and  each  bullet  inflicts  a  fatal  wound  there  is  no  way 
of  distinguishing  between  A  and  B  on  causal  grounds, 
and  the  only  alternative  to  convicting  both  is  to 
acquit  both,  a  course  as  clearly  unjust  as  it  is  just 
to  convict  both  (cf.  Hall,  p.  263;  F.  H.  Lawson, 
Negligence  in  the  Civil  Law,  pp.  51-2). 
Suppose,  however,  that  A  inflicts  a  fatal  wound  on 
C,  and  some  time  later,  B  comes  along  and  inflicts  a 
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homicide,  since  it  is  homicide  to  shorten  a  man's 
life,  however  near  to  death  he  may  be  (Hume,  i.  183). 
Is  A  also  guilty?  This  question  can  be  conveniently 
approached  by  Way  of  the  American  case  of  People  v.  Lewis 
((1899)  124  Cal.  551,  Sayre,  p.  189),  an  example  of 
an  actual  situation  of  this  kind.  The  accused  inflicted 
a  fatal  wound  on  the  deceased  who  cut  his  own  throat 
a  few  minutes  later,  and  died  after  another  five 
minutes.  It  was  assumed  that  the  deceased  was  guilty 
of  suicide,  and  that  his  suicide  was  a  voluntary  act 
for  which  he  was  responsible,  and  the  only  question 
was  whether  the  accused  could  be  regarded  as  having 
also  been  responsible  for  the  death.  The  defence, 
as  stated  by  Temple,  J.  9  the  trial  Judge,  was  '  ...  that 
this  is  a  case  where  one  languishing  from  a  mortal 
wound  is  killed  by  an  intervening  cause,  and  therefore, 
the  deceased  was  not  killed  by  Lewis...  He  was  as 
effectually  prevented  from  killing  as  he  would  have 
been  if  some  obstacle  had  turned  aside  the  bullet 
from  its  course  and  left  [him]  unwounded'  (Sayre,  p.  190). 
The  Judge  then  rejected  the  argument  that  the 
suicide  had  been  caused  by  the  wound,  saying,  'The 
wound  induced  the  suicide,  but  the  wound  was  not, 
in  the  usual  course  of  things,  the  cause  of  the  suicide'. 
He  none  the  less  took  the  view  that  Lewis  was  guilty 
of  murder,  and  said, 
'The  test  is  -  or  at  least  one  test  - 
whether,  when  the  death  occurred,  the  wound 
inflicted  by  the  defendant  did  contribute 
to  the  event.  If  it  did,  although  other 
ihdependent  causes  also  contributed,  the 
causal  relation  between  the  unlawful  acts 
of  the  deceased  and  the  death  has  been  made 
out.  Here,  when  the  throat  was  cut,  [the 
deceased]  was  not  merely  languishing  from  a 
mortal  wound.  He  was  actually  dying  - 
and  after  the  throat  was  cut  he  continued 126 
to  languish  from  both  wounds.  If  the 
throat  cuttinc  had  been  by  a  third  party, 
unconnected  with  the  defendant,  he  might  be 
guilty,  for,  although  a  man  cannot  be  killed 
twice,  two  persons,  acting  independently,  may 
contribute  to  his  death  and  each  be  guilty 
of  a  homicide'  (ib.  pp.  191-2). 
In  its  approach  to  causality  this  decision  is  in 
line  with  the  approach  of  the  Court  in  R.  v.  Smith 
((1959) 
2  'J.  L.  R.  623,  supra  )//7 
);  so  long  as  the 
original  wound  remains  an  operating  and  substantial 
cause,  the  person  who  inflicted  it  is  guilty  of 
homicide  -  although  the  English  Courts  might  have 
regarded  the  deceased's  suicide  as  an  overwhelming 
event  "breaking  the  causal  link.  The  core  of  Lewis 
is  the  general  proposition  contained  in  the  last 
sentence  quoted  -  that  two  persons,  acting  independently, 
may  contribute  to  the  death  of  one  man,  and  both  be 
guilty  of  homicide.  (Where  the  two  persons  act 
in  concert  quite  different  considerations  apply, 
since  then  the  death  is  the  act  of  the  concert,  so  to 
speak,  and  the  question  is  whether  the  accused  were 
truly  in  the  concert,  or  plot,  to  kill  the  deceased  - 
see  infra.  ch.  4). 
The  decision  in  Lewis  has  been  strongly  criticised 
by  Hall  (Hall,  pp.  261-6)  and  his  arguments  are 
applicable  to  Scots  law.  Indeed,  there  is  an 
explicit  dictum  in  Scotland  that  two  people 
acting  independently  cannot  be  guilty  of  the  same 
crime,  but  the  dictum  appears  in  a  case  in  which  the 
only  question  was  whether  if  a  woman  had  pleaded  guilty 
to  fraud,  her  husband  could  later  be  charged  with  the 
same  fraud  on  an  indictment  that  did  not  allege  that 
he  had  acted  in  concert  with  her,  and  there  was  no 
discussion  of  general  principles  (Greig  v.  Muir, lLI' 
1955  J.  C.  20,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Thomson  at  p.  23). 
The  general  principle  is  that  A  cannot  be  convicted 
of  the  murder  of  C  unless  A's  act  caused  C's  death 
(Hume,  i.  181).  Macdonald  states  in  terms  that,  'If,  after 
the  injury,  some  other  person  has  done  an  act  which 
causes  death,  the  person  who  did  the  first  injury 
cannot  be  held  guilty  of  homicide.  Thus,  if  A 
mortally  stab  B,  but  C  administer  poison  to  B  and  kill 
him,  A  cannot  be  found  guilty  of  homicide,  the  direct 
cause  of  death  being  the  poison'  (Macdonald,  p.  8'1). 
Macdonald's  authorities  are  a  passage  from  Hume  which 
does  not  go  quite  as  far  as  this,  since  it  deals  with 
the  case  where  the  initial  wound  is  'of  that  sort  which 
either  may  or  may  not  prove  f  atal'(Hume,  i.  181),  and 
a  passa  e  in  More's  Lectures  which  does  support  his 
view,  but  itself  refers  to  no  authority  (John  S.  More, 
Lectures  on  the  Law  of  Scotland,  Vol.  2,  p.  361). 
The  only  Scots  authority  to  the  contrary,  however, 
is  the  case  of  John  Ross  and  Ors.,  ((1847)  Ark.  258). 
Ross  was  a  driver  w_io  had  left  his  horse  and  cart 
unattended  with  a  passenger  in  it;  A  and  47,  the  two 
other  accused,  were  also  cart  drivers,  and  together 
drove  their  carts  recklessly  into  Ross's  cart, 
whereupon  Ross's  horse  bolted  and  his  passenger  was 
thrown  out  and  killed.  All  three  were  charged  with 
culpable  homicide,  and  the  indictment  against  Ross 
was  held  to  be  relevant.  This  is  rather 
surprising,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Ross's  horse 
was  in  the  position  of  the  donkey  in  Davies  v. 
Mann  ((1842)  10  M.  W.  546,  supra,  122),  and  the 
case  against  Ross  was  later  abandoned.  There  remains 
the  question  of  the  guilt  of  the  other  two  accused, 
and  it  is  not  clear  whether  this  rested  on  the  fact 128 
that  they  were  acting  in  concert.  It  may  be  that  their 
actins  can  be  regarded  as  similar  to  those  of  two 
persons  who  simultaneously  inflict  fatal  bullet  wounds 
on  a  third.  The  case  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
followed,  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  views  of  More 
and  of  Macdonald,  and  the  dictum  in  Greig  v.  Lluir 
(supra).  It  is  submitted  that  it  can  be  disregarded 
as  an  authority. 
The  argument  in  favour  of  Macdonald's  view  is 
fairly  clear.  The  mere  fact  that  A  intended  to  kill 
C  canl;  ot  make  him  guilty  of  murder.  Otherwise  A  would 
be  guilty  of  murdering  C  if  he  stuck  pins  in  C's  effigy 
with  the  intention  of  causing  his  death  in  this 
way,  and  C  was  run  over  and  killed  by  a  lorry 
just  after  his  effigy  had  been  pierced.  A  must  cause 
C's  death.  pow,  the  law  accepts  that  an  unfore- 
seeable  event  operates  as  a  novus  actus  interveniens 
and  breaks  the  objective  causal  connection  between  two 
events  which  otherwise  are  directly  connected  with 
each  other.  This  objective  break  occurs  irrespectively 
of  whether  A  intended  to  cause  C's  death  by  his  actings, 
so  that  A  is  not  guilty  of  killing  C  unless  C  died 
as  a  result  of  A'S  act.  He  must  also  die  more  or  less 
in  the  way  intended  by  A.  If  A  'intending  to  kill  his 
victim,  poisoned  his  food  and  the  victim,  while  on  the 
way  to  hospital  for  treatment,  was  struck  by  a  falling 
tree  and  died,  [A] 
would  not  presumably  be  convicted 
of  murder  although  he  intended  the  victim's  death  and 
it  would  not  have  occurred  but  for  his  act'  (?  I.  L.  A. 
Hart  and  A.  M.  Honore,  'Causation  in  the  Law',  (1956)  '12 
L.  Q.  R.  58,404;  cf.  D.  9.2.15(1);  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  1097; 
Schänke-Schrdder,  pp.  309-10).  As  Hall  puts  it, 
the  law  is  concerned  with  what  in  fact  happened,  and 
not  with  what  might  have  happened,  and  in  fact  A  did 129 
not  kill  C  (Hall,  p.  262). 
If,  then,  A  delioerately  inflicts  a  fatal  wound  on 
C-  and  a  fortiori  if  he  inflicts  the  wound  carelessly, 
or  if  the  wound  is  not  necessarily  fatal  but  only  fore- 
seeably  so  -  and  B  later  does  somet.  zing  which  causes 
C's  death,  A  should  not  be  convicted  of  homicide.  At 
the  same  time,  A  may  well  oe  morally  responsible  for 
C's  death  -  there  is  no  reason  why  A  and  i3  should  not 
both  be  morally  to  blame  for  killing  C,  at  any  rate  if 
one's  moral  attitudes  are  deontological  in  character  - 
and  this  may  on  occasion  influence  the  law  to  depart 
from  the  criterion  of  direct  causation,  and  to  seek 
to  achieve  the  morally  desirable  result  by  way  of  the 
criterion  of  foreseeability.  If  A's  act  was  not 
foreseeably  fatal  -  if  A  ought  not  to  have  realised 
that  it  might  cause  C's  death  -  the  law  will  be  more 
ready  to  regard  B's  intervention  as  unforeseeable  by  A, 
and  so  as  a  novus  actus  interveniens,  particularly  if 
B's  behaviour  is  not  particularly  heinous.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  A's  act  was  foreseeably  fatal,  the  law 
will  be  inclined  to  regard  B's  intervention  as  fore- 
seeable  by  A,  or  at  least  to  say  that  a  fatal  result 
was  foreseeable,  in  order  to  avoid  treating  B's 
intervention  as  a  novus  actus  interviens,  and  in  order 
to  convict  A.  The  latter  course  is  almost  invariably 
adopted  where  A  deliberately  inflicts  a  serious  injury 
on  C  and  B  is  a  doctor  who  is  negligent,  but  not 
grossly  or  criminally  so. 
With  these  considerations  in  mind,  I  turn  to 
consider  three  classes  of  cases  which  involve  causal 
problems  -  those  where  A's  act  is  followed  by  an  act  of 
a  third  party;  those  where  it  is  followed  by  a  natural 
event;  and  those  where  it  is  followed  by  an  act  of  the 
victim. 130 
Acts  by  a  third  party.  Most  of  the  cases  in  this 
group  are  concerned  with  the  problem  of  malregimen, 
of  the  effect  of  negligent  medical  treatment  on  the 
wounds  originally  inflicted  by  the  assailant,  and  the 
general  rule  is  that  reasonable  medical  treatment  is 
considered  to  have  been  foreseeable,  while  grossly 
improper  treatment  is  regarded  as  something  which 
interrupts  the  causal  series,  and  so  prevents  the 
victim's  ultimate  condition  from  being  regarded  as  a 
consequence  of  the  original  injury. 
The  creation  ofanew 
_inj 
ury.  In  the  American 
case  of  Purchase  v.  Seelye  ((1918)  231  Mass.  434;  8 
A.  L.  R.  503)a  railway  employee  was  injured  through 
the  negligence  of  his  employers.  He  was  taken  to 
hospital  where  he  was  operated  on  by  a  surgeon  who 
mistook  him  for  another  patient,  and  instead  of 
operating  on  his  wound  operated  on  the  other  side 
of  his  body.  The  question  raised  in  the  case  was 
whether  the  employee  was  entitled  to  damages  from 
his  employers  for  the  additional  injuries  caused  by 
the  surgeon.  It  was  held  that  he  was  not.  The 
Court  pointed  out  that, 
The  question  is  whether  the  act  of  the 
(surgeon]  in  operating  by  mistake  upon  the  ...  left  side  was  a  natural  and  probable  result 
of  the  negligence  of  the  railroad  company... 
The  reason  why  a  wrongdoer  is  held  liable 
for  the  negligence  of  a  physician  whose 
unskilful  treatment  agmravates  an  injury 
is  that  such  unskilful  treatment  is  a  result 
which  reasonably  ought  to  have  been  anticipated 
by  him. 
The  railroad  company  could  not  be  held 
liable  because  of  the  [surgeon's]  mistaken 
belief...  The  fact  that  the  mistake...  might 
possibly  occur  is  not  enough  to  charge  the 
railroad  company  with  liability;.  the  unskilful 
or  improper  treatment  must  have  been  legally 131 
and  constructively  anticipated  by  the  original 
wrongdoer  as  a  rational  and  probable  result 
of  the  first  injury.  '  (8  A.  L.  R.  505-6, 
Crosby,  J.  ) 
Although  the  Court  applied  the  criterion  of 
foreseeability,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  additional 
injuries  were  not  merely  unforeseeable,  but  would  also 
have  been  regarded  as  breaking  the  chain  of  direct 
causation. 
The  only  Scots  case  on  this  point  is  not  altogether 
conclusive.  It  is  the  case  of  Hugh  and  Euphemia  II'Millan 
((182`7)  Syme  288).  The  accused  threw  acid  at  the 
victim;  she  received  injuries  to  her  face;  as  part  of 
the  medical  treatment  given  her,  she  was  suojected  to 
blood  letting,  and  a  cut  was  made  in  her  arm  for  that 
pur_oose;  this  cut  became  inflamed  and  caused  her  death. 
In  these  circunstanc.:  s  the  Lord  Advocate  dropped  the 
charge  of  murder,  and  proceeded  on  a  statutory  capital 
charge  of  assault  by  acid-throwing,  but  in  doing  so 
he  commented  that  it  might  be  a  nice  question  whether 
the  accused  were  guilty  of  murder  since  bloodletting 
was  the  normal  remedy  for  the  deceased's  injuries 
(at  p.  293).  It  remains  a  nice  question.  The 
case  seems  to  have  proceeded  on  the  criterion  of  direct 
causation;  it  is  likely,  however,  that  if  a  similar 
situation  were  to  arise  today,  it  would  be  decided  by 
way  of  the  criterion  of  foreseeability,  in  which  case, 
since  bloodletting  is  ex  hypothesi  the  normal  treatment, 
and  so  is  to  be  regarded  as  foreseeable,  the  accused 
would  be  convicted  of  homicide. 
Ag.  ravationofthe_original  inLjury.  This  is  a 
more  difficult  case,  but  the  approach  in  Scotland  is 
probably  fairly  simple,  although  not  altogether 
logical.  The  general  rule  is  that  negligent  treatment 132 
is  irrelevant,  since  the  accused  must  'stand  the 
peril  of  the  conseouences  of  his  act'  (Jas.  Wilson, 
(1838)  2  Sw.  16,  Lord  Cockburn  at  o.  18).  Where, 
however,  'it  could  be  clearly  proved  that  the  wound 
would  not  naturally  have  led  to  a  mortal  issue,  and  that 
this  result  has  been  produced,  not  by  the  wound  but  by 
the  bad  treatment...  it  will  be  difficult  to  sustain 
a  charge  of  murder'  (John  S.  More,  op.  cit.  p.  364). 
The  position  is  left  rather  vague,  but  the  balance 
is  wei  ;  kited  somewhat  against  the:  accused.  Where  the 
wound  is  foreseeably  fatal  the  law  seems  to  be  that 
its  subsequent  aggravation  is  irrelevant;  and  Judges 
are  reluctant  to  say  that  where  it  is  not  fo  re  seeably 
fatal  subsequent  aggravation  by  medical  negligence  is 
to  be  regarded  as  breaking;  the  causal  chain  between  the 
accused's'  ac-c  and  the  Victim's  death.  In  Jas.  Williamson 
((1866)  5  Irv.  326)  Lord  Inglis  went  only  so  far  as  to 
say  th?  t  if  the  wound  were  not  'fatal  in  itself',  and 
giere  followed  by  improper  treatment,  it  would  be 
possible  to  say  that  the  accused  had  not  caused  death. 
Alrain,  in  Heinrich  Heidmeisser  ((18'/9)  1'J  S.  L.  R.  266) 
Lord  Moncrieff  said  that  where  the  wound  was  not  fore- 
seeably  fatal  it  did  not  necessarily  follow  that  the 
wound  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  death  if 
improper  treatment  intervened  between  the  wound  and 
death  (at  p.  267). 
There  is  authority  that  where  the  wound  is 
foreseeably  fatal,  then  although  the  victim  might  have 
recovered  had  the  best  attention  been  available,  the 
absence  of  such  attention  does  not  prevent  the 
wound  being  regarded  as  the  cause  of  death  (ib.  ), 
and  that  where  it  might  have  been  cured  by  ordinary 
treatment  but  no  treatment  was  given,  the  wound  is  the 
cause  of  death  (John  Macglashan,  Bell's  Notes,  p.  69; 133 
r.  iar  ;  t.  Shearer,  (1951)  J.  Shaw  468).  It  does  not,  however, 
follow  from  this  that  where  a  foreseeably  fatal  wound 
is  followed  and  a  ;  gravated  by  improper  treatment  the 
assailant  must  be  regarded  as  having  caused  the  death. 
There  is  a  difference  between  the  absence  of  treatment 
which  megns  that  the  wound  is  left  to  take  its  course, 
or  the  presence  of  improper  treatment  of  a  kind  which 
fails  to  prevent  the  wound  taking  its  course,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  improper  treatment  which  itself  operates 
on  the  wound  to  aggravate  it  and  so  to  cause  death, 
on  the  other  hand.  In  the  first  cases  it  can  be  said 
that  death  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  wound, 
in  the  second  the  improper  treatment  has  been  added 
to  the  causal  series,  and  has  in  fact  altered  the 
'natural'  progress  of  the  wound  by  aggravating  its 
seriousness,  so  that  it  becomes  necessary  to  ask  if 
the  introduction  of  this  new  causal  factor  is  to  be 
regarded  as  interrupting  the  causal  series. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  foreseeability  of  the 
original  wound  being  fatal  is  not  a  sufficient 
criterion  (nor,  indeed  from  the  causal  point  of  view, 
whatever  the  requirements  of  morality,  is  it  a  necessary 
condition,  a  fact  which  is  recognised  in  the  'take  your 
victim  as  you  find  him'  cases);  the  wound  must  be 
shown  to  have  caused  death.  Suppose  A  injures  two 
people,  X  and  Y;  X's  wound  is  foreseeably  fatal, 
Y's  is  not.  X  and  Y  are  taken  to  hospital  in  the  same 
ambulance  and  are  killed  on  the  way  because  of  the 
negligence  of  the  ambulance  driver.  Is  A  guilty  of 
killing  X  and  not  Y?  This  cannot  be  the  case,  but 
it  is  the  result  of  concentrating  on  the  likelihood 
of  the  original  wound  proving  fatal.  This  concentration 
is  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  more  likely  the 
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serious  injury  intended,  and  the  more  wicked  the  accusdd 
must  have  been. 
The  proper  causal  approach  is  by  way  of  the 
foreseeability,  not  of  the  fatality  of  the  ori4inal 
wound,  but  of  the  subsequent  events.  ,  hether  or  not 
medical  negligence  operates  as  a  novus  actus  inter- 
veniens  should  depend  on  the  foreseeability  of  the 
particular  intervention,  of  the  particular  mistake, 
or  at  any  rate  on  the  foreseeability  of  an  inter- 
vention  or  mistake  of  that  kind.  If  this  approach 
is  adopted  it  can  be  said  that  'death  resulting 
from  any  normal  treatment  employed  to  deal  with  a 
felonious  inj;  ry  may  be  regarded  as  caused  oy  the 
felonious  injury',  but  that  death  resulting  from 
abnormal  -treatment  may  be  regarded  as  caused  by 
the  treatment  (R.  v.  Jordan,  (1956)  40  Cr.  App. 
Rep.  152,15'/).  Abnormal  treatment  is  usually 
grossly  improper  treatment,  but  this  need  not  be  so. 
A  surgeon  may  use  a  new,  unusual,  experimental  treat- 
ment  without  impropriety,  but  the  treatment  may  be  so 
uqusual  -  and  so  risky  -  as  to  rank  as  a  novus  actus 
interveniens.  The  insistence  on  impropriety  is  the 
result  of  adopting,  perhaps  surreptitiously,  the 
principle  that  what  the  doctor  does  can  only  operate 
as  a  novus  actus  interveniens  if  the  doctor  was  to 
blame  for  it,  so  that  he  can  be  substituted  for  the 
accused  as  an  object  of  punishment.  It  is  also  felt 
that  the  accused  must  not  be  allowed  to  'get  away'  with 
what  he  has  done  by  criticising  the  doctor  -  'it 
will  never  do...  to  say  that  every  criticism  that  can 
be  made  on  the  treatment  of  the  patient...  is  to  furilish 
a  ground  for  acquitting  the  person  who  inflicted  the 
wound'  (Williamson 
,  supra).  No  suen  sug,  estion  is 
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the  accused  caused  the  death;  not  whether  he 
intended  to  cause  it,  or  acted  recklessly  and  wickedly 
in  assaulting  the  victim.  Nor  is  it  a  question 
of  criticising  the  medical  treatment,  but  of  asking  if 
it  caused  death,  and  if  it  was  foreseeable. 
Subsequent  events.  The  cases  under  this  head 
concern  the  incidence  of  disease  supervening  on  an  injury. 
The  basic  criterion  is  that  of  direct  causation,  allied 
to  the  idea  of  remoteness.  So  Hume  says  that  if  'A 
person  of  a  weakly  habit  receives  a  wound,  of  which, 
after  some  space  of  time,  he  is  cured;  but  owing  to 
the  long  confinement,  he  is  taken  ill  of  consumption, 
or  some  other  malady  incident  to  such  a  state  of  weakness; 
and  of  this  he  dies',  the  assailant  is  not  responsible 
for  the  death  since,  'Inferences  of  this  kind  are  far 
too  remote,  and  too  uncertain,  to  serve  as  the  grounds 
of  judgment  in  human  tribunals'  (Hume,  i.  182).  (Hume 
also  quotes  a  case  in  which  the  accused  broke  into  a 
house  in  order  to  beat  the  owner,  and  their  'raging 
and  roaring'  caused  his  wife,  who  wrs  in  childbed, 
to  contract  a  fever  of  which  she  died  -  Duff  of  Braco 
Nov.  10,1707,  Hume,  i.  183  -  which  seems  to  be  a  case 
in  which  the  criterion  of  directness  was  abandoned  on 
grounds  of  foreseeability. 
At  the  other  e..  treme  is  the  case  of  Heidmeisser 
((1879)  1,7  S.  L.  R.  266).  There  the  victim  was  in 
hospital  recovering  from  a  wound  inflicted  by  the  accused. 
He  died  of  a  chill  caught  when  'He  had  been  brought 
through  the  danger,  and  nothing  more  was  required  but 
ordinary  skill  and  care  -  but  he  had  not  recovered, 
and  if  a  chill  was  sufficient  to  carry  him  off,  as  in 
point  of  fact  it  seems  to  have  done,  the  man  who  put 
his  fellow-man  in  a  position  where  a  chill  would  carry 
hin  off  is  responsible'  (Lord  Ioncrieff  at  p.  267). 136 
ow,  although  tale  deceased  had  not  entirely  recovered 
from  his  wound,  t:  ze  general  tenour  of  the  case  seems 
to  conflict  wit-.  Hume'  ä  statement  of  tae  law.  And 
the  ratio  of  the  case  -  that  the  accused  -reut  the 
deceased  into  a  position  in  which  a  chill  might  carry 
,  li.  ý  off  -  is  capable  of  I,  iuch  wider  application. 
Indeed,  it  is  very  like  the  unsatisfactory  criterion 
of  the  causa  sine  qua  pion  (cf.  supra,  ]0).  If 
lieidmeisser's  victim  had  caught  a  disease  which 
might  have  been  fatal  to  a  healthy  man,  but  which 
was  endemic  in  the  hospital  in  :  ww'lich  he  was  recovering 
from  his  wound,  it  could  still  have  been  said  t,  '1at 
Heidereisser  had  'put  him  in  a  position'  where  this 
disease  would  carry  hiln  off. 
It  is  submitted  that  -leidmeisser  is  wrong,  and  that 
the  proper  criterion  is  that  of  directness,  subject 
to  an  exception  in  the  case  of  direct  consequences 
which  appear  too  remote  to  make  it  reasonable  to 
attribute  them  to  the  accused's  act.  The  law  is 
probably  contained  in  Lord  Cockburn's  summing-up 
in  Jas.  Wilson  ((1838"1  2  Sw.  16,19),  where  he  said 
that  'provided  the  disease,  from  which  death  follows, 
be  not  altogether  new,  but  a  natural  consequence  of  the 
injury,  the  law  holds  that  injury  to  be  the  cause 
of  death',  but  that  where  'the  disease  was  an  entirely 
new  disease  -  not  produced  by  the  woundss,  but  by 
infection,  or  some  other  external  cause',  death  will 
not  be  treated  as  a  consen_uence  of  the  injury.  (Cf. 
also  J.  Campbell,  April,  1819,  Alison,  i.  147). 
Acts  of  the  victim  .  Here  the  element  of  Diaure 
is  most  important.  If  it  appears  fair  to  say  that  the 
victim  had  only  himself  to  blame,  his  death  will 
probably  not  be  attributed  to  his  assailant.  This 
is,  of  course,  particularly  so  if  the  wound  vies  trivial. 137 
'If  a  person  receive  some  slight  injury,  in  itself 
nowise  dangerous  or  difficult  to  be  cured,  but  which 
owing  to  his  obstinacy  and  intemperance,  or  to  rash 
and  hurtful  application,  degenerates  in  the  end  into  a 
mortal  sore'  he  is  regarded  as  'having  killed  himself' 
(Hume  i,  182).  In  the  case  of  Jos.  and  Mary  Norris 
(1886)  1  M.  292)  the  wound  was  trivial,  but  the 
victim  went  drinking,  exposed  himself  to  the  cold,  and 
took  off  his  bandages,  so  that  he  caught  tetanus  and 
died.  Lord  Craighill  told  the  jury  that  the  question 
for  them  to  consider  was  whether  the  tetanus  would  have 
developed  whether  or  not  the  victim  had  behaved  as 
imprudently  as  he  did  (at  p.  295).  (Cf.  also  Jos. 
Flinn  and  Margt.  Brennan,  (1848)  J.  Shaw  9  where  the 
victim  was  struck  on  the  head  with  a  tray,  and  then 
drank  whcsky  and  died  -  the  Crown  dropped  the  charge 
of  homicide.  ) 
These  cases  are  perhaps  comparable  to  cases  where 
improper  treatiaeýit  makes  a  trivial  wound  fatal,  but 
the  reference  to  'obstinacy  and  intemperance'  suggests 
that  even  where  the  wound  is  foreseeably  fatal  there 
may  be  cases  in  which  the  victim's  own  behaviour  will 
be  regarded  as  the  cause  of  death;  it  is  probably 
necessary  to  retain  this  possibility  in  order  to 
provide  for  the  case  of  a  spiteful  victim  deliberately 
disobeying  his  doctor  in  order  to  ensure  the  conviction 
of  his  assailant  for  murder.  Since  the  victim's 
actions  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  foreseeable, 
the  conviction  of  the  assailant  could  be  avoided,  in 
the  present  state  of  the  law  as  to  situations  where  the 
wound  is  foreseeably  fatal,  only  by  treating  acts 
by  the  victim  as  different  from  acts  by  third  parties. 
In  one  case,  that  of  Daniel  Houston  (25  Nov.  1833, 
Bell's  Notes,  p.  70),  the  Court  stopped  a  homicide 138 
trial  because  they  thought  that  the  rejection  of 
medical  advice  night  be  on  a  different  footing  from 
improper  treatment,  but  the  point  was  left  undecided. 
Conversely,  of  course,  there  might  be  cases  in 
which  the  victim's  conduct,  although  imprudent, 
was  foreseeable,  and  so  would  not  operate  as  a  novus 
actus  interveniens.  If  A  inflicts  a  wound  on  B  which 
induces  a  strong  thr_i,  st  in  B  and  at  the  same  time  makes 
it  dangerous  for  him  to  drink,  and  both  results  are 
foreseeable,  B's  conduct  in  drinking,  however 
obstinate,  intemperate  and  lacking  in  self-control, 
may  not  constitute  a  novus  actus  interveniens. 
There  may  also  be  situations  in  which  the 
assailant  is  so  clearly  deserving  of  punishment  for 
the  victim's  death,  and  the  victim's  own  behaviour  so 
clearly  not  blameworthy,  that  the  assailant  will  be 
convicted  of  murder,  irrespective  of  causal 
considerations,  provided  of  course  that  the  death  was 
in  some  material  sense  a  consequence  of  the  assault. 
In  Stephenson  v.  State  ((1932)  205  Ind.  141,179  N.  E. 
633,  see  Franci2  X.  Busch,  Guilty  or  Not  Guilty,  pp. 
77-124,  and  G.  C.  T.,  'A  Note  on  Stephenson  v.  State', 
(1932-3)  31  Michigan  Law  Review,  659),  the  accused 
raped  a  girl,  and  in  doing  so  inflicted  wounds  on 
her  breast.  The  wound  caused  an  abscess;  the  girl 
took  poison  a  few  days  after  the  rape  with  the 
intention  of  killing  herself;  the  poison  itself 
would  not  have  caused  death,  but  it  did  so  in  combination 
with  a  complication  of  the  partly-healed  abscess. 
The  Appeal  Court  upheld  the  accused's  conviction  for 
murder,  holding  that  the  abscess  had  actively 
contributed  to  the  death,  that  the  suicide  was  not  a 
responsible  act,  and  that  in  any  event  the  girl  was 
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violence.  As  was  pointed  out  in  a  note  in  the 
Michigan  Law  Review  (supra)  none  of  these  grounds  was 
sufficient  according  to  the  letter  of  the  law  -  the 
abscess  was  not  foreseaably  fatal,  there  was  no 
precedent  for  treating  the  suicide,  on  the  evidence, 
as  involuntary  or  irresponsible,  and  the  girl  took 
poison,  not  to  excape  violence,  but  to  escape  shame. 
The  accused  was  convicted  because  'Assuming  that  his 
act  has  caused  death  in  fact,  its  punishability  as 
a  homicide  should  be  determined,  not  so  much  by  the 
more  or  less  fortuitous  course  of  events  subsequent 
to  the  actin;,  as  by  the  social  menace  of  the  act 
and  the  viciousness  of  the  actor's  intent'  (31  Michigan 
Law  Review,  p.  663). 
The  place  of  the  act 
Criminal  conduct  and  the  actus  reus 
In  talking  of  criminal  conduct  and  the  actus  reus 
it  has  been  assumed  that  the  two  can  always  be 
separated.  'The  actus  reust  which  is  the  result  of 
conduct,  and  therefore  an  event,  must  be  distinguished 
from  the  conduct  which  produced  the  result'  (Kenny, 
para.  12).  This  is  not,  it  is  submitted,  always  so. 
There  are  crimes  in  which  the  actus  reus  is  inseparable 
if  not  logically  indistinguishable  from  the  conduct.  The 
The  actus  reus  of  perjury,  for  example,  is  juht  the 
giving  false  evidence  on  oath.  But  in  most  crimes  the 
two  can  be  separated,  and  when  this  is  so,  there  will 
not  be  a  completed  crime  until  the  actus  reus  has 
occurred,  as  for  example,  where  a  man  dies  as  a 
result  of  an  injury  inflicted  some  time  previously. 
The  kind  of  crime  in  which  conduct  and  actus  reus 140 
are  separated  is  known  in  German  law  as  an  Erfolgsverbrechen, 
a  success-  or  result-crime,  since  the  criminality  of 
the  conduct  depends  on  the  result  produced. 
In  such  crimes  the  conduct  and  the  actus  reus 
may  occur  in  different  countries,  and  the  question  then 
arises;  In  which  country  was  the  crime  committed? 
Where  the  actus  reus  occurs  in  Scotland.  It  is 
clear,  both  in  principle,  and  on  authority,  that  where 
criminal  conduct  abroad  has  as  its  result  an  actus  reus 
in  Scotland,  a  crime  has  been  committed  against  the  law 
of  Scotland.  The  leading  authority  on  the  subject 
is  the  case  of  John  , Vitherin  on  ((1881)  4  Coup.  475) 
in  which  the  Lord  Justice-General,  Lord  Inglis, 
illustrated  the  rule  as  follovns:  - 
'The  best  and  most  conclusive  example... 
is  the  case  of  a  murder  by  poisoning,  which 
takes  place  in  Edinburgh,  while  the  murderer 
is  domiciled  and  resident  in  London,  and 
never  was  in  Scotland.  The  manner  in  which 
the  murderer  accomplishes  his  purpose  is 
to  send  by  post,  or  otherwise,  to  his  victim 
in  Edinburgh,  a  packet  of  deadly  poison, 
recommending  it  to  him  (knowingly  and 
maliciously  for  the  purpose  of  acconnlishing 
the  death)  as  a  salutary  medicine...  If  the 
victim  acts  on  the  suggestion  and  swallows 
the  poison  it  is  not  doubtful  that  a  murder 
has  been  committed  in  Edinburgh'  (at  p.  489). 
Lord  Inglis  also  pointed  out  the  importance 
of  the  concept  of  the  result-crime, 
In  most  of  these  cases  the  perpetrator's 
success  is  his  criminal  object  is  necessary  to 
complete  the  crime.  In  the  case  of  poisoning 
there  would  have  been  no  murder  if  the  victim 
had  not  swallowed  the  poison... 
There  are  crimes  of  a  different  description 
which  may  be  fully  committed  without  the 
criminal  succeeding  in  the  object  for  which 
he  commits  the  crime.  The  most  obvious 
of  these  are  forging  and  uttering.  If  a  man 
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messenger  for  the  purpose  ofits  being  used  and 
acted  on  as  genuine,  the  crime  is  completed 
as  soon  as  the  document  nasses  out  of  his  own 
possession  or  control,  although  the  forger  may 
be  immediately  afterwards  detected,  andno  one 
is  injured... 
Now,  the  question  of  jurisdiction  here 
seems  to  me  to  depend  on  wnether  the  offence 
charged  in  this  indictment  belongs  to  the 
former  or  the  latter  of  these  descriptions 
of  crime'  (at  p.  491). 
WitherinFton  itself,  like  many  of  the  cases  on 
this  subject,  (e.  g.  Wm.  Bradbury,  (1872)  2  Coup.  311, 
Thos.  11'Gregor  and  Geo.  Inglis,  (1846)  Ark.  49), 
concerned  a  type  of  long-firm  fraud.  The  accused 
who  lived  in  England  sent  letters  to  Scottish  traders 
containing  false  representations  by  means  of  which  he 
persuaded  them  to  send  goods  to  him  in  England, 
the  goods  being  despatched  by  railway  carrier. 
The  ratio  of  the  decision  that  the  Scots  Court  had 
jurisdiction  to  convict  the  accused  of  fraud  was 
that  the  actus  reus  consisted  in  the  obtaining  of  the 
goods,  and  that  this  had  occurred  when  the  railway 
accepted  them  for  transmission  to  him.  As  Lord 
Inglis  said,  'It  is  here  (i.  e.  in  Scotland)  that  [the 
dupe]  is  imposed  upon  and  induced  to  believe  the  false 
and  fraudulent  representations  of  the  panel;  it  is 
here  that  he  acts  on  the  belief...  and  delivers 
the  goods  in  Scotland  to  a  public  carrier  who  is 
thereby  constituted  the  innocent  agent  of  the 
panel  in  carrying  out  the  fraudulent  scheme  to  its 
completion.  Lohen  the  goods  were  delivered...  tha, 
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Where  the  actus  reus  occurs  abroad  as  a  result  of 
conduct  in  Scotland.  The  position  here  is  more 
difficult.  If  the  conduct  is  criminal  in  itself,  it  is 
punishable  as  such  in  Scotland,  whether  or  not  its 
remoter  results  are  also  punishable  there.  If,  for 
example,  it  were  a  crime  to  possess  poison,  and  A 
sent  poison  from  Scotland  to  England  to  kill  B  there, 
he  can  be  convicted  in  Scotland  of  the  crime  of 
possessing  poison,  whether  or  not  he  can  also  be 
convicted  of  B's  murder.  The  difficult  question  is 
whether  he  can  also  be  convicted  of  B's  murder. 
It  seems  to  have  been  assumed  that  a  foreign 
actus  reus  is  punishable  in  Scotland,  provided  that 
the  'main  act'  is  committed  in  Scotland  (Macdonald,  p.  191). 
There  are  dicta  which  take  it  for  ;  ranted  that  the  man 
who  shoots  across  the  border  from  Scotland  into 
England  and  kills  someone  there,  can  be  tried  for 
murder  in  Scotland  as  well  as  in  England  (Wm.  Bradbury, 
(18'/2)  2  Coup.  311;  Lord  Neaves  at  p.  319;  Wm.  Allan, 
(1873)  2  Cour.  402,  Lord  Ardmillen  at  p.  407; 
Llacdonald,  p.  191).  Nor  is  this  view  confined  to 
Scotland.  The  English  Draft  Code  of  1879  proposed  that 
'Every  offence...  shall...  be  deemed  to  be 
committed  at  every  place  where  any  act  is  done... 
the  doing...  of  vi  ich  forms  a  part  of  the  offence, 
or  where  any  event  happens  necessary  to  the 
completion  of  the  offence...  '  (Report  of  Royal 
Commission  on  Draft  Code,  1879.  Draft  Code,  s.  4) 
But  this  view  conflicts  with  the  principle  of 
territoriality.  At  common  law,  and  by  the  basic 
principles  of  international  law  the  criminal 
jurisdiction  of  any  country  extends  only  to  crimes 
committed  within  its  boundaries  (cf.  Huntington  v.  Atrill, 
E18931A.  C.  150;  John  Hall,  (1881)  4  Coup.  438,  Lord 
Young  at  p.  449).  It  will  only  be  exercised  with 143 
respect  to  crimes  committed  outwith  these  boundaries 
where  there  is  special  statutory  provision  for  such 
exercise  (cf.  Mortensen  v.  Peters,  (1906)  5  Adam  121; 
Hetherington,  (1915)  7  Adam  633). 
There  are  also  practical  difficulties  in  regarding 
the  creation  of  an  actus  reus  abroad  as  a  crime  against 
the  law  of  Scotland.  No  two*  countries  have  the  sane 
criminal  law,  and  presumably  the  Scots  Courts  will 
not  convict  a  man  of  a  crime  for  doing  something  which, 
though  criminal  in  the  country  in  which  it  takes  effect, 
is  not  criminal  in  Scotland.  Would  it,  for  example, 
have  been  possible  to  try  someone  in  Scotland  for 
arranging  to  smug  le  refugees  from  Nazi  Germany  in 
contravention  of  German  emigration  laws,  even  if  the 
plan  to  do  so  were  concocted  in  Scotland,  the  necessary 
materials  made  in  Scotland,  and  the  whole  operation 
directed  from  Scotland  by  radio?  Even  where  the  actus 
reus  would  have  been  a  crime  in  Scotland,  it 
. ay  not 
be  the  same  crime  in  the  place  of  its  occurrence 
as  in  Scotland.  Suppose  that,  before  England  adopted 
the  principle  of  diminished  responsibility,  a  person 
of  dimirLshed  responsibility  sent  a  parcel  bomb  from 
Scotland  to  England  and  killed  someone  there  -  would 
he  be  guilty  in  Scotland  of  culpable  homicide  or  murder? 
Conversely,  suppose  A  does  something  x  in  Scotland 
which  is  lawful  in  itself,  and  which  causes  a  result  y 
in  England,  and  suppose  that  y  is  an  actun  reus  in 
Scots  law,  but  lawful  in  English  law.  It  is  not  a 
crime  to  cause  y  in  England,  nor  to  do  x  in  Scotland  - 
how  then  can  it  be  a  crime  against  the  law  of  Scotland 
to  cause  y  in  England  by  doing  x  in  Scotland?  To 
charge  A  in  Scotland  with  committing  y  is  either  to 
charge  him  with  creating  a  situation  which  was  not 
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that  the  Scots  courts  have  jurisdiction  at  common 
law  over  crimes  committed  anywhere  in  the  world  - 
both  of  which  ratios  are  clearly  wrong. 
It  is  accordingly  submitted  that  on  principle 
the  better  view  is,  as  Kenny  puts  it,  that  the  crime 
is  committed  where  it  takes  effect,  and  only  there, 
so  that  homicide  is  committed  where  the  victim  dies, 
and  not  where  the  shot  was  fired  or  the  poison 
dispatched  (Kenny,  para.  648).  (Strictly  speaking, 
the  crime  is  probably  committed  where  its  results 
begin  to  take  effect.  If  A  shoots  B  in  Glasgow, 
and  B  dies  as  a  result  in  an  English  hospital,  A's 
crime  is  probably  a  Scots  one.  But  the  difficulty 
here  is  one  of  causation,  and  not  of  jurisdiction.  ) 
This  view  was  taken  in  State  v.  Hall  ((1894)  114  N.  C. 
909,41  Am.  St.  Rep.  822),  where  a  citizen  of  North 
Carolina  standing  in  North  Carolina  shot  across  the 
border  and  killed  a  man  in  Tennessee,  and  it  was  held 
that  there  was  no  jurisdiction  to  try  him  for  homicide 
in  North  Carolina  since  the  crime  had  been  committed 
in  Tennessee. 
The_cases_suDDorting-_the_view  that  conduct  inScotlmd 
is-enough.  It  is  submitted  that  githough  there  are 
dicta  contrary  to  the  submission  just  made,  there  is 
no  bidding  and  acceptable  authority  against  it. 
Macdonald  (p.  191)  relies  in  part  on  Hume,  but  the 
latter  is  concerned  mainly  with  continuing  crimes, 
and  his  other  examples,  such  as  uttering  in  Scotland 
a  deed  forged  abroad,  or  sending  threatening  letters 
from  abroad,  are  cases  where  the  actus  reus  occurs 
in  Scotland,  and  the  'main  act'  relied  on  as  a  criterion 
by  Macdonald,  is  described  by  Hume  as  that  'which 
completes  the  crime'  (Hume,  ii.  54;  Macneil  and  Mackay, 
April  1817,  Hume,  i.  156.  The  crime  of  uttering 
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number  of  occasions  with  respect  to  the  one  deed,  since 
it  is  coiunitted  each  time  the  deed  is  uttered.  ) 
In  Thos.  TT'Gregor  and  Geo.  Inglis  ((1846)  Ark.  49) 
an  accused  was  convicted  of  obtaining  goods  by  false 
pretences  where  he  wrote  letters  from  Scotland  to 
England  whereby  an  English  trader  was  induced  to  send 
goods  from  England  to  Scotland  where  they  were  received 
by  the  accused.  The  Court  aid  not  consider  the 
question  of  jurisdiction  in  detail  but  simply  held 
that  the  sending  of  the  letters  from,  and  the  receipt 
of  the  goods  in,  Scotland,  were  sufficient  to  confer 
jurisdiction  -  i.  e.  the  actus  reus  was  taken  to  be 
the  receipt  of  the  goods  in  Scotland.  The  case  is 
thus  the  exact  converse  of  Witherington  (suora),  and 
the  two  can  only  be  reconciled  by  saying  that  the 
crime  was  co-,  =  itted  in  both  countries,  which  conflicts 
prima  facie  with  my  argument.  It  is  submitted,  however, 
that  cases  like  Witherington  and  M'Gregor  are  special, 
since  they  involve  the  agency  of  public  carriers. 
Even  if  the  actus  reus  is  regarded  as  the  obtaining 
of  the  goods  (Witherington  supra;  of.  Rep.  v.  Ellis 
[1899)  1Q  .  B.  230;  Salmond,  p.  406),  the  goods  can  be 
said  to  be  obtained  by  the  accused  at  either  end  of 
transmission  -  personally  at  the  receiving  end,  and 
by  the  agency  of  the  carrier  at  the  dispatching  end. 
'Where  something  is  going  on  by  the  medium  of  the  post, 
the  offence  is  committed...  at  both  ends  of  the  trans- 
mission  by  the  Post  Office'  (Lipsey  v.  Mackintosh,  (1913) 
7  Adam  182,  Lord  Justice-General  Dunedin  at  p.  187; 
of.  Kenny,  para.  64'/). 
In  S.  Michael  ((1842)  1  Broun  4'/3)  the  charge 
was  of  taking  a  letter  from  Edinburgh  to  Birmingham 
and  uttering  it  there  in  order  to  persuade  the  dupe  to 
send  goods  to  Scotland.  The  goods  were  sent,  and 146 
appropriated  by  the  accused  on  their  arrival  in 
Scotland.  The  part  of  the  charge  concerning  the 
representations  made  in  England  was  dropped  and  the 
accused  were  convicted  merely  of  obtaining  the  goods 
in  Edinburgh  by  fraud,  which  supports  the  submission 
set  out  above. 
In  Wm.  Jeffrey  ((1842)  1  Broun  337)  a  forged  letter 
was  sent  from  Edinburgh  to  London  for  a  fraudulent 
purpose,  and  the  crime  of  uttering  the  letter  was 
held  to  have  been  committed  in  Scotland,  because 
posting  was  treated  as  equivalent  to  uttering  -  i.  e. 
on  the  ground  that  the  actus  reus  had  taken  place 
in  Scotland,  uttering  not  being  a  result-crime. 
(Cf.  R.  v.  Owen,  [1957)  1'.  B.  175). 
In  John  M'Key  ((1866)  5  Irv.  329)  the  accused 
was  a  Scots  bankrupt  who  had  concealed  from  his 
creditors  that  he  had  money  in  Liverpool  and  had  'rut 
it  away'  there.  He  was  charged  with  concealment 
and  with  the  'away-putting'.  The  Court  held  that 
it  had  jurisdiction,  because  'the  away  putting  in  its 
essence  is  committed  in  Scotland  as  well  as  the  conceal- 
ment.  There  is  an  away-putting  and  concealment  by  a 
bankrupt  domiciled  and  sequestrated  in  Scotland,  whose 
duty  it  was  to  reveal  all  his  property  for  the  benefit 
of  his  creditors  within  Scotland'  U.  Cowan  at  p.  335). 
In  other  words  the  away-putting  was  treated  as  criminal 
conduct  having  as  its  result  the  prejudicing  of  the 
Scots  creditors  of  the  bankrupt. 
None  of  these  cases  supports  Macdonald's  view. 
The  only  one  cited  by  him  which  does  support  it  is 
Semple  (1937  J.  C.  41)  and  it,  it  is  submitted,  was 
wrongly  decided.  The  charge  was  of  attempted 
abortion  by  supplying  abortifacients  to  someone 
in  Glasgow.  Nothing  was  said  of  where  the  abort- 
ifacients  were  to  be  used,  and  the  Court  rejected  an 1L.  '/ 
argument  that  this  omission  rendered  the  indictment 
irrelevant.  The  ground  of  judgment  was  that  'the 
attempt  to  procure  abortion  began  with  the  supply 
of  the  drug  with  the  intention  that  it  should  be  used, 
and  that  was  in  Glasgow'  (Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison 
at  p.  45).  But  the  sup-;  lying  was  not  c-zarged  as  a 
separate  crime,  but  as  attempted  abortion,  and 
accordingly  if  any  place  was  irrelevant  it  was  the 
place  of  supply,  and  not  the  place  of  the  abortion. 
The  supply  could  only  be  criminal  if  the  abortion  was 
criminal,  and  if  the  abortion  was  to  take  place  in  a 
country  in  which  abortion  was  legal,  the  supply 
would  not  be  criminal,  or  at  any  rate  would  not  amount 
to  attempted  abortion.  If  the  drugs  were  supplied 
for  the  purpose  of  being  used  to  procure  a  miscarriage 
in  Ruritania,  and  were  used  there,  the  attempted  crime 
was  an  attempt  to  procure  a  miscarriage  in  Ruritania  - 
and  if  that  act  is  not  a  crime  in  Ruritania,  it  is 
impossible  to  see  how  anyone  can  be  convicted  in  Scotland 
of  attempting  to  commit  it.  Or  again  -  the  supplier's 
guilt  was  accessory  to  the  guilt  of  the  person  who 
actually  tried  to  procure  the  miscarriage;  now  if 
that  person  committed  no  crime  because  he  tried  to 
procure  the  miscarriage  in  Ruritania  where  such 
actings  are  not  criminal,  how  could  the  Scots  supplier 
be  guilty  of  being  an  accessory  to  that  'crime'? 
It  is  submitted  that  the  proper  approach  to 
problems  such  as  that  of  Semple  is  the  one  adopted  by 
the  House  of  Lords  in  Board  of  Trade  v.  Owen  ([1957 
A.  C.  602,  see  esp.  Lord  Tucker  at  p.  622).  There  the 
accused  were  charged  with  conspiring  in  London  to 
defraud  a  German  Export  Control  Department,  and  with 
uttering  forged  documents  in  London  in  pursuance  of 
the  conspiracy.  They  were  convicted  of  the  uttering 148 
since  it  was  held,  following  Wm.  Jeffrey  (supra),  that 
that  crime  was  completed  when  the  documents  were  posted 
in  London  (see  R.  v.  Owen  [19573  1  Q.  -B.  175).  The 
conspiracy  charge  was  rejected  as  irrelevant, 
because  there  was  no  conspiracy  to  do  anything 
contrary  to  English  law.  It  is  submitted  that  the  same 
reasoning  would  apply  to  a  charge  of  attempted  abortion 
by  supplying  abortifacients  in  Scotland  for  use 
in  another  country,  since  the  crime  charged  would  really 
be  a  crime  against  the  law  of  that  other  country. 
This  would  be  so  whether  or  not  attempted  abortion 
was  a  crime  in  the  other  country,  although  the 
principle  involved  appears  more  clearly  where  it  is 
not  a  crime  in  the  other  country.  Even  if  attempted 
abortion  is  criminal  in  Ruritania,  a  person  in  Scotland 
who  is  an  accessory  to  a  Ruritanian  attempt  at  abortion 
has  committed  a  crime  in  Ruritania,  not  in  Scotland. 
Continuing  crimes. 
Continuing  crimes,  such  as  crimes  of  possession, 
are  committed  wherever  the  possessor  goes.  Reset  is 
committed  wherever  the  accused  goes  with  the  stolen 
goods  Gracie  v.  Smith  (1884)  5  Coup.  379).  But  the 
thief  himself  cannot  be  guilty  of  reset  (Wilson  v. 
I  'Fa  en,  1945  J.  C.  43),  and  the  question  arises  whether 
a  person  can  be  tried  in  Scotland  for  a  theft  committed 
abroad  if  he  is  found  in  Scotland  with  the  stolen 
property  in  his  possession.  It  may  be  true  that 
'Possession  in  Scotland  is  evidence  of  theft  in 
England'  (Clement's  Case,  (1830)  1  Lewin  C.  C.  113, 
quoted  in  Megarry,  Miscellany-at-Law,  p.  289),  but  the 
question  is  whether  it  is  theft  in  Scotland.  I  am 
inclined  to  the  view  that  on  principle  a  man's  presence 
in  Scotland  in  possession  of  the  pröceeds  of  an  English 149 
theft  should  no  more  give  the  Scots  Court  jurisdiction 
to  try  him  for  the  theft,  than  his  possession  of  the 
proceeds  of  an  English  housebreaking  gives  jurisdiction 
to  try  him  for  the  offence,  or  rather  aggravation,  of 
breaking  into  the  house  (Alison,  ii.  78).  But  there 
is  authority  that  the  Scots  Courts  can  try  a  person 
for  an  English  theft  if  he  is  found  in  possession 
of  the  proceeds  in  Scotland  (Jas.  Taylor,  rear.  1767, 
Maclaurin,  No.  76).  This  decision  must  depend  on 
the  view  that  theft  is  a  crimen  continuum,  committed 
wherever  the  thief  goes  with  the  stolen  property, 
and  not  simply  the  taking  of  the  property,  which  would 
be  a  once-for-all  thing  like  housebreaking.  Whether 
this  view  of  theft  is  correct  depends  on  the  law 
relating  to  the  specific  crime  of  theft,  and  not  on 
any  general  principles  regarding  criminal  jurisdiction. 
Hume  held  that  a  kidnapper  commits  a  crime  wherever 
he  goes  with  the  abducted  person,  but  this  seems  to 
be  because  the  victim  has  a  claim  to  the  protection 
of  the  Courts  wherever  he  is  (Hume,  ii.  54)  -  which 
is  probably  correct,  because  the  kidnapper  is  continually 
depriving  his  victim  of  his  liberty,  and  the  protection 
of  the  liberty  of  everyone  within  its  jurisdiction 
is  one  of  the  basic  functions  of  Courts  of  law.  The 
position  with  regard  to  the  theft  of  property  is 
by  no  means  so  clear.  Hume  himself  seems  to  have 
regarded  Taylor  as  rather  anomalous,  and  perhaps 
simply  based  on  'the  high  expediency  of  bringing  the 
possessors  of  stolen  goods  to  speedy  justice,  and  at  a 
moderate  expense,  upon  either  side  of  the  Border' 
(ib,  55),  a  view  which,  as  he  remarks,  is  borne  out 
by  the  fact  that  the  matter,  as  between  Scotland 
and  England,  was  regulated  by  legislation  shortly  after 
Taylor's  case  (by  13  Geo.  III,  c.  31).  It  is  now 150 
regulated  by  the  Larceny  Act,  1916,  (6  &7  Geo.  V, 
c.  50.  s.  39)  but  so  far  as  other  countries  are 
concerned,  Taylor  probably  still  represents  the  law. 151 
Chapter  4:  Actings  Art  and  Part 
Art  and  part  and  acting  in  concert. 
The  basis  of  art  and  part  guilt. 
It  is  a  basic  principle  of  Scots  law  that  all 
persons  who  are  concerned  in  the  commission  of  a 
crime  are  equally  guilty,  and  that  the  guilt  of  each 
is  of  the  ultimate  actus  reus,  whatever  his  own  part 
in  the  criminal  conduct.  Everyone  who  is  party  to  a 
plot  to  commit  a  crime  is  guilty  of  that  crime;  the 
subordinate  nature  of  the  participation  of  any 
one  of  the  plotters  is  irrelevant  to  the  question  of 
his  guilt,  although  it  may,  of  course,  influence  his 
sentence. 
This  rule  applies  even  where  it  is  legally  or 
physically  impossible  for  a  particular  accused  to 
have  committed  the  crime  himself.  It  is  said  to  be 
the  law  that  a  man  cannot  rape  his  wife  (at  any 
rate  provided  there  is  no  separation  order  in  force,  - 
cf.  R.  v.  Clarke,  (1949)  33  Cr.  App.  Rep.  216),  but 
he  may  be  guilty  of  rape  on  his  wife  if  he  assists 
another  man  to  have  forcible  connection  with  her 
(Hume,  i.  306).  Logically  a  woman  who  assists 
a  man  to  rape  another  woman  should  be  convicted  of 
rape,  on  the  same  principle,  but  in  fact  in  the  only 
Scots  instance  of  such  a  situation  the  woman  was  charged 
with  'aiding  and  abetting'  the  man  to  commit  a  rape, 
by  closing  the  door  and  preventing  the  victim  escaping 
or  calling  for  assistance,  although  the  words  'aiding 
and  abetting'  are  not  Scots  terms  of  art  (but  cf. 
Martin  and  Ors.,  1956  J.  C.  1),  and  the  woman's  actings 152 
were  enough  to  make  her  art  and  part  in  the  rape 
(Chas.  !  ilatthews  and  Margt.  Goldsmith,  Glasgow  High 
Court,  Dec.  29,1910,  unrepd.  ). 
Where  an  accused  person's  part  in  the  crime  is 
that  of  an  accessory,  where  he  does  not  himself  carry 
out  the  final  or  principal  act,  he  is  said  to  be 
-guilty  'art  and  part'.  Anyone  charged  with  a  crime 
may  be  convicted  whether  the  evidence  shows  3is  part 
to  have  been  that  of  an  accessory,  or  of  a  principal 
(Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act,  1887,50  &  51 
Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  7),  but  where  several  persons  are 
charged  with  acting  together,  it  is  normal  to  state 
this  in  the  charge;  and  where  only  one  person  is 
charged,  but  he  is  thought  to  have  committed  the 
crime  with  the  help  of  others,  he  is  usually  charged 
with  acting  together  with  other  named  or  unnamed 
persons.  Once  it  is  established  that  a  number  of 
persons  acted  together  thei  since  each  is  guilty 
of  the  crime  charged,  the  crime  is  regarded  as  having 
been  committed  by  them  all  as  a  group,  or  'concert', 
and  what  is  evidence  against  one  of  them  is  evidence 
against  them  all,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  things  done 
or  said  in  pursuance  of  the  group's  common  plan.  The 
most  recent  reported  statement  of  the  position  is 
in  a  summing-up  by  Lord  Patrick  in  a  case  where  a 
number  of  accused  were  charged  with  organising  and 
carrying-out  a  bank  robbery.  Lord  Patrick  said: 
'If  a  number  of  men  form  a  common  plan 
whereby  some  are  to  commit  the  actual  seizure 
of  the  property,  and  some  according  to  the  plan 
are  to  keep  watch,  and  some  according  to  the 
plan  are  to  help  to  carry  away  the  loot,  and 
some  according  to  the  plan  are  to  help  to 
dispose  of  the  loot,  then,  although  the  actual 
robbery  may  only  have  been  committed  by  one  or 
two  of  them,  everyone  is  guilty  of  the  robbery, 
because  they  joined  together  in  a  common  plan 153 
to  commit  the  robbery:  But  such  responsibility 
for  the  acts  of  others  under  the  criminal  law 
only  arises  if  it  has  been  proved  affirmatively... 
that  there  was  such  a  common  plan  and  that  the 
accused  were  parties  to  that  common  plan.  If 
it  has  not  been  proved  that  there  was  such  a 
common  plan,  or  if  it  has  not  been  proved 
that  the  accused  were  parties  to  this  previously 
conceived  common  plan,  then  in  law  each  is  only 
responsible  for  what  he  himself  did,  and  bears 
no  responsibility  whatever  for  what  any  of  the 
other  accused  or  any  other  person  actually  did'. 
(Lappen  ü.  Ors.,  1956  S.  L.  P.  109,110). 
Generally  speaking  a  man  is 
own  actings,  but  a  group  is 
of  the  group,  and  therefore 
is  responsible  for  the  acts 
The  group  is  defined  by  ref, 
purpose,  and  so  each  member 
responsible  for  what  any  of 
of  that  common  purpose. 
only  responsible  for  his 
responsible  for  the  actings 
each  member  of  the  group 
of  all  the  other  members. 
erence  to  their  common 
of  the  group  is 
them  does  in  furtherance 
Acting  in  concert.  Acting  in  concert  is  just 
another  way  of  describing  art  and  part  guilt,  and  is 
the  phrase  more  often  used  where  a  group  of  people 
are  found  engaged  in  an  allegedly  criminal  activity, 
all  at  one  time.  Where  A  supplies  B  with  instructions 
to  carry  out  a  crime,  and  with  the  means  of  carrying 
it  out,  and  B  carries  it  out,  we  should  normally  speak 
of  A  as  being  guilty  art  and  part,  and  of  B  as  being 
the  principal  actor.  But  both  are  equglly  guilty, 
and  they  are  acting  in  concert.  Where  we  find  a 
group  of  people,  such  as  a  gang  of  youths,  engaged 
in  a  crime,  such  as  breaking  into  a  shop,  or  attacking 
someone,  we  talk  of  them  as  committing  the  crime  while 
acting  in  concert.  This  phrase  is  thus  used  where 
there  is  no  independent  evidence  of  any  prior  group 
purpose,  of  any  meeting  at  which  it  was  decided  to 154 
commit  the  crime.  But  persons  'acting  in  concert' 
are  art  and  part  in  the  crime,  since  concerted  action 
involves  a  plan,  however  spontaneously  conceived. 
Therefore  each  is  guilty  of  the  whole  crime.  This 
concept  is  of  great  use  in  gang  fights.  For  if  it 
can.  be  shown  that  a  group  of  people  were  acting 
in  concert,  and  that  one  or  more  of  then  delivered 
a  fatal  blow,  all  are  guilty  of  the  homicide.  Lloreover 
because  their  guilt  is  equal,  it  is  unnecessary  to 
prove  which  of  them  actually  delivered  any  blows  - 
they  may  all  be  convicted  of  homicide  even  if  no-one 
saw  a  blow  delivered,  provided  it  is  proved  that 
they  were  acting  in  concert,  and  that  the  fatal  blow 
must  have  been  delivered  by  one  of  them  (cf.  Crosbie  and 
Ors.,  Glasgow  High  Court,  11-15  December,  1945,  unrepd., 
discussed  infranvff). 
The  position  of  co-accused. 
Where  several  accused  are  charged  in  one  indictment 
with  acting  together,  and  concert  is  not  proved,  it  is 
quite  proper  to  convict  some  of  them  -  provided  that 
each  person  convicted  can  be  shown  to  be  sufficiently 
connected  with  the  crime  by  reason  of  his  own  actings. 
If  several  men  are  charged  with  robbery,  those  who 
actually  assaulted  the  victim  and  took  his  property, 
can  be  convicted,  even  if  the  man  who  planned  the  robbery, 
and  the  man  who  had  arranged  to  dispose  of  the  proceeds, 
are  acquitted.  But  the  planner  and  the  resetter  cannot 
be  convicted  of  robbery,  if  the  actual  perpetrators 
are  acquitted,  because  their  only  connection  with  the 
crime  is  through  the  actual  perpetrators. 
Similarly,  if  an  accused  can  be  convicted  of  a 
certain  crime  only  on  the  assumption  that  he  was  acting 
in  concert  with  his  co-accused,  he  cannot  be  convicted 
if  they  are  acquitted.  In  the  famous  Scottish  Silks 155 
case,  Young,  the  company  secretary,  was  convicted  on  a 
charge  of  issuing  fraudulent  allotments  of  shares, 
a  charge  on  which  all  the  directors  of  the  company  were 
acquitted.  This  was  a  crime  Young  could  not  have 
committed  on  his  own,  and  accordingly  his  conviction 
was  quashed  (Young,  1932,  J.  C.  163).  It  seems,  indeed, 
that  even  if  it  had  been  shown  that  Young  had  committed 
the  offence  in  concert  with  other  persons  not  named 
in  the  indictment,  he  would  still  have  been  entitled 
to  an  acquittal.  For  if  Y's  sole  part  in  a  crime 
is  that  he  is  alleged  to  have  acted  along  with  A  and  B, 
and  A  and  B  are  acquitted,  there  is  nothing  left  of  the 
indictment  to  connect  Y  with  the  crime  charged.  It 
is  not  clear  whether  he  could  later  be  charged  with 
having  committed  the  same  offence  in  concert  with  X  and  Z; 
but  if  '  guilt  art  and  part  is  the  same  as  guilt  as  a 
principal,  which  it  is,  then  acquittal  art  and  part 
should  be  the.  same  as  acquittal  as  a  principal,  and  to 
retry  Y  for  acting  with  X  and  Z  would  be  to  retry  him 
on  the  same  charge,  the  only  difference  being  in  the 
alleged  mode  of  commission,  so  that  the  second  charge 
could  probably  be  met  by  a  plea  that  Y  had  tholed  his 
assize. 
It  has  been  held  that  where  A  and  B  are  charged 
with  acting  in  concert  to  commit  a  crime,  and  A  is 
acquitted,  C  cannot  later  be  charged  with  having 
committed  the  crime  together  with  A  and  B  (bi'Aule 
,  1946 
J.  C.  8).  This  is  because  it  is  improper  for  the 
Crown  to  infer  that  A,  who  has  been  acquitted,  is  none 
the  less  guilty,  and  also  because  in  order  to  convict 
C  they  would  have  to  prove  A's  guilt,  which  would  amount 
to  retrying  him  in  his  absence.  Despite  the  cogency 
of  these  considerations  I  venture  to  submit  that  it  may 
not  be  a  universal  rule  that  where  one  conspirator  has 156 
been  acquitted,  no-one  can  be  subsequently  charged  with 
having  acted  along  with  him.  It  is  possible  to  figure 
a  case  where  the  acquitted  conspirator  was  prepared  to 
confess  his  complicity  in  the  crime  and  to  give  evidence 
against  his  former  associates.  In  such  circumstances 
it  would  be  in  the  interests  of  justice  to  charge  the 
former  associate.  The  difficulty  of  giving  him 
fair  notice  of  the  charge  against  him  without  averring 
the  guilt  of  the  acquitted  conspirator  would  ue  merely 
technical  where  this  guilt  was  admitted  (cf.  Greis;  v. 
Muir,  1955  J.  C.  20),  although  there  would  remain  the 
objection  that  had  they  been  tried  together  they  might 
have  both  been  acquitted. 
The  f  onus  of  art  and  part  guilt. 
There  are  three  ways  in  which  a  person  may  be  art 
and  part  in  a  crime  -  by  counsel  or  instigation;  by 
supplying  materials  for  the  commission  of  the  crime; 
by  assisting  at  the  time  of  the  actual  commission  of 
the  crime.  In  the  words  of  the  French  Penal  Code: 
'Seront  punis  comae  complices..  ceux  quij,, 
par  dons,  promesses,  menaces,  abus  d'autorite  ou 
de  pouvoir,  machinations  ou  artifices  coupable, 
auront  provoque  ä  cette  action,  ou  donna  des 
instructions  pour  la  comnettre;  ceux  qui 
auront  procurg  des  armes,  des  instruments,  ou 
tout  autre  moyen  qui  aura  servi  ä  faction, 
sachant  qu'ils  devaient  y  servir;  ceux  qui 
auront  avec  connaissance,  aide  ou  assiste 
l'auteur  ...  dans  les  faits  qui  l'auront 
prepare  ou  £acilitee  ou  dans  ceux  qui 
l'auront  consommee'  (Art.  60). 
Counsel  and  Instigation 
The  distinction  between  counsel  and  instigation 
is  not  of  real  importance  in  the  context  of  art  and  part 
guilt.  But  where  the  intended  crime  is  not  in  fact 
carried  out,  the  distinction  may  be  important,  since 157 
where  there  is  only  counsel  and  not  instigation  the 
plotters  may  all  be  guilty  of  conspiring  to  commit  the 
intended  crime,  but  non)  can  be  convicted  of  inciting 
the  others  to  commit  it.  It  may  be,  also,  that  a  man 
cannot  be  convicted  of  conspiring  with  a  hired  assassin 
but  only  of  inciting  him.  There  is  no  great  practical 
importance  in  the  distinction,  but  equally  there  is 
no  great  harm  in  retaining.  it. 
Counsel.  The  simplest  form  of  concert  is  the 
case  of  a  conspiracy  to  commit  a  crime,  and  in  such 
a  case  none  of  the  conspirators  need  incite  any 
of  the  others,  so  long  as  there  is  mutual  counsel 
among  them.  Where  a  group  of  people  plan  a  crime 
and  decide  that  one  of  them  will  hire  a  professional 
assassin  to  carry  it  out,  they  may  all  be  said  to  have 
counselled  together  to  instigate  the  assassin  to 
commit  the  crime.  They  are  all  guilty  of  the 
instigation,  and  of  the  ultimate  crime  if  it  is 
carried  out,  not  because  they  instigated  one  of  their 
number  to  hire  the  assassin,  but  because  they  agreed 
that  he  should  do  so.  The  basic  principle  in  such 
a  case  is  probably  that  gui  Tacit  per  alium  facit  per  se. 
Again,  anyone  who  is  in  a  position  of  authority 
such  that  the  conspirators  have  to  apply  to  him  for  his 
fiat  before  proceeding  with  the  projected  crime, 
becomes  art  and  part  in  the  crime  by  giving  his 
permission  for  it  to  be  carried  out,  in  the  sameway 
as  does  someone  who  instructs  others  to  carry  out  his 
criminal  orders.  (Cf.  D.  48.8.15(1).  For  an 
example  of  such  situations  see  B.  Turkus  and  S.  Feder, 
Murder  Inc.,  Passim.  ) 
Another  example  of  a  concerted  plot  without  the 
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inddpendently  to  steal  a  particular  article,  and  then 
on  discovering  each  other's  plans,  agree  to  pool 
their  resources  and  do  the  job  together.  Here  it  is 
submitted  that  the  ultimate  crime  is  the  result  of  a 
concerted  plot,  so  that  both  will  be  guilty  of  theft 
even  if  one  of  them  merely  supplies  the  other  with 
information  regarding  the  location  of  the  article  in 
return  for  a  share  of  the  proceeds. 
Instigation.  There  is  instigation  where  A 
instigates  B  to  do  something,  where  A  and  B  are 
not  involved  in  any  plot  or  pre-formed  group  at  the 
time  of  the  instigation,  and  where  there  is  no 
detailed  discussion  between  them  about  the  commission 
of  the  crime.  The  instigation  must  be  more  than  'a 
naked  advice,  which  has  no  effect  on  him  who  received 
it,  further  than  as  a  coincidence  of  wishes'  (Hume,  i. 
278),  but  must  be  'very  serious,  earnest,  and  pointed' 
(ib.  ).  Hume  states  that  'No  proclaiming  of  it  as 
a  meritorious  thing  to  destroy  the  hateful  object; 
no  words  of  mere  permission  or  allowance  to  do  the 
deed;  no  intimation  of  thanks  or  approbation  if  it 
shall  be  done;  not  the  strongest  expressions  of  enmity 
to  the  person,  or  the  most  earnest  wishes  for  his 
death:  None  of  these  amount  to  what  the  law  requires 
on  such  an  occasion'  (ib.  ).  (These  strict  requirements 
may  not,  however,  apply  where  the  relationship  of  speaker 
to  hearer  is  such  that  any  expression  of  wish  by  the 
former  is  treated  as  an  order  by  the  latter.  Indeed, 
if  the  crime  is  one  that  can  be  committed  unintentionally 
it  may  be  enough  that  the  speaker  ought  to  have  known 
that  his  words  might  be  acted  on:  Henry  II,  on  this 
view,  might  have  been  guilty  art  and  part  in  the  killing 
of  Becket,  albeit  only  to  the  extent-of  being  guilty 
of  culpable  homicide.  ) 159 
Just  what  words  will  be  treated  as  instigation 
thus  depends  on  the  circumstances  of  each  case.  The 
offer  of  a  reward  will  probably  be  enough  in  any  case, 
since  it  clearly  shows  interest  and  seriousness. 
Short  of  that,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  instigation 
was  such  as  to  be  capable  of  influencing  the 
perpetrator,  anti  that  it  did  in  fact  influence  him. 
There  must  always  be  difficulty  in  making  one 
man  responsible  for  influencing  the  'free'  actions 
of  another.  The  case  of  financial  inaucement  is 
perhaps  special  because  there  the  perpetrator 
becomes  the  agent  of  the  instigator.  But  where  there 
is  only  persuasion  or  suggestion  the  difficulty  is 
greater,  although  it  is  as  much  a  difficulty  of 
proof  as  of  anything  else.  How  prove  that  it  was 
because  of  the  suggestion  that  the  crime  was 
committed.  If  it  was  committed  independently  of 
the  suggestion  or  inaucement,  there  is  no  causal 
nexus  between  the  instigation  and  the  crime,  and  so 
no  art  and  part  guilt.  If  A  decides  by  himself  to 
steal  an  object,  and  lays  all  his  plans  to  do  so,  and 
B  then  incites  him  to  steal  this  same  object,  B 
would  probably  not  be  guilty  of  theft  (although  he 
would  be  guilty  of  attempted  inducement),  because  the 
theft  would  have  been  committed  independently  of  the 
instigation:  B's  criminal  conduct  would  not  have 
caused  the  actus  reus.  This  situation  is  different 
from  that  where  two  thieves  pool  their  individual 
plans,  since  then  the  resultant  theft  is  the  result  of 
their  combined  plan. 
It  is  -because  of  the  evidential  difficulty  that 
Hume  desiderates  'a  direct  and  special  counsel'  (ib. 
279)  which  must  be'relative,  less  or  more,  to  some 
near  occasion  of  doing  the  deed,  so  as  to  excite  him 160 
to  an  immediate  course  of  action'  (i$,  ).  Deere 
general  expressions  of  desire  cannot  amount  to  instigation 
being  'nothing  more.  than  the  expression  of  the  party's 
own  distempered  state  of  mind'  (ib,  278).  But  where 
the  evidence  is  clear  Hume  allows  the  possibility 
of  treating  aseries  of  suggestions  as  an  instigation, 
even  where  there  is  no  specification  as  to  how  or  when 
the  crime  is  to  be  committed.  He  gives  the  example 
of  a  series  of  letters  written  by  a  man  to  a  woman 
pregnant  by  him  in  which  he  gradually  persuades  her 
to  have  an  abortion  (ib.  279).  If  the  evidence 
shows  that  there  was  inhtigation  -  that  the  mind  of 
the  perpetrator  was  turned  towards  the  crime  because 
of  the  deliberate  suggestions  made  to  him  by  the 
instigator,  there  seems  no  need  to  require  the 
instigator  to  say  how  the  crime  is  to  be  committed, 
any  more  than  there  is  such  a  need  in  the  case  where 
a  hired  assassin  is  told  'Kill  X  and  I  will  pay  you 
£1,000  -I  leave  the  details  to  you'. 
Withdrawal  of  instigation.  Since  the  instigation 
is  the  conduct  of  which  the  actus  reus  in  the  consequence, 
the  instigator  will  be  guilty  of  the  completed  crime 
if  it  follows  on  the  instigation,  even  although  he 
had  changed  his  mind  in  the  meantime  and  no  longer 
wished  the  crime  to  be  committed.  Such  a  change 
is  no  more  significant  than  the  repentance  of  a 
murderer  after  the  death  of  his  victim.  In  order  to 
clear  himself  of  guilt  the  instigator  must  interrupt 
the  chain  of  events  either  by  preventing  the  commission 
of  the  crime,  or,  at  least,  by  removing  the  influence 
of  his  instigation  (cf.  Hume,  1.280).  This  he  can 
perhaps  do  by  telling  the  prospective  perpetrator  that 
he  has  changed  his  mind  and  no  longer  wishes  him  to 
commit  the  crime.  If  the  perpetrator  than  carries  on 161 
and  commits  the  crime  the  instigator  will  be  free  of 
responsioility,  not  because  he  has  given  evidence 
of  the  sincerity  of  nis  repentance,  out  because  it 
will  no  longer  be  true  to  say  that  the  crime  was 
committed  under  the  influence  of  nis  instigation. 
That  is  the  simple  case,  ::  ut  there  may  oe  cases 
where  even  although  the  instigator  has  intimated 
his  change  of  mind  to  the  perpetrator,  the  latter 
carries  on  as  a  result  of  the  state  of  mind  induced 
in  him  by  the  instigation.  Suppose  that  in  Hume's 
example  of  the  young  man  who  suggested  that  his 
mistress  should  have  an  abortion,  the  man  changed  his 
mind  and  told  the  girl  he  would  rather  she  had  the 
child,  but  that  the  girl  had  by  then  become  convinced 
by  hi,  --. q  tn:  it  she  should  not  have  the  child,  an  idea 
she  woula  never  have  entertained  but  for  his  suggestions, 
and  suppose  she  went  on  and  did  have  an  abortion.  it 
could  be  said  that  the  young  man  had  set  in  train 
a  series  of  events  calculated  to  lead  to  abortion, 
that  they  had  in  fact  led  to  abortion,  and  that 
his  ineffective  change  of  mind  was  no  more  relevant  than 
the  ineffective  attempts  of  a  murderer  to  save  his 
victim's  life  after  he  has  shot  him.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  could  be  said  that  by  intimating  his  change  of 
heart,  the  young  man  broke  the  connection  between  his 
suggestions  and  the  abortion,  and  that  the  latter 
must  be  regarded  as  he  consequence  of  the  girl's 
voluntary  decision  to  have  the  abortion,  and  of  that 
alone.  There  is  a  suggestion  in  the  case  of  Baxter 
((1908)  5  Adam  609),  a  case  of  supplying  abortifacients 
that  the  supplier  if  he  changed  his  mind  should  write 
to  the  recipient  'forbidding  him  to  use  them  for  the 
purpose  for  which  he  sent  them,  and  saying  that,  if 
be  did  not  get  an  undertaking  that  they  would  not  be 
used,  he  would  himself  inform  the  police  of  the  matter' 162 
(Lord  Justice-Clerk  Macdonald  at  p.  615).  If  the 
police  act  and  prevent  the  abortion,  all  will  be  well; 
but  suppose  the  police  fail  -  in  strict  logic  is  the 
instigator  not  guilty  of  being  art  and  part  in  the 
abortion?  Perhaps  so,  in  strict  logic,  but  in 
practice  his  having  done  all  he  could  to  a  7ert  the 
danger  he  has  created  will  probably  be  treated  as 
excusing  him. 
Supply  of  materials. 
Where  the  person  who  supplies  the  tools  with 
weich  a  crime  is  committed  is  also  a  conspirator  or 
instigator  his  responsibility  as  an  accessory 
can  be  dealt  with  under  that  head.  Normally  there 
will  have  been  some  element  of  concert  beyond  what  is 
involved  in  the  supply  of  materials,  but  it  is 
possible  to  spell  concert,  and  thus  art  and  part 
complicityi,  by  reference  only  to  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  actual  supply  of  the  materials; 
the  supplier  may  bring  himself  into  the  plot  just  by 
supplying  the  materials  with  which  the  crime  is 
carried  out.  'Whosoever,  being  in  the  knowledge  of 
the  mortal  purpose,  though  contrived  and  imagined  by 
another,  shall  lend  immediate  and  material  aid  towards 
the  execution,  is  thus  involved  in  the  guilt  of 
murder'  (Hume,  i.  274). 
Knowledge  of  the  criminal  plot  is  of  course 
essential  -a  man  cannot  be  art  and  part  in  a  crime 
of  which  he  knows  nothing,  he  cannot  be  in  a  plot 
without  knowing  of  its  existence  -  the  gunsmith  who 
sells  a  murderer  the  fatal  weapon  in  the  normal 
course  of  his  business  and  in  ignorance  of  the  latter's 
purpose  cannot  be  art  and  part  in  the  murder.  But 
mere  knowledge  is  probably  not  enough  either.  If  he 16,  > 
sells  Lhe  gun  in  the  ordinary  way  at  the  ordinary 
price,  without  any  discussion  regarding  its  proposed 
criminal  use,  the  seller  does  not  become  art  and  part 
in  tale  crime  (}-fume,  i.  157).  On  the  other  hand, 
a  member  o..  =  a  criminal  organisation  whose  'job' 
is  to  supply  the  materials  necessary  for  the  carrying 
out  of  the  organisation's  criminal  purpose,  is  clearly 
art  and  part  in  the  ultimate  crime  -  but  he  has  been 
one  of  the  counsellors  of  the  crime,  and  so  is  in  con- 
cert  ýjit_i  the  principas  perpetrators  (ib.  4 
.  And  so  is 
someone  who  hears  that  a  crime  is  to  be  committed, 
and  oL.  fers  to  help  by  sup,  )lying  the  necessary  materials. 
The  situation  wnich  raises  acutely  the  problem 
of  whether  mere  supply  of  materials  can  make  the 
supplier  art  and  pa--,  t  is  intermediate  between  that  of 
the  gunsmith  and  that  of  the  member  of  the  organisation. 
This  is  he  situation  of  the  tradesman  who  knows 
that  his  goods  are  being  bought  for  a  criminal 
purpose,  and  as  a  result  charges  more  than  their 
usual  price,  but  who  has  no  further  interest  in  the 
crime.  This  situation  is  referred  to  by  Hume  (ib,  ), 
but  he  gives  no  ans.  jer  to  the  problem.  The  ans,,  7?  r 
probably  depends  on  the  precise  circumstances  in  which 
the  materials  are  supplied.  Consider  the  following 
situations: 
(a)  A  takes  a  fourteen  year  old  girl  to  a  hotel 
wit-',,  the  intention  of  seducing  her.  He  asks  the  hotelier 
for  a  room.  The  latter  knows  that  the  reason  A 
wants  the  toum  is  to  seduce  the  girl;  but  he  says 
nothing  of  this  and  lets  the  room  at  the  usual  price. 
It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  hotelier  can  be  said 
to  have  made  himself  party  to  any  plan  to  seduce  the 
girl,  and  so  he  is  not  art  and  part.  (b)  The  hotelier 
discloses  his  knowledge  and  tells  A  that  since  he 164 
wants  the  room  for  an  immoral  purpose  he  must  pay 
extra.  In  such  a  case  it  can  be  said  that  the  hotelier 
has  pushed  himself  into  the  plot,  and  so  made  himself 
art  and  part  in  the  seduction.  Once  the  hotelier  has 
disclosed  his  knowledge  and  demanded  his  reward,  he 
becomes  a  conspirator.  (c)  A  discloses  his  purpose 
to  the  hotelier  and  asks  the  latter  to  help  him  by 
providing  a  room.  Here  the  hotelier,  if  he  agrees, 
is  clearly  art  and  part,  since  he  is  acceding  to  a 
request  for  help  from  the  principal  criminal.  (d)  This 
is  the  most  difficult  of  all.  The  hotelier  knows 
of  A's  purpose,  but  he  says  nothing,  and  doubles  the 
price  of  the  room,  pretending  that  that  is  the  normal 
price.  There  is  here  no  concert,  there  is  no  officious 
attempt  to  'get  into  the  plot'  as  there  is  in  case  (b), 
but  the  hotelier  is  making  a  profit  out  of  the  crime. 
It  is  submitted  that  in  the  absence  of  the  essential 
element  of  concert,  there  can  be  no  conviction 
of  the  hotelier  as  art  and  part  in  the  seduction,  but 
it  must  be  admitted  that  the  distinction  between  (b) 
and  (d)  is  a  difficult  one  to  make. 
The  importance  of  the  element  of  concert,  of 
participation  in  a  plot  with  the  principle  perpetrator 
can  be  seen  by  examining  two  modern  cases.  The  first 
is  Johnstone  (1926  J.  C.  89).  The  accused  gave  a 
woman  the  name  of  an  abortionist  with  whom  he  had  no 
connection  himself,  and  whom  he  knew  only  by  name; 
he  was  acquitted  of  being  art  and  part  in  the 
subsequent  abortion.  Lord  Moncrieff  pointed  out 
that  it  would  be  straining  the  law  to  hold  that  the 
mere  giving  of  a  name  by  a  party  who  was  not  in  actual 
communication  with  the  party  named  amounted  to 
participation  in  the  crime.  He  told  the  jury  that 
what  they  had  to  cohsider  was  whether  there  was  any 165 
association  between  the  accused  and  the  abortionist 
(at  p.  90).  Had  the  accused  been  employed  by  the 
abortionist  as  a  canvasser,  or  received  a  commission 
on  busines..  introduced,  the  necessary  connection 
would  have  been  present,  and  the  supply  of  the 
abortionist's  name  would  have  been  sufficient  to  make 
the  accused  art  and  part  in  the  abortion.  If  a  woman 
approaches  X  and  asks'Do  you  know  a  good  man  for 
abortions?  '  and  X  replies  'Yes,  A.  B.  ',  he  is  not  art 
and  part  with  the  woman,  because  he  has  done  no  more 
than  impart  information,  or  at  most  give  a  'naked 
advice'  (Hume,  i.  278);  and  he  is  not  art 
and  part  with  A.  B.,  if  he  has  no  dealing  with  him. 
In  Semple  (1937  J.  C.  41)  on  the  other  hand, 
there  was  ample  evidence  of  complicity.  The  accused  supplied 
a  woman  with  abortifacients,  told  her  how  to  use  them, 
and  advised  her  to  make  use  of  them.  Lord  Aitchison 
said  'Supply  by  itself  does  not  amount  to  a  crime,  but 
here  it  is  coupled  with  use,  and  the  distinction  between 
supply  and  administration  does  not  appear  to  me  to  be 
material  in  a  case  where  the  supply  is  closely  related 
to  the  use  by  words  of  instigation  or  by  some  act  of 
instigation'  (at.  p.  44).  This  suggests  that  the 
supplier  must  be  a  moving  spirit  in  the  enterprise, 
be  much  more  than  just  'in  the  know',  and  be  the 
equivalent  of  an  instigator,  which,  it  is  submitted, 
goes  beyond  what  the  law  requires.  But  the  law  does 
require  an  element  of  complicity,  and  it  is  this  which 
distinguishes  the  mere  supply  of  Johnstone  from 
cases  of  art  and  part  by  supply  in  circumstances  which 
make  the  supplier  a  conspirator. 
The  supply  must  be  fora  specific  crime.  The 
material  must  be  supplied  for  the  commission  of  a 
particular  crime  and,  indeed,  of  an  imminent  crime 166 
(Hume,  i.  276).  This  requirement  rests  partly 
on  evidential  grounds,  and  partly  on  the  rules 
regarding  mens  rea.  Suppose  A  says  to  B  'I  am  on 
my  way  to  kill  C.  If  you  lend  me  your  car  I'll  just 
catch  him  before  he  goes  to  work';  B  lends  A  the  car, 
and  A  goes  off  and  kills  C;  B  is  art  and  part  in  the 
killing.  Now  suppose  A  says  'Lend  me  your  car 
please.  I  want  to  catch  C  before  he  leaves  for  work; 
I've  a  bone  to  pick  with  him.  In  fact,  I'm  getting  a 
bit  fed  up  with  him,  and  if  be  doesn't  change  his  ways 
I'll  kill  him  one  of  these  days';  B  lends  him  the  car; 
A  goes  off  and  kills  C;  B  is  probably  not  art  and 
part,  because  he  did  not  supply  his  car  for  the 
purpose  of  helping  A  to  kill  C  (cf.  ib.  ).  The 
intention  necessary  to  bring  B  into  A's  plot  is 
lacking  in  the  second  case,  and  in  any  event  a  vague 
threat  to  kill  someone  in  the  future  is  hardly  a  plot. 
If  A  all  along  intended  to  kill  C  that  day  B  cannot  be 
art  and  part  because  he  knew  nothing  of  this;  if  he  did 
not,  but  was  only  mouthing  vague  threats,  there  was 
no  plot  for  B  to  join.  Of  course,  if  B  should  have 
realised  that  A's  intended  quarrel  with  C  would  end 
fatally,  things  might  be  different,  and  B  might  be  held 
responsible  for  C's  death  since  the  death  would  be 
the  consequence  of  a  situation  B  helped  to  create. 
If  A  had  asked  B  for  a  pistol  with  which  to  frighten 
C,  and  B  had  given  him  it,  B  might  well  have  been 
art  and  part  in  the  death  of  C  (although  in  practice 
prosecution  would  be  unlikely)  since  he  ought  to  have 
realised  that  A  might  kill  C.  But  that  would  depend 
on  the  law  regarding  responsibility  for  the  consequences 
of  one's  actions,  and  not  an  any  specialty  of  the  law 
of  art  and  part  by  supply  of  materials  (see  infra!  7a  ). 167 
Assistance  in  the  actual  commission  of  the  crime. 
(1)  Where  there  has  in  fact  been  a  prior  concert. 
Examples  of  this  type  of  art  and  part  guilt  are  very 
common.  The  man  who  keeps  watch  while  his  friend 
breaks  into  a  house,  the  man  who  stands  on  the  edge 
of  a  crowd  and  collects  the  property  bis  friend 
has  picked  from  the  pockets  of  members  of  the  crowd 
(cf.  Hume  i.  115),  the  man  who  holds  a  girl  down 
while  his  friend  rapes  her;  all  these  are  art  and 
part  in  the  principal  crime.  Similarly  if  two 
people  agree  to  go  out  on  a  joint  pickpocketing 
expedition  and  arrange  that  one  shall  operate  on 
one  side  of  the  street  and  one  on  the  other,  but  that 
they  will  share  the  proceeds  and  be  prepared  to  help 
each  other  should  occasion  arise,  each  will  be  guilty 
art  and  part  of  the  thefts  carried  out  by  the  other. 
In  all  these  cases  the  assistance  is  rendered  in 
consequence  of  a  prior  agreement,  and  need  only  be 
regarded  as  evidence  of  that  agreement.  Where  there 
is  independent  evidence  of  the  agreement,  where,  for 
example,  someone  has  overheard  the  criminals  arranging 
their  crime,  it  does  not  matter  what  part  each  actually 
took  in  the  crime.  Where  there  is  no  such  evidence 
then  what  each  did  will  be  important  in  the  sense  that 
it  will  constitute  the  facts  from  which  the  prior  agree- 
ment  is  to  be  inferred;  and  the  more  active  a  man's 
part  in  the  actual  crime,  the  easier  it  will  be  to 
infer  a  prior  agreement.  It  is  easier  to  convict  a 
person  of  art  and  part  guilt  where  he  has  stood, 
by  and  encouraged  his  friend  to  comit  a  crime,  than 
when  he  has  just  stood  by  and  watched,  since  in  the 
latter  case  there  is  probably  not  enough  evidence 
to  enable  a  jury  to  infer  any  prior  agreement  about  the 
crime,  and  in  the  absence  of  independent  evidence 168 
of  such  an  agreement,  mere  presence  is  insufficient 
to  make  a  person  art  and  part  (cf.  Geo.  Kerr  and  Ors. 
(1871)  2  Coup.  335).  Again,  where  two  pickpockets 
are  operating  on  opposite  sides  of  the  street  it  will 
be  very  difficult  to  convict  one  of  being  art  and  part 
in  the  other's  crime  in  the  absence  of  independent 
evidence  of  their  agreement  to  'go  into  business' 
together;  but  if  one  of  them  does  actually  come 
to  the  assistance  of  the  other,  it  will  be  easy 
to  infer  such  an  agreement.  In  all  :;  uch  cases  the 
difficulty  is  evidential,  and  the  question  always  is  - 
are  there  facts  from  which  prior  concert  can  be  inferred? 
(2)  Where  there  is  no  prior  concert.  There  may 
be  art  and  part  guilt  even  in  cases  where  there  has 
in  fact  been  no  prior  agreement.  In  such  cases 
the  assistance  given  is  not  evidence  of  a  concerted 
plot,  but  constitutes  the  plot,  which  is  created  by 
the  act  of  assistance.  The  plot,  accordingly,  can 
only  be  defined  by  reference  to  the  intention 
of  the  assister.  Suppose  A  sees  his  friend  B 
attacking  a  girl  and  thinks  he  intends  to  rape  her; 
the  girl  tries  to  escape;  A  without  any  prior 
arrangement  with  B,  intervenes  and  takes  hold  of  the 
girl  to  prevent  her  escaping,  and  so  enables  B  to  rape 
her;  A  is  art  and  part  in  the  rape.  But  suppose 
in  such  a  case  B  does  not  rape  the  girl  but  stabs  her. 
A  is  then  not  art  and  part  in  the  stabbing,  because 
he  did  not  enter  into  any  agreement  to  stab  the  girl, 
but  only  to  rape  her.  The  'agreement'  is￿  of  course, 
of  a  peculiar  nature,  in  that  it  is  spontaneous,  and 
may  be  entered  into  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
principal  criminal.  But  by  lending  bis  assistance 
A  brings  himself  into  a  plot  which  at  the  same  time 
he  creates,  a  sort  of  spontaneous  concert;  and  by 169 
doing  so,  he  renders  himself  liable  to  be  treated  as 
if  he  had  entered  into  a  prior  agreement  with  B  to 
carry  out  the  crime. 
It  is  difficult  to  find  illustrations  of  this  type 
of  art  and  part  activity.  The  case  of  Ryach  (1721, 
Burnett,  p.  277,  Hume,  1.267)  did,  however,  proceed 
on  the  same  principle.  The  accused  there  intervened 
in  a  :  tight  which  was  going  on  between  her  husband 
and  the  deceased.  She  held  the  deceased  by  the  hair 
while  her  husband  stabbed  him.  But  she  did  not  know 
that  herhusband  had  a  knife,  and  she  was  trying  to 
stop  the  deceased  attacking  him,  so  she  was  acquitted 
of  killing  the  deceased.  Sim-Uarly,  in  Ross  and  Roberts 
(9  July,  1716,  Hume,  i.  267)  one  of  the  accused  held  the 
deceased's  hands  while  the  other  stabbed  him,  but 
as  he  had  not  known  his  co-accused  had  a  knife, 
he  was  held  not  to  be  art  and  part  in  the  use  of  it. 
The  modern  case  of  Gallacher  and  Ors.  (Glasgow 
High  Court,  31  Oct.  -3  Nov.  1950  unrepd.  -  it  is 
reported  on  another  point  in  1951  J.  C.  38)  may  also 
be  an  example  of  'spontaneous  concert'.  In  Gallacher 
the  three  accused  were  part  of  a  group  which  stood 
round  the  deceased  and  kicked  him  to  death.  There 
was  no  evidence  of  any  prior  agreement  among  the 
accused  or  other  persons,  to  attack  the  deceased,  but 
the  accused  were  all  convicted  of  murder  since  they  'were 
in  a  kicking  crowd  and  animated  by  a  common  purpose, 
joining  in  the  attack,  assisting  and  encouraging' 
(Lord  Keith,  Judge's  Charge,  p.  37). 
The  position  is  usually  looked  at  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  intervener.  But  what  about  theoriginal 
criminal?  He  is  not  in  any  plot,  and  has  not  asked 
for  help.  Suppose  A  intends  to  steal  a  man's  watch- 
chain;  an  officious  friend  sees  him,  helps  him  to 170 
steal  the  chain,  and,  thinking  A  was  going-  to  steal 
the  man's  wallet,  takes  it  as  well.  A  is  surely 
not  guilty  of  stealing  the  wallet,  since  he  did  not 
intend  to  steal  it,  and  entered  into  no  agreement  with 
his  friend  to  steal  it.  There  can  o4ily  be  a 
plot  insofar  as  the  intentions  of  the  two  criminals 
coincide  (Ryach  and  Ross  and  Robertson,  supra), 
and  this  rule  must  operate  in  favour  of  the  original 
criminal  as  Jaell  as  in  favour  of  the  intervener. 
In  Gallacher  (supra)  the  matter  was  complicated 
by  the  rule  that  all  the  members  of  a  concert, 
spontaneous  or  prearranged,  are  res-)onsible  for  the 
consequences  of  the  plot  (see  infra).  Suppose 
A  starts  to  nick  X  with  the  intention  of  causing 
slight  injury,  and  other  persons  come  along  and  join 
in  the  kicking  so  that  X  is  killed.  If  A-retires 
as  soon  as  the  others  join  in,  he  cannot,  it  is 
submitted,  be  guilty  of  homicide,  unless  his  oven  acts 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  cause  death.  But  if 
he  continues  to  kick  X  after  the  others  have  joined  in 
and  the  assault  has  become  foreseeably  fatal,  he 
will  be  guilty  of  homicide  even  though  his  own 
acts  were  not  in  themselves  foreseeably  fatal, 
because  he  will  have  made  himself  party  oa  soontaneous 
concert  to  kill  X,  or  at  a.  iy  rate  to  inflict  fore- 
seeably  fatal  injuries  on  him. 
Responsibility  for  the  unintended  consequences 
of  a  plot. 
Responsibility  for  consequences  in  the  case  of  an  individual. 
The  criminal  law  sometimes  holds  a  man  responsible 
for  the  uniültendeü  consequences  of  his  actions,  and  where 
a  person  unintentionally  causes  death  he  may  be  guilty 
of  murder  if  his  acts  were  so  clearly  dangerous  that 171 
he  must  have  realised  they  might  well  be  fatal,  i.  e. 
if  he  acts  recklessly.  A  man  who  beats  another  to 
death  with  a  crowbar  may  be  guilty  of  murder  whether 
or  not  he  intends  to  hill  him.  17here  the  act  which 
caused  death  was  so  dangerous  as  to  be  foreseeably 
fatal,  but  not  so  dangerous  as  to  be  regarded  as  reck- 
less,  the  agent  may  be  guilty  of  culpable  homicide. 
In  addition,  there  is  a  rule  of  law  that  any  death 
caused  by  a  criminal  act  is  culpable  homicide,  however 
unforeseeable  the  fatal  consequence  was.  So  if  A 
punches  B  and  B  falls  and  cuts  his  head  on  a  stone 
and  dies,  A  is  guilty  of  culpable  homicide.  (These 
rules  are  discussed  in  detail  infra,  cI.  lI.  ). 
Responsibility  for  the  consequences  of  a  plot. 
Where  death  is  the  unintended  result  of  a  plot, 
the  same  rules  apply,  so  that  if  the  plot-,,.  iss  so  to 
speak,  reckless,  each  conspirator  may  be  convicted  of 
murder  if  death  is  caused  in  the  course  of  carrying  it 
out.  In  other  words  the  conspirators  are  regarded 
as  one  person,  and  the  plot  and  its  carrying  out  as 
their  act,  so  that  if  someone  is  killed  as  a  result 
of  the  carrying  out  of  the  plot,  all  the  conspirators 
are  guilty  of  homicide.  The  cases  are  mostly  concerned 
with  homicide,  but  the  principles  apply  to  any  crime 
which  can  be  committed  unintentionally. 
Death  as  the  consequence  of  a  criminal  purpose. 
The  simplest  example  of  this  principle  is  that 
of  a  concerted  housebreaking  in  the  course  of  which  one 
of  the  housebreakers  kills  the  householder.  If  the 
housebreakers  had  agreed  to  use  whatever  violence 
was  necessary  to  effect  their  purpose,  then  they  are 
all  guilty  of  homicide,  unless  the  violence  was 
employed  for  a  private  purpose  and  not  to  further  the 
housebreaking.  So  long  as  the  violcence  used  can  be 172 
regarded  as  part  of  the  plot,  all  are  guilty.  If 
the  agreiment  is  to  use  only  limited  violence, 
say  only  hand  blows,  and  the  householder  is  killed 
but  such  a  blow,  all  are  guilty  of  homicide  because 
of  the  rule  that  death  caused  by  criminal  violence 
is  culpable  homicide,  even  although  the  death  was 
unforeseeable.  It  is  probably  therefore  the  law 
that  all  the  parties  to  a  robbery  are  guilty  of  homicide 
if  the  victim  is  killed,  sincai  an  agreement  to  rob 
involves  an  agreement  to  use  force  (cf.  Eraser  and  Rollins, 
1920  J.  C.  60;  Wm.  and  Helen  Harkness,  Glasgow  High 
Court,  30  and  31  Jan.  1922,  unrppd.  ). 
The  only  exception  to  the  above  rule  is  that  where 
the  violence  used  is  more  serious  than  that  agreed 
upon,  it  may  be  that  only  the  persons  who  use  the 
violence  are  guilty  of  its  results.  In  order  to 
convict  all  the  conspirators  it  is  essential  to  show 
that  the  violence  used  was  a  result  -  intended  or 
foreseeable  -  of  the  plot,  and  if  the  violence  used 
was  so  different  from  that  contemplated  that  it  could 
not  be  regarded  as  a  foreseeable  development  of  the 
plot  this  essential  requirement  will  not  be  satisfied. 
If  the  plotters  agree  to  use  their  fists  and  one  of 
them  uses  a  fruit  dish,  or  if  they  agree  only  to  use 
violence  to  effect  their  escape,  and  one  of  them  attacks 
the  housekeeper  in  order  to  effect  entry,  it  will 
depend  on  the  circumstances  of  the  case  whether  or  not 
the  use  of  violence  is  regarded  as  a  consequence  of 
the  original  plot.  An  example  of  circumstances  in 
which  it  would  not  be  so  regarded  was  given  by  Lord 
Thomson  in  the  reported  case-  of  Harris  and  Ors. 
(Glasgow  High  Court,  6th-9th  Sept.  1950,  see  infra  jr,  4 
where  his  Lordship  said  'Suppose  three  Zen  set  out  to 
perpetrate  some  act  of  minor  violence  on  a  fourth  man 
and  proceed  to  beat  him  up.  Now,  if  quite  unexpectedly 173 
one  of  the  assailants  produces  a  revolver,  which  none 
of  the  rest  know  he  had  with  him,  and  the  man  who 
produces  the  revolver  shoots  the  victim...  the  unexpected 
character  of  that  event  could  not  be  laid  at  the  door 
of  those  who  had  no  just  cause  to  expect  such  a  thing  to 
happen.  That  is  to  say,  shooting  would  not  be  within 
the  scope  of  the  common  purpose'.  (p.  375  of  transcript). 
What  is  important  is  not  the  unexpectedness  of  the 
death  in  relation  to  the  violence  actually  used,  but 
the  unexpectedness  of  the  violence  actually  used  in 
relation  to  the  violence  agreed  upon.  Had  the  victim 
died  as  a  result  of  the  beating  up,  however  unexpected 
such  an  event,  all  three  men  would  be  guilty  of  homicide  - 
even  although  one  of  them  only  kept  watch  while  the 
other  two  assaulted  the  victim. 
Even  if  there  is  no  agreement  to  use  any  violence 
at  all,  the  plotters  may  all  be  guilty  of  homicide 
if  fatal  violence  is  used  by  one  of  them,  provided  that 
such  violence  was  foreseeable.  Suppose  a  group  of 
householders  agree  that  they  will  not  use  force  to 
effect  their  purpose,  but  one  of  the  group  carries 
a  gun  with  him  and  this  is  known  to  the  others.  If  he 
uses  the  gun  in  breach  of  the  agreement  the  others  may 
be  guilty  of  homicide  if  his  action  is  regarded  as  one 
they  ought  to  have  foreseen  as  likely. 
The  type  of  situation  in  which  only  the  person 
who  uses  the  violence  is  responsible  for  its  con- 
sequences  may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  case 
of  Walsh  and  M'Lachlan  ((1£397)  5  S.  L.  T.  137)  in  which 
it  was  alleged  that  two  men  had  broken  into  a  house 
and  that  one  of  them  had  beaten  the  owner  to  death  with 
a  crowbar.  It  was  not  known  which  accused  had  struck 
the  blows,  and  indeed  there  seems  to  have  been  no  evidence 
at  all  about  what  happened  in  the  house.  In  these 174 
circumstances  Lord  Young  told  the  jury  that  in  view  of 
the  sudden  and  unexpected  nature  of  the  violence, 
and  the  absence  of  any  agreement  between  the  accused 
to  use  violence,  each  could  only  be  held  responsible 
for  his  own  part  in  the  affair.  Accordingly,  since 
it  was  not  known  who  had  struck  the  blows,  both  must 
be  acquitted  of  homicide.  (In  fact,  both  were  acquitted 
of  housebreaking  as  well,  but  that  does  not  affect  the 
argument.  In  Webster  and  Anr.  v.  WWishart,  1955  S.  L.  T. 
243  the  accused  tigere  two  thieves  who  used  a  car  to 
make  their  getaway.  The  car  was  driven  recklessly 
and  both  were  convicted  of  reckless  driving.  On 
appeal  the  convictions  were  quashed  since  there  was 
no  evidence  to  show  which  had  driven  the  car,  and 
no  evidence  of  the  circumstances  of  the  reckless 
driving  -  i.  e.,  presumably,  no  evidence  of  a  concert 
to  drive  recklessly,  and  no  evidence  to  show  that  the 
reckless  driving  was  a  foreseeable  consequence  of  the 
theft.  ) 
Even  where  there  is  no  agreement  to  use  violence 
there  may,  of  course,  be  art  and  part  guilt  by  reason 
of  spontaneous  concert,  a  concert  which  would  require 
to  be  established  by  evidence  of  what  happened  at 
the  time  of  the  assault,  evidence  which  was  lacking  in 
Walsh.  Such  a  spontaneous  concert  to  do  violence 
would  be  quite  independent  of  thh_original  concert  to 
break  in.  The  case  of  M'Cudden  and  Cameron  (Glasgow 
High  Court,  17  -  20  April,  1932,  unrepd.  )  may  be 
regarded  as  an  example  of  this  type  of  situation. 
The  two  accused  agreed  to  break  into  a  shop, 
expecting  the  caretaker  to  be  absent.  They  asked 
a  friend  to  keep  watch  for  them,  and  assured  him 
that  no  violence  would  be  used.  In  fact  the  caretaker 
was  present  and  disturbed  the  accused,  who  killed  her, 175 
one  of  them  striking  her  after  the  other  had  bound 
and  gagged  her.  (That  is  the  effect  of  the  only 
available  evidence  which  consisted  of  statements  by 
the  accused.  )  It  was  accepted  that  neither  had 
intended  to  kill  her.  Lord  Blackburn  directed  the 
jury  that  both  were  responsible  for  the  death.  His 
Lordship  also  referred  to  the  position  of  the  man  who 
was  supposed  to  keep  watch  for  them  -  it  seems 
that  in  fact  he  did  not  do  so  -  and  said,  '...  if...  he 
had  been  keeping  cop  outside  as  part  of  the  general 
scheme  to  rob  the  shop,  he  might  quite  well  have  been 
sitting  here  today  in  Court  on  the  charge  of  art  and 
part  in  the  murder,  although  he  may  have  had  a  different 
defence  that  he  was  only  keeping  cop  to  enable  the  two 
accused  to  escape  detection  when  burgling  the  safe. 
But  he  would  just  as  likely  have  been  charged  with 
murder'  (p.  300  of  transcript).  It  is  submitted 
that  he  would  have  been  guilty  of  murder  only  if 
he  had  known  that  serious  violence  was  contemplated. 
If  he  had  been  charged  with  murder  and  the  jury  had 
believed  that  he  had  only  agreed  to  keep  watch  on 
condition  that  no  violence  was  used  they  would  have 
been  bound  to  acquit  him  -  for  violence  would  not  then 
have  been  part  of  the  plot  he  was  in,  nor  a  foreseeable 
result  of  it  since  no  weapons  were  carried.  His  =ere 
presence  outside  could  not,  of  course,  make  him 
party  to  any  concert  entered  into  inside  by  the  other 
two. 
Concerted  recklessness.  The  same  principles  apply 
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when  death  results  from  a  concert  to  do  something  lawful 
in  itself,  but  to  do  it  recklessly.  In  Geo.  Barbier 
and  0_.  ((1867)  5  Irv.  483)  two  men  went  shooting 
on  a  range:  they  did  not  put  up  the  customary  warning 176 
flags,  or  give  any  other  warning  that  they  were  going  to 
shoot:  they  shot  in  the  direction  of  a  public  beach, 
and  a  girl  was  killed,  having  been  hit  by  only  one 
bullet.  Lord  Neaves  told  the  jury  that  '...  if  two 
or  more  persons  went  together  to  shoot,  and  shot  in  a 
reckless  manner  in  the  direction  of  a  public  place... 
and  death  resulted,  all  would  be  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide,  although  it  could  not  be  proved  who  fired 
the  fatal  shot'  (at  pp.  487-8).  This,  as  stated, 
is  too  wide;  there  must  be  an  agreement,  not  merely 
to  shoot,  but  to  shoot  recklessly.  All  the  members 
of  a  shooting  party  would  not  be  guilty  of  homicide 
if  one  of  them  stupidly  pointed  a  gun  at  a'ghillie 
and  killed  him.  Even  if  two  of  them  independently 
were  stupid  enough  to  fire  in  the  direction  of  some 
passers-by  these  two  would  not  be  both  guilty  of 
homicide.  If  it  were  Imown  whose  gun  fired  the  fatal 
shot  he  would  be  ]guilty;  if  it  were  not  known,  both 
would  have  to  be  acquitted  (cf.  Docherty,  1945  J.  C.  89). 
It  does  not  matter  in  this  connection  whether 
or  not  the  reckless  discharge  of  firearms  is  a 
crime  in  itself  even  where  no  injury  is  caused. 
What  is  important  is  that  where  death  is  caused  by 
the  reckless  actings  of  an  individual  that  individual 
is  guilty  of  homicide;  accordingly,  where  death  is 
caused  by  the  reckless  actings  of  a  concert,  then  all 
the  members  of  the  concert  are  guilty. 
Homicide  in  a  brawl. 
The  cases  discussed  above  are  all  fairly  simple, 
both  in  their  facts  and  in  the  law  applicable  to  them. 
The  rule  regarding  responsibility  for  foreseeable 
consequences  is  also  applied  in  the  more  complicated 
situation  of  the  street  brawl  in  the  course  of  which 
someone  is  killed.  Such  cases  are  usually  distinguished 177 
by  the  presence  of  a  number  of  people,  associated 
for  the  purpose  of  creating  a  disturbance  or  of  committing 
some  minor  crime,  by  a  deal  of  confusion  as  to  how  the 
victim  was  killed,  and  by  the  fact  that  one  or  more  of 
the  people  so  associated  delivered  the  fatal  blow. 
The  ideal  approach  to  such  a  situation,  especially 
where  there  is  no  pre-concert  to  do  any  violence, 
is  no  doubt  that  advocated  in  the  Digest  -  to  investigate 
the  blows  given  by  each  of  the  persons  assembled  at  the 
scene  of  the  brawl  (D.  48.8.17),  and  where  such  an 
investigation  yields  results,  these  results  will 
normally  be  taken  into  consideration  and  an 
individualistic  approach  will  be  adopted,  so  that 
only  those  who  actually  took  part  in  the  attack  on 
the  deceased  will  be  convicted  of  murder.  But 
this  is  a  counsel  of  perfection  -  it  is  usually 
impossible  to  discover  which  of  the  accused  struck 
the  victim,  and  in  such  circumstances  the  tendency 
is  to  adopt  a  collectivist  approach,  and  to  treat  the 
death  as  the  consequence  of  the  brawl,  and  therefore 
to  regard  all  the  brawlers  as  guilty.  The  law  tends 
to  oscillate  between  the  two  approaches,  depending 
on  the  information  available,  and  the  general  mood  of 
the  times.  I  propose  first  to  consider  Hume's  treat- 
ment  of  the  problem,  and  then  to  consider  some  modern 
cases,  in  order  to  show  the  way  in  which  the  matter  is 
dealt  with  in  practice. 
13ume's  treatment  of  the  problem.  Hume  deals  with 
two  situations  in  this  connection.  The  first  is 
where  'a  felonious  purpose  is  taken  up  suddenly, 
on  a  fortuitous  quarrel  among  persons  who  were  lawfully 
assembled  for  some  other  object',  and  someone  is  killed 
with  a  lethal  weapon.  In  such  cases  Hume  holds  that 
anyone  who  co-operated  in  the  killing,  by  using  a  weapon, 178 
or  at  least  having  one  ready  in  his  hand,  is  guilty 
of  homicide,  but  that  'a  person  shall  not  be  liable 
to  any  punishment,  unless  he  have  in  some  measure  been 
active  in  the  assault'  (Hume,  i.  270-1).  Hume 
seems  to  require  a  spontaneous  concert  to  kill,  or  do 
serious  violence,  and  he  treats  the  display  of  weapons 
as  evidence  of  the  accused's  adherence  to  that  concert. 
He  excludes  from  guilt  those  who  do  not  use  or  brandish 
weapons,  considering  that  they  may  have  been  involved 
only  'out  of  curiosity  or  indiscretion,  of  at  worst 
with  no  more  criminal  purpose  than  that  of  raising  a 
brawl  in  the  street'  (ib.  271).  Mere  presence  as 
part  of  a  group  of  brawlers,  mere  intention  to  brawl, 
is  not  enough  to  make  one  guilty  of  murder  if  one 
or  more  of  the  brawlers  uses  weapons  and  kills  someone. 
The  second  situation  with  which  Hume  deals  is 
that  where  there  are  no  lethal  weapons,  and  so  no  line 
can  be  drawn  between  those  who  had  weapons  and  those 
who  had  not.  He  gives  the  following  example: 
'Two  parties  of  men,  all  of  them  in  liquor,  meet  and 
quarrel  on  the  streets  of  a  town,  in  the  dusk  of  the 
evening.  Words  pass  at  first;  and  it  soon  cones  to 
blows  (owing  to  faults  on  both  sides)  with  such 
instruments  as  the'parties  have  with  them,  or  can 
lay  hold  of  at  the  time;  and  in  this  bustle  a  man 
is  killed,  it  cannot,  with  certainty,  be  said  how,  or 
by  whom,  but  probably  through  a  succession  of  injuries, 
done  by  several  persons...  In  these  circumstances  it 
would  plainly  be  unjust  to  punish  everyone  capitally, 
who  is  proved  to  have  struck  or  at  all  meddled  with 
the  sufferer...  the  fair  result  is,  to  inflict  an 
arbitrary  pain  on  those  who  struck  the  man,  and 
entirely  to  gcquit  the  others'  (Hume,  i.  272).  Hume 
seems  deliberately  to  have  made  the  facts  confused, 1'/  y 
and  he  includes  among  tree  reasons  for  his  solution 
that  it  was  probably  partly  the  fault  of  the  deceased 
anyway.  Such  a  consideration  may  be  irrelevant  in 
: ýtricýr  lo  ;  ic,  but  in  fact,  of  course,  it  will  influence 
a  jury,  and  so  affect  their  views  on  reasonable  fore- 
seeability.  Huine'.  2  main  grounds  seem  to  be  that  the 
quarrel  arose  suddenly  and  that  no  lethal  weapons  were 
used.  lIe  apparently  rejects  the  simple  view  that  the 
fact  that  the  members  of  the  group  were  assisting 
each  other  in  the  attack  is  enoug  to  make  them  art 
and  part  with  each  other. 
Hume's  approach  is  supported  by  at  least  two  cases. 
The  first  is  Geo.  lutchieson  and  Ors.  Aug.  12,1784, 
Hurte,  i.  212)  in  which  a  group  of  people  were  en-aged 
in  molesting  and  insulting  passers-by  in  the  street. 
The  deceased  intervened  to  protect  one  of  their  victims, 
and  the  group  attacked  him  with  stones  and  killed  him. 
All  the  accused  were  convicted  of  rioting,  but  none  of 
homicide.  The  second  case  is  Thos.  Marshall  and  Ors. 
(Sep.  1824,  Alison,  i.  64)  in  which  a  group  of 
Dundee  apprentices  got  into  a  fight  with  some  country 
masons.  There  were  blows  on  both  sides,  and  a  mason 
was  killed.  In  the  absence  of  previous  concert  and 
of  evidence  that  any  of  the  accused  had  struck  the 
fatal  blow  they  were  convicted  of  riot  and  assault, 
but  not  homicide  (cf.  also  lviacpherson  and  Ors., 
11  Jan.  1008,3urnett,  2«1,  Alison,  i.  63-4). 
The  modern  treatment  of  the  problem.  It  is 
difficult  to  pin  down  the  modern  la.,  but  it  seems  to  be 
more  collectivist  in  ap-oroach  than  Hume.  It  makes  use 
of  sae  idea  of  foreseeability  and  it  does  not  lay  any 
particular  stress  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  lethal 
weapons.  The  differences  are  perhaps  only  differences 
in  approach,  even  Derhaps  only  differences  of 
impression,  but  some  modern  cases  do  suggest  that  at 180 
least  some  of  the  accused  in  Hutchieson  (supra)  and  in 
Marshall  (supra)  might  have  been  convicted  of  murder 
had  they  been  tried  in  Glasgow  in  recent  years. 
The  best  statement  of  the  modern  law  is  contained 
in  Lord  Lioncrieff's  opinion  in  Docherty  in  1945  (1945 
J.  C.  89,95-6).  (The  passage  in  question  is  obiter 
since  the  facts  of  the  case  -  three  men  went  into  a 
room,  one  was  killed  by  a  hatchet,  one  disappeared, 
and  the  third  was  tried  for  murder  -  are  rather  different 
from  those  of  the  brawl.  The  accused's  conviction  was 
quashed  because  there  was  no  evidence  that  he  had 
struck  the  fatal  blow  and  no  evidence  of  concert, 
following  Walsh  and  M'Lachlan  (1897)  5  S.  L.  T.  137,  see 
supra  /)3.  )  Lord  Moncrieff  criticised  an  illustration 
given  by  the  trial  Judge,  Lord  Jamieson,  to  the  effect 
that  *'If  without  premeditation,  two  or  three  men  set 
on  to  someone  in  the  street  with  the  intention,  just 
perhaps  entered  into  at  the  time,  jof  causing  him 
injury,  and  one  stabs  him  fatally,  then  all  are  equally 
guilty  although  there  was  not  really  an  intention, 
until  the  man  came  along,  to  attack  him  at  all'. 
This,  said  Lord  Moncrieff,  was  'too  widely  and 
unguardedly  expressed'.  He  referred  to  Hume's 
treatment  of  the  subject  and  to  Anderson's  statement 
that  'If  a  sudden  brawl  arise,  rixa  per  p  lures,  sticks 
and  fists  being  used,  and  one  draws  a  knife  and  stabs 
another,  the  friends  of  the  man  who  used  the  knife 
and  stabs  another,  the  friends  of  the  man  who  used 
the  knife  are  not  guilty  of  murder  if  the  injured  man 
dies'  (Anderson,  p.  48).  This,  of  course,  is  because 
in  such  circumstances  the  use  of  the  knife  is  treated 
as  unforeseeable. 
Lord  Moncrieff  went  on  to  state  the  law  as  follows: 181 
'It  is  true  that  if  people  acting  in  concert 
have  reason  to  expect  that  a  lethal  weapon  will 
be  used  -  and  their  expection  may  be  demonstrated 
by  various  circumstances,  as  for  example,  if  they 
themselves  are  carrying  arms  or  if  they  know 
that  arms  and  lethal  weapons  are  being  carried 
by  their  associates  -  they  may  then  under  the  law 
with  regard  to  concert  each  one  of  them  become 
guilty  of  murder  if  the  weapon  is  used  with  fatal 
results  by  one  of  them.  In  view  of  their 
assumed  expectation  that  it  might  he  used,  and 
of  their  having  joined''  together  in  an  act  of 
violence  apt  to  be  completed  by  its  use,  they  will 
be  assumed  in  law  to  have  authorised  the  use... 
Secondary  responsibility  for  a  criminal  act 
arises  only  in  the  cases  of  reasonable  expectation' 
(at  pp.  95-6). 
Lord  Moncrieff  confines  himself  to  the  use  of  lethal 
weapons,  but  his  statement  that  'Secondary  responsibility 
...  arises  only  in  cases  of  reasonable  expectation' 
is  capable  of  wider  application,  and  indeed  is  the 
kernel  of  the  modern  law  -  all  else  is  merely  illus- 
tration  and  exposition.  It  is  notable,  however,  that 
Lord  Moncrieff  requires  a  joining  together  in  an  act 
of  violence,  although  not  active  participation  in  the 
violence.  It  is  also  notable  that  he  talks  of  an 
'assumed  expectation',  i.  e.  of  what  the  jury  deem  to 
be  the  expectation  of  the  accused.  This  assumption 
depends  on  reasonable  foreseeability,  on  whether  the 
jury  treat  the  death  as  a  foreseeable  consequence 
of  the  group  action,  and  this  in  turn  may  depend  on  the 
jury's  view  of  the  responsibility  of  the  accused  for  the 
crime. 
Three  modern  cases.  The  modern  law  can  perhaps 
best  be  illustrated  by  discussing  three  unreported 
cases  which  involved  the  problem  of  concert,  and  which 
resemble  the  typical  brawl  more  or  less  in  their 
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The  Crosbie  case.  The  first  is  that  of  Crosbie 
and  Ors.  (Glasgow  High  Court,  11-15  Dec.  1945,  unrepd. 
The  case  is  reported  on  another  point  sub.  nom,  Lennie, 
1946  J.  C.  79).  The  facts  of  Crosbie  are  typical 
of  the  20th  century  street  killing  which  has  been 
a  feature  of  Scottish,  and  particularly  of  Glasgow, 
crime,  for  some  time.  The  facts  are  confused,  and 
most  of  the  witnesses  were  unreliable,  but  I  think 
the  following  is  a  sufficient  summary  of  what  happened. 
The  accused  were  members  of  a  group  of  about  five 
people  who  went  about  the  streets  for  about  an  hour 
before  the  murder  creating  a  disturbance,  brandishing 
bayonets  and  knives,  and  threatening  at  least  two 
persons,  They  ultimately  debouched  from  a  tramcar 
into  a  crowded  street  where  they  probably  chased,  or 
were  chased  by,  a  rival  group.  In  any  event, 
they  chased  after  the  deceased  (who  did  not  belong  either 
to  the  Crosbie  group  or  to  the  group  the  Crosbies 
appeared  to  be  'out  to  get'),  shouting  cries  of  'Kill 
him'  or  'Get  him',  and  waving  bayonets.  A  few 
minutes  later  a  group  of  people  were  seen  standing 
round  the  deceased's  body,  and  one  of  the  accused  cane 
from  the  edge  of  the  group  (or  the  other  side  of  the 
road)  brandishing  a  bloody  bayonet  and  shouting  'Here's 
your  victim'.  Of  the  four  accused,  all  of  whom  were 
charged  with  a  breach  of  the  peace,  two  assaults  prior 
to  the  murder,  and  murder,  those  who  had  been  seen 
brandishing  weapons  were  convicted  of  all  the  charges, 
and  one  who  had  not  been  seen  with  a  weapon  was 
acquitted  of  all  except  breach  of  the  peace;  the  one 
who  was  seen  waving  the  bayonet  after  the  murder  was 
hanged. 
On  these  facts  it  is  fairly  simple  to  infer  a 
concert  to  do  serious  harm  to  the  deceased,  albeit  a 183 
concert  formed  only  a  short  while  before  his  death, 
and  the  result  was  consistent  with  Hume's  version  of 
the  law.  But  the  presiding  Judge,  Lord  Mackay, 
approached  the  problem  from  the  foreseeability  point 
of  view,  and  laid  hardly  any  stress  on  the  question 
as  to  which  accused  was  carrying  weapons,  or  on  what 
was  actually  done  by  each  accused  at  the  time  of  the 
killing.  He  described  the  accused  as  forming  'a 
little  group  -I  will  not  use  the  word  "Gang"  - 
or  bunch  of  wrongdoers  who  were,  if  not  ready  to  use 
lethal  weapons,  at  least  brandishing  lethal  weapons 
and  threatening  the  lieges  with  lethal  weapons'.  He 
then  directed  the  jury  as  follows: 
'...  if  the  Crown  has  proved  that  if  there 
is  a  group  of  associated  people  with  some 
comxaon  purpose,  whether  suddenly  taken  up  or 
at  more  length  considered,  and  in  this  case  I 
shall  say  short  of  pre-concert  -  for  instance 
pre-concert  to  kill  anybody,  that  is  not 
averred  -  but  short  of  pre-concert,  if  they 
are  found  associated  for  a  continuous  time 
brandishing  lethal  weapons  which  should  not  be 
brandished  in  public  streets,  threatening  the 
lieges,  or  three  particular  people  in  the 
lieges  with  these  weapons,  terrifying  the 
populace,  if  they  are  doing  that  at  four 
different  places  and  times  consecutively  within 
an  hour  and  a  quarter,  and  on  the  last  occasion 
one  of  their  weapons  is  used  to  lethal  purposes, 
and  the  others  so  grouped  as  to  help  in  that 
lethal  purpose  they  cannot  escape  the  consequences. 
If  they  have  killed  a  man  it  does  not  matter 
that  the  Crown  cannot  put  their  finger  on  the 
right  person,  but  there  must  be  a  group 
associated  for  that  purpose'  (Ttudge's  Charge, 
pp.  43-4). 
This  is  not  altogether  clear.  The  last  sentence 
begs  the  question  of  the  purpose  of  the  group,  and  'so 
grouped  as  to  help'  is  unsatisfactory  -  the  question 
is  'Did  they  help?  '  It  is  also  clear  from  the  general 
progress  of  the  case,  and  the  lack  of  any  clear 184 
distinction  between  those  who  did  and  those  who  did 
not  nave  or  use  weapons,  that  the  ratio  was  not  so  much 
the  formation  of  a  spontaneous  concert  to  attack  the 
deceased,  as  that,  'If  you  go  around  the  streets  brandish- 
ing  weapons,  someone  will  get  hurt',  and  accordingly 
all  the  accused  could  have  been  held  responsible  for 
the  death.  The  alternative  approach  -  that  the 
jury  could  oril;,  convict  persons  seen  using  or 
waving  bayonets  at  the  time  of  the  murder  -  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  considered,  perhaps  because  the 
evidence  about  who  had  weapons,  and  what  happened 
at  the  end,  was  very  confused,  and  such  an  approach 
might  have  led  to  the  acquittal  of  all,  or  all  but  one, 
of  the  accused.  (It  should  perhaps  also  be  noted 
that  the  case  was  heard  at  a  ti. 
eie  ,  4rhen  street  fighting 
by  gangs  of  youths  was  rife  in  Glasgow,  and  that 
the  authorities  regarded  this  case,  and  the  execution 
of  one  of  the  accused,  as  responsible  for  the  subsequent 
decite  in  crimes  of  violence  -  see  R.  C.  App.  6,  para. 
'78.  The  execution  was  the  first  in  Scotland  for 
seventeen  years,  and  the  trial  the  first  example,  at 
least  in  this  century,  of  a  conviction  of  several  persons 
for  the  murder  of  one  person  in  a  brawl.  There  were 
only  three  prior  cases  in  this  century  in  which 
two  people  had  been  convicted  of  murdering  another 
in  concert,  and  they  were  connected  with  robbery 
or  housebreaking  -I  am  indebted  to  ivir.  D.  J.  Stevenson, 
Depute  Clerk  of  Justiciary,  for  this  information  -cf. 
R.  C.  App.  2,  Table  5.  ) 
The  Harris  case.  The  second  unreported  case 
I  propose  to  discuss  is  that  of  Harris  and  Ors. 
(Glasgow  High  Court,  6-9  Sep.  1950,  unre4.  ). 
Three  men  -  two  brothers,  Paul  Christopher  Harris 
and  Claude  Milford  Harris,  and  a  third  man,  Walter 185 
Drennan  -  were  charged  with  assaulting  Drennan's 
Brother-in-law  U1.,  and  a  man  Boyle,  and  with 
murdering  a  man  Donleavy,  by  striking  him  with  a 
broken  bottle.  The  facts,  so  far  as  relevant  to  this 
discussion,  were  as  follows.  The  three  accused 
were  together  in  a  public  house  when  Drennan  announced 
his  intention  of  going  to  see  P.  I.  who  had  the  day 
before  assaulted  his  wife,  Drennan's  sister.  It 
seems  clear  that  Drennan  intended  to  assault  M., 
and  the  Harrises  agreed  to  go  along  and  see  fair  play. 
At  least  some  of  the  accused  carried  bottles,  a  weapon 
recognised  as  lethal.  (So  much  so  that  the  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  directed  the  jury  that  there  was  no 
room  for  a  verdict  of  culpable  homicide  -  i.  e.  that  the 
use  of  a  bottle  was  reckless  and  not  merely  negligent 
ug  oad  the  possibility  of  death.  )  The  three  went  together 
to  where  ItiI  stayed,  and  there  is  evidence  that  one  of  them 
said  'Come  on,  we'll  get  them  one  by  one'.  Drennan 
went  up  to  M's  house,  followed  by  Christopher; 
Claude  remained  at  the  closemouth.  In  the  house 
Drennan  made  to  attack  H  who  retreated,  while  Boyle 
and  the  deceased,  who  were  in  the  house,  intervened. 
Drennan  did  not  manage  to  strike  U,  but  Christopher  did. 
A  running  fight  then  seems  to  have  developed  between 
Boyle  and  Drennan,  and  between  Christopher  and  the 
deceased,  and  it  seems  that  when  this  fight  reached 
the  close,  Claude  joined  in.  In  any  event  Drennan 
and  Boyle  moved  out  into  the  street,  and  the  Harrises 
and  the  deceased  went  into  the  back  court  where  they 
were  seen  to  kick  him.  Very  soon  afterwards  the 
deceased  received  fatal  bottle  wounds  administered 
by  one  of  the  Harrises,  but  there  was  no  evidence 
about  how  this  happened,  or  which  brother  used  the  bottle. 
In  the  course  of  the  trial  the  Crown  dropped  the 186 
charge  against  Claude  of  assaulting  M,  and  the  Judge 
directed  the  jury  to  acquit  Christopher  of  the  assault 
on  Boyle,  and  to  acquit  Drennan  of  the  murder.  In 
the  result,  Drennan  and  Christopher  were  convicted 
of  assaultin_,;  R7,  and  both  the  Hariises  were  convicted 
of  murder  (Drennan  and  Claude  were  acquitted  of 
assaulting  Boyle  for  reason  that  do  not  affect  this 
discussion.  ) 
The  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  Lord  Thomson,  adopted 
an  individualistic  approach  to  the  matter,  and  did 
not  stress  the  aspect  of  foreseeability.  He  did 
say  that  'People  that  take  the  law  into  their  own 
hands  must,  I  think  -.  you  are  to  judge  -  have  in 
contemplation  that  there  may  be  resistance  to  the  act 
and.  that  third  parties  may  intervene'  (p.  384  of  trans- 
cript),  and  that  the  jury  must  ask  themselves  if  the 
use  of  a  bottle  was  'within  the  purview  of  the  common 
purpose'  (p.  375),  but  he  did  not  go  on  to  say 
that  all  the  accused  could  be  convicted  of  all  the 
charges  since  they  were  in  a  concert  to  assault  M 
and  knew  bottles  were  being  carried.  Instead,  he 
directed  the  jury  that  to  convict  even  the  Harrises 
of  murder  they  must  find  that  the  brothers  had  formed 
an  agreement  specifically  to  kill  or  grievously 
injure  the  deceased,  saying  that  'If  one  of  them  killed 
the  deceased  while  they  were  acting  together  with  the 
common  purpose  of  killing  him  or  of  doing  him  grievous 
bodily  harm  regardless  of  the  consequences,  then 
each  is  responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  other,  but 
you  must  be  satisfied...  that  they  were  acting  in 
concert  in  that  common  criminal  purpose'  (p..  373)  , 
and  not,  presumably,  in  any  other,  such  as  a  purpose  to 
assault  Drennan's  brother-in-law.  Drennan  was 
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not  present  at  the  time,  and  therefore  was  not  in  any 
concert  to  kill  Donleavy. 
In  the  same  way,  although  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
said  of  the  assault  on  M  that,  'If  you  are  satisfied 
that  Drennan  and  Christopher  had  formed  a  comaon 
criminal  purpose  to  combine  and  punish  M...  then,  in 
virtue  of  that  common  criminal  purpose  Drennan  is 
responsible  for  what  Christopher  did  and  Christopher  is 
responsible  for  what  Drennan  did'  (p.  362),  he  obviously 
accepted  the  Crown  view  that  Claude,  who  had  also  been 
in  the  concert,  could  not  be  charged  with  assaulting 
M,  because  he  had  remained  downstairs,  although  his 
later  actings  made  it  clear  that  he  had  not  in  any 
way  dissociated  himself  from  the  plan. 
The  Hamilton  Circus  case.  The  third  and  last 
unreported  case  I  Irish  to  consider  is  t  iat  of 
Gallacher  and  Ors.  (Glasgow  High  Court,  31  Oct.  -3 
Nov.  1950,  unrepd.  The  case  is  reported  on  another 
point  in  1951  J.  C.  38),  and  it  is  of  interest  because 
of  the  absence  of  any  lethal  weapons,  and  also, 
apparent  ly,  cfa  yprior  concert  at  all.  The  background 
of  the  case  was  a  feud  between  the  members  of  a  travelling 
circus  and  the  local  inhabitants  of  Hamilton,  and 
it.  is  thought  that  the'  deceased  was  mistaken  for  a 
member  of  the  circus  staff.  It  seems  that  one  of  the 
local  men  started  a  fight  with  the  deceased  on  the 
circus  ground  while  the  circus  was  being  dismantled, 
and  that  a  number  of  other  men  joined  in.,  Ultimately, 
they  all  stood  around  the  victim  who  was  kicked  to 
death.  Three  of  the  crowed  were  charged  with  murder 
and  convicted  (R.  C.  Asap.  4  para.  6). 
There  was  some  evidence  that  each  of.  the  accused 
had  kicked  the  deceased,  but  the  presiding  Judge, 
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conviction,  saying  that,  'If...  any  of  the  accused 
was  part  of  a  crowd  or  group  engaged  in  the  common 
purpose  of  assaulting  this  man  each  is  responsible 
for  the  consequences  of  that  assault,  although  only 
one  of  them  may  have  delivered  the  fatal  kick. 
If  the  accused  were  in  a  kicking  crowd,  and 
animated  by  a  common  purpose,  joining  in  the  attack, 
assisting  and  encouraging,  each  and  all  are  responsible 
for  the  consequences  (Judges  Charge,  p.  37). 
Gallacher  applies  the  rule  of  foreseeability 
to  cases  of  'spontaneous  concert'  where  there  are 
no  lethal  weapons,  and  thus  seems  to  go  beyond 
Hutchieson  (supra)  and  L2arshall  (supra).  The  ratio 
of  Gallacher  is  that  if  A  joins  a  group  of  people  who 
are  assaulting  someone,  and  joins  with  the  purpose 
of  aiding  in  that  assault,  then,  if  the  assault 
proves  fatal,  he  is  guilty  of  homicide,  whatever  his 
own  part  in  the  assault  was.,  Whether  his  guilt 
is  of  murder  of  only  of  culpable  homicide  depends 
on  how  likely  it  was  tnat  the  assault  would  prove 
fatal.  The  two  verdicts  were  left  to  the'  jury 
in  Gallacher;  in  Crosbie  and  in  Harris  the  Court 
took  the  view  that  the  weapons  used  were  so  dangerous 
that  those  using  them  must  be  regarded  as  reckless, 
and  so  as  guilty  of  murder. 
Conclusion.  It  is  very  difficult  to  reach  a 
conclusion  on  this  matter.  It  is  clear  that  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  brawl  is  conducted  with 
lethal  weapons  or  not,  so  long  as  no-one  produces  any 
weapons  unexpectedly.  It  is  clear  that  it  is  not 
necessary  for  the  Crown  to  show  that  any  particular 
accused  struck  any  blows  in  order  to  obtain  a  conviction 
against  him.  It  is  clear  that  where  two  or  more  men 
agree  to  do  serious  injury  to  another  and  he  dies, 
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follows,  fron  the  rule  that  an  intention  to  do  serious 
injury  is  regarded  as  involving  recklessness  au  oad 
death.  If  one  man  intends  seriously  to  injure  another 
who  dies,  he  is  guilty  of  murder,  and  in  the  same  way 
if  two  so  intend,  and  the  man  dies,  both  are  guilty  of 
murder.  This  is,  so  to  speak,  the  minimum 
operation  of  foreseeability,  and  causes  no  difficulty. 
It  is  when  we  try  to  formulate  any  more  general 
rules  than  these  that  there  is  difficulty.  Crosbie 
and  Gallacher  may  be  authorities  for  the  view  that  anyone 
who  joins  in  an  operation  of  which  death  is  a 
foreseeable  result  is  guilty  of  homicide;  but  there 
was  in  fact  evidence  in  Crosbie  and  Gallacher  that 
each  accused  had  struck  a  blow  or  brandished  a 
weapon,  and  Harris  suggests  that  membership  in  a 
criminal  enterprise  which  results  in  death  is  not 
enough,  even  where  death  is  foreseeable. 
I  would  suggest,  very  tentatively,  that  the 
doctrine  of  responsibility  for  foreseeablo  consequences 
is  used  by  the  law  only  as  a  last  resort,  and  only 
where  no  detailed  information  is  available  about  the 
fatal  assault.  I  think  this  is  borne  out  by  the 
way  the  accused  were  treated  in  Harris.  There  was 
evidence  that  only  Christopher  and  Drennan  were 
actually  engaged  in  the  assault  on  M;  there  was 
evidence  that  Drennan  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
final  assault  on  the  deceased.  So  an  individualistic 
view  was  taken,  even  though  the  result  was  that  Drennan, 
who  started  the  whole  thing  and  on  whose  behalf  the 
Harrises  entered  the  quarrel,  escaped  most  lightly. 
It  was  known  that  both  Harrises  were  involved  in  an 
assault  on  the  deceased  by  kicking  him,  so  it  was 
possible  to  go  the  length  of  finding  a  spontaneous 
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known  who  killed  the  victim,  or  who  had  wielded 
the  bottle,  so  at  that  stage,  rather  than  acquit 
bath,  recourse  was  had  to  the  concert  to  attack  the 
deceased  -  not  to  the  original  concert  to  attack  M- 
and  only  then  was  the  concept  of  foreseeability  used. 
One  can  go  even  further  -  it  is  said  that  after 
conviction  one  of  the  brothers  confessed  that  he  had 
struck  the  fatal  blow,  and  that  he  was  hanged  and  his 
brother  reprieved  (I  owe  this  information  to  the  Depute 
Clerk  of  Justiciary,  Mr.  Stevenson),  so  that  once 
fuller  information  was  available  the  approach  became 
individualistic  again.  Now,  compare  this  to  the 
Crosbie  case.  There  there  was  no  evidence  on  which  to 
base  a  concert  to  attack  the  deceased,  so  the  matter 
had  to  be  taken  back  to  the  only  concert  of  which  there 
was  evidence  -  the  concert  to  brawl.  (At  least  that 
seems  to  have  been  the  view  of  the  evidence  taken  by 
Lord  Mackay.  )  But  even  so,  the  accused  who  was 
not  actually  seen  brandishing  weapons  wasacquitted, 
albeit  by  a  verdict  of  not  proven  and  not,  as  in  the 
Harris  case,  by  direction  of  the  Judge.  In  Gallacher 
there  seems  to  have  been  nothing  to  choose  among  the 
accused  on  the  evidence,  so  all  were  convicted. 
This  suggestion  leads  to  yet  another,  even  more 
tentative.  It  is  that  the  foreseeability  rule  is 
used  rather  as  a  Pule  of  evidence  than  as  a  rule  of 
substantive  law,  and  is  used  in  a  way  which  shifts  the 
onus  from  the  Crown  to  the  accused.  Where  a  group  of 
people  is  involved  in  a  murder  the  jury  will  assume, 
in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  that  they 
each  acted  in  accordance  with  what  one  would  reasonably 
expect.  If  a  group  brawl  and  brandish  weapons,  and 
chase  someone  with  their  weapons,  it  is  foreseeable 
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will  gssume  that  each  member  of  the  group  in  fact 
continued  to  brandish  his  weapon,  and  took  part  in  the 
final  assault.  But  if  it  can  be  shown  that  this  did 
not  happen,  that  one  accused  did  not  take  an  active 
part  in  the  assault,  the  jury  will  disregard  their 
assumption  and  that  of  the  law  of  concert,  and  deal 
with  that  accused  as  an  individual  responsible  only 
for  his  own  actings. 
Where,  therefore,  a  number  of  people  are  engaged 
in  a  common  purpose  which  is  not  itself  a  purpose  to 
kill  or  do  serious  injury  to  another,  and  someone  is 
killed  as  a  result  of  that  purpose,  they  are  all 
guilty  of  homicide  providing  (a)  the  death  was  a 
foreseeable  consequence  of  the  common  purpose  or 
was  the  result  of  a  criminal  act  which  was  itzelf 
a  foreseeable  result  of  the  common  purpose;  and  (b) 
there  is  no  evidence  to  enable  a  distinction  to  be 
drawn  among  them  on  the  basis  of  their  actings  at 
the  time  of  the  fatal  assault.  If,  and  insofar  as, 
these  conditions  are  not  satisfied,  each  will 
only  be  responsible  for  his  own  actings. 
The  Homicide  Act,  1957.  It  should  be  added  at 
this  point  that  where  the  charge  is  capital  murder 
an  individualistic  approach  is  now  required  by 
statute.  Section  5(2)  of  the  Homicide  Act,  1957 
(5  &6  Eliz.  II,  c.  ll)  provides  that  if,  in  a 
capital  murder  'two  or  more  persons  are  guilty  of  the 
murder,  it  shall  be  capital  murder  in  the  case  of  any 
of  them  who  by  his  own  act  caused  the  death  of,  or 
inflicted  or  attempted  to  inflict  grievous  bodily  harm 
on,  the  persons  murdered,  or  who  himself  used  force 
on  that  person  in  the  course  or  furtherance  of  an 
attack  on  him;  but  the  murder  shall  not  be  capital 
murder  in  the  case  of  any  other  of  the  persons  guilty 
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The  aim  of  this  section  is  clearly  to  ensure  that 
only  persons  who  took  an  active  part  in  the  murder 
shall  be  hanged  for  it,  although  it  is  not  clear 
what  'attempted  to  inflict  grievous  bodily  harm' 
means,  or  how  it  is  to  be  distinguished  from  using 
force  'in  the  course  or  furtherance  of  an  attack  on 
him'.  This  means  that  in  cases  of  capital  murder  it 
will  be  necessary  for  the  Crown  to  show  that  a  particular 
accused  did  take  an  active  part  in  the  assault 
(probably  by  striking,  or  aiming  at  and  missing,  the 
Victim)  before  he  can  be  convicted  of  capital  murder. 
Thus,  had  Crosbie  or  Harris  (supra)  been  cases  of 
capital  murder  tried  after  the  passing  of  the  act, 
none  of  the  accused  could  have  been  convicted  of 
capital  murder.  But  presumably  they  could  all  have 
been  so  convicted  in  Gallacher  (supra),  had  the  jury 
accepted  the  evidence  that  they  had  all  kicked  the 
deceased. 
Accession  after  the  fact. 
Since  guilt  art  and  part  is  guilt  of  the  whole 
crime  and  the  same  as  the  guilt  of  the  principal 
perpetrator  of  the  crime,  no  one  can  be  guilty  art 
and  part  merely  because  of  anything  he  did  after  the 
crime  had  been  completed.  The  act  of  hiding  a 
murderer,  or  a  body,  does  not  in  any  sense  'cause' 
the  murder,  and  so  cannot  make  the  hider  guilty 
of  the  murder. 
The  only  way  actings  after  the  crime  can  affect 
art  and  part  guilt  is  by  providing  evidence  of  a  pre- 
existing  agreement  to  help  in  the  crime,  evidence  of 
prior  concert.  The  pick  pocket's  accomplice  who 
carries  off  the  spoils  is  guilty  of  theft,  not  just 193 
because  he  takes  away  what  he  knows  to  have  been 
stolen,  but  because  his  actings  are  evidence  that 
he  was  in  league  with  the  pickpocket  from  the  outset. 
If  A  knows  that  B  is  going  to  kill  someone  and 
offers  to  help  him  by  disposing  of  the  body,  A  may 
be  guilty  art  and  part  of  murder  because  of  this 
prior  agreement;  but  if  A  knows  nothing  of  the 
murder  until  after  it  is  over,  and  then  agrees  to 
hide  the  body  out  of  friendship  for  B.  he  is  not  art 
and  part  in  the  murder.  He  may  be  guilty  of  a 
separate  crime  if  what  he  does  is  in  itself  a  crime, 
but  that  has  nothing  to  do  with  being  art  and  part  in 
B's  crime.  The  murderer's  wife  who  commits  perjury 
in  order  to  save  him  from  the  gallows  is  guilty  of 
perjury;  she  is  not  guilty  of  murder.  (cf.  Hume, 
i.  281-3).  The  only  crime  in  which  there  can  be 
accession  after  the  fact  is  treason,  and  that  is  because 
treason  is  governed  by  the  law  of  England  -  Treason 
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Chapter  5:  Inchoate  Crimes 
I  ATTEMPTED  CRIMES 
The  general  theory  of  responsibility  for  attempts 
The  essential  difference  between  attempted 
crimes  and  completed  crimes  is,  of  course,  that  in  the 
former  the  actus  reus  of  the  crime  attempted  is  not  in 
fact  brought  into  being,  although  other  crimes  may  be 
fully  committed  in  the  course  of  the  attempt.  The 
circumstances  of  an  attempted  murder,  for  example,  may 
disclose  the  crimes  of  housebreaking  and  hamesucken, 
or  they  may  disclose  no  completed  crime  at  all; 
what  is  important,  from  our  present  point  of  view,  is 
that  they  do  not  disclose  the  crime  of  murder.  Punish- 
ment  for  attempted  murder  is  independent  of  any  other 
crimes  that  may  have  been  committed  in  the  course  of  the 
attempt  and  that  may  be  punished  in  addition  to  it. 
The  justification  for  punishing  attempts. 
In  punishing  persons  for  attempting  to  commit 
crimes  the  law  is  punishing  them  for  something  they 
did  not  do,  for  an  unfulfilled  intention.  The 
justification  for  this  can  be  stated  in  two  ways. 
Firstly,  it  can  be  said  that  the  man  who  intends  to 
kill  and  does  not  succeed,  is  just  as  wicked  as  the  man 
who  does  succeed,  and  indeed  should  be  punished  as 
severely  as  if  he  had  succeeded  -  in  the  words  of  the 
Digest,  anyone  who  did  not  kill  a  man  but  wounded 
him  for  the  purpose  of  killing  him,  should  be  convicted 
of  homicide.  (cf.  D.  48.8.1.  (3)).  But  although 
it  seems  wrong  that  a  wicked  man  should  escape 
punishment  because  he  has  been  'lucky'  enough  not  to 
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felt  that  he  should  not  be  punished  an  severely 
as  if  he  had  succeeded.  This  may  be  because 
it  is  felt  that  Providence  has  intervened  to  save  him 
from  the  greater  sin  of  having  completed  his  crime, 
and  that  he  is  entitled  to  the  'benefit'  of  this 
intervention;  or  it  may  be,  from  a  more  strictly  legal 
standpoint,  because  the  law's  main  concern  is  with 
external  harm,  and  in  fact  an  attempt  causes  less 
harm  than  a  completed  crime.  The  law  punishes 
people  for  what  they  do,  and  not  for  what  they  intend  - 
and  this  is  true  even  in  the  realm  of  attempts  so  that, 
albeit  the  punishment  is  based  on  the  wicked  intention, 
it  is  still  proportionate  to  the  harm  done. 
Secondly,  it  is  only  common  sense  to  shut  the  stable 
once  the  horse  has  shown  signs  of  intending  to  get  out, 
and  foolish  to  wait  until  it  has  gone:  in  a  phrase, 
prevention  is  better  than  cure.  If  a  man  shows 
that  he  intends  to  kill  someone,  it  is  clearly  foolish 
to  leave  him  to  get  on  with  it.  The  law  may  not  be 
able  to  intervene  until  he  has  actually  tried  to 
kill,  but  once  he  has  tried,  there  can  be  no 
objection  to  seeing  that  he  does  not  remain  at  liberty 
to  try  again.  Indeed,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
there  is  much  more  point  in  punishing  someone  for 
an  attempted  crime,  than  for  a  completed  one.  For 
once  there  is  an  attempt,  'the  offender  appears 
to  the  legal  system  on  the  strerh  of  the  act  done, 
already  so  dangerous  that  the  law  dare  not  wait  for 
further  proofs  of  his  dangerous  character;  the 
incompleted  act  furnishes  a  sufficient  proof'. 
Success  encourages,  failure  discourages,  and  punishment 
discourages  still  further,  weakening  the  offender's 
aggressive  tendencies,  and  so'the  punishment  of 
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endurable  result  than  the  punishment  of  a  completed 
crime'  (W.  Ullmann,  'The  Reasons  for  Punishing 
Attempted  Crimes',  (1939)  51  Jur.  Rev.  353,363-4). 
The  actus  reus  of  an  attempted  crime. 
Before  the  law  will  inflict  punishment  for 
attempting  to  commit  a  crime  it  requires  the  commission 
of  some  overt  act  in  pursuance  of  the  attempt. 
This  overt  act,  as  we  shall  see,  is  not  required 
merely  as  evidence  that  the  accused  really  was 
attempting  to  commit  the  crime  in  question,  as  evidence 
of  his  intention;  it  is  required  in  order  to 
constitute  the  attempt,  and  there  is  no  attempt  until 
the  requisite  overt  act  has  been  committed.  To  be 
guilty  of  an  attempted  crime  the  accused  must  have 
intended  to  commit  the  crime,  and  must  have  done 
certain  things  in  pursuance  of  that  intention. 
The  law  is  forced  by  its  very  nature,  as  it  were, 
to  concentrate  on  what  was  in  fact  done,  and  not  just 
on  what  was  intended,  because  what  was  in  fact  done, 
is  the  standard  on  which  it  usually  relies  in 
ascribing  responsibility.  'Crimes,  '  says  Beccaria, 
'are  only  to  be  measured  by  the  injury  done  to  society. 
They  err  therefore,  who  imagine  that  a  crime  is  greater 
or  less,  according  to  the  intention  of  the  person  by 
whom  it  is  committed...  Upon  that  system,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  form,  not  only  a  particular  code  for 
every  individual,  but  a  new  penal  law  for  every  crime' 
(Beccaria,  p.  25).  The  punishment  of  attempted  crimes 
necessarily  involves  some  departure  from  this  strict 
view  of  the  irrelevance  of  intention,  but  the  departure 
is  far  from  complete.  As  a  result  there  has  grown 
up  something  like  a  definition  of  attempted  crimes  in 
terms  of  external  situations  as  well  as  in  terms  of  the 
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becomes  almost  an  entity  in  itself  ,  with  something 
like  an  actus  re  us  of  its  own  :a  person  is  not  guilty 
of  an  attempted  crime  until  he  has  brought  about  the 
appropriate  actus  reus. 
The  question  in  every  case  is  therefore,  'Does 
what  the  accused  did  amount  to  the  "actus  reus"  of 
the  attempted  crime?  ',  and  in  practice  this  question 
becomes  'Has  the  accused  reached  the  stage  of  attempt, 
has  he  gone  far  enough  in  the  prosecution  of  his 
intention  to  have  committed  an  attempted  crime?  ' 
The  answer  given  in  any  case  depends  on  the  theory 
adopted  by  the  answers  regarding  the  criterion  of 
criminal  attempt.  There  are  a  number  of  different 
theories,  söme  of  which  must  now  be  considered  in 
detail. 
Theories  of  criminal  attempts. 
The  following  are  the  most  important  theories 
of  criminal  attempts: 
act  theory.  This  is  the  theory 
that  A  is  guilty  of  an  attempt  to  commit  the  crime  x 
when,  in  pursuance  of  his  intention  to  commit  x,  he 
commits  a  completed  crime,  y. 
(_2_t9.  On  this  theory 
A  is  guilty  of  an  attempt  to  commit  x  when,  in 
pursuance  of  his  intention  to  commit  x,  he  has  done  an 
act  which  is  such  that  it  can  be  unequivocally  inferred 
from  a  consideration  of  that  act  that  it  was  done  with 
the  intention  of  committing  x. 
Kc)  The  appropriate_stage_theories_  These 
are  theories  which  hold  that  once  A  hasadvanced  a 
certain  stage  towards  the  commission  of  x  he  has 
committed  an  attempted  crime.  In  these  theories 
it  is  assumed  that  before  we  come  to  consider  whether 
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aliunde  that  his  actions  were  performed  with  the 
intention  of  committing  x.  The  appropriate  stage 
may  lie  anywhere  between  the  formation  of  the 
intention  to  commit  x  and  the  actual  commission  of  x. 
In  particular  it  can  be  placed  either:  -  (i)  at  the 
beginning,  at  the  point  where  A  starts  to  put  into 
effect  his  intention  to  commit  x-  the  first 
stage  theory;  or 
(ii)  at  an  intermediate  stage  usually  described 
as  that  at  which  A  passes  from  preparation  to 
perpetration  -  the  perpetration  theory;  or, 
(iii)  at  the  end,  when  A  has  no  more  to  do  in 
order  to  bring  about  x,  but  to  wait  for  matters  to 
take  their  natural  course  -  the  final  stage  theory. 
(a)  The  wrongful  act  theory. 
As  a  theory  of  attempts  this  can  be  easily  dismissed: 
it  clearly  will  not  do.  Whether  or  not,  for  example, 
the  buying  of  poison  constitutes  attempted  murder 
cannot  depend  on  whether  or  not  the  buying  of  poison 
is  itself  a  crime.  On  this  theory,  a  an  who  breaks 
into  his  neighbour's  house  with  the  intention  of 
raping  his  neighbour's  daughter  is  guilty  of  attempted 
rape  as  soon  as  he  forces  his  way  into  the  house, 
although  a  man  who  goes  into  his  own  living-room 
in  order  to  rape  his  guest  is  not  guilty  of  attempted 
rape  until  he  has  started  to  assault  her. 
There  is  no  Scots  authority  in  favour  of  this  theory. 
It  is  true  that  Hume  opens  his  treatment  of  attempts 
by  saying,  'But  the  vicious  will  is  not  sufficient 
unless  coupled  to  a  wrongful  act',  but  he  is  only 
pointing  to  the  necessity  for  an  overt  act  before  there 
can  be  an  attempt.  The  examples  he  gives,  such  as 
that  of  a  man  shooting  at  someone  and  missing,  are 
compatible  with  the  theory  he  in  fact  develops  at 
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Preventive  crimes.  Although  the  wrongful  act 
theory  is  useless  as  a  theory  of  attempt,  it  is 
important  in  the  more  general  consideration  of  the 
ways  in  which  the  law  can  deal  with  unfulfilled 
intentions.  It  is  the  only  theory  which  insists 
that  a  completed  crime  must  have  been  committed  before 
there  can  be  any  conviction  at  all,  and  it  points  the 
way  to  the  creation  of  a  substitute  for  attempted 
crimes.  If  the  accused  must  have  committed  one 
crime  before  he  can  be  guilty  of  attempting  to 
commit  another,  why  not  just  charge  him  with  the 
crime  he  has  committed,  and  so  avoid  the  difficulties 
inherent  in  any  law  of  attempt?  And  even  if  we  do 
not  accept  the  principle  that  there  can  be  no  attempt 
unless  there  has  been  a  completed  crime,  why  not 
deal  with  the  attempt  problem  by  making  certain  common 
steps  on  the  way  to  certain  crimes,  crimes  in 
themselves?  That  is  to  say,  why  not  create 
preventive  crimes?  This  course  was  recommended  by 
Hume  who  said  of  'acts  of  matured  and  extensive 
preparation...  attended  with  danger  to  the  interests 
of  trade',  that  'it  is  for  the  Legislature  to  inter- 
pose  and  provide  a  remedy,  accommodated  to  the  exigency 
of  the  case;  and  thus  the  evil  is  obviated,  without 
infringing  on  the  humane  principle  of  the  common  law' 
(Hume,  i.  29).  If,  for  example,  we  wish  to  prevent 
people  injuring  others  with  lethal  weapons,  we  can  do  so 
not  by  trying  to  show  that  anyone  who  carries  a  lethal 
weapon  with  the  intention  of  using  it  is  ipso  facto 
guilty  of  attempted  assault,  but  by  making  it  a 
crime  to  carry  a  lethal  weapon  without  lawful  excuse 
(Prevention  of  Crimes  Act,  1953,1  &.  2  Eliz  II.  c.  14). 
Preventive  crimes  can  also  be  created  in  spheres  in 
which  attempts  would  be  impossible,  e.  g.  to  prevent 20m 
the  careless  infliction  of  harm,  as  is  done  by  making 
careless  or  drunken  driving  a  crime  in  itself,  whether 
or  not  any  harm  is  done. 
Although  this  type  of  crime  is  normally 
created  by  statute,  as  Hume  indicated  it  should  always 
be  created,  and  although  it  is  unlikely  in  the  'extreme 
that  the  common  law  would  today  create  a  new  preventive 
crime  (cf.  Semele,  1937  J.  C.  41;  Quinn  v.  Cunningham, 
1956  J.  C.  22)  there  are  two  cases  of  such  common-law 
creation.  In  John  Horne  (15  Jul.  1814,  Hume,  i.  150-3) 
the  High  Court  held  that  it  was  criminal  for  a  forger 
of  notes  to  sell  them,  as  forged  to  an  accomplice. 
It  is  not  altogether  clear  whether  the  Court  considered 
this  to  be  a  crime  Of  its  own,  or  whether  they  considered 
it  to  be  a  form  of  attempted  uttering,  but  they 
recognised  that  to  make  it  attempted  uttering  would  be 
to  go  beyond  the  limit  of  the  general  rules  governing 
attempt,  and  they  made  the  conduct  in  question  criminal 
because,  inter  alia,  'In  itself,  such  a  dealing  was  a 
criminal  act,  and  one  of  a  dangerous  as  well  as  a  base 
nature'.  The  view  that  Horne  created  a  preventive 
crime  is  supported  by  Alison  U.  406)  and  by  Macdonald 
(p.  69),  both  of  whom  regard  the  selling  of  forged 
notes  to  an  accomplice  as  an  independent  crime. 
A  clearer  example  of  the  common  law  creation  of 
a  preventive  crime  is  the  case  of  Chas.  MacQueen  and 
Alex.  Baillie  (15,22,  and  25  Jan.  1810,  Hume,  i.  102) 
where  a  charge  of  housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal 
was  held  relevant,  although  attempted  theft  was  not  at  that 
time  criminal.  Housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal 
filled  part  of  the  gap  created  by  the  fact  that 
attempted  theft  was  not  criminal,  but  it  is  in  itself 
a  substantive  crime,  and  now  that  an  attempt  to  commit 
any  crime  is  criminal  (Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland) 201 
Act,  188'/,  50,  x  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  61)  it  is  relevant 
to  charge  attempted  housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal 
(Macdonald,  pp.  24,51). 
'With  intent'.  The  crime  of  housebreaking  with 
intent  to  steal  leads  to  a  consideration  of  the  practice 
of  charging  accused  persons  with  behaving  in  a  particular 
way  with  intent  to  commit  a  crime.  `; Vhere  an  accused 
is  charged  with  doing  A  with  intent  to  commit  B 
there  are  four  possible  situations.  (i)  A  is  not 
in  itself  a  crime,  but  the  whole  facts  libelled  disclose 
an  attempt  to  commit  B.  In  such  cases  the  charge 
is  just  a  charge  of  attempting  to  commit  B.  In 
Coventry  v.  Douglas  (1944  J.  C.  13)  it  was  held  that  a 
charge  of  putting  one's  hand  into  a  receptacle  'with 
intent  to  steal  therefrom'  was  just  a  charge  of 
attempted  theft.  (ii)  A  is  not  itself  a  crime  and 
the  facts  libelled  do  not  disclose  an  attempt  to 
commit  B.  In  such  a  situation  there  is  a  crime  only 
if  'A  with  intent  to  commit  B'  is  a  crime  in  itself, 
as  in  'housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal'.  If  'A 
with  intent  to  commit  B'  is  not  a  crime  in  itself,  the 
charge  is  irrelevant,  since  it  discloses  neither  a 
completed  nor  an  attempted  crime.  In  Semple  (193'7  J.  C41) 
the  accused  was  charged  with  supplying  abortifacients 
to  a  non-pregnant  woman  with  intent  to  cause  an 
abortion.  It  was  accepted  that  this  was  not  attempted 
abortion,  as  the  woman  was  not  pregnant  (see  infra  245), 
and  accordingly  the  question  for  the  Court  was 
whether  supplying  or  administering  abortifacients  to 
a  non-pregnant  woman  with  intent  to  cause  an  abortion 
was  in  itself  a  crime.  The  Court  declined  to  'create' 202 
this  crime,  holding  tLiat  it  was  for  the  legislature 
to  do  so  if  they  thought  it  necessary,  and  this  approach 
shows  that  here,  as  in  Mac  Queen,  we  have  left  the 
real  of  attempts,  and  entered  the  realm  ;  of  the  creation 
of  new  substantive  crimes.  (iii)  A  is  itself 
criminal  and  the  facts  libelled  constitute  an  attempt 
to  commit  B.  In  such  situations  there  has  been  an 
attempt  to  commit  B,  and  such  an  attempt  should  be 
libelled  in  preference  to  libelling  'A  with  intent  to 
commit  B'.  Hume  commented  that  in  his  day  'our 
lawyers  have  refrained...  fron  libelling  directly  as  for 
an  attempt  to  murder,  rob,  ravish,  or  the  like; 
and  have  thought  it  better  to  shape  the  charge  as 
for  the  assault  made,  or  other  harm  done,  and  to  state 
the  ultimate  and  flagitious  purpose,  as  an  accompaniment 
only  or  aggravation  of  the  injury'  (Hume,  i.  26). 
This  practice  is  inadvisable,  since  it  confuses  this 
situation  with  the  next  type  where  there  is  in  fact  no 
attempt  at  B  but  only  the  commission  of  A  with  intent  to 
commit  B.  (iv)  A  is  itself  criminal,  but  the  whole 
facts  do  not  disclose  an  attempt  to  commit  B.  The 
commonest  examples  of  this  type  of  charge  are  assault 
with  intent  to  ravish  and  assault  with  intent  to  rob. 
Such  charges  are  usually  regarded  as  aggravations  of 
assault,  and  this,  it  is  submitted,  is  the  best  way 
of  dealing  with  them.  One  is  tempted  to  say  that  this 
form  of  charge  is  a  survival  from  the  days  when  many 
attempts  at  crime  were  not  themselves  criminal,  and  that 
now  that  all  attempts  are  criminal  this  form  should  not 
be  used.  But  attempted  rape  and  attempted  robbery 
were  crimes  in  Hume's  day  (Hume,  i.  26;  Burnett,  p.  107), 
and  such  charges  are  still  current  today.  (Macdonald 
says,  'Formerly  it  was  also  the  practice  to  treat 
assaults  as  being  aggravated  by  intent  to  commit  more 
serious  crime,  but  the  present  practice  is  to  charge 203 
assault  and  attempt  to  commit  the  more  serious  crimes', 
but  admits  that  it  would  still  be  open  to  juries  to 
convict  of  assault  with  intent  to  cause  serious  injury 
or  death,  on  a  charge  of  attempted  murder  -  Macdonald,  p. 
117.  In  fact  charges  of  assault  with  intent  to 
ravish  or  rob,  at  any  rate,  are  still  brought,  although 
not  very  frequently.  The  1887  Act  itself  recognises 
their  continued  competency  in  the  same  section  which 
provides  that  attempt  to  commit  any  crime  is  criminal  - 
50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  61.  The  section  provides 
that  the  jury  may  convict  of  assault  or  of  assault 
with  intent  to  commit  another  crime  even  if  assault 
with  intent  to  commit  that  crime  is  not  charged, 
provided  the  charge  is  of  a  crime  importing  personal 
injury  resulting  in  death  or  serious  injury.  The 
prthvision  is  merely  procedural  and  is  restricted  to 
charges  of  murder  or  serious  injury.  But  it  implies 
that  a  charge  of  assault  with  intent  to  kill  remains 
competent,  and  if  that  is  so,  then  a  charge  of  assault 
with  intent  to  rob  or  ravish  would  also  be  competent, 
although  a  person  might  not  be  open  to  conviction  for 
at  any  rate  assault  with  intent  to  rob  unless  it  were 
specifically  charged.  )  In  effect  this  type  of  charge 
represents  a  sort  of  half-way  house  between  assault 
and  attempted  rppe,  robbery,  or  murder,  etc.,  as  is 
recognised  by  Burnett  who  suggests  that  where  it  is 
doubtful  if  the  facts  amount  to  rape  there  should  be 
alternative  charges  of  rape,  attempted  rape,  and 
assault  with  intent  to  ravish  (Burnett,  p.  107),  and 
the  same  approach  is  adopted  by  the  Crown  Office  today. 
(In  at  least  two  reported  charges  of  assault  with 
intent  to  ravish  the  narrative  of  the  indictment  bore 
that  the  accused  attempted  to  have  carnal  knowledge 
of  the  victim  forcibly  and  against  her  will  -  Hugh 204 
M'Namara,  (1848)  Ark.  521,522;  Jas.  Kennedy,  (1871) 
2  Coup.  139).  But  there  is  no  warrant  for  classifying 
such  charges  as  half-way  houses  to  attempt,  or  for  treat- 
ing  tLIem  as  substantive  crimes  (pace  Lord  Deas  in 
Andrew  Allan,  (1870)  1  Coup.  468,469;  cf.  Kenne  d,  7, 
supra).  Housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal  is  a  crime 
consisting  of  the  act  of  housebreaking  with  a  particular 
wens  rea,  just  as  theft  is  the  act  of  taking  another's 
property  with  a  particular  mens  rea  but  there  is  no 
objective  act  distinguishing  assault  from  assault  with 
intent  to  rob,  until  we  reach  the  'act'  characterised 
as  an  attempt.  To  make  assault  with  intent  to  rob 
a  different  and  greater  crime  than  assault  is  to  make 
the  mere  intent  to  rob  criminal,  which  is  contrary 
to  the  fundamental  principle  that  'the  vicious  will 
is  not  sufficient  unless  coupled  to  a  wrongful  act' 
(Hume,  1.26).  Assault  with  intent  to  commit  another 
crime  is  just  an  aggravated  form  of  assault.  (Cf. 
Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act,  1887,  s.  61  -  supra, 
which  entitled  the  jury  to  convict  someone  charged  with 
e.  g.  murder,  of  assault,  or  of  'the  aggravation  that 
such  assault'  was  committed  with  intent  to  kill). 
The  aggravation  is  different  from  other  aggravations 
of  assault  such  as  indecency  or  the  use  of  firearms 
because  it  depends  on  the  accused's  subjective  state 
and  not  on  any  objective  feature  in  the  situation. 
But  aggravating  factors,  like  mitigating  factors, 
are  merely  factors  the  Judge  is  entitled  to  take 
into  account  in  passing  sentence;  and  if  he  is  entitled 
to  take  provocation  into  account  in  imposing  a  lesser 
sentence  than  is  normal  for  the  crime  in  question,  it 
seems  only  fair  that  he  should  be  entitled  to  take  an 
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into  account  in  passing  a  higher  sentence  than 
is  normal  for  the  crime  in  question. 
(b)  The  unequivocal  act  theory. 
This  theory  holds  that  before  a  person  can  be 
convicted  of  an  attempted  crime  he  must  have  committed 
an  overt  act  of  such  a  nature  that  the  only  reasonable 
inference  which  can  be  drawn  from  a  consideration  of  the 
act  is  that  it  was  committed  with  the  intention  of  going 
on  to  commit  the  crime  attempted.  The  act  must  be 
'unequivocally  referable',  to  the  intention  to  commit 
the  crime.  This  theory  relies  on  the  overt  act  as 
evidence  of  the  criminal  intent  and  the  intent  is  only 
held  proved  if  no  other  reasonable  inference  can  be 
drawn  from  the  act  but  the  inference  that  it  was 
done  with  that  intention. 
There  is  no  Scottish  authority  in  support  of  this 
theory,  but  as  it  is  the  theory  held  by  Salmond  (see 
10th  edn.  pp.  387-9.  The  passage  dealing  with 
attempts  has  been  omitted  from  the  11th  edn.  ),  and  also 
by  the  editor  of  Kenny,  and  of  Russell  on  Crimes  (see 
J.  I.  C.  Turner,  'Attempts  to  Commit  Crimes'  in 
Modern  Approach,  p.  279;  Kenny,  para.  63;  Russell, 
p.  195),  it  requires  to  be  considered. 
The  critical  difficultyjof  this  theory  is  that 
no  act  is  unequivocally  referable  to  anything  when 
regarded  in  isolation.  'It  is  impossible  to  determine 
that  issue  until  we  know  all  the  relevant  factors,  and 
they  usually  extend  far  beyond  the  immediate  behaviour- 
circumstances  which  may  or  may  not  constitute  criminal 
attempt'  (Hall,  pp.  108).  Salmond  explains  the 
theory  by  saying  that  the  act  must  be  'of  such  a 
nature  that  it  is  itself  evidence  of  the  criminal 
intent  with  which  it  is  done.  A  criminal  attempt 
bears  criminal  intent  upon  its  face.  Res  ipsa  loauitur' 206 
(10th  edn.  pp.  388-9).  But  Salmond  himself  commences 
his  exposition  by  saying  that  'To  mix  arsenic  in  food 
is  in  itself  a  perfectly  lawful  act,  for  it  may 
be  that  the  mixture  is  designed  for  the  poisoning  of 
rats.  But  if  the  purpose  is  to  kill  a  human  being 
the  act  becomes  by  reason  of  this  purpose  the  crime  of 
attempted  murder?  (ib.  p.  387).  But  on  Salmond's  own 
test  it  is  not  attempted  murder,  since  it  is  equivocal  - 
it  may  be  referable  to  an  attempt  to  poison  rats 
or  to  an  attempt  to  poison  a  human  being. 
The  theory  is  also  peculiar  in  that  it  is, 
as  Salmond  himself  accepts,  ultimately  a  theory  of 
evidence:  it  is  not  interested  in  the  overt  act  as 
such,  but  only  in  the  act  as  proof  Of  criminal 
intention.  If  that  is  so,  why  does  the  theory  accept 
only  overt  acts  as  proof  of  such  intention?  Salmond 
says  that  it  is  because  of  the  danger  of  punishing  a 
man  for  acts  in  appearance  and  in  themselves  perfectly 
innocent.  (ib.  p.  339).  But,  as  Glanville  Williams 
points  out  in  a  fottnote  to  the  10th  edition  of  Salmond 
(ib.  ),  this  danger  may  be  completely  removed  by  a 
confession  of  criminal  intention,  and  the  accused  still 
not  be  guilty  of  attempt,  on  Salmond's  view,  because  of 
the  equivocality  of  his  acts.  What  in  fact  happens 
is,  of  course,  that  where  the  accused  has  confessed 
his  intention,  the  Court  finds  it  easier  than  otherwise 
to  treat  his  acts  as  unequivocally  referable  to  that 
intention. 
This  sort  of  situation  arose  in  the  New  Zealand 
case  of  R.  v.  Barker  ([1924  N.  S.  L.  R.  865)  in  which 
Salmond  gave  judicial  expression  to  his  theory.  Barker 
had  written  a  note  to  a  young  boy  asking  him  to  meet 
him  for  five  minutes  in  a  paddock  and  saying  'We  can 
have  some  fun'.  The  boy  showed  the  note  to  his 207 
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father,  and  when  Barker  wrote  to  the  boy  again 
suggesting  a  meeting,  arrangements  -rere  made  for  the 
police  to  be  present.  Barker  met  the  boy  and  the  two 
walked  together  for  a  short  time  until  the  police  inter- 
vened  and  charged  Barker  with  attempted  sodomy  and 
attempted  indecent  assault.  Barker  later  confessed 
to  an  intention  to  commit  sodomy.  He  was  convicted 
of  attempted  sodomy,  and  his  conviction  was  upheld 
by  the  appeal  Court  which  held,  for  a  number  of 
reasons,  that  his  behaviour  constituted  an  attempt 
to  commit  that  crime.  Stringer,  J.  adopted  the 
unequivocal  act  theory,  and  said  that  there  must  be 
facts  which  'indicate,  of  themselves,  the  intention 
to  Commit  the  offence'  (at  p.  871),  but  he  seems  to 
have  adopted  this  test  because  'Until  this  stage  is 
reached,  the  matter  rests  in  mere  intention,  and  there 
is  a  locus  poenitentia'  (ib.  );  that  is  to  say,  he 
confused  the  unequivocality  theory  with  a  final  stage 
theory  (see  inf  ra,  2.  ). 
Salmond,  J.  himself  came  out  unequivocally  for 
the  unequivocal  act  theory,  saying  that 
'an  act  done  with  intent  to  commit  a  crime 
is  not  a  criminal  attempt  unless  it  is  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  be  itself  sufficient  evidence 
of  the  criminal  intent  with  which  it  is  done. 
A  criminal  attempt  is  an  act  which  shows 
criminal  intent  on  the  face  of  it.  The  case 
must  be  one  in  which  Res  ii  sa  loauitur. 
An  act...  in  its  own  nature  and  on  the  face 
of  innocent...  cannot  be  brought  within  the  scope 
of  criminal  attempt  by  evidence  aliunde  as  to  the 
criminal  purpose  with  which  it  is  one' 
(at  pp.  874-5). 
The  difficulty  of  the  theory  becomes  apparent 
when  we  try  to  understand  how  Salmond,  J.  succeeded 
in  applying  it  to  the  facts  of  Barker  in  such  a  way 
as  to  produce  the  conclusion  that  Barker  was  guilty  of 
attempted  sodomy.  Barker's  conduct  in  inviting  the  boy 208 
for  a  walk  and  going  for  a  walk  with  him  is  in 
itself,  it  is  submitted,  as  referable  to  an  intention 
to  take  the  boy  for  a  wvalk,  or  to  the  zoo,  or  to  kill, 
the  boy,  or  to  many  other  possible  intentions,  as  it 
is.  to  an  intention  to  commit  sodomy.  In  fact, 
as  Uringer,  J.  suggested,  the  'guilty  complexion 
is  probably  due  to  the  light  cast  upon 
[Barker's 
actings]by  the  subsequent  confession  of  the  accused, 
which,  admittedly,  could  not  be  legitimately  used  for 
that  purpose'  (at  p.  871). 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  English 
case  of  R.  v.  Pviiskell  ((1954)  37  Cr.  App.  Rep.  214) 
in  which  the  facts  were  very  similar  to  those  in 
Barker  -a  soldier  met  a  boy  and  made  an  indecent 
suggestion  with  a  promise  of  money;  they  met  again, 
the  soldier  said  'Let's  take  a  walk',  and  was  arrested  - 
the  accused  was  convicted  of  attempting  to  procure  the 
boy  for  an  indecent  purpose,  but  Hilbery,  J.  pointed 
out  that  the  facts  did  not  amount  to  an  attempt  to 
commit  indecent  behaviour  (at  p.  218).  Glanville 
Williams  also  points  out  that  to  offer  a  girl  money 
to  go  into  a  park  has  been  held  in  New  Zealand  to  be 
an  attempt  to  have  carnal  knowledge  of  her  (Yelds,  [  1928 
N.  Z.  L.  R.  18)  but  that  to  offer  a  girl  money  to  enter 
a  hut  has  been  held  not  to  be  attempted  indecent 
assault  (!  oore,  (19361  N.  Z.  L.  R.  979;  see  Gl.  Williams, 
para.  145).  These  examples  make  it  clear  that  the 
theory  is  untenable. 
(c)  Stage  theories. 
Theories  which  require  that  the  accused  shall  hive 
reached  a  certain  stage  in  the  commission  of  his  intended 
crime  before  he  can  be  convicted  of  attempt  suffer  from 
a  difficulty  not  altogether  unlike  the  main  difficulty 
of  the  unequivocal  act  theory.  These  theories  do  not 
view  the  act  in  isolation,  but  they  have  to  fix  on  a 209 
stage  in  the  series  leading  up  to  the  completed  crime 
which  they  can  characterise  as  the  beginning  of  the 
commission  on  the  crime,  or  the  stage  of  perpetration, 
or  the  final  stage.  There  is  no  agreed  standard  of 
measurement  which  will  tell  us,  for  example,  whether 
the  poisoner  begins  to  commit  murder  when  he  buys  the 
poison,  or  when  he  puts  it  in  the  food,  or  when  he  invites 
the  victim  to  dinner.  The  standard  is  a  variable  one, 
and  the  decision  in  any  case  may  well  depend  on  whether 
the  Court  feels  that  the  accused  deserves  to  be 
punished,  rather  than  on  the  logical  application 
of  a  principle.  'No  facts  or  events  force  us  by  their 
very  nature  to  relate  them  in  a  particular  way  to  some 
other  fact  or  event.  Between  any  two  facts  there  may 
be  a  number  of  relations  among  which  we  may  choose,  and 
our  choice  aill  depend  on  our  purpose'  (0.  C.  Jensen, 
The  Nature  of  Legal  Argument,  p.  134).  In  cases  of 
attempt  the  purpose  behind  the  choice  is  either  to 
convict  or  to  acquit  the  accused,  and  the  decision  to 
treat  his  acts  as  sufficiently  closely  related  to  the 
intended  crime  to  constitute  an  attempt  to  commit  it 
may  often  be  itself  the  result  of  a  decision  to  convict 
him,  and  conversely,  the  decision  that  his  acts  do  not 
amount  to  attempt  may  often  just  follow  on  the  decision 
that  he  ought  not  to  be  punished. 
Are  there  different  stages  for  different  crimes? 
Professor  Jensen,  following  Mr.  Justice  Holmes,  takes  the 
view  that  the  real  criterion  of  attempt  is  simply  public 
policy,  the  important  factors  being,  as  Holmes  puts  it, 
'the  nearness  of  the  danger,  the  greatness  of  the  harm,  K 
and  the  degree  of  apprehension  felt'  (Hdznes,  The  Common 
Law,  p.  68;  cf.  Jensen,  op.  Pit.  P.  130,163; 
Swift  and  Co.  v.  U.  S.  (1905)  196  U.  S.  395,396).  If 
this  is  so,  it  will  be  reasonable  to  relate  the 210 
appropriate  stage  to  the  seriousness  of  the  intended 
crime,  or  to  the  amount  of  danger  involved  in  the  acts 
already  committed.  In  that  case  no  principles  drawn 
fron  a  consideration  of  cases  of  attempts  to  commit 
crime  x  would  be  applicable  to  cases  of  attempts  to 
crime  y.  The  law  might  be,  for  example,  that  where  the 
intended  crime  is  trivial,  there  is  no  attempt  until 
the  final  stage  has  been  reached,  but  where  the 
intended  crime  is  serious,  there  is  attempt  as  soon 
as  the  accused  has  started  to  put  his  intention  into 
operation. 
This  type  of  approach  is  envisaged  by  Hume,  who 
says  of  his  own  rules  'that  in  some  instances,  there 
seems  to  be  room  for  an  exception  to  theordinary 
rule,  on  account  of  the  deep  atrocity  of  the  intended 
mischief,  or  the  extensive,  mature,  and  elaborate 
preparation  and  contrivance.  The  case  has  been 
put  of  one  who  has  stored  his  neighbour's  cellar  with 
gunpowder,  for  the  destruction  of  him  and  all  his 
family;  and  that  of  a  plot,  in  a  state  of  great 
advancement,  to  burn  and  plunder  a  hole  quarter  of 
a  certain  town'  (Hume,  1.29).  A  similar  approach 
lies  behind  the  decision  of  the  Court  in  John  Horne 
(15  Jul.  1814,  Hume,  i.  150-3)  that  it  was  criminal 
to  sell  forged  notes  to  an  accomplice.  The  Court 
justified  their  decision,  by  reference,  inter  alia 
to  the  'daring  energy  of  disposition  in  the  artist...  ', 
describing  the  preparations  in  question  as  'important 
steps  of  a  deep  and  advanced  conspiracy  against  the 
safety  of  trade'  (i.  b.  152).  As  such,  the  Court 
regarded  them  as  punishable,  even  although  they  had 
not  reached  what  was  normally  regarded  as  the  stage  of 
attempt.  (It  is  not  clear  whether  they  regarded  Horne 
as  guilty  of  attempted  uttering  or  of  the  independent 211 
crime  of  selling  forged  notes  to  an  accomplice  -i  cf. 
supra  -  but  whatever  the  form,  the  effect  of  t.  ae 
decision  was  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  attempt 
because  of  the  dangerous  nature  of  the  accused's 
behaviour.  ) 
This  approach  has  not  survived  into  modern  times. 
This  is  partly  because  the  'deep  and  advanced  conspiracy' 
can  be  dealt  with  by  using  the  law  of  conspiracy 
without  recourse  to  the  law  of  attempt  (see  infra2st  ), 
but  mainly  because  it  is  more  difficult  to  maintain 
such  an  approach  in  a  system  in  which  an  attempt  to 
commit  any  crime  is  statutorily  declared  to  be 
criminal  (Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act,  1887, 
50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  61)  than  it  was  in  the  time  of 
Hume.  In  Hume's  day  attempts  were  criminal  only 
in  the  case  of  serious  crimes,  and  the  fact  that 
attempts  to  commit  less  serious  crimes  were  not 
criminal  at  all  could  be  viewed  as  the  logical 
conclusion  of  this  approach.  In  any  event,  there 
is  no  suggestion  in  any  modern  cases  that 
there  is  more  than  one  standard  for  criminal  attempts. 
(c)(i)  The  first  stage  theory. 
On  this  theory  A  has  committed  an  attempted  crime 
as  soon  as  he  has  performed  an  overt  act  with  the 
intention  of  comm:  ýtting  a  specific  crime,  providing 
that  the  act  was  regarded  by  him  as  a  step  towards  the 
commission  of  that  crime.  The  difference  between 
this  theory  and  the  unequivocal  act  theory  is  that  on 
this  theory  the  intention  of  the  accused  may  be 
discovered  otherwise  than  by  examining  the  act  itself. 
On  this  theory  if  A  buys  poison  as  part  of  a  deliberate 
scheme  to  poison  B  he  is  guilty  of  the  attempted 
murder  of  B;  but  if  he  buys  poison  with  a  vague  idea 
that  it  might  come  in  handy  one  day  should  he  ever 
make  up  his  mind  to  poison  B,  he  is  not  guilty  of 212 
attempted  murder,  and  will  not  be  so  guilty  until  he 
has  formed  a  specific  plan  to  poison  B,  and  committed 
some  further  act  in  pursuance  of  that  plan. 
The  theory  adopts  a  subjective  criterion  -  an 
overt  act  may  constitute  an  attempt,  provided  itwas 
part  of  a  mhheme  to  commit  a  particular  crime; 
in  order  to  decide  whether  a  particular  act  or  series 
of  acts  constitutes  attempt  it  is  necessary  to  know 
if  the  accused  considered  them  as  part  of  the  carrying 
out  of  his  intention  to  commit  a  crime.  The  fact  that 
the  conduct  appears  to  be  unequivocally  referable  to 
such  a  scheme  will  be  evidence  of  the  accused's 
intention,  but  no  more.  It  has  been  said  that  on  the 
unequivocal  act  theory,  '  ...  If  A  intending  to  kill  Z, 
goes  into  the  street  with  a  loaded  gun,  but  fails  to 
find  Z...  A  has  not  attempted  to  murder  Z  ... 
[but] 
if  a  person  goes  out  at  night  with  apparatus  specially 
fitted  for  committing  mischief  by  fire,  not  only  must 
he  be  presumed  to  intend  to  commit  that  crime,  but  he 
has  already  made  a  move  towards  his  purpose  sufficient 
to  constitute  an  attempt'  (A.  Gledhill,  "'Attempt" 
in  Indian  Criminal  Law',  Indian  Year  Book  of  Inter- 
national  Affairs,  1955,  P.  1,  at  p.  2).  The 
distinction,  however,  seems  unfair,  and  the  first  stage 
theory  avoids  the  necessity  of  making  it.  On  the  first 
stage  theory  A  will  be  guilty  of  attempted  murder 
if  in,  fact  he  was  carrying  the  gun  in  order  to  go  and 
kill  Z  with  it;  he  will  not  be  guilty  of  attempted  fire- 
raising  if  he  can  bring  evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption 
of  fact  that  he  intended  to  raise  fire. 
The  first  stage  theory  seems  to  fit  the  ordinary 
meaning  of  'attempt',  since  all  it  requires  is  that 
the  accused  shall  have  been  seriously  bent  on  the 
commission  of  a  crime,  and  have  in  fact  started  to  put 
his  criminal  intention  into  effect.  On  this  theory 213 
a  jury  need  only  ask  themselves  'Was  the  accused 
engaged  in  carrying  out  his  intention  to  commit  the 
crime  when  he  was  arrested?  This  is  a  simple  and 
easily  understandable  test,  and  concentrates 
attention  on  the  accused's  state  of  mind,  which  is, 
after  all,  what  is  being  punished  when  we  punish 
attempts.  The  theory  also  has  the  advantage  that 
it  enables  wicked  intentions  to  be  punished  and  so 
frustrated  more  often  than  do  theother  theories 
which  may  require  considerable  harm  to  be  done  before 
the  law  can  intervene. 
A  number  of  codes  use  language  which  could  be 
interpreted  as  embodyin;  this  theory,  perhaps  because 
of  the  similarity  between  the  theory  and  the  ordinary 
meaning  of  'attempt'.  The  French  Penal  Code  talks 
of  attempts  manifested  'par  un  commencement  d'execution' 
(C.  P.  Art.  2.  );  the  English  Draft  Code  of  'an  act 
done  or  omitted  with  intent  to  commit  that  offence, 
forming  part  of  a  series  of  acts  or  omissions  which 
would  have  conttituted  the  offence  if..  not  interrupted' 
(Report  of  Royal  Commission  on  Draft  Code,  1879, 
Draft  Code,  s.  74);  the  New  Zealand  Code  of  'an  act 
for  the  purpose  of  accomplishing'  the  criminal 
object'  (Crimes  Act,  1908,  s.  93,  (i)),  the  Indian  Code 
of  anyone  who  'in  such  attempt  does  any  act  towards  the 
commission  of  the  offence'  (Indian  Penal  Code,  s.  511); 
the  Queensland  and  Western  Australia  Criminal  Code 
of  someone  who  'begins  to  put  his  intention  into 
execution  by  means  adopted  to  its  fulfilment'  (s.  4); 
and  the  Swiss  Code  of  someone  who  'mit  der  Ausführung 
eines  Verbrechens...  begori  n  hat'  (SchwStGB  Art.  21). 
But  in  fact  all  of  these  systems  reject  the  first 
stage  theory,  and  all  for  the  same  reason.  They  all 
distinguish  acts  of  preparation  from  attempts,  and  agree 
that  acts  of  preparation  are  not  punishable  (see,  e.  g. 214 
Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p.  132;  New  Zealand  Crimes  Act, 
s.  93(ii);  Ranchhoddas  and  Thakore,  The  Indian  Penal 
Code,  p.  456;  H.  Pfander,  'Swiss  Criminal  Law',  1944 
Can.  Bar  Rev.  v  p.  874).  It  is  felt  that  to  punish 
mere  preparation  for  the  commission  of  a  crime  is 
to  go  too  far,  since  it  comes  near  to  punishing  mere 
intentions, 
(which 
it  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  criminal 
law  to  do.  The  nearest  approach  to  the  first  stage 
theory  I  can  find  is  that  of  German  Law.  Art  43  of 
the  StrafGesetzbuch  talks  of  'Anfang  der  Ausführung', 
and  this  isinterpreted  as  excluding  preparatory  acts, 
but  the  distinction  between  preparation  and  perpetration 
depends  on  the  intention  or  plan  of  the  intending 
criminal  -  Nach  ihm  kann  allein  beurteilt  werden, 
ob  eine  Handlung  schon  der  Ausfuhrung  oder  nur  der 
Vorbereitung  dient'  (Sch8nke-Schrlider,  p.  192).  It  is 
on  this  principle  that  a  distinction  is  drawn  between 
someone  who  buys  a  revolver  with  which  he  intends 
to  commit  a  murder  after  some  weeks,  and  someone  who 
pulls  out  a  pistol  when  he  intends  to  kill  a  particular 
person  at  once.  On  this  view  again,  it  is  possible 
to  regard  the  poisoning  of  a  watchdog  as  attempted 
theft,  which  it  probably  would  not  be  on  a  strict 
perpetration  theory.  (ib.  p.  193). 
Although  this  theory  is  an  inviting  one,  there  is 
no  authority  for  it  in  Scotland,  and  its  approach  is 
out  of  tune  with  the  general  attitude  of  Scots  law 
towards  attempt,  which  requires  an  almost  complete  act 
of  execution  before  there  can  be  an  attempted  crime. 
(c)(ii)  The  perpetration  theory. 
Despite  its  wide  adoption  this  theory  is  highly 
unsatisfactory.  It  is  objective  theory  since  it 
requires  more  than  the  combination  of  intention 
with  an  overt  act  -  it  requires  a  particular  sort  of 
overt  act.  That  being  so,  it  should  be  able  to  point  to 215 
a  quality  which  distinguishes  the  type  of  act  it  requires  - 
an  act  showing  that  the  accused  has  passed  from  the  stage 
of  preparation  to  that  of  perpetration.  But  it  is 
unable  to  do  this,  and  as  a  result  it  is  so  vague  that 
it  enables  the  Court  to  adopt  an  individual  approach 
to  each  case,  and  to  decide  whether  or  not  there  has 
been  an  attempt  solely  by  reference  to  whether  or  not 
it  wishes  to  punish  the  accused.  If  this  were  frankly 
admitted  it  might  not  be  altogether  a  bad  thing  - 
it  would  be  flexible  and  would  take  account  of  ordinary 
moral  reactions  -  but  it  would  not  be  a  stage  . 
theory 
of  attempt.  In  the  same  way,  the  theory  can  be  used 
to  introduce  the  tenable  Holmesian  theory  that  the 
criterion  of  attempt  is  public  mischief,  but  it  would 
be  better  to  adopt  the  Holmesian  theory  explicitly, 
For  when  Judges  continually  talk  about  preparation 
and  perpetration,  and  not  about  morality  or  public 
mischief,  they  end  by  convincing  themselves  that  the 
words  mean  something,  and  the  result  is  that  in  order 
to  justify  their  decisions  on  attempt  they  employ  the 
perpetration  theory.  But  the  theory  is  quite  incapqble 
of  standing  on  its  own,  and  it  tends  to  be  combined 
or  confused  with  an  unequivocal  act  theory  when  the 
Court  wish  to  convict,  and  with  a  final  stage  theory 
when  they  wish  to  acquit.  (Cf.  Donnedieu  de  Vabres, 
pp.  132,134,;  R.  V.  Barker  [1924]  N.  Z.  L.  R.  865; 
O.  C.  Jensen,  22.  cit.,  Pt.  III,  assim..  "  The  most 
striking  example  of  this  is  offered  by  two  South 
African  cases,  in  one  of  which  it  was  held  that  a  man 
putting  on  a  contraceptive  beside  a  naked  coloured 
woman  had  not  attempted  to  have  intercourse  with  her 
because  there  was  still  an  opportunity  for  him  to 
change  his  mind,  and  in  the  other  that  a  man  lying 
undresged  in  bed  with  a  naked  coloured  woman,  in  a 
state  of  erection,  had  attempted  to  have  intercourse 
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with  her  -N  and  B  [1952(4)]  S.  A.  L.  R.  210,  and  S,  ib.  591). 
The  theory  in  Scotland.  Hume  talks  at  one  stage 
of  'ambiguous  cases,  with  respect  to  which  it  is  very 
difficult  to  say  where  preparation  ends,  and 
perpetration  begins',  but  he  is  talking  there  of 
the  possibility  of  treating  dangerous  attempts,  dr 
attempts  to  commit  dangerous  crimes,  differently  from 
ordinary  attempts.  In  any  event  it  is  clear  from  his 
examples,  that  he  equates  the  beginning  of  perpetration 
with  the  final  stage.  For  he  says  that  it  is  not 
attempted  assault  to  lie  in  wait  for  someone,  or  to 
lurk  in  the  night  near  a  shop  with  a  ladder  and  pick  the 
lock,  because  until  the  person  is  assaulted  or  the  lock 
of  the  shop  picked,  there  is  no  'inception'  of  the 
crime,  and  'fear,  remorse,  a  moment's  confusion, 
some  accidental  alarm,  might  have  prevented  hny 
attempt  from  being  made'  (Hume,  i.  29). 
Again,  in  Baxter  ((1908)  5  Adam  609),  Lord  Macdonald 
said  that  'A  man  who  has  done  something  by  way  of  overt 
act  with  the  purpose  of  committing  a  crime,  but  does 
not  complete  it,  is  punishable  for  attempting  to  commit 
the  crime',  but  his  examples  are  of  placing  poison 
in  a  teapot,  or  sending  a  parcel  of  explosives  through 
the  post  so  that  they  will  blow  up  on  being  opened. 
And  it  is  these  acts  that  he  describes  as  'acts 
done  by  a  person  who  is  in  course  of  committing  the 
full  crime,  and  the  person  attempting  had  by  overt  act 
directly  taken  steps,  not  merely  to  prepare  for  the 
perpetration  of  a  crime,  but  to  put  his  machinations 
into  a  practical  action'  (at  p.  615).  It  is  clear 
from  the  examples  and  from  the  whole  tenour  of  the  case 
that  the  theory  adopted  was  the  final  stage  one  (and 
indeed  probably  the  possibility  of  repentance  version 
-  cf.  infra).  Lord  Macdonald  also  spoke  of  a  house- 
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with  all  his  tools  ready  to  break  in,  and  said  that  such 
a  man  was  not  guilty  of  attempted  housebreaking  if  he 
went  away  when  the  watchman  caught  sight  of  him  (ib. 
p.  614). 
The  only  direct  authority  in  Scotland  for  the 
perpetration  theory  is  the  case  of  Camerons  ((1911)  6 
Adam  456).  The  accused  were  husband  and  wife, 
and  they  were  charged  with  atten.  3ting  to  defraud  an 
insurance  company.  The  attempt  involved  an  elaborate 
scheme  much  of  which  had  been  carried  out  before  they 
were  arrested.  They  had  obtained  possession  of  a 
necklace  for  a  limited  time  during  which  they  effected 
an  insurance  on  it.  Then,  after  they  had  given  the 
necklace  back,  they  pretended  that  the  wife  had  been 
robbed  of  it,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  produce 
simulate  injuries  on  her.  They  then  reported  the 
'theft'  to  the  police  and  to  the  insurance  company's 
assessors.  The  latter  requested  a  formal  claim,  and 
although  it  appears  that  such  a  claim  was  made  the  Crown 
failed  to  prove  this,  and  the  case  went  to  the  jury 
on  the  assumption  that  no  claim  was  made.  In  these 
circumstances  the  accused  were  convicted  of  attempted 
fraud. 
The  presiding  Judge,  was  Lord  Dunedin,  and  he 
consulted  the  other  J,.  ldges  before  directing  the  jury, 
so  that  his  charge  is  of  considerable  weight  as  an 
authmrity.  It  is  submitted,  however,  with  respect,, 
that  it  is  nonetheless  wrong  insofar  as  it  purports 
to  define  the  Scots  law  of  criminal  attempts  in  terms 
of  the  perpetration  theory. 
Lord  Dunedin  approached  the  law  by.  way  of  Hume  'a 
requirement  of  an  inchoate  act  of  execution.  He  then 
referred  to  Hume  's  example  of  scuttling  a  ship  with  the 
intention  of  defrauding  underwriters.  But  although 
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Hume  regarded  t_iis  as  attempted  fraud  (Hume,  1.27) 
Lord  Dunedin  did  not  appear  to  do  so,  since  he 
treated  the  simulate  robbery  in  Camerons  as  itself 
insu:  ficient  to  constitute  an  attempt,  although  he  said 
that  'very  little  more  will  do'  (at  pp.  484-5).  He 
went  on  to  quote  Hume's  statement  about  ambiguous 
cases  in  which  it  was  difficult  to  say  where  perpetration 
began  (Hume,  i.  29),  and  summed  up  his  own  view  of  the 
law  by  saying  that  'the  root  of  the  whole  matter' 
was  to  discover  where  preparation  ends  and  where 
perpetration  begins.  In  other-words,  it.  is  a  question 
of  degree,  and  when  it  is  a  question  of  degree,  it  is  a 
jury  question'  (at  485).  (This  last  statement  is 
rather  surprising  -  the  question  was  decided  on 
relevancy  in  the  earlier  cases  of  Sam.  Tumbleson,  (1863) 
4  Irv.  426  and  Baxter,  (1908)  5  Adam  609,  and  in  the 
later  cases  of  Liackenzies  (1913)  7  Adam  189  and  Semple 
1937  J.  C.  41,  and  is  generally  regarded  as  one  of 
law  -  cf.  Report  of  Royal  Comgission  on  Draft  Code,  1879  - 
Draft  Code,  s.  74;  New  Zealand  Crimes  Act,  1908,  s.  93(ii); 
Gardner  and  Lansdown,  South  African  Criminal  Law  and 
Procedure,  Vol.  I,  p.  103.  )  The  jury,  naturally 
enough  in  the  circumstances,  convicted  the  accused  - 
naturally,  because  there  could  be  no  doubt  that  the 
accused  had  concocted  and  to  a  great  extent  carried 
out  a  deliberate  and  complex  plot  to  defraud  the 
insurers. 
It  is  not  clear,  however,  whether  Lord  Dunedin 
would  have  convicted  the  accused,  had  the  matter  rested 
with  him.  He  said  to  the  jury,  'Supposing  that  after 
getting  that  letter...  saying  that  they  wanted  a  formal 
claim...  they  said  "No,  we  have  changed  our  minds,  and 
we  give  it  up;  we  are  not  to  claim  at  all"  -  do  you 
think  there  would  have  been  much  chance  of  convicting 
them?  Well,  of  course  they  are  not  in  that  happy 219 
position,  but  through  the  omission  of  the  Crown  to 
prove  any  claim  they  are  in  the  same  position,  as  you 
must  just  take  it,  as  if  they  had  been  arrested  after 
the  letter  to  the  broker  reporting  the  theft  and 
asking  that  enquiries  be  made'  (at  pp.  495-6). 
Lord  Dunedin  was  thus  at  least  flirting  with  the  final 
stage  theory;  he  certainly  thought  that  actual 
repentance  would  prevent  conviction;  and  he  was 
apparently  by  no  means  convinced  that  on  the  proved 
facts  there  had  been  'perpetration',  -  the  passage 
sounds  very  like  a  suggestion  to  the  jury  to  acquit. 
On  the  other  hand  the  suggestion  that  once  the  robbery 
had  been  carried  out  'very  little  more'  would  do,  and 
the  treatment  of  the  question  as  one  of  degree  make  it 
clear  that  his  Lordship  was  not  directing  the  jury 
in  terms  of  either  the  final  stage  theory,  or  the 
first  stage  theory.  What  he  himself  meant  by 
perpetration,  or  where  he  thought  it  began  in  the 
case,  it  is  impossible  to  tell. 
Thevalue  ofthecase  asauthority.  The  case  is 
--  -----  --  ---  ----  -- 
of  considerable  persuasive  authority  but  it  is  not, 
of  course,  technically  binding,  and  it  is  submitted 
that  it  should  not  be  followed.  It  conflicts  with  the 
decision  in  Baxter  ((1908)  5  Adam,  609)  and  with  the 
dicta  in  LTackenzies  ((1913)  7  Adam,  189),  which  will 
be  considered  shortly.  Again,  although  the  phrase 
about  preparation  and  perpetration  has  been  used 
frequently  since  Camerons,  all  the  later  cases  in  which 
the  accused  hove  been  convicted  of  criminal  attempts 
have  been  final  stage  cases  on  their  facts  (Se  mDle, 
1937  J.  C.  41;  Angus,  1935  J.  C.  1;  Dalton,  1951  J.  C.  76 
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The  objections  to  the  theory.  It  is  submitted 
further  that  there  are  so  many  objections  to  the  theory 
that  it  should  not  be  adopted  in  the  absence  of  binding 
authority  in  its  favour.  The  objections  may  perhaps 
be  summarised  as  follows: 
(1)  It  is  meaningless.  To  'perpetrate'  is  to 
'carry  through,  execute,  perform'  (N.  E.  D.  ).  That  is  to 
say,  attempt  and  perpetration  are  mutually  exclusive. 
At  least,  the  crime  is  not  perpetrated  until  the  last 
act  is  committed.  To  begin  to  perpetrate  either 
means  the  same  as  to  begin  to  carry  out  -  in  which  case 
the  Camerons  had  committed  an  attempt  when  they 
staged  their  robbery  if  not  earlier  -  or  it  means  to 
carry  out  the  last  act,  or,  of  course,  it  means 
nothing  at  all.  Hume,  as  we  shall  see,  took  the  view 
that  the  beginning  of  perpetration  was  the  stage  at  which 
the  last  act  was  performed.  The  same  view  is  probably 
taken  by  the  editors  of  the  5th  edition  of  Macdonald 
when  they  say  that  there  is  an  attempt  'when  it  is 
beyond  the  power  of  the  man  to  prevent  the  consequences; 
or,  as  sometimes  hu,  when  the  matter  advances  from 
preparation  to  perpetration'  (p.  1.  bey  italics). 
To  'prepare'  means  to  'get  ready'  (N.  E.  D.  ),  and 
if  what  you  are  getting  ready  to  do  is  to  carry  out 
the  crime,  then  either  you  are  getting  ready  until 
you  have  committed  the  final  act,  or  you  cease  to  be 
getting  ready  when  you  start  to  put  your  plan  into 
operation.  If  you  stop  getting  ready  sometime  before 
the  final  act  but  after  the  start,  there  is  a  gap 
which  is  neither  preparation  or  perpetration,  and  there 
is  no  point  at  which  the  one  ends  and  the  other  begins. 
(2)  It  is  vague.  The  distinction  between 
preparation  and  perpetration  is  said  to  be  one  of 
degree,  and  that  in  itself  means  that  it  isbound  to  be 
difficult  to  apply.  But  it  is  more  difficult  than  many 221 
other  questions  of  degree,  because  even  the  points 
between  : °lhich  the  variations  in  degree  operate  are 
unfixed.  In  most  questions  of  degree  there  is  a 
wide  area  in  which  it  is  clear  on  which  side  of  the  line 
we  are.  : 7e  may  not  know  where  a  horse's  tail  ends 
and  its  body  begins,  but  outside  of  a  small  part  of  the 
horse  we  know  without  any  doubt  which  is  horse  and 
which  is  tail:  and  we  know  clearly  what  'horse'  and 
'tail'  mean.  When  it  comes  to  preparation  and  per- 
petration  the  terms  are  so  vague  as  to  be  undefinable 
without  reference  to  the  borderline  cases  themselves, 
and  almost  every  point  in  the  series  can  be  regarded 
as  the  borderline.  Any  point  between  the  time  at  which 
the  Camerons  obtained  possession  of  the  necklace  they 
insured  until  the  time  they  were  arrested  can  be 
plausibly  described  as  the  point  at  which  preparation 
ended  and  perpetration  began.  A  difference  of  degree 
which  presents  difficult  borderline  cases  is  one  thing, 
but  a  difference  of  degree  which  leaves  nothing  but  a 
borderline  is  quite  another. 
(3)  It  is  unintelligible.  If  the  question  is  a 
jury  question  it  is  important  to  be  able  to  explain  the 
principle  involved  in  intelligible  terms.  This  can  be 
done  with  the  first  stage  theory  and  also  with  the  final 
stage  theories.  But  it  cannot  be  done  with  this 
theory  which  presents  the  jury  with  such  a  bnoad  and 
meaningless  standard  of  measurement  that  they  may  reach 
any  result  they  please.  Indeed,  they  will  have  to 
reach  their  result  in  some  other  way  than  by  applying 
the  theory,  and  leave  it  to  the  lawyers  to  rationalise 
their  verdict  by  using  the  theory.  A  jury  cannot 
be  expected  to  grapple  with  the  perplexing  assonances 
of  preparation  and  perpetration  which  sound,  and  indeed 
are,  much  more  like  the  components  of  a  riddle,  or 
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(4)  It  leads  to  ludicrous  results.  The  result 
of  trying  to  use  the  test  is  to  produce  distinction 
without  a  diference.  In  the  English  case  of  R.  v. 
Robinson  [1915]  2  K.  B.  342  a  jeweller  staged  a  fake 
robbery  and  reported  it  to  the  police,  all  with  the 
intention  of  defrauding  his  insurers.  It  was  held 
that  the  police  were  third  parties,  the  statement  to 
them  therefore  merely  preparatory,  and  accordingly 
that  there  had  been  no  attempted  fraud,  no  step  taken 
in  the  commission  of  the  crime.  There  is  a  distinction 
between  this  case  and  Caraerons  (supra),  but  does 
it  mean  anything?  Could  it  not  have  been  said 
of  Robinson  as  it  was  of  the  Camerons  that  one  does 
not  normally  report  the  theft  of  insured  goods  without 
a  view  to  a  claim?  (Cf.  Camerons,  surra,  at  p.  486). 
This,  sort  of  distinction  is  so  slight  and  artificial 
that  it  is  objectionable.  It  is  highly  unsatisfactory 
that  liability  to  punishment  by  the  law  should  rest 
on  distinctions  so  thin  that  they  seem  to  be  the 
result  of  pilpulistic  casuistry  and  not  of  principle 
at  all. 
(c)(iii)  The  final  stage  theory. 
This  theory  is  probably  the  one  adopted  by  the  law 
of  Scotland,  and  so  requires  considerably  more  attention 
than  has  been  given  to  the  other  theories. 
It  may  take  one  of  two  forms: 
(1)  The_la  stact  theory.  This  is  the  theory 
that  the  stage  of  attempt  is  reached  once  the  accused 
has  done  all  that  he  thinks  it  is  necessary  for  him 
to  do  in  order  to  bring  the  crime  to  completion. 
On  this  theory  it  is  attempted  fire-raising  to  set 
light  to  a  fuse  leading  to  a  barrel  of  petrol  in  the 
cellar  of  a  house;  it  is  attempted  murder  to  send  a 
box  of  poisoned  chocolates  through  the  post  to  the 223 
intended  victim;  it  is  attempted  fraud  to  send  a 
letter  containing  fraudulent  statements  on  the  strength 
of  which  a  request  is  made  for  money.  In  all  these 
cases  someth  .  ng  remains  to  be  done  -  the  house  must 
burn,  the  victim  eat  the  chocolates,  the  recipient  of 
the  letter  send  the  money  -  before  the  crime  is 
completely  executed,  but  there  is  nothing  more  for  the 
accused  to  do  except  sit  back  and  hope  that  all  goes 
well. 
(2)  The_possibility_ofintervention  theory. 
On  this  theory  the  stage  of  attempt  has  not  been 
reached  as  long  as  it  is  possible  for  the  accused  to 
repent,  and,  following  on  such  repentance,  to  inter- 
vene  and  prevent  the  completion  of  the  crime. 
Thus,  in  each  of  the  above  examples  there  would  be  no 
attempt  -  the  accused  might  put  out  the  fuse  before 
the  house  took  fire,  he  might  telephone  the  persons  to 
whom  the  poison  or  letter  had  been  sent  and  warn  them 
of  the  situation. 
Attempt  and  repentance.  Since  the  ground  of 
punishment  in  attempted  crimes  is  the  evil  intention 
of  the  accused,  any  theory  of  atte4ts  must  deal  with 
the  question  of  repentance.  Repentance  may  be 
important  in  two  types  of  situation  -  when  the  accused, 
having  passed  the  stage  of  attempt,  abandons  his  plan, 
and  desists  from  any  further  action;  or  when,  having 
completed  his  plan,  he  intervenes  to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  the  intended  consequence. 
Abandonment.  The  position  in  Anglo-American 
law  seems  to  be  that  once  the  stage  of  attempt  has  been 
passed,  abandonment  is  irrelevant,  since  an  attempted 
crime  has  been  'fully'  committed  (cf.  Gl.  Williams, 
para.  142;  Hall,  p.  133;  Gardner  and  Lansdown,  South 
African  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure,  Vol.  I,  p.  108; 
A.  Gledhill,  'Attempt"'  in  Indian  Criminal  Law,  Indian 224 
Year  book  of  International  Affairs,  1955,  p.  l,  at 
pp.  7-8).  This  approach  concentrates  on  the  analogy 
between  acts  constituting  criminal  attempts  and  the  actus 
reus  of  a  completed  crime,  and  so  argues  that  repentance 
after  the  stage  of  attempt  has  been  reached  is  as 
irrelevant  as  repentance  after  the  completion  of  a 
crime.  But  this,  it  is  submitted,  is  fallacious; 
the  acts  constituting  an  attempt  are  not  the  same  as 
an  actus  raus,  anc3  the  Anglo-American  approach  carries 
the  analogy  too  far.  What  is  punished  in  attempts  is 
basically  the  intention,  and  not  the  acts  constituting 
the  attempt,  and  it  is  therefore  unreasonble  to  refuse 
to  give  the  accused  credit  for  having  abandoned  that 
intention,  provided  of  course  that  the  abandonment  was 
voluntary.  It  seems  unfair  and  contrary  to  religious 
and  moral  ideas  not  to  accept  the  accused's  repentance, 
coming  as  it  does  before  he  has  committed  the  harm  in 
question.  (If,  of  course,  it  is  preceded  by  the 
incidental  commission  of  a  completed  crime,  it  cannot 
affect  the  responsibility  for  that  crime,  but  that  is 
quite  independent  from  the  question  of  responsibility 
for  attempting  the  'ultimate''  crime.  )  The  acceptance  of 
such  repentance  is  also  desi, 
_'able  on  utilitarian 
grounds  -  'on  veut  encourager  le  repentir'  (Donnedleu 
de  Vabres,  p.  135).  This  is  recognised  in  a  number 
of  Continental  Codes  E-  e.  g.  St.  GB  Art.  46(l);  SchwStGB 
Art.  22;  Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  pp.  135-9),  and  it  is 
submitted  that  Scots  law  should  adopt  the  same  attitude. 
The  question  is,  however,  unlikely  to  arise  in 
Scots  law  because  the  adoption  of  a  last  act  theory 
avoids  the  difficulty  by  postponing  the  stage  of  attempt 
until  it  is  impossible  for  the  accused  effectively 
to  abandon  his  object.  (Strictly  speaking  the  stage  of 
attempt  should  probably  be  set  by  reference  to  what  the 
accused  thinks  is  the  last  act  necessary  to  achieve 225 
his  purpose.  Thus  if  A  believes  that  he  can  kill  B 
by  pointing  a  gun  at  him  without  firing  it,  he  could 
not  abandon  his  plan  after  he  Yrd  pointed  the  gun  - 
but  this  raises  the  question  of  attempts  at  the 
impossible.  Schänke-Schröder  raise  the  more  realistic 
question  of  the  position  in  which  A  fires  at  B  and 
misses,  and  adopt  the  logical  view  that  if  A  intended 
only  to  fire  once  at  B,  he  cannot  abandon  his  attempt 
after  having  done  so,  but  that  if  he  envisaged  the 
possibility  of  missing  and  intended  to  fire  again,  or 
to  adopt  some  other  means  of  killing,  he  can  still 
abandon  his  attempt  by  desisting  from  using  his  other 
means  of  killing  -  but  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  a 
Scots  Court  would  take  tois  view  -  see  Schänke-Schröder, 
pp.  204-5.  The  Scots  approach  would  probably  be 
objective,  and  the  last  act  would  be  fixed  by  reference 
to  the  reasonable  man.  ) 
Intervention.  Suppose  now  that  the  accused  has 
carried  out  the  last  act  -  he  has  shot  at  his  victim, 
or  sent  hin  a  poisoned  cake,  or  a  blackmailing 
letter.  He  can  now  no  longer  abandon  his  plan,  because 
there  is  no  plan  left  to  abandon;  all  he  can  do  if  he 
repents  is  to  intervene  and  prevent  events  taking  their 
natural  course.  If  he  succeeds  in  doing  this  -  if 
he  obtains  medical  attention  for  the  man  he  has  shot, 
or  warns  the  man  he  intended  to  poison,  or  countermands 
his  request  for  money  and  gives  up  the  incriminating 
letters  he  is  using  for  blackmail  -  he  will  have 
manifested  his  repentance  in  the  best  way  possible 
in  the  circumstances  -  by  preventing  the  execution 
of  his  crime,  and,  in  the  case  of  murder,  saving  the 
victim's  life.  In  such  a  situation,  as  in  the  case 
of  abandonment,  it  seems  reasonable  to  give  the  accused 
credit  for  what  he  has  done  and  to  treat  him  as  having GGb 
by  his  acts  earned  remission  for  his  original 
ýtt-mpt  (cf.  Schänke-Schröder,  p.  204).  This  type 
of  repentance  must  of  course  be  voluntary,  and  so 
must  probably  precede  the  discovery  of  the  attempt 
(cf.  StGB  Art.  46(2)). 
Recognition  of  this  type  of  repentance  is  not 
free  from  difficulty.  It  means  for  example  that  the 
man  who  shoots  and  misses  cannot  avoid  guilt  of  an 
attempted  crime  -  since  he  cannot  abandon  his  completed 
pla:  i,  nor  save  his  victim's  life  which  is  not  in 
danger  -  while  the  man  who  shoots  and  wounds  may  avoid 
such  guilt  by  intervention.  There  is  probably  a  great 
deal  to  be  said  for  adopting  the  Swiss  solution 
which  gives  the  Court  a  discretion  to  impose  a  lesser 
penalty  (Schw.  StGB  Art.  22)  rather  than  the  German 
which  treats  intervention  as  rendering  the  accused  free 
of  all  punishment  (StGB  Art.  46(2)).  On  the  other 
hand  it  may  be  said  that  successful  intervention 
should  result  in  freedom  from  blame,  and  unsuccessful 
but  sincere  intervention  result  in  mitigation  of 
penalty  as  it  no  doubt  would  in  practice  in  Scotland, 
even  if  only  by  way  of  the  Royal  prerogative.  Be 
that  as  it  may,  it  is  submitted  that  the  law  should  give 
some  recognition  to  successful  intervention,  both 
because  it  shows  that  the  accused  did  not  persist  in 
his  evil  intention,  and  because  it  is  socially  desirable 
to  give  intending  criminals  an  interest  to  prevent  the 
consequences  of  their  actions  (cf.  Donnedieu  de  Vabres, 
p.  139).  Of  course,  if  the  accused  has  committed 
a  completed  crime,  such  as  assault,  his  guilt  for  that 
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Possible  re-oentance.  So  far  we  have  been  talking 
of  actual  repentance.  But  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
law  should  not  punish  a  man  so  long  as  it  is  possible 
for  him  to  repent  effectively,  either  by  abandonment 
or  by  intervention.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the 
refusal  to  punish  preparations  for  crimes,  and  one 
of  the  reasons  for  the  adoption  of  the  last  act  theory 
in  Scotland,  is  that  it  is  felt  to  be  wrong  to  deprive 
a  man  of  bis  chance  to  repent  his  evil  deeds. 
The  last  act  theory  leaves  him  this  chance  right  up 
to  the  time  he  completes  his  part  in  the  crime, 
until  he  fires  the  shot,  or  puts  his  hand  into  the 
pocket  from  which  he  intends  to  steal.  But  if 
repentance  is  central  to  one's  theory  of  attempt, 
it  can  be  argued  that  the  possibility  of  intervention 
should  also  be  treated  as  sufficient  to  prevent  the  stage 
of  attempt  being  reached.  On  this  view  there  would  be 
no  attempt  until  something  had  made  it  impossible 
for  the  accused  to  intervene  effectively,  whether  the 
act  of  another,  or  the  mere  passage  of  time, 
. _or 
anything 
else.  Where  the  test  is  actual  repentance  we  ask, 
'Had  the  accused  effectively  repented  when  he  was 
arrested?  ',  but  where  the  test  is  possible  repentance 
we  ask,  'Would  he  have  had  time  or  been  able  to 
repent  effectively  had  he  not  been  arrested  when  he  was?  ' 
Which  form  of  the  final  stage  theory  is  preferable? 
It  is  submitted  that  the  last  act  theory  is  the  preferable 
form  of  the  final  stage  theory,  and  that  for  two  reasons. 
(1)  It,  is  easier  to  apply.  The  last  act  theory 
offers  a  fairly  easy  way  of  fixing  the  stage  of  attempt 
in  any  given  case.  We  need  ask  only  -  did  anything 
remain  for  the  accused  to  do  in  order  to  complete  the 
crime?  But  on  the  intervention  form  of  the  theory 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  fix  the  relevant  stage,  because  it 
is  difficult  to  say  when  intervention  has  been  excluded. 228 
Is  it,  for  example,  enough  to  constitute  attempted 
murder  that  the  accused  shot  at  the  victim,  or  must 
we  allow  the  possibility  of  his  repenting  thereafter 
and  sendin  for  a  doctor  or  an  ambulance,  of  otherwise 
saving  the  victim's  life?  To  allow  actual  repentance 
of  this  sort  to  extinguish  or  diminish  guilt  seems 
morally  sound,  and  this  .  *, jill  in  any  event  happen  so 
rarely  that  the  law  may  feel  entitled  to  make  an 
exception  to  the  last  act  theory  in  favour  of  such 
situations  when  they  do  occur.  But  to  allow  the 
mere  possibility  of  such  intervention  is  surely  to 
adopt  such  an  extreme  attitude  that  one  might  as  well 
abolish  attempted  crimes  altogether;  for  if  we  stop 
short  of  the  last  conceivable  chance  of  intervention, 
there  will  be  no  principle  by  which  to  fix  the  stage  of 
attempt. 
(2)  The  intervention  theory  leads  to  paradox. 
Suppose  A  sends  a  bottle  of  poisoned  wine  to  B  in 
London  with  the  intention  of  killing  him;  he  is 
arrested  the  following  day'.  by  which  time  B  has  taken 
the  poison  and  is  seriously  ill.  A  is  probably  guilty  of 
attempted  murder.  Suppose  now  that  at  the  time  of  A's 
arrest  B  had  not  yet  taken  the  poison  because  of  an 
unexpected  delay  in  the  post,  or  because  the  dinner 
party  at  which  i9  expected  the  wine  to  be  drunk  was  post- 
poned,  and  the  police  telephoned  B  and  prevented  his 
drinking  the  wine.  In  the  second  case  intervention 
was  still  possible  at  the  time  of  A's  arrest,  but  it 
seems  illogical  to  convict  him  in  the  first  case  and 
not  in  the  second,  since  in  neither  did  he  actually 
repent,  and  since  he  did  exactly  the  same  thing  in 
both  cases. 
An  even  more  paradoxical  situation  may  be 
conceived.  Suppose  A  and  B  simultaneously  shoot  X  and  Y 
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similar  serious  wounds.  A  and  B  are  arrested 
immediately  after  firing  the  shots.  A  is  a  lawyer 
and  knows  nothing  of  medicine,  and  it  is  impossible  for 
him  to  do  anything  about  X's  wounds;  B  is  an  extremely 
clever  surgeon  and  one  of  the  few  men  who  can  save  Y's 
life  -  is  it  to  be  said  that  A  is  guilty  of  attempted 
murder,  but.  B  is  not,  and  will  not  be  so  guilty 
unless  he  remains  at  liberty  until  someone  else  has 
saved  Y's  life? 
Objections  to  the  final  stage  theory.  The  main 
objection  to  the  theory  is  that  it  allows  too 
many  prospective  criminals  to  escape  punishment,  and 
allows,  even  those  it  does  punish  to  advance  very  far 
in  their  criminal  purposes  before  it  can  intervene  to 
punish  them  for  attempting  to  commit  a  crime.  It  thus 
renders  nugatory  the  main  purposes  of  the  law  of  attempts  - 
to  prevent  harm  by  catching  the  criminal  before  he  has 
had  a  chance  to  do  appreciable  damage,  and  to  punish 
intending  criminals  who  have  shown  their  dangerousness 
even  although  they  have  not  succeeded  in  their 
intentions. 
Another  objection  is  that  the  theory  makes  it 
impossible  to  convict  anyone  of  attempting  to  commit 
a  number  of  common  crimes.  This  result  is  contrary  to 
the  principle  underlying  the  rule  that  an  attempt  to 
commit  any  crime  is  punishable  (Criminal  Procedure 
(Scotland)  Act,  1887,50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  61),  and 
also  contrary  to  current  practice.  Convictions  for 
attempted  rape,  for  example,  are  'not  uncommon,  but 
attempted  rape  cannot  be  committed  on  the  final 
stage  theory  -.  either  there  has  been  penetration,  in 
which  case  the  crime  has  been  completed,  ;;  or  there  has 
not,  in  which  case  the  last  act,  penetration,  remains 
to  be  done  and  the  accused  can  still  change  his  mind 
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can  L)e  made  to  any  form  of  attempted  assault,  and 
probably  to  any  charge  of  attempting  to  commit  a  crime 
which  is  indistinguishable  from  the  criminal  conduct 
necessary  to  commit  it,  i.  e.  to  any  crime  which  is  not 
a  'result-crime'  (cf.  supra,  /4p  ). 
The  difficulties  raised  by  the  theory  are  even 
clearer  in  the  case  o.  '  theft.  It  seems  reasonable 
to  hold,  as  the  law  does,  that  it  is  atte.  ipt  ed  theft 
to  place  one's  hand  in  a  receptacle  with  intent  to 
steal  something;  therefrom  (Coventry  v.  Douala  s,  1944, 
J.  C.  13).  But  the  crime  of  theft  requires  that 
the  object  to  be  stolen  be  taken  away,  or  at  least 
moved,  by  the  accused  (Hume,  i.  70,  ;  Alison,  i.  265  - 
atte::,,  pted  theft  was  not  a  crime  before  1887),  so  that 
merely  to  place  one's  hand  in  a  receptacle  is  not  the 
last  act  necessary  to  the  commission  of  the  theft; 
the  object  must  be  moved.  And  once  it  is  moved 
there  is  a  completed  crime.  All  we  have  in  the 
situations  described  -is  a  'penultimate'  act, 
and  if  that  is  to  be  accepted  as  sufficient  we  are  on 
the  same  slippery  slope  as  the  perpetration  theory. 
It  may  be  said  that  once  the  pickpocket  has  put  his 
hand  in  the  victim's  pocket,  this  is  virtually  the 
last  act,  since  the  possibility  of  his  repentance  and 
withdrawal  at  that  stage  is  so  slight  that  it  cap  be 
discounted:  but  how  for  must  the  accused  go  to  reach 
this  stage?  If  the  object  is  in  a  desk  drawer  is 
it  enough  for  him  to  open  the  drawer,  or  must  he  put 
his  hand  inside  the  desk?  And  if  there  are  a  number 
of  objects-  in  the  desk  and  he  is  interested  in  only 
one  of  then,  must  he  go  the  length  of  finding,  or 
touching  that  one?  Again,  if  the  object  is  not  in  a 
recepta.  e,  but  lying  on  a  table,  is  it  enough  for  him 
to  stretch  his  hand  out  towards  the  object,.:  or  must 
he  reach  or  touch  the  table,  or  the  object? 231 
This  problem  does  not  appear  to  have  been  considered 
in  Scotland.  The  cases  on  attempt  deal  with  'result- 
crimes'  like  murder,  abortion,  and  fraud,  and  the 
decisions  in  these  cases  have  not  been  applied  to 
crimes  like  rape  and  theft.  It  has  just  been  taken 
for  granted  that  rape  and  theft  can  be  attempted  - 
they  are  serious  matters,  they  deserve  punishment, 
and  the  1887  Act  (supra)  said  that  an  attempt  to  commit 
any  crime  was  criminal.  The  most  that  can  be  said 
about  the  present  law  is  that  the  final  stage  theory 
applies  to  those  crimes  ý.  vhich  are  capable  of  being 
attempted  on  that  theory.  So  far  as  other  crimes  are 
concerned,  somet_ting  approaching  the  final  stage  theory 
is  adopted,  so  that  room  is  left  for  the  possibility 
of  attempt,  but  at  the  same  time  a  very  advanced 
degree  of  'preparation'  is  required  before  the  accused 
will  be  convicted  of  attempt. 
Attempted  theft  and  attempted  rape  are  too 
firmly  ensconced  in  the  law  for  the  final  stage  theory 
to  be  consistently  adopted,  but  such  an  adoption  would 
be  in  accord  with  principle,  and  could  be  reconciled 
with  the  requirements  of  'public  safety'.  The  1887 
Act  (supra)  says  that  all  attempts  to  commit  a  crime 
are  punishable;  it  does  not  define  an  attempt,  nor  say 
that  all  crimes  can  be  attempted.  Even  in  present 
practice,  concealment  of  pregnancy  and,  probably, 
perjury,  cannot  be  attempted.  In  many  cases  in  stich 
the  final  stage  theory  would  prevent  a  conviction  for 
attempt  it  will  be  possible  to  convict  the  accused  of 
some  completed  crime.  In  cases  of  attempted  rape, 
for  example,  it  will  be  possible  to  convict  the  accused 
of  indecent  assault,  , 
jor  at  least  of  assault  with  intent 
to  ravish;  and  in  many  cases  of  theft  it  will  be 
possible  to  convict  him  of  the  preventive  crime  of 
housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal.  In  other  cases, 23  2 
where  no  conviction  is  possible,  it  would  be  consistent 
with  principle  to  adopt  Hune's  view  that  it  is  for  the 
legislature.  to  create  preventive  crimes  where  this  is 
necessary,  so  as  to  obviate  the  evil  'without  infringing 
on  the  humane  principles  of  the  common  law'  (Hume,  i.  29.. 
This  attitude  was  in  fact  adopted  in  Semple,  1937 
J.  C.  41,  where  the  Court  refused  to  regard  the 
administration  of  abortifacients  to  a  non-pregnant 
woman  as  either  attempted  abortion  or  as  an  independent 
crime).  Again,  where  there  is  a  serious  and  advanced 
plot  (cf.  Hume,  i.  29),  the  plotters  can  be  dealt  with 
by  reference  to  the  law  of  conspiracy,  without  the 
need  for  any  'recourse  to  the  law  of  attempt. 
The  Scots  authorities  on  the  final  stage  theory. 
I  turn  now  to  consider  briefly  those  Scots  cases  which 
support  my  submission  that  this  is  the  theory  adopted 
by  Scots  law,  I  shall  deal  first  with  those  cases 
which  appear  to  support  the  possibility  of  intervention 
version  of  the  theory,  and  then  with  those  in  favour 
of  the  last  act  version. 
(1)  T_he_possibility_of_intervention.  In  Baxter 
((1908)  5  Adam  609)  the  accused  sent  abortifacients 
to  A  with  instructions  to  use  them  to  procure  the  abortion 
of  Y.  They  were  not  in  fact  so  used.  Baxter  was 
charged  with  attempted  abortion  and  the  Lord  Justice- 
Clerk  had  little  difficulty  in  holding  that  the  indict- 
ment  was  irrelevant.  This  decision  may  accord 
with  the  last  act  theory  -  Baxter's  guilt  was  only  art 
and  part  and  if  A  had  not  administered  the  drugs  the 
last  act  had  not  been  performed  -  but  Lord  Macdonald's 
language  suggests  that  he  was  thinking  in  terms  of  the 
possibility  of  intervention.  His  reason  for  rejecting 
the  suggestion  that  Baxter  had  been  guilty  of  attempt 
was  that  'There  was  plenty  of  room  for  going  back  on  what 233 
was  done.  The  sender  of  the  drugs  might  i  mediately 
afterwards  have  sent  a  letter  to  the  man  to  whom  they 
were  sent  forbidding  him  to  use  them  for  the  purpose 
for  which  he  sent  them,  saying  that,  if  he  did  not  get 
an  undertaking  at  once  that  they  would  not  be  so  used, 
he  would  himself  inform  the  police  of  the  matter.  It 
is  quite  plain  that,  if  he  had  done  that,  it  could  not  be 
said  that  an  attempt  to  commit  the  crime  had  been  made. 
If  that  is  so,  it  is  equally  plain  that  it  cannot  be 
said  that  an  attempt  was  made  if  nothing  took  place' 
(at  p.  615). 
In  Llackenzies  ((1913)  7  Adam  189)  a  husband  and 
wife  were  charged  with  being  involved  in  a  scheme 
of  the  husband's  to  copy  his  employer's  trade  secrets 
and  sell  them  to  a  trade  rival.  Both  were  charged 
with  attempted  fraud  -  the  husband  in  that  he  copied 
the  secrets  and  the  wife  in  that  knowing  they  had  been 
fraudulently  obtained  she  wrote  offering  to  sell  them 
to  various  persons.  Apparently  husband  and  wife  were 
not  charged  with  being  art  and  part  in  each  other's  alleged 
crimes.  The  charge  against  the  husband  was  rejected 
as  irrelevant  because  it  was  held  that  what  he  had  done 
was  not  criminal,  and  accordingly  the  charge  against  the 
wife  was  dropped.  But  the  Court  considered  what  her 
position  would  have  been  had  the  secrets  been  criminally 
obtained  and  had  she  known  of  this  when  she  wrote  the 
letters.  The  Court  took  the  view  that  she  would  not 
in  that  event  have  been  guilty  of  attempted  fraud,  since 
she  w.  ould  only  have  expressed  a  willingness  to  commit 
fraud,  and  could  still  have  drawn  back  and  repented 
of  her  proposal  (at  p.  197).  It  is  just  arguable 
that  this  is  consistent  with  the  last  act  theory  -  the 
wife  had  still  to  hand  over  the  secrets  and  receive 
the  money  -  but  the  impression  given  by  the  opinions  is 
that  they  were  based  on  the  intervention  theory. 234 
Neither  of  these  cases,  it  is  submitted,  is 
direct  authority  for  the  intervention  theory.  The 
remarks  in  Mackenzies  are  obiter,  and  the  facts  of 
Baxter  is  too  bound  up  with  the  question  of  art  and 
part  guilt  by  counsel  to  be  a  clear  authority  on  the 
application  of  the  theory. 
Apart  from  these  two  cases  the  theory  is  supported 
only  by  one  or  two  dicta.  Macdonald  says  that  the 
stage  of  attempt  is  reached  'when  it  is  beyond  the 
power  of  the  man  to  prdvent  the  consequences' 
(Elacdonald,  p.  1-  the  passage  first  appears  in  the 
5th  edition),  but  he  goes  on  to  equate  this  with  the 
stage  of  perpetration,  and  his  authority  (Sam. 
Tumbleson,  (1853)  4  Irv..  426)  is  clearly  a  last 
act  case.  In  Tannahill  (1943  J.  C.  150),  it  was  said 
that  for  attempt  there  must  be  'some  overt  act  the 
consequence;  of  which  cannot  be  recalled  by  the  accused' 
(Lord  Wark  at  p.  153)  but  in  that  case  there  had  been 
no  more  than  a  suggestion  to  a  prospective  accomplice 
that  he  and  the  accused  might  carry  out  a  fraud.  This 
dictum  was  repeated  in  Morton  and  L3'Guire  v.  Henderson 
(1956  J.  C.  55,  Lord  Justice-General  Clyde  at  p.  58), 
but  there  again  the  facts  only  disclosed  a  suggestion 
that  a  fraud  should  be  committed. 
It  is  accordingly  submitted  that  the  possibility 
of  intervention  version  of  the  final  stage  theory 
does  not  represent  Scots  law. 
(2)  Thelast  act.  This  theory  receives  the 
support  cf  Hume  who  says 
'even  when  no  harm  ensues  on  the  attempt, 
still  the  law  rightly  takes  cognisance  of  it, 
si  deventum  sit  ad  act=um  maleficio  arm;;, 
i?  there  had  Teen  an  inchoate  act  of  execution 
of  the  meditated  deed;  if  the  man  have  done 
that  act,  or  a  part  of  that  act,  by  which  he 
meant  and  expected  to  perpetrate  his  crime, 
and  which  if  not  providentially  interrupted  or 
defeated,  would  have  done  so;  and  more  especially  -V. 235 
still  (but  this  is  not  indispensable) 
where  he  has  done  something  which  must 
have  its  own  course,  and  puts  repentance 
out  of  his  power  '  (i.  27). 
It  is  submitted  that  this  is  clear  authority 
for  the  application  of  the  last  act  theory  and  the 
rejection  of  the  possibility  of  intervention  theory. 
It  is  true  that  Hume  speaks  of  'that  act,  or  a  part  of 
that  act',  and  it  is  not  too  clear  what  he  means  by 
'a  part  of  that  act',  but  his  talk  of  what  the  man 
expected  the  act  to  accomplish,  a  providential 
interruption,  and  the  way  in  which  he  deals  with  the 
possibility  of  repentance  all  clearly  point  to  the 
last  act  theory.  So  do  most  of  his  examples,  such  as 
giving  a  man  a  poisoned  cup,  throwing  combustibles 
on  stacks  in  a  barnyard,  ineffectual  instigation 
or  subornation.  (He  treats  the  scuttling  of  a  ship 
as  attempted  fraud  on  the  underwriters,  but  it  is 
submitted  that  he  is  wrong  in  that,  and  was  probably 
influenced  by  the  grave  nature  of  the  act  of  scuttling  - 
such  an  act  has  been  regarded  by  those  who  adopt 
the  distinction,  as  being  merely  preparatory,  and  so 
not  even  the  first,  far  less  the  last,  act  of  execution  - 
see  Camerons,  (1911)  6  Adam  456,484.  of.  supra  )21  . 
It  seems  clear  that  it  is  not  attempted  fraud  on  Hume  's 
own  definition  of  attempt.  ) 
The  theory  is  also  supported  by  Alison,  who  says, 
'In  attempts  at  murder,  the  crime  is  to  be 
held  as  completed  if  the  panel  has  done  all 
that  in  him  lay  to  effect  it,  although,  owing 
to  accident  or  any  other  cause,  the  desired 
effect  has  been  prevented  'from  taking  place' 
(Alison,  i.  165). 
The  cases  which  focus  the  problem  concert  attempts 
to  commit  murder  by  poisoning,  and  on  this  matter 
Alison's  views  are  as  follows:  - 
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'Whether  the  mere  purchase  of  poison,  or 
the  mixing  it  up  with  a  view  to  mingling  it  v  th 
the  food  that  is  intended  to  be  taken,  are  to  be 
taken  as  a  com.  -)lete  commission  of  the  crime, 
seems  much  more  doubtful.  In  other  departments 
of  law  the  analogous  cases  are  a-rainst  such  a 
construction.  An  incendiary  letter  written, 
but  not  sent  or  disclosed,  a  libel  lying  in  the 
author's  desk  not  published,  a  letter  offering 
a  bribe  and  enclosing  the  banknotes,  but  still 
in  the  pocket  of  the  writer,  are  no  -points  of 
dittay...  Judging  from  these  principles,  there 
seems  good  ground  to  distinguish  between  those 
cases  where  the  person  meditating  poison  has 
merely  purchased  and  mixed  up  the  materials  vii  th 
that  view,  and  those  where  he  has  actually  put 
them  out  of  his  hands,  and  Providence  or  fortune 
only  have  prevented  the  effect.  The  one  case  is 
analogous  to  an  incendiary  letter  written,  but 
still  in  the  pocket;  the  other,  to  such  a  letter 
put  into  the  post-office,  but  intercepted  on  its 
route  by  some  supervening  accident'  (i.  167). 
The  last  act  theory  is  supported,  as  against  the 
possibility  of  intervention  theory,  by  two  cases  of 
attempted  poisoning.  The  first  is  that  of  Janet 
Ramage  (28  Dec.  1825,  Hume  i.  28)  where  the  accused 
had  placed  poison  in  a  teapot  full  of  tea  which  she 
found  by  the  fire  in  the  victim's  house,  and  from  which 
the  victim  was  expected  to  drink  her  breakfast  tea. 
Now  at  that  stage,  the  accused  could  still  have 
prevented  the  crime  -  she  could  have  come  back  and 
removed  the  teapot,  or  warned  the  victim;  but  she 
had  done  all  she  needed  to  do  to  poison  the  victim, 
she  had  only  to  wait  for  the  victim  to  come  and  take 
her  usual  breakfast.  Accordingly  the  charge  was  held 
to  be  relevant. 
A  similar  situation  arose  in  Sam.  Tumbleson 
((1853)  4  Srv.  426)  where  the  accused  put  poison  in 
his  wife's  oatmeal  and  gave  the  poisoned  oatmeal 
to  a  servant  to  give  to  his  wife.  The  indictment 
does  not  say  what  happened  after  the  servant  was  given 237 
the  poison  and  the  case  must  therefore  be  treated  as 
if  the  accused  had  been  arrested  "3s  soon  as  the 
poison  was  given  to  the  servant,  i.  e.  when  he  could 
still  have  countermanded  his  instructions  about  giving 
the  oatmeal  to  his  wife.  The  charge  was  held  relevant 
on  the  ground  that  the  accused  had  put  machinery  in 
motion  which  'by  its  own  nature  is  calculated  to 
terminate  in  murder',  and  which  was  'let  out  of  the 
party's  hands  to  work  its  natural  results'  (Lord 
Neaves  at  p.  430). 
There  are  three  modern  cases  which  should  be 
mentioned,  which  are  consistent  with  both  the  last 
act  and  the  possibility  of  intervention  theories. 
The  first  is  Semple  (1937  J.  C.  41)  in  which  a  charge  of 
attempted  abortion  was  held  relevant  where  the 
abortifacients  had  in  fact  been  administered,  but 
no  abortion  had  resulted.  The  other  two  concern 
the  crime  of  subornation  of  perjury,  which  is  complete 
as  soon  as  the  witness  to  be  suborned  agrees  to  give 
false  evidence.  (Cf.  Hume,  i.  382,  where  he.  treats  this 
as  a  crime  sui  generis  -  in  any  event  whether  it  is 
called  subornation  or  merely  conspiracy  to  suborn 
or  some  other  name,  the  name  subornation  being  reserved 
for  the  case  where  false  evidence  is  given,  it  forms 
in  itself  a  completed  crime,  and  not  merely  an  attempt 
at  some  other  crime.  )  Where  he  does  not  agree  or  where 
he  in  fact  gives  true  evidence,  the  crime  is  attempted 
subornation  -  although  in  the  latter  case  it  should 
probably  be  subornation  if  he  initially  did  agree  to 
give  false  evidence,  since  in  that  event  he  was  suborned 
for  a  time  at  least.  The  situation  here  is  essentially 
similar  to  that  in  which  a  pistol  is  fired  with  intent 
to  kill.  'The  conspiracy  has  had  its  course  so  far 
as  depended  on  the  suborner'  (Hume,  i.  382). 238 
In  Angus  (1935  J.  C.  1)  the  suborned  witness  had 
in  fact  given  true  evidence  and  the  accused  was 
convicted  of  attempted  subornation.  In  Dalton  (1951 
J.  C.  76)  the  accused  had  asked  someone  to  refuse  to 
make  a  statement  to  the  police,  and  there  was  considerable 
argument  as  to  whether  this  was  a  crime.  But  it  was 
accepted  that  if  what  was  intended  could  be  regarded 
as  a  form  of  subornation,  the  accused  had  gone  far 
enough  to  enable  the  Court  to  convict  him':  of  attempt. 
(The  crime  was  charged  as  an  attempt  to  pervert  the 
course  of  justice,  but  that  is  not  so  much  a  crime 
as  a  description  of  a  group  of  crimes  of  which  subornation 
is  one  -  cf.  sum).  The  important  point  about 
subornation  in  relation  to  attempt  is  that  subornation 
is  a  form  of  incitement,  and  that  the  crime  of  incite- 
ment  is  complete  once  a  suggestion  has  been  made  to 
someone  that  he  should  commit  a  crime. 
Art  and  part  in  attempted  crimes.  The  case  of 
Tumble  son  (suDra)  is  authority  for  the  view  that  to 
give  poison  to  the  victim's  servant  to  give  to  the 
victim,  is  attempted  murder.  This  is  because  the 
servant  in  Tumbleson  knew  nothing  of  the  accused's 
intention,  and  so  was  an  innocent  agent.  To  give 
poison  to  an  innocent  agent  is  like  posting  it,  or 
placing  it  on  a  conveyor  belt  which  will  take  it  to 
the  victim.  In  such  a  situation  there  is  no  need  to 
consider  the  act  and  will  of  the  agent,  and  the  intending 
poisoner  has  only  to  sit  back  and  let  events  take  their 
normal  course,  just  as  where  he  posts  the  poison,  or 
leaves  it  in  a  cup  from  which  he  expects  the  victim 
to  drink.  The  Indian  Venal  Code  recognises  this  very 
clearly  in  one  of  the  examples  it  gives  of  attempted 
murder  -  'A  intending  to  murder  Z  by  poison,  purchases 
poison  and  mixes  the  same  with  food..  .  which  remains  in 
A's  keeping;  A.  has  not  yet  committed  [attempted  murder]. 239 
A  places  the  food  on  Z's  table  or  delivers  it  to  Z's 
servants  to  place  it  on  Z's  table.  A  has  co  imitted 
[attempted  murder] 
I  (Indian  Penal  Code,  s.  307). 
The  position  is,  it  is  submitted,  quite  different 
where  A  gives  the  poison  to  an  accomplice  who  knows 
that  the  substance  is  poisonous  and  who  is  party  to 
A's  intention.  It  is  true  that  in  such  a  situation 
A  need  do  nothing  more  himself;  he  need  only  wait 
for  his  accomplice  to  deliver  the  poison  in  the  same 
way  as  he  need  only  wait  for  the  post  office  to  do  so. 
But  where  the  agent  is  an  accomplice  we  leave  the 
realm  of  individual  action  and  enter  that  of  conspiracies, 
and  we  must  therefore  leave  the  logic  and  language  of 
individual  action,  and  use  that  of  conspiracies, 
of  art  and  part.  This  means  that  we  no  longer  talk 
of  the  actions  of  individuals,  but  of  the  conspiracy; 
we  personify  the  plot,  so  to  speak.  If  we  do  that, 
it  is  clear  that  at  the  stage  where  A  gives  his  accomplice 
the  poison,  something  still  remains  to  be  done  in 
pursuance  of  the  plot  by  the  conspiracy,  and  so  - 
notionally  -  by  A,  before  there  is  attempt.  In  such 
a  situation  A  is  not  guilty  of  attempt  until  his 
accom:  lice  'places  the  food  on  Z's  table  or  delivers  it 
to  Z's  servants'.  If  the  accomplice  recants  before 
he  does  this,  there  will  have  been  no  attempt  of 
which  A  could  be  guilty.  In  this  situation,  although 
there  is  nothing  more  for  A  to  do,  A  knows  that  a 
deliberate  human  act  is  still  necessary  before  the  crime 
can  be  completed,  and  an  act  of  this  kind,  by  a  willing 
accomplice,  is  quite  different  from  the  operation  of  a 
conveyor  pelt,  or  the  act  of  a  postman,  or  of  any  other 
innocent  agent.  One  might  say  also  that,  just  cis  A 
is  responsible  for  the  acts  of  his  accomplice,  so  he  is 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  accomplice's  inaction. 
The  above  situations  are  fairly  simple,  but ell+U 
between  the:.:,  bet.  jeen  the  case  of  `1'umbleson  or  the 
example  of  the  post  office,  and  the  fully-fled'red 
conspiracy,  there  falls  a  number  of  very  difficult 
situations.  One  such  arose  in  the  South  African 
case  of  R.  v.  Nlhovo  (  [1921]  A.  i.  485).  There  the 
accused  gave  poison  to  on--  N,  telling  him  that  it  was 
medicine,  and  that  he  was  to  put  it  in  V's  food 
because,  'V  arrests  me  when  I  go  and  pick  mealies  and 
peaches'.  N  never  intended  to  put  the  poison  in  V's 
food;  he  took  it  straight  to  V  and  the  two  r:  ien 
went  to  the  police.  The  Appeal  Court  ! geld  that 
there  had  been  no  attempt  to  poison,  but  oily  an 
a,  --. 
tempted  incitement.  One  of  the  Judges,  Maasdorp, 
J.  A.,  considered  Scots  law  in  his  opinion,  and  referred 
to  the  case  of  Nalter  Buchanan  (Jan.  l;,  1728,  Hume,  i. 
181,  Burnett,  p.  10).  That  case  is  described  by  Hume 
as  one  of  attempted  po'soning  by  'giving  poison  to  a 
third  party,  who  did  not  know  it  for  such,  and  soliciting 
him,  but  without  success,  to  administer'  it  to  the 
victim.  In  fact  the  poison  was  given  to  a  dog  who 
died  of  it.  Maasdorp,  J.  A.  also  referred  to  IMacdonald's 
stateigent  that  it  was  attempted  poisono  'give  poison 
to  be,  to  be  administered  to  C,  whether  B  is  a  consenting 
party  to  the  crime  or  not'(Macdonald,  3rd.  ed.,  p.  144, 
5th  ed.,  p.  108),  and  concluded  that  ''?  lhovo  would  have 
been  convicted  of  attempted  poisoning  in  Scotland, 
a  result  he  attributed  to  the  influence  of  the  Roman 
law's  special  treatment  of  attempts  to  commit  flagitious 
crimes  (see  R"  v.  TTlhovo,  supra,  at  pp.  499-500). 
It  is  submitted  that  Buchanan  and  Pllhovo  can  be 
reconciled  by  making  the  distinction  which  Macdonald 
rejects,  between  giving  poison  to  an  ignorant  agent, 
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It  is  not  clear  how  much  N  knew  in  Nihovo,  nor, 
and  this  is  more  important,  how  much  the  accused 
'thought  he  knew,  but  his  actions,  and  the  Court's 
view  that  there  had  been  incitement,  suggests  that  although 
nothing  was  said,  the  accused  was  aware  that  N  knew  he 
was  being  asked  to  poison  V.  If  that  was  the  case, 
it  is  submitted  that  a  similar  result  would  follow 
in  Scotland,  since  the  question  would  then  fall  to  be 
decided  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  law  of  conspiracy. 
In  such  a  situation  the  accused  would  not  think  of 
himself  as  doing  all  that  was  required  of  him  to  bring 
about  V's  death,  but  merely  as  entering  into  a 
conspiracy  with  N  to  poison  V.  There  is  authority 
in  Scotland  that  to  invite  someone  to  commit  a  crime 
does  not  constitute  an  attempt  to  commit  that  crime 
(Tannahill,  1943  J.  C.  150,  Morton  and  M'Guire  v. 
Henderson,  1956  J.  C.  55),  and  in  practice  a  case  like 
Nlhovo  would  probably  be  decided  on  that  simple  ground. 
If  N  had  agreed  to  poison  V  and  then  been  caught  by 
the  police  or  run  down  by  a  motor  car  before  he  had 
done  so,  there  would  have  been  no  attempted  poisoning  - 
that  being  so  it  would  be  strange  if  there  were  to  be 
attempted  poisoning  because  N  did  not  agree  to  poison 
V.  As  Solomon,  J.  A.  pointed  out,  when  the  poison 
was  given  to  N,  the  crime  'was  actually  further  away 
from  being  committed  than  if  the  poisoner  had  procured 
the  poison  with  the  intention  of  himself  placing  it  in 
V's  food'  (Nihovo,  supra,  at  p.  490). 
The  distinction  between  Nlhovo  and  Buchanan 
depends  on  the  accused's  views  about  the  state  of  know- 
ledge  of  the  person  to  whom  he  hands  over  the  poison. 
Alison  describes  Buchanan  as  'an  attempt  to  commit 
poison,  through  the  hand  of  an  ignorant  person',  and 
thus  as  similar  to  offering  poisoned  food  to  the  victim, 
or  leaving  it  in  the  victim's  cup.  (Alison,  i.  166). 242 
The  failure  of  the  innocent  agent  to  'deliver  the  goods' 
is  comparable  to  a  'breakdown  in  a  conveyor  belt,  his 
unexpected  discovery  that  he  is  carrying  poison  the  same 
as  such  a  discovery  by  a  postman,  and  these  do  not  affect 
the  guilt  of  the  intending  poisoner.  (The  position 
becomes  difficult  where  the  innocent  agent  does  not 
accept  the  poison  at  all,  whether  because  he  thinks 
it  may  be  poison  or  for  any  other  reason.  There  is 
then  no  attempted  incitement  or  invitation,  but  instead 
something  like  a  telephone  on  which  one  cannot  get 
through,  or  a  pillar  box  that  will  not  take  one's 
parcel,  or,  perhaps,  a  gun  that  will  not  go  off. 
The  difficulty  is  one  of  defining  the  last  act. 
Is  the  'last  act'  the  request  that  the  agent  deliver 
the  poison,  or  the  placing  of  the  poison  in  his  hands? 
Is  it,  similarly,  the  firing  of  a  bullet  from  a  gun, 
or  the  pressing  of  a  Lrigger?  Strictly  speaking, 
it  is  probably  the  latter  of  the  two  alternatives 
in  each  case,  but  in  practice  it  is  probably  attempt 
to  pull  a  trigff;  er  that  does  not  go  off,  but  because 
of  the  similarity  to  cases  of  incitement,  not  attempt 
today  -  whatever  the  position  may  have  been  in  1728  - 
to  ask  someone  to  deliver  poison  if  in  fact  he  refuses 
to  do  so.  It  seems,  incidentally,  that  in  the  eight- 
eenth  century  it  was  attempted  poison  to  deliver  the 
poison  to  an  ignorant  third  party,  but  that  it  was 
capital  attempted  poison  if  in  fact  the  poison  had  been 
administered  to  the  victim  -  Burnett,  10ý,. 
Attempts  to  do  the  impossible. 
In  theory  two  general  principles  are  fairly  clear. 
Since  the  essence  of  atteipt  is  that  the  intended 
crime  should  not  occur,  the  reason  for  its  non-occurrence 
is  not  normally  important,  and  perhaps  should  not  be 243 
important  at  all.  It  does  not  matter  whether  the 
assailant's  shot  misses  because  he  is  a  bad  shot  or 
because  the  victim  is  out  of  range.  On  the  other  hand 
it  is  clear  that  where  the  accused  knows  of  the 
impossibility  of  what  be  is  'trying'  to  do,  there  can 
be  no  attempt  -a  man  cannot  in  ten  d  to  do  what  he  knows 
to  be  impossible.  It  is  not  the  impossibility  but 
the  accused's  knowledge  of  it  which  is  important.  A 
charge  of  administering  drugs  with  intent  to  cause 
abortion,  for  example,  is  meaningless  unless  there 
is  postulated  'a  belief  in  the  mind  of  the  panel 
that  what  he  was  supplying  was  something  calculated  to 
cause  an  aoortiQn  to  take  place'  (Semple,  1937  J.  C.  41,44). 
But  what  if  the  accused  administers  coloured 
water  in  the  knowledge  that  it  is  coloured  water,  but 
in  the  belief  that  coloured  water  has  abortifacient 
properties?  If  he  administers  it  believing  it  to  be  a 
known  abortifacient,  he  is  guilty  of  atteiapted  abortion, 
in  the  same  way  as  a  man  who  administers  salt  to  his 
victim  in  the  belief  that  it  is  arsenic  is  guilty 
of  attempted  murder:  such  people  are  clearly  bent  on 
crime  and  so  are  dangerous.  But  the  man  who  administers 
salt  in  the  belief  that  salt  is  poisonous  is  not 
dangerous,  however  wicked  he  nay  be.  'His  mistake' 
in  Glanville  Williams'  phrase,  'shows  his  ineptitude  and 
therefore  his  harmlessness'  (Gl.  Williams,  papa.  150). 
The  solution  is  probably  that  the  mistake  must  be 
reasonable  before  there  is  attempt.  Unreasonable 
mistakes  are  unlikely  to  occur,  since  the  person  who 
fell  into  them  would  probably  be  insane.  Hall's  view 
is  that  for  impossibility  to  exclude  attempt  there  must 
be  'a  material  fact..  lacking  which  makes  the  commission 
of  the  intended  harm  impossible',  and  the  fact  must  be 
such  that  'all  teasonable  persons  would  have  known  that 
the  necessary  fact  was  lacking'  (p.  125).  Hall's  view 244 
is  that  the  principle  is  'if  the  risk  of  effecting 
the  harm  sought  is  great  in  such  situations  generally, 
there  is  a  criminal  attempt  regardless  of  insufficient 
conditions  in  any.  particular  case',  and  he  adds  that  'In 
such  simple  factual  situations  as  are  met  in  the 
criminal  cases,  most  serious  mistakes  would  be  symptomatic 
of  a  severe  psychosis'  (Hall,  p.  124-,  cf.  Schänke-Schreder, 
198). 
The  decided  cases.  There  is  no  authority  in 
Scotland  on  the  question  of  unreasonable  belief 
in  the  possibility  of  the  impossible,  but  it  is  submitted 
that  the  view  taken  by  Hall  and  by  Glanville  Williams 
would  be  acceptable.  It  may  be  necessary  to  punish 
people  in  South  Africa  who  believe  that  it  is  possible 
to  kill  someone  by  sticking  pins  in  his  image,  but  such 
practices  would  not  be  regarded  here  as  dangerous, 
but  only  as  signs  of  insanity  (cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para. 
150). 
The  law  regarding  the  more  normal  type  of 
impossibility  is  unfortunately  contradictory,  and  no 
effort  has  been  made  to  resolve  the  contradiction. 
The  matter  has  been  considered  only  with  regard  to 
attempted  theft  and  attempted  abortion,  and  the 
result  is  that  it  is  attempted  theft  to  place  one's 
hand  in  an  empty  pocket  with  intent  to  steal,  and 
not  attempted  abortion  to  administer  abortifacients  to 
a  non-pregnant  woman  with  intent  to  cause  her  to  abort. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  rule  in  theft  is  the  correct 
one,  assuming  that  it  is  attempted  theft  to  place 
one's  hand  in  a  full  pocket  with  intent  to  steal  the 
contents,  and  that  the  abortion  cases  are  anomalous. 
If  it  is  attempted  theft  to  place  one's  hand  in  a  full 
pocket  with  intent  to  steal,  it  is  equally  attempted 
theft  if  the  intent  is  frustrated  only  by  the  absence 
of  anything  to  steal.  As  Lord  Sands  said  in  Lamont  v. 245 
Strathern  (1933  J.  C.  33),  the  case  which  settled  that 
such  conduct  was  atte  opted  theft,  it  is  'not  reasonbble 
to  deny  Mother  Hubbard  the  credit  of  an  attennnt  to  fetch 
a  bone  for  her  dog'  (at  D.  36). 
Against  Lamont,  and  the  case  of  Coventry  v.  Douglas 
(1944  J.  C.  13)  w'ii::  h  followed  it,  must  be  set  the  case 
of  Anderson  (1928  J.  C.  1)  and  the  case  of  Semple  (1937 
J.  C.  41)  which  followed  it.  Anderson  decided  that 
it  was  not  attempted  abortion  to  administer  abort- 
ifacients  to  a  woman  who  was  not  pregnant,  and  this  was 
followed  in  Semple  despite  the  face  that  it  was  held 
in  Semple  that  it  was  attempted  abortion  to  administer 
harmless  drugs  to  a  pregnant  woman  in  the  belief 
that  they  were  abortifacients. 
It  is  impossible  to  reconcile  Anderson  and  Lamont 
without  treating  abortion  as  special,  and  impossible 
to  reconcile  Semple  with  either  or  with  itself  without 
treating  the  fact  that  a  woman  is  not  pregnant  as  an 
exception  to  the  general  law  of  impossibility.  Lord 
Sands  in  Lamont  tried  to  distinguish  Anderson  by 
defining  attempted  abortion  as  'an  attempt  to  make  a 
pregnant  woman  abort'  and  attempted  theft  as  'attempting 
to  steal  anything..  that  might  be  found'  (Lamond,  supra, 
at  p.  37).  This  may  represent  the  ratio  of  Anderson, 
but  the  distinction  is  logically  untenable.  It  could 
as  well  be  said  that  attempted  abortion  was  attempting 
to  remove  any  foetus  that  might  be  found,  and  attempted 
theft  attempting  to  steal  the  contents  of  a  house,  or 
bag,  or  pocket,  etc.  The  ratio  of  Anderson  rests  on 
a  paralogism  which  is  the  result  of  equtating  the  facts 
which  show  that  the  accused  has  reached  the  stage  of 
attempt  with  facts  constituting  an  actua  reus. 
Anderson  and  Semple  treat  attempted  abortion  as  an 
independent  crime  with  its  own  actus  reus  which  they 246 
arbitrarily  define  as  'trying  to  make  a  pregnant  woman 
abort'.  (In  France,  incidentally,  it  is  specifically 
delcared  criminal  to  procure  or  try  to  procure  the 
abortion  of  a  woman  'enceinte  ou  supposee  enceinte  - 
C.  P.  Art.  317,  Dec.  of  29  Jul.  1939.  Cf.  also 
Schänke  Schröder,  p.  764,  where  reference  is  made  to  a 
case  in  which  it  was  held  to  be  attempted  abortion  to 
give  harmless  drugs  to  a  non-pregnant  woman  with 
intent  to  cause  abortion.  )  But  attempted  abortion 
is  not  an  independent  crime,  it  is  an  attempt  to  commit 
the  crime  of  abortion.  This  should  have  been  clear  to 
the  Court  in  Semple  ,  for  in  Lamont  Lord  Sands  had 
suggested  that  Anderson  would  have  been  relevant  had 
it  charged  the  independent  crime  of  administering  drugs 
with  intent  to  cause  an  abortion  (Lamont,  at  p.  37),  and 
this  was  the  form  of  the  charges  in  Semple.  The  Court 
had  therefore  to  decide  the  relevancy  of  this  form  of 
charge,  and  they  held  that  where  the  charge  was  of  ad- 
ministration  to  a  pregnant  woman  with  this  intent  it 
was  attempted  abortion,  and  where  it  was  administration 
to  a  non-pregnant  woman  it  was  neither  attempted  abortio  n 
nor  the  crime  of  administration  with  intent,  since  the 
latter  was  not  a  known  crime  (cf.  supra  Zc)  . 
Attempts  to  commit  unintentional  crimes. 
If  A  writes  a  letter  to  B  with  the  intention  of 
obtaining  money  from  him,  and  makes  statements  which  he 
thinks  may  be  true  or  false,  without  inquiring  into  their 
truth  or  falsehood,  or  if  A  sees  B  pass  by  and  pick  up 
and  fires  a  gun  at  him  hoping  to  kill  him,  but 
without  ascertaining  whether  the  gun  is  loaded,  he  may 
be  guilty  of  attempt,  on  the  view  that  he  intended  to 
obtain  money  or  kill,  whatever  the  state  of  his  mindas 
to  the  means  adopted  by  him  (cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para.  142; 
J.  C.  Smith,  'Two  problems  in  Criminal  Attempts' 247 
(1957)  70  H.  L.  R.  422).  But  if  A  picks  up  a  gun  without 
knowing  whether  it  is  loaded  or  not,  and  fires  it  at 
random,  wounding  B,  is  he  guilty  of  attempted  murder? 
It  seems  that  he  is  not,  because  he  did  not  intend 
to  kill  anyone,  and  it  seems  further  that  even  if  the 
circumstances  had  been  such  that  he  would  have  been 
guilty  of  murder  if  B  had  died,  he  cannot  be  guilty 
of  attempted  murder,  because  he  did  not  intend  to  kill 
B,  or  anyone  else.  The  position  is  clearer  if  A 
would  only  have  been  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  had  B 
died  -  i.  e.  if  his  behaviour  was  only  negligent 
and  did  not  amount  to  wicked  recklessness.  It  seems 
a  contradiction  in  terms  to  attempt  to  commit 
involuntary  homicide  -  one  can  hardly  try  to  do  some- 
thing  unwillingly. 
In  the  English  case  of  R.  v.  Whybrow  ((1951)  33 
Cr.  App.  Rep.  141)  the  accused's  wife  was  seriously 
injured  by  an  electrical  apparatus  constructed  by  the 
accused  who  was  charged  with  attempted  murder.  He 
pleaded  that  the  apparatus  had  been  innocently 
constructed  and  that  the  death  was  accidental.  The 
trial  Judge  told  the  jury  they  they  could  convict  of 
attempted  murder  if  they  found  either  that  the  accused 
had  intended  to  kill  his  wife,  or  that  he  had  intended 
to  do  her  grievous  bodily  harm.  It  was  conceded  on 
appeal  that  this  direction  was  wrong,  and  Lord  Goddard 
said, 
'if  the  charge  is  one  of  attempted  murder, 
the  intent  becomes  the  principal  ingredient  of 
the  crime.  It  may  be  said  that  the  law,  which 
is  not  always  logical,  is  somewhat  illogical 
in  saying  that,  if  one  attacks  a  person  intending 
grievous  bodily  harm  and  death  results,  that  is 
murder,  but  that  if  one  attacks  a  person  and  only 
intends  to  do  grievous  bodily  harm,  and  death  does 
not  result,  it  is  not  attempted  murder,  but  wound- 
ing  with  intent  to  do  grievous  bodily  harn.  It 
is  not  really  illogical,  because,  in  that 
particular  case,  the-intent  is  the  essence  of 248 
the  crime,  while,  where  the  death  of  another 
is  caused,  the  necessity  is  to  prove  malice  afore- 
thought,  which  is  supplied  in  law  by  proving 
intent  to  do  grievous  bodily  harn'  (at  p.  147). 
In  Scotland  the  mens  rea  of  murder  consists  of  intent 
to  kill  or  reckless  indifference  to  the  possibility  of 
death,  but  although  this  is  logically  different  from 
the  definition  of  'malice  aforethought'  the  two  things 
amount  often  to  the  same  thing  in  practice  since  reck- 
lessness  is  shown  by  reference  to  the  seriousness 
of  the  injury  intentionally  inflicted.  In  any  event 
the  ratio  of  Lord  Goddard's  judgment  is  that  attempted 
murder  requires  an  intention  to  kill,  and  that  ratio 
would  apply  equally  to  exclude  recklessness  as  it  does 
to  exclude  intent  to  cause  grievous  bodily  harm.  In 
a  way,  the  position  is  clearer  in  Scotland  -  for  intent 
to  cause  grievous  bodily  harm  is  an  intention  to  commit 
a  crime,  while  recklessness  may  exist,  theoretically 
at  any  rate,  without  any  criminal  intention  at  all. 
In  the  case  of  recklessness,  accordingly,  it  is 
submitted  that  the  accused  cannot  be  convicted  of 
attempted  murder,  since  he  cannot  be  said  to  have 
tried  to  kill.  (There  is  no  reported  Scots  case 
on  the  subject,  but  I  understand  that  in  the  case  of 
MI'Adam,  Glasgow  High  Court,  8  Jul.  1959,  unrepd., 
Lord  Sorn  directed  the  jury  that  in  order  to  convict 
the  accused  of  attempted  murder  they  must  find  that  he 
intended  to  kill  the  complainer.  In  that  case  the 
accused  had  assaulted  a  woman  and  then  put  her  on  an 
ashpit  where  he  left  her  without  obtaining  assistance 
for  her  or  informing  anyone  that  she  was  there.  He 
was  acquitted  of  the  attempted  murder  charge  and 
convicted  of  assault  to  the  danger  of  lifer  t. 
It  is,  however,  theoretically  possible  to  commit 
attempted  voluntary  culpable  homicide  -  e.  g.  attempted 249 
culpabl  homicide  under  provocation.  The  Indian 
Penal  code  makes  special  provision  for  this,  in 
Article  308,  which  provides  that  'Whoever  does  any 
act  with  such  intention  or  knowledge  and  under  such 
circumstances  that,  if  he  by  that  act  caused  death, 
he  would  be  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting 
to  murder'  is  guilty  of  attempted  culpable  homicide. 
The  example  given  is  of  a  killing  under  provocation. 
The  some  view  is  taken  by  Alison  who  says  'An 
attempt  to  commit  homicide,  however  clearly  established, 
does  not  necessarily  infer  an  intent  to  murder, 
because  the  circumstances  may  be  such  as  render  it 
only  culpable  or  justifiable;  and  the  punishment 
must  be  proportioned  to  the  magnitude  of  the  offence' 
(1.165).  It  is  submitted  however,  that  there  will 
never  be  a  conviction  for  this  type  of  attempted 
homicide.  There  are  two  reasons  for  this.  The 
first  is  that  the  distinction  between  voluntary  and 
involuntary  homicide  is  imperfectly  appreciated  in 
Scotland,  and  that  accordingly  the  phrase  'attempted 
culpable  homicide'  sounds  like  an  oxymoron.  The 
other  is  this  -  the  reason  certain  killings  are  only 
regarded  as  voluntary  culpable  homicide  is  in  order 
to  avoid  imposing  the  penalty  of  murder.  'There  the 
victim  has  not  died  there  is  no  question  of  this 
penalty,  and  the  charge  would  be  either  one  of  assault 
or  of  attempted  murder.  If  it  were  one  of  attempted 
murder  and  the  accused  established  a  'defence'  of 
provocation  or  of  diminiihed  responsibility,  it  is 
difficult  even  to  guess  at  the  result.  The  jury 
would  probably  just  have  to  decide  whether  or  not  they 
wished  the  accused  to  be  punished,  and  convict  or  acquit 
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II.  CONSPIRACY  AND  INdCITEI,  MTT 
Conspiracy. 
'Conspiracy,  when  regarded  as  a  crime,  is  the 
agreement  of  two  or  more  persons  to  effect  any  unlawful 
purpose,  whether  as  their  ultimate  aii1,  or  only 
as  a  means  to  it,  and  the  crime  is  coy  plete  if  there 
is  such  agreel.  aent,  even  though  nothing  is  done  in 
pursuance  of'  it'  (Crofter  Hand  Woven  Harris  Tweed  Co.  v. 
5i;  eitch,  1942  S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  1'Visc.  Simon,  Z.  C.  at  p.  5). 
Charges  of  conspiracy  are  uncommon,  and  may  perhaps 
be  divided  into  three  types,  'of  which  the  third  is 
most  important  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  development 
of  the  l2w  of  inchoate  crimes. 
(1)  Where  specific  crimes  have  been  carried  out  in 
pi  rsitance  of  the  conspiracy.  Where  the  accused  have 
conspired  together  to  bring  about  a  certain  object  by 
criminal  mans,  and  have  in  pursuance  of  that  object 
committed  certain  crimes,  they  may  be  charged  as  art 
and  part  to  those  crimes  without  being  charged  with 
conspiracy.  The  same  is  true  where  the  conspiracy 
is  simply  to  commit  a  specific  crime,  and  the  crime  is 
committed.  Where  the  crime-has  only  been  attempted, 
they  may  of  course  be  charged  with  being  art  and  part 
in  the  attempt.  But  where  the  Crown  propose  to  bring 
evidence  of  the  actual  formation  of  the  conspiracy, 
such  as  evidence  of  a  meeting  at  which  it  was  agreed 
to  commit  the  crime,  they  may  give  notice  of  this  by 
including  a  recital  of  the  conspiracy  in  the  charge 
of  the  specific  crime,  and  perhaps  they  must  give  such 
notice  lest  it  be  said  that  in  leading  evidence  of  the 
meeting  they  are  leading  evidence  of  a  substantive  crime 
(conspiracy)  which  has  not  been  charged. 251 
In  ',  `dalsh  and  Ors.  (Glasgow  High  Court,  8-  20 
Aug.  1921,  unre`;  reported  on  other  points,  1922 
J.  C.  82)  there  was  a  charge  that  the  accused  in 
pursuance  of  a  P;  eneral  conspiracy  to  further  the  aims 
of  the  Irish  Republican  Army,  tdid..  enter  into  a  con- 
spiracy  to  release  from  custody  one  F.  S.....  and  that 
by  murdering  officers  of  police,  and  did,  in  pursuance 
of  said  conspiracy  acting  in  concert,  assemble  armed... 
and  did  murder'  a  police  officer.  This  was  described 
by  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  Lord  Scott  Dickson  as  a 
charge  of  rsurder  (Scotsman  Newspaper,  22  Aug.  1921) 
i.  e.  the  conspiracy  to  murder  was  simply  charged  as 
an  element  in  the  modus  of  the  commission  of  the 
murder  and  not  as  a  separate  crime. 
Such  charges  are,  however,  uncommon.  The  more 
normal  course  is  simply  to  charge  art  and  part  guilt. 
In  Martin  (1956  J.  C.  1)  there  was  a  conspiracy  among 
two  free  men  and  a  prisoner  to  effect  the  prisoner's 
escape  whereby  the  free  men  waited  for  the  prisoner 
and  took  him  away  in  their  car  when  he  came  over  the 
prison  wall.  Although  it  was  averred  that  the 
accused  had  each  'conceived  the  felonious  intention' 
of  carrying  out  the  plan,  there  was  no  charge  of 
conspiracy;  the  prisoner  was  charged  with  attempting 
to  defeat  the  ends  of  justice  by  escaping,  andthe  free 
men  with  attempting  the  same  crime  by  'aiding  and 
abetting'  him. 
There  have  also  been  cases  in  which  the  accused 
were,  charged  with  conspiring  to  effect  a  certain 
object  by  means  of  a  particular  crime,  and  alternatively 
with  committing  the  crime  in  pursuance  of  the  conspiracy. 
(e.  g,  Mar,  7t.  Boule  and  Orsi,  (1859)  3  Irv.  440  - 
conspiracy  to  extort  money  by  false  accusation  and 252 
perjury,  and  making  false  accusations  and  committing 
perjury;  Robt.  Sprot  and  Ors.,  (1844)  2  Broun,  1/9  - 
conspiracy  to  make  certain  people  leave  their  houses 
by  violence,  and  injuring  someone;  John  Rae  and  Ors., 
(1845)  2  Broun  476  -  conspiracy  to  defeat  the  ends 
of  justice  by  having  someone  else  impersonate  a 
prisoner  at  his  trial,  and  fraud,  the  deception 
having  been  in  fact  carried  out.  And  cf.  Martin  and  Ors., 
1956  J.  C.  1  where  two  of  the  accused  had  arranged 
the  escape  of  thethird  from  prison.  The  prisoner 
was  charged  with  absconding  from  lavrful  custody,  and 
the  other  two  with  'aiding  and  abetting'  (sic)  him, 
and  all  three  were  charged  with  having  attempted  to 
defeat  the  ends  of  ju.  -tice,  but  the  last  charge 
should  probably  be  regarded  as  a  non-technical  description 
of  the  purpose  of  the  crimes,  rather  than  as  a  specific 
crime,  although  it  was  regarded  as  a  specific  crime 
by  the  trial  Judge  -  see  supra,  The  reason  for 
the  laternative  cLiarges  is  presumably  so  that  even  if 
the  crime  is  not  proved,  a  conviction  can  be  obtained 
for  the  conspiracy,  if  that  is  proved.  The  Crown 
clearly  cannot  obtain  a  conviction  against  an  accused 
for  conspiring  to  commit  a  crime  and  also  for  being  art 
and  part  in  its  commission,  since  that  would  be  to  convict 
him  twice  for  the  same  conduct.  Nor  can  they  obtain  a 
conviction  for  e.  g.  murder  on  a  charge  of  conspiring  to 
effect  a  particular  object  by  murder  (Thos.  Hunter  and 
Ors.,  (1838)  2  Sw.  1-  the  famous  case  of  the  cotton 
spinners). 
(2)  Where  no  specific  crime  is  charged.  Charges 
of  conspiracy  sometimes  do  not  ! set  out  any  specific 
crime  by  means  of  which  the  conspiracy  was  to  be 
effected,  but  merely  state  that  it  was  to  be  carried 
out  by  criminal,  or  violent,  means.  In  Walsh  (supra) 
there  was  a  charge  of  conspiring  to  further  the 
purposes  of  the  I.  R.  A.,  'by  the  unlawful  use  of  force 253 
and  violence...  anä  especially  by  means  of  Explosive 
substances...  to  be  used...  for  the  purpose  of  endangering 
the  lives  and  persons  and  destroying  the  property  of 
the  lieges'.  A  similar  charge  was  brought  in  the  case 
of  Ii'Allister  and  Ors.  (Edinburgh  High  Court,  17-23 
Nov.  1953,  unrepd.  )  in  which  the  accused  were  alleged 
to  be  melibers  of  a  'Scottish  Republican  Army',  and 
to  have  formed  a  plot  to  blow  up  St.  Andrew's  House. 
The  conspiracy  was  alleged  to  be  'to  further  by 
criminal  means  the  purposes  [of  the  organisation... 
with  the  intention  of  coercing  Her  Majesty  into  the 
setting  up  of  a  separate  Government  in  Scotland, 
or  with  the  intention  of  overthrowing  Her  Majesty's 
Government  in  Scotland'.  The  charge  then  went  on 
to  allege  that  the  accused  'did  in  pursuance  of  said 
conspiracy  obtain  possession  of  and  retain...  explosives'  - 
which  is  not  a  crime  except  under  a  statute  which  was 
not  libelled  in  the  conspiracy  charge  -  'for  use...  in 
destroying;  or  damaging  the  property  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government  and  endangering  the  lives  and  property  of 
the  lieges'.  The  first  eonnpiracy  -  to  coerce  the 
Government  -  probably  amounted  to  the  crime  of  treason, 
but  this  crime  was  not  charged;  the  second  conspiracy  - 
to  endanger  life  and  property  by  means  of  explosives  - 
discloses  no  crime  other  than  the  conspiracy  itself. 
Walsh  and  IrI'Allister  are  thus  modern  authorities  for  the 
view  that  to  conspire  to  further  an  'object  by  criminal 
means  is  to  commit  the  crime  of  conspiracy,  and  that  any 
further  criminal  action  is  unnecessary  (cf.  Jas.  Cumming 
and  Ors.,  (1848)  Shaw  17). 
Unlawful  and  criminal  means.  This  type  of  con- 
spiracy  raises  the  question  whether  the  crime  is 
committed  by  an  agreement  to  accomplish  an  object  by 
unlawful,  although  not  criminal  means;  that  is 
to  say  whether  it  is  criminal  to  agree  to  do  what  if 254 
done  by  one  person  would  not  be  a  crime,  although 
it  might  be  a  breach  of  the  civil  law,  such  as  a  breach 
of  contract.  Macdonald's  view  is  that  only 
conspiracies  to  do  what  would  be  criminal  if  done  by 
one  person  äre  criminal  conspiracies  (Macdonald,  p.  186) 
and  this,  it  is  submitted,  is  the  law.  In  both 
Walsh  ;  and  M'Allister  however  the  presiding  Judge 
described  a  conspiracy  as  an  agreement  to  do  something 
'unlawful'  (Scotsman  Newspaper,  22  Aug.  1921; 
transcript  of  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Thomson's  charge  in 
F:  i'Allister,  p.  20),  and  in  Walsh  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
is  reported  as  having  said  that  a  conspiracy  was  a  'plan 
to  do  something  that  was  contrary  to  law.,.  to  carry 
out  some  project  or  purpose  which  was  not  criminal  in 
itself,  by  illegal  or  criminal  means'  ('Scotsman' 
Newspaper,  22  Aug.  1921).  'Illegal  or  criminal' 
may  however  have  been  intended  to  ee  tautologous,  since 
the  conspiracy  was  charged  as  involving  the  uu:  of 
criminal  means.  In  order  to  find  a  case  of  criminal 
conspiracy  to  do  what  would  not  be  criminal  if  done  by 
one  man,  we  have  to  go  back  to  the  special  case  of 
workmen's  combinations  to  raise  wages  by  striking  work. 
Burnett  is  of  the  view  that  these,  and  also  combinations 
by  employers  to  keep  down  the  price  of  labour,  are  criminal 
even  if  unaccompanied  by  threats  or  violence  (Burnett, 
pp.  23'/-8,  cf..  Hume,  i.  494-496).  The  modern  view  is 
probably  that  of  Anderson  who  quotes  Burnett  and  then 
says  'It  is  clear,  however,  that  such  a  combination 
would  become  criminal  only  when  violence  or  threats 
were  employed  to  effect  its  object'  (Anderson,  p.  73). 
(3)  Conspiracy  as  a  substitute  for  attempt.  There 
two  or  more  persons  have  unsuccessfully  tried  to  carry 
out  a  crime,  such  as  murder  or  fraud,  they  may  be  charged 
with  conspiracy  to  commit  the  crime.  And  such  a 
charge  may  be  brought  in  cases  where  a  charge  of  attempt 255 
would  not  lie  either  because,  before  188'/,  an 
attempt  to  commit  the  crime  in  question  was  not  indictable, 
or  because  matters  had  not  reached  the  stage  of  attempt. 
(It  may  also  oe  combined  with  an  alternative  charge 
of  attempt-Euphemia  Robertson  and  Ors.,  (1842)  1 
Broun  295  -  conspiring  and  attempting  to  extort  money 
by  false  threats  to  accuse  of  adultery,  and  attempted 
extortion).  The  position  is  that  an  agreement  to  commit 
a  crime  is  a  criminal  conspiracy,  even  where  no  crime 
is  cor:  ilitted  in  pursuance  of  the  conspiracy,  and 
conspiracy'.  is  thus,  as  Macdonald  points  out  (Macdonald, 
p.  181)  an  extension  of  the  law  of  attempt. 
Hume  treats  conspiracy  under  the  head  of  'falsehood' 
in  his  chpaber  on  crimes  against  property  (1.1'/0) 
saying  that  'process  is  properly  brought  under  this 
generic  name,  for  any  sort  of  consoiracy  or  machination, 
directed  against  the  fame,  safety.,  or  state  of  another, 
and  meant  to  be  accomplished  by  the  aid  of  subdolous 
and  deceitful  contrivance,  to  the  disguise  or 
suppression  of  the  truth',  although  his  exampleD  ate 
of  conspiracy  to  murder,  or  to  make  a  false  accusation. 
Alison  has  a  heading  'False  Conspiracy',  under  which 
he  deals  with  conspiracies  to  fix  false  charges  on 
individuals.  U.  369-/0).  But  today  conspiracy 
is  not  confined  to  any  particular  sort  of  crime;  as 
soon  as  two  persons  have  agreed  together  to  commit  a 
crime  they  are  guilty  of  conspiracy. 
Incitement. 
Despite  the  circular  wording  of  the  Criminal 
Procedure  (Scotland)  Act,  188'  (50  &  51  Vict.  ,  c.  35,  s.  61) 
to  the  effect  that  'Attempt  to  commit  any  indictable 
crime  shall  itself  be  an  indictable  crime',  it  is  not 
possible  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  attempted  crime 
by  charging  an  accused  with  attempting  to  commit  the 
indictable  crime  of  attempting  to  commit  a  crime,  say 256 
murder.  That  would  involve  an  infinite  regress. 
But  although  conspiracy  is  an.  inchoate  crime  in  that  it 
does  not  require  the  putting  into  effect  of  any 
criminal  purpose,  it  is  in  itself  a  substantive  crime. 
That  -being  so,  it  is  a  crime  to  attempt  to  form  a 
conspiracy.  This  crime  is  usually  called  incitement, 
or  attempted  incitement  (or  instigation).  Jhether 
it  is  called  attempted  conspiracy,  incitement,  or 
attempted  incitement,  is  unimportant.  It  seems  to  be 
the  practice  to  charge  attempted  incitement  where  the 
person  incited  resists  the  instigation,  although 
once  the  invitation  has  been  made  to  him  there  has 
been  a  completed,  even  if  unsuccessful,  crime.  This 
position  is  recognised  in  the  particular  instance  of 
incitement  known  as  suoornation  of  perjury  (cf.  Hume, 
i.  382),  but  the  same  reasoning  applies  to  any  form 
of  incitement.  Where  the  invitation  is  one  to  enter 
an  existing  conspiracy  it  may  be  charged  as  'attempt  to 
induce  A.  B.  to  enter  said  conspiracy'  (M'Allister  supra), 
or  as  'attempt  to  instigate  and  attempt  to  conspire 
with  A.  B.  '  (cf.  Kay  and  Strain,  Glasgow  High  Court, 
8  May,  1952,  unread.  ).  What  is  important  is 
that  as  soon  as  one  person  approaches  another  with  an 
invitation  to  join  in  the  commission  of  a  crime, 
that  first  person  has  committed'  an  indictable  offence, 
call  it  attempted  conspiracy,  attempted  incitement 
incitement,  or  that  you  will. 
Cases  of  conspiracy  and  incitement. 
The  starting  point  for  the  use  of  conspiracy  as  an 
extension  of  the  law  of  attempt  seems  to  be  the  case  of 
Elliott  and  Nicolson  in  1694  (Hume,  i.  170-1).  N 
wanted  to  poison  his  wife  and  obtained  poison  from  E 
for  that  purpose  which  he  gave  to  r:  I  to  give  to  his  wife. 
This  plot  failed;  and  N  and  1,2  then  concocted  a  schmme 25'/ 
to  have  N's  wife  accused  of  poisoning  him,  and  got  E  to 
make  out  a  receipt  for  poison  purportedly  given  by  N's 
wife.  There  were  thus  two  conspiracies,  one  to 
murder  (which  may  have  reached  the  stage  of  attempt), 
and  one  to  fix  a  false  charge  of  attempted  murder, 
and  the  Court  treated  them  as  together  involving  a 
capital  crime. 
The  case  of  Nicol  rauschet  and  Campbell  (March  1'/21,. 
Hume,  i.  170)  is  a  clearer  case  of  a  charge  of  conspiracy 
where  attempt  could  not  be  charged.  12  bribed  C 
to  obtain  false  evidence  of  M's  wife's  adultery.  C  did 
This  by  drugging  Mrs.  T.  Z.,  placing  a  man  in  bed  beside 
her,  and  calling  in  two  honest  people  to  witness  this. 
As  Hume  points  out,  there  could  be  no  charge  of  attempted 
subornation  since  the  witnesses  would  not  have  committed 
perjury  had  they  given  evidence  of  what  they  had  seen. 
The  crime  was  accordingly  punished  as  'a  false 
conspiracy  and  machination,  or  crime  of  its  own  sort' 
(Hume,  ib.  ). 
In  1720,  in  the  case  of  W.  A.  Fraser  (Hume,  i.  136) 
there  was  an  example  of  a  charge  of  incitement  where 
the  persons  incited  had  refused  to  take  any  part  in 
the  proposed  crime.  The  charge  was  of  'having 
invited  or  solicited  others  to  set  fire'  to  a  barn. 
Again,  a  century  later,  in  1818  in  Roderick-Dingwall, 
(Hume,  i.  27,28-9)  the  accused  was  charged  with 
'attempting  to  prevail  upon'  a  surgeon  'to  enter  into 
a  cons-oiracy  to  commit  murder  by  furnishing  poison 
for  that  purpose'.  Dingwall  had  asked  the  surgeon 
for  poison  for  his  wife,  and  asked  him  to  also  ' 
vist  the  wife  and  advise  her  to  take  the  poison. 
In  fact  the  surgeon  gave  him  some  harmless  medicine. 
Dingwall  was  charged  with  attempted  murder,  with 
procuring  poison  with  intent  to  murder,  and  with 258 
attempted  conspiracy,  but  only  the  last  was  held 
relevant. 
It  seems,  therefore,  that  by  the  early  19th 
century  it  was  recognised  that  attempted  conspiracy 
was  a  crime,  but  the  matter  appears  to  have  lain 
dormant  until  the  case  of  Tannehill  in  1943  (1943  J.  C.  150). 
Talinahill  was  charged  with  forming  a  scheme  whereby 
contractors  would  charge  the  Government  for  work 
they  had  in  fact  done  for  him,  and  with  attempting  to 
defraud  the  Government.  He  was  also  charged  with 
instigating  and  attempting  to  induce  the  contractors 
to  render  false  accounts,  and  to  defraud  the  Government. 
Lord  Wark  directed  the  jury  that  in  the  absence  of  an 
overt  act  of  fraud  they  could  not  convict  of  attempted 
fraud,  but  that  they  could  convict  of  the  attempted 
inducement. 
The  position  of  attempted  inducement  and  attempted 
conspiracy  were  discussed  on  a  plea;  to  the  relevancy 
of  the  first  charge  in  the  case  of  Kay  and  Strain 
(Glasgow  High  Court,  8  May,  1952  unread.  ).  The  accused 
were  acquitted  on  that  charge,  and  so  the  matter  was 
not  discussed  in  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal.  The 
accused  were  police  officers,  and  they  were  charged  with 
approaching  one  F  with  a  scheme  to  defraud  an  Insurance 
Company.  The  scheme  was  that  the  two  accused  would 
enter  F's  home  (the  fact  that  the  house  belonged  to 
Mrs.  F.  was  regarded  as  immaterial),  and  'steal'  his 
wife's  fur  coat,  after  which  F  would  get  his  wife  to 
make  a  claim  on  the  insurance  company,  and  the  accused 
would  share  in  the  proceeds.  (It  was  argued  that 
as  the  coat  was  tars.  F's  and  she  was  not  in  the  plot, 
the  coat  would  in  fact  be  stolen  and  that  there  was 
no  question  of  fraud,  but  this  argument  was  rejected). 
F  pretended  to  comply  with  this  scheme,  but  in  fact 
he  informed  the  police,  and  Kay  and  Strain  were  caught 259 
while  removing  the  coat  from  F's  house  -  they  were 
charged  with  theft  as  well  as  with  conspiracy  and  were 
convicted  of  theft.  Tne  first  charge  was  of  attempting 
to  instigate  F  to  defraud  the  Insurance  Company,  and 
of  attempting  to  consoire  with  him  for  that  purpose, 
and  of  entering  the  house  and  stealing  the  coat  in 
pursuance  of  the  conspiracy.  (There  was  no  charge 
that  the  two  accused  conspired  with  each  other  to 
instigate  F  to  enter  the  conspiracy,  or  to  steal  the 
coat.  The  second  charge  was  a  simple  charge  of  art 
and  part  theft,  and  the  allegation  in  the  first  charge 
that  they  'stole  the  coat  in  pursuance  of  the  conspiracy' 
merely  nattative,  and  not  a  charge  of  theft.  ) 
r 
The  charge  of  attempted  inducement  and  attempted 
conspiracy  (the  two  things  were  treated  as  being 
one  and  the  same)  was  held  relevant  by  Lord  Keith 
who  followed  Tannehill  (supra).  He  went  on  to  say, 
'It  is  unnecessary  to  consider  what  the 
basis  of  the  doctrine  is,  whether  it  is  oome- 
thing  of  a  half-way  house  between  preparation  and 
perpetration,  a  recognition  of  acts  thatmay  mark 
the  end  of  preparation  and  the  prelude  to 
perpetration,  or  whether  it  is  that  because 
conspiracy  to  commit  a  crime  is  itself  a 
crime  an  attempt,  although  unsuccessful  of 
course,  an  attempt  to  engage  in  conspiracy 
or  to  instigate  someone  else  to  conspire 
in  a  crime  is  an  attempt  to  commit  a  crime. 
Hume  deals  with  the  matter  on  p.  2'?  although  I 
confess  thot...  it  is  not  by  any  mans  easy 
to  distinguish  passages  referring  to  attempts 
to  commit  a  crime  from  passages  which  may  refer 
to  unsuccessful  instigation  to  a  crime,  there 
are  [detailed  references]  to  at  least  two  cases 
which  support  the  view  that  instigation  to 
commit  a  crime  in  which  the  instigation  is 
unsuccessful,  may  of  itself  be  a  crime'  (The 
two  cases  are  Dingwall  *and  Fraser  (su-ara)i 
The  original  entries  from  the  Acts  of 
Adjournal  relative  to  Dingwall  were  produced 
to  L.  %eith  and  satisfied  him  that  the 
instigation  there  had  been  unsuccessful). 2b0 
It  is  submitted  that  to  treat  attempted  incitement 
as  a  half-way  house  between  preparation  and  perpetration 
would  be  unsatisfactory.  This  is  not  only  because 
the  distinction  between  preparation  and  perpetration 
is  itself  unsatisfactory  (supra),  but  also  because  it 
does  not  explain  why  this  half-way  house  should  only 
exist  where  more  than  one  person  is  involved,  or  is 
sought  to  be  involved,  ih  the  crime.  It  is  much 
simpler  to  treat  the  charge  in  Kay  and  Strain  as 
disclosing  an  attempt  to  commit  the  crime  of 
conspiracy,  or  of  attempting  to  incite  some  one 
to  commit  a  crime. 
Furthermore,  if  attempted  incitement  is  merely 
a  half-way  house  to  perpetration,  it  is  a  sort  of 
attempt  to  commit  the  ultimate  crime,  and  so  does 
not  have  to  be  specifically  libelled,  since  on  any 
indictment  charging  a  crime,  the  jury  can  convict  of 
an  attempt  to  commit  that  crime.  (Criminal 
Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1887,50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35, 
s.  61).  This  approach  comes  perilously  near  to 
making  attempted  incitement  an  attempt  to  attempt 
to  commit  a  crime.  But  there  is  authority  that 
where  a  conviction  is  sought  for  incitement,  the  incite- 
ment  must  be  charged  specifically.  In  l:  Iorton  and  L'I'Guire 
v.  Henderson  (1956  J.  C.  55)  the  accused  were  charged 
with  attempting  to  defraud  bookmakers  by  'requesting' 
a  racing  dog's  owner  to  'impair  the  racing  ability 
of  his  greyhound...  by  administering  to  it  a  concoction', 
and  it  was  held  that  these  acts  did  riot  disclose 
attempted  fraud,  since  matters  had  not  reached  the 
stage  of  attempt.  But  it  was  observed  by  the  High 
Court  that  if  the  complaint  had  been  appropriately 
framed  the  accused  could  have  been  convicted  of  attempted 
incitement. 261 
Conspiracy,  Incitement,  and  Attempt. 
The  effect  on  the  laut  of  attempt  of  the  existence 
of  the  crimes  of  conspiracy  and  incitement  is  considerable. 
When  a  single  criminal  reaches  the  stage  of  attempt 
he  becomes  guilty  of  an  inchoate,  uncompleted  crime. 
Up  to  that  stage  he  is  guilty  of  nothing  at  all; 
at  that  stage  he  has  still  not  committed  a  crime, 
but  only  attempted  to  do  so.  But  when  two  criminals 
agree  to  cor2mit  a  crime,  then,  although  matters  are 
much  more  inchoate  and  uncompleted  than  when,  for 
example,  a  would-be  poisoner  invites  his  victim  to 
dinner,  they  have  committed  a  completed  crime,  the 
crime  of  conspiracy.  And  this  is  so,  whether  the  aim 
of  the  conspiracy  is  to  blow  up  the  Houses  of  Parlia- 
ment,  to  coerce  the  Government,  to  defraud  bookmakers, 
or  to  steal  a  stick  of  rock  from  a  child.  The 
crime  of  conspiracy  probably  began  as  a  result  of  the 
danger  to  society  involved  in  large-scale  political 
conspiracies,  and  as  a  result  the  term  'conspiracy' 
carries  with  it  a  great  deal  of  emotive  effect  - 
a  conspiracy  to  do  something  sounds  much  worse  than 
an  attempt  to  do  it,  may  even  sound  much  worse  than 
simply  doing  it.  But  this  emotive  element,  which  led, 
for  example,  to  making  Trade  Unions  illegal,  and  to 
Hume's  suggestion  that  the  rules  regarding  attempted 
crimes  should  suffer  exception  in  the  case  of  deeply 
atrocious  or  extensive  plots,  has  been  forgotten  in  the 
later  logical  approach  to  the  idea  of  conspiracy. 
Once  it  is  accepted  that  the  mere  agreement  of  a 
large  group  of  people  to  attain  their  ends  by  violence 
is  an  example  of  the  crime  of  conspiracy,  it  follows 
logically  that  any  agreement  by  two  or  more  people 
to  commit  any  crime,  is  an  example  of  the  crime  of 
conspiracy.  The  mistake,  if  mistake  there  be, 
is  in  thinking  of  conspiracy  as  a  'logical'  crime  at 262 
at  all,  rather  than  as  the  reaction  to  certain  special 
kinds  of  threat  to  the  whole  structure  of  society,  or 
at  any  rate  to  the  administration  of  justice. 
The  reco7;  nition  of  the  crime  of  attempted  conspiracy, 
which  again  follows  logically  from  the  existence 
of  conspiracy,  takes  matters  even  further,  for  it  means 
that  merely  to  invite  someone  to  commit  a  crime  is 
criminal.  The  result  of  recognising  this  crime 
is  that  as  soon  as  one  criminal  asks  another  to  join 
him  all  the  principles  underlying  the  reluctance 
of  the  law  to  punish  people  for  attempts  and  its 
insistence  on  the  actual  execution  of  a  considerable 
part  of  the  criminal  plan  before  it  will  do  so,  go  by 
the  board.  Yet  these  principles  cannot  be  said  to  be 
valid  where  one  criminal  is  involved,  and  invalid 
as  soon  as  he  tries  to  bring  in  a  second  to  join  him. 
It  is  true  that  to  commit  attempted  conspiracy  there 
must  be  a  final  act  -  the  act  of  asking  someone  to 
join  your  criminal  plot.  But  once  the  invitation 
has  been  given,  there  is  a  completed  crime. 
Whatever  the  objections  to  its  existence,  attempted 
conspiracy  is  a  crime,  and  for  aught  yet  seen,  is  a 
crime  in  every  case  in  which  it  occurs,  whatever  the 
object  of  the  conspiracy,  provided  of  course  it  is 
criminal.  This  means  that  the  law  is  much  more 
strongly  armed  against  intending  criminals  than  its 
adoption  of  the  last  act  theory  in  attempt  would 
lead  us  to  think.  The  common  law  is  able  to  squash 
in  the  bud  any  su,  Bestion  that  a  crime  should  be  committed, 
as  soon  as  the  sug  :;  estion  is  imparted  to  a  proposed 
accomplice.  The  strict  rules  of  attempt  only  apply 
to  the  solitary  criminal  who  does  not  seek  anyone  else's 
aid  in  his  crime.  This  development  seems  to  be 
comparatively  new.  Humes  difficulty  in  reconciling 2bß 
the  law  of  attempt  with  the  necessity  to  fore- 
stall  extensive  conspiracies,  (i.  29),  the  High  Court's 
difficulty  in  holding;  it  to  be  criminal  for  a  forger 
to  sell  forged  notes  as  such  to  someone  who  bought  them 
for  the  purpose  of  uttering,  (John  Horne  (15  July,  1814, 
Hume,  i.  150-3),  the  approach  of  the  Court  in  Baxter 
((1908),  5  Adam  609),  the  absence  of  any  suggestion 
of  a  charge  of  conspiracy  in  Camerons  ((1911)  6  Adam 
456),  611  sui;;  ~est  that  the  early  cases  were  not 
regarded  as  containing  any  general  principle  regarding 
conspiracies  and  incitements.  It  may  be  that  the  time 
has  come  to  relate  the  development  of  the  law  of 
conspiracy  to  the  law  of  attempt,  and  to  consider 
whether  Scots  law  should  encourage  the  development, 
since  it  minimises  the  number  of  cases  where  the 
strict  law  of  attempt  prevents  the  law  from  administer- 
ing  deserved  punishment,  or  whether  it  should 
discourage  it  as  being  contrary  to  the  general  spirit 
of  a  law  which  requires  at  the  very  least  extensive 
and  advanced  preparations  as  a  pre-requisite  for 
the  punishment  of  proppective  criminals. 264 
Chanter  6:  The  Criminal  Mind. 
Mens  rea. 
The  basic  principle  of  the  common  law  in  criminal 
matters  is  that  actus  non  facit  reus  nisi  mens  sit  rea  - 
no  act  is  punishable  unless  it  is  performed  with  a 
criminal  mind,  i.  e.  by  a  person  whose  state  of  mind 
is  such  that  it  makes  his  actings  criminal.  Thus, 
for  example,  the  killing  of  someone  by  a  lunatic 
is  not  punishable,  because  the  lunatic's  state  of 
mind  is  such  that  he  has  no  mens  rea.  This 
principle  reflects  the  deontological  outlook  of  the 
common  law,  and  demonstrates  the  close  connection 
between  the  common  law  and  ordinary  moral  judgments. 
Mens  rea  may  be  defined  amorally  as  'a  legally 
reprehensible  state  of  mind'  (Kenny,  para.  11),  but  the 
standard  of  reprehensibility  is  essentially  a  moral 
one,  so  that  the  ascription  of  mens  rea  is  a  moral 
judgement. 
Mens  rea  and  dole. 
The  nearest  Scots  term  to  'mens  real  is  'dole', 
but  'dole'  as  used  by  Hume  has  a  somewhat  different 
meaning  from  'wens  real  as  used  in  modern  English 
textbooks,  and  in  modern  Scots  law.  To  use  the 
word  'dole'  to  indicate  the  mental  element  required 
by  the  modern  law  would,  I  think,  be  misleading,  since 
it  would  carry  over  into  modern  law  the  Humean  concept 
of  dole  as  a  eneral  wicked  disposition.  On  the 
other  hand,  to  use  the  word  'dole'  to  indicate  this 
general  disposition,  as  against  the  modern  idea  of 
wens  rea  as  a  particular  mental  attitude  to  a  particular 
act,  might  also  be  confusing,  because  'dole'  is  still 265  = 
sometimes  used  as  the  Scots  word  for  mens  rea,  however 
the  latter  is  defined  (cf.  T.  i3.  Smith,  pp.  ?  0'1-8). 
Three  possible  meanings  of  mens  rea. 
When  we  descrioe  a  man  as  possessing  a  criminal 
mind  we  may  mean  one  of  three  things  -  (1)  That  he  is 
a  man  of  wicked  or  criminal  character  in  general; 
(2)  That  a  particular  act  of  his  reveals  him  as  a 
wicked  man,  or  as  a  man  of  cr_in:  inal  propensity; 
(3)  That  he  committed  a  particular  act  in  a  particular 
state  of  mind  which  is  regarded  by  the  law  as 
sufficient  to  make  that  act  a  particular  crime.  So 
far  as  the  law  is  concerned  it  is  of  course  criminality 
and  not  wickedness  which  is  important,  out  the  first 
two  meanings  of  the  phrase  are  closely  connected 
with  ideas  of  moral  wickedness,  and  tend  to  be 
expressed  in  the  language  of  morality. 
(1)  General  character.  We  may  call  a  man 
a  person  of  criminal  mentality  when  we  mean  that  he  is 
a  criminal  by  nature.  This  is  a  judgment  of  what 
sort  of  man  we  take  him  to  be,  by  and  large.  We 
can  look  back  on  a  man's  life  and  say  'He  was  a 
decent  chap;  mind  you,  he  did  one  or  two  things 
that  were  not  altogether  admirable,  but  on  the  whole 
he  was  a  good  man.  His  bad  deeds  were  really  out 
of  character'.  Conversely  we  can  say,  'He  was  a 
really  wicked  man,  a  right  criminal,  even  although 
he  was  kind  to  dogs  and  once  saved  someone's  life'. 
Crippen  was  of  a  quiet  and  kindly  disposition,  but 
the  murder  of  his  wife  was  none  the  less  a  wicked  act; 
Hitler  may  have  performed  many  'Little  nameless 
unremembered  acts  of  kindness  and  of  love',  but  he 
was  none  the  less  of  a  wicked  disposition. 
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responsibility,  moral  or  legal,  for  any  particular  act. 
Its  only  relevance  to  the  law  is  that  it  may  influence 
the  Judge  in  passing  sentence.  It  is  by  way  of  this 
sort  of  assessment  that  a  Judge  may  feel  justified 
in  treating  a  particular  criminal  leniently  because 
he  is  by  and  large  a  good  man.  Thus  a  man  who  has 
otherwise  led  a  , 
blameless  life  will  be  less  severely 
punished  for  a  particular  crime  than  would  a  hardened 
of.  -,  f'ender  who  had  committed  the  some  crime. 
(2)  General'  wens  rea.  Instead  of  looking  to 
a  man's  whole  life,  we  may  judge  his  character  from 
the  point  of  view  of  one  particular  act,  and  ask  only 
if  that  act  was  done  out  of  wickedness  or  criminality 
of  disposition.  We  treat  the  act  as  evidence  of  the 
criminality  of  the  agent's  nature.  This  approach 
treats  the  criminal  mind  as  a  general  characteristic  of 
the  man  involved  which  has  been  exhibited  in  the 
commission  of  a  crime,  just  as  kindness  is  a  general 
characteristic  exhibited  in  particular  acts  of  charity. 
This  is  what  Hume  means  by  dole,  which  he  describes 
as  'that  corrupt  and  evil  intention,  which  is  essential 
(so  the  light  of  nature  teaches,  and  so  all 
authorities  have  said)  to  the  guilt  of  any  crime' 
(i.  21).  The  requirement  of  dole,  Hume  says,  does 
not  mean  that  there  must  be  'evidence  of  an  intention 
to  do  the  very  thing  that  has  been  done,  and  to  do  it 
out  of  enmity  to  the  individual  who  has  been 
injured',  but  only  that  there  must  be  circumstances  which 
'indicate  a  corrupt  and  malignant  disposition,  a  heart 
contemptuous  of  order,  and  regardless  of  social  duty' 
(i.  21-2).  Because  this  approach  treats  the  criminal 
mind  as  a  general  characteristic,  revealed  by  a 
particular  act,  but  capable  of  being  extended  to  cover 26'/ 
other  acts,  I  propose  to  refer  to  it  as  'general  mens  real. 
This  way  of  treating  mens  rea  is  open  to  serious 
objections.  The  criminal  law  is  concerned  with 
actions  and  not  with  character,  and  it  is  not 
concerned  with  motive  which  is  the  clue  whereby  a  man's 
character  can  be  related  to  his  actions.  There  is 
a  difference  in  character  between  the  man  who  vidts 
a  sick  uncle  out  of  sympathy-  and  one  who  does  so  out 
of  a  desire  to  be  left  something  in  his  uncle's  will, 
but  the  man  who  commits  bigamy  out  of  a  sense  of 
religious  duty  is  as  guilty  as  the  man  who  commits 
it  out  of  a  desire  to  deceive  and  seduce. 
The  presence  or  absence  of  general  mens  res  is 
not  strictly  relevant  to  criminal  responsibility, 
but  it  is  important  in  two  respects.  It  makes 
possible  legal  doctrines  which  depend  on  the  trans- 
ferring  of  a  criminal  mind  uq  oad  one  crime  to  the 
commission  of  another  crime,  so  that  a  person  who 
accidentally  does  X  while  criminally  doing  Y  may  be 
deemed  to  have  done  X  criminally;  and  it  forms 
a  basis  for  certain  recognised  mitigating  factors. 
(i)  Constructive  crime  and  transferred  mens  rea. 
If  the  requirement  of  mens  rea  is  satisfied  by  the 
presence  of  a  'corrupt  and  malignant  disposition', 
then  the  requirement  is  the  same  for  all  crimes. 
This  means  that  if  a  man  breaks  into  a  house  and 
accidentally  kills  the  householder,  his  killing  of  the 
householder  must  be  a  crime.  For  the  actus  reus  - 
the  killing  -  is  present;  and  so  is  the.  mens  rea, 
because  the  housebreaking  is  a  circumstance  exhibiting' 
the  necessary  corrupt  and  malignant  disposition. 
Although  this  rule  may  not  operate  in  Scotland  to  make 
the  killing  of  the  householder  constructive  murder, 
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so  as  to  make  the  latter  intentional  (see  innl  an  I.  f 
it  probably  does  operate  to  make  it  constructive 
culpable  homicide  where  without  the  element  of  house- 
breaking  it  might  not  be  a  crime  at  all. 
This  idea  of  general  mens  rea  is  also  one  reason 
why  recklessness  is  said  to  be  equivalent  to  intention. 
A  reckless  indifference  as  to  whether  one's  acts  will 
cause  harm  may  exhibit  a  corrupt  and  malignant  dis- 
position,  as  where  A  attacks  another  with  a  weapon, 
regardless  of  the  possibility  that  he  may  kill  him. 
If,  then  he  does  kill  him,  there  is  a  crime,  since 
the  killing  has  been  done  in  circumstances  indicating 
a  criminal  mind. 
(ii)  r:  Titi7ation.  Where  a  crime  has  been  committed 
in  the  absence  of  circumstances  indicating  corrupt  and 
malignant  disposition,  or  wickedness,  or,  as  it  is 
often  called,  malice,  then,  even  although  it  has 
been  intentionally  committed,  and  so  is  reus  according 
to  modern  ideas  of  mens  rea,  the  Court  will  almost 
certainly  take  the  absence  of  malice  into  account  in 
passing  sentence.  Now  in  homicide  the  sentence  can 
only  be  reduced  if  the  crime  itself  is  reduced  by  the 
jury  from  murder  to  culpable  homicide,  and  accordingly 
there  have  grown  up  recognised  grounds  on  which  a  jury 
may  make  this  reduction.  There  are  certain 
circumstances  which  are  almost  compulsoby  mitigating 
factors,  matters  of  law  rather  than  of  that  general 
discretion  which  a  judge  employs  when  he  takes  general 
character  into  account.  These  circumstances  do  not 
affect  the  accused's  responsibility  for  his  actings, 
but  they  do  affect  his  liability  to  punishment. 
A  man  who  kills  in  circumstances  which  exhibit  such 
mitigating  factors  is  not  liable  to  capital  punishment 
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to  imprisonment  or  fine  in  the  modern  law.  Since  the 
Homicide  Act,  1951  (5  6  Eliz.  II,  c.  ll)  these 
mitigating  factors  mean  that  a  man  cannot  be  hanged 
for  capital  murder  or  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment 
for  murder,  but  only  to  a  fixed  term  of  imprison_-:  ent 
or  other  fixed  penalty  for  culpable  homicide.  (I  am 
speaking  here,  of  course,  of  voluntary  culpable 
homicide,  intentional  homicide  under  mitigating 
circumstances,  and  not  of  involuntary  or  negligent 
homicide.  The  difference  between  murder  and  involuntary 
homicide  is  a  difýerence  in  responsibility,  that  between 
murder  and  voluntary  homicide  merely  a  difference 
in  liability  to  punishment.  ) 
The  circumstances  which  are  regarded  as  mitigatory 
in  this  way  are  so  regarded  because  they  show  that  the 
crime  was  not  committed  out  of  malice,  but  from  some 
other  cause,  such  as  the  accusedts  mental  state,  or 
his  reaction  to  provocation.  This  idea  of  the 
requirement  of  general  _.  mens  res  for  a  murder 
conviction  also  influences  the  Crown  authorities  in 
deciding  whether  to  charge  an  accused  with  murder  or 
with  culpable  homicide.  It  is  because  of  the  absence 
of  malice  and  corrupt  malignancy  that  it  is  thought 
that  the  survivors  of  suicide  pacts  and  those  who 
commit  euthanasia  would  only  be  charged  with  culpable 
homicide  in  Scotland  (cf.  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper 
5428). 
(3)  The  particular  act.  The  modern  meaning  of 
mens  rea  is  quite  independent  of  moral  wickedness, 
or  even  of  any  idea  of  general  criminal  depravity. 
lens  rea  is  'not  the  desire  to  do  wrong  but  the  intent 
to  do  that  which  causes  social  injury'  (F.  B.  Sayre 
'The  Present  Significance  of  Mens  Rea  in  the  Criminal 
Law,  '  in  Harvard  Legal  Essays,  p.  399,  at  p.  402).  Each 2/0 
type  of  crime  has  its  own  mens  rea,  the  mental  state 
appropriate  to  its  commissions,  so  that  'it  is  quite 
futile  to  seek  to  discover  the  meaning  of  mens  rea 
by  any  common  principle  of  universal  application 
running  alike  through  all  the  cases'  (ib,  D.  404). 
In  Stephen's  famous  sentence,  'The  truth  isthat  the  maxim 
about"wens  rea"  means  no  more  than  that  the  definition 
of  all  or  nearly  all  crimes  contains  not  only  an 
outward  and  visible  element,  but  a  mental  element, 
varying  ae.  cording  to  the  different  nature  of 
different  crimes'  (Stephen,  2  H.  C.  L.,  p.  95).  As 
Glanville  Williams  puts  it,  mens  rea  is  merely  'the 
mental  element  necessary  for  the  particular  crime' 
(Gl.  Williams,  para.  9).  For  example,  the  mental 
element  reeuired  for  murder  is  an  intention  to 
kill  or  a  reckless  disregard  of  the  probability  of 
death  (cf.  1Iacdonald,  p.  89),  the  mens  rea  of  theft 
an  intention  to  take  something  'with  a  purpose  to 
detain  it  from  the  owner'  (Hume,  i.  '/5),  the  mens  rea  of 
culpable  homicide  merely  a  sufficiently  negligent 
failure  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  of  death. 
There  are  three  attitudes  of  mind  which  may  form 
part  of  the  mens  res  of  a  crime  -  intention,  recklessness, 
and  negligence. 
Intention. 
Intention  is  defined  by  Glanville  Williams  as 
'that  species  of  desire  on  the  part  of  a  person  that  is 
coupled  with  his  own  actual  or  proposed  conduct  to 
achieve  satisfaction'  (Gl.  Williams,  para.  11). 
The  requirement  of  'actual  or  proposed  conduct'  is 
necessary  in  order  to  distinguish  the  mental  state  of 
intention  from  that  of  mere  wishful  thinking.  I  may 
desire  to  go  to  London,  but  unless  I  make  more  or 
less  detailed  and  definite  plans  to  go  there,  such 2/1 
as  reserving;  a  room  in  a  hotel,  or  buying  a  railway 
ticket,  or  at  least  'set  myself'  to  do  these  thinrgs, 
I  would  not  bo  said  to  be  intending  to  go  there. 
Intention  and  desire.  Intention  can,  however,  be 
distinguished  from  desire.  To  desire  an  end  is  to 
intend  the  means  adopted  for  the  attainment  of  that 
end,  even  if  the  means  are  not  themselves  regarded 
as  desirable.  Again,  a  man  is  said  to  intend  which- 
ever  of  two  possible  courses  of  action  he  adopts, 
even  although  it  would  be  true  to  say  that  the  way 
he  acted  was  not  the  way  he  'really'  wanted,  not  the 
way  in  which  he  would  have  preferred  to  act. 
The  relation  between  intention  and  desire  was 
discussed  by  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  in  the  Australian  case  of  Lang  v.  Lang  ([195/], 
A.  C.  402).  It  was  there  held  that  a  husband  who  pur- 
sued  a  course  of  conduct  which  he  knew  would  lead  to 
his  wife's  leaving  him,  intended  her  to  leave  him, 
although  he  did  not  want  her  to  go.  Lord  Porter 
said,  'A  man  may  well  have  incompatible  desires. 
He  may  have  an  intention  which  conflicts  with  a  desire: 
i.  e.  he  may  will  one  thing,  and  wish  another,  as  when 
he  renounces  some  cherished  article  of  diet  in  the 
interest  of  health.  But  "intention"  necessarily 
connotes  an  element  of  volition:  desire  does  not' 
(at  p.  428). 
His  Lordship  went  on  to  say  'If  the  husband  knows 
the  probable  result  of  Ilia  acts  and  perists  in  them, 
he  is  to  be  held  to  have  intended  that  result 
(at  p.  429).  This  seems  to  confuse  intention  and 
recklessness  -  if  the  result  is  only  foreseen  as 
probable  it  is  brought  about  recklessly  rather  than 
intentionally.  The  distinction  between  intention  and 
desire  arises  from  the  fact  that  a  result  foreseen 2/2 
as  certain  is  regarded  as  intended  -  and  this  is  enough 
to  distinguish  the  two  without  reference  to  probable 
results.  Deliberately  to  bring  about  a  result  foreseen 
as  certain,  is  to  bring  it  about  intentionally.  As 
Hall  puts  it,  'One  who,  in  an  effort  to  escape  from 
officers,  drives  his  automobile  in  a  certain  direction, 
knowing  that  various  persons  block  the  passage  of  his 
car,  intends  their  destruction  regardless  of  any 
regret  he  may  feel  and  despite  the  fact  that  harming 
them  is  not  his  ultimate  goal'  (Hall,  pp.  215-6). 
The  vocnbulary  of  Scots  law. 
The  terms  used  in  Scots  indictments  before  188/ 
to  indicate  the  wens  rea  of  intentional  crimes  were 
'wickedly  and  feloniously',  or  'wilfully  and 
maliciously',  and  in  the  case  of  fraud  and  similar 
crimes,  'falsely  and  fraudulently';  each  of  these 
terms  is  now  implied  'in  every  case  in  which  according 
to  the  existing  (i.  e.  pre-l88'?  law  and  practice  its 
insertion  would  be  necessary  in  order  to  make  the  indict- 
ment  relevant  '  (Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act, 
1887,50  &  51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  8).  There  is  therefore 
no  longer  any  possibility  of  an  objection  being  taken 
to  the  relevancy  of  an  indictment  on  the  ground  that 
it  fails  to  libel  any  of  these  qualifications  (or  even 
that  it  fails  to  allege  that  an  act  was  done  'knowingly' 
-  ib.  ).  If  the  qualifications  are  not  necessary 
to  the  guilt  of  the  accused  no  objection  can  be  taken 
to  their  absence;  if  they  are  necessary,  they  are 
impliedly  present  (see  Swan,  (1888)  2  Wh.  137).  As 
a  result,  there  are  no  modern  decisions  on  relevancy 
concerned  with  the  pure  question  of  the  mens  rea 
of  any  crime;  the  modern  law  must  be  derived  from 
those  charges  to  juries  on  the  subject  which  are  still 
extant,  and  from  occasional  appeals  on  the  ground  of 
misdirection. 2/3 
1',  7ickedly 
_and 
feloniously'.  This  phrase,  and  also 
'wilfully  and  maliciously',  were  described  by  Lord 
M'Laren  in  Dingwall  ((1888)  2  Nh.  21,34)  as  'expletive 
expressions',  and  as  having  'in  general...  no  particular 
meaning'  This  seems  a  little  too  harsh:  Lord  Young 
pointed  out  in  the  same  case  that  'if  the  act  was 
criminal  or  innocent  according  as  it  was  done,  fraud- 
ulently  or  feloniously  or  not,  then  the  allegation  that 
it  was  done  fraudulently  or  feloniously  is  no  mere 
epithet'(at  pp.  40-1),  and  it  is  submitted  that  the 
same  is  true  of  the  other  qualifications.  (The  actual 
decision  in  Dingwall  was  overruled  in  Swan,  supra.  In 
Robt.  Vance  ((1848)  J.  Shaw,  212),  where  a  charge  of 
culpable  homicide  bore  that  the  killing  had  been  done 
wickedly  and  feloniously  the  Court  directed  the  jury 
to  acquit  because  although  there  had  been  culpable 
homicide  the  accused  had  not  acted  wickedly  and 
feloniously.  ) 
It  is  almost  impossible  to  give  any  precise  legal 
meaning  to  'wickedly  and  feloniously'.  'Wickedly' 
is  simply  a  term  of  moral  disapprobation,  and  'feloniously' 
which,  despite  its  frequent  use  in  Scotland  from  Hume 
onwards,  is  not  a  Scots  term  of  art,  means  only 
'atrocious'  or  'heinous'(N.  E.  D.  ).  Lord  Inglis 
observed  in  Jas.  Miller  ((1862)  4  Irv.  238,244)  that 
'the  settled  meaning'  of  these  words  is  'a  quality 
of  the  act  which  is...  charged;  they  express  that 
which  is  essential  to  the  constitution  of  the  crime  -a 
certain  condition  of  mind  on  the  part  of  the  accused 
at  the  time  of  committing  the  act  libelled'.  But  this 
does  not  tell  us  anything  about  the  condition.  The 
tautological  nature  of  these  words  as  they  apnear  in 
indictments  was  recognised  by  Lord  Inglis  in  the  later 2'/4 
case  of  Elizabeth  Edmiston  ((1866)  5  Irv.  219,222-3) 
when  he  said  that  'Every  crime  is  wicked  and  felonious, 
and  the  moment  you  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the 
act  charged  against  the  prisoner  is  a  crime,  that  of 
itself  is  sufficient  proof  of  wicked  and  felonious 
intent.  The  words  mean  no  more  than  that  the  act 
is  criminal'. 
'Wilfully  and  maliciously'.  This  phrase  has 
more  meaning.  'P:  Taliciously'  is  an  ethical  term  which 
strictly  speaking  has  no  legal  meaning,  unless  in  any 
special  case  its  meaning  of  'spiteful'  is  important, 
and  is  just  another  word  for  'wickedly'.  But  it  does 
indicate  the  presence  of  'general  mens  real  (cf.  supra 
It  does  not  mean  intentional.  The  offence  of  malicious 
mischief,  for  example,  can  be  committed  without  any 
intention  of  doing  injury,  'it  is  enough  if  the  damage 
is  done  by  a  person  who  shows  a  deliberate  disregard  of, 
or  even  an  indifference  to,  the  property  or  possessory 
rights  of  another'  (Ward  v.  Robertson,  1938  J.  C.  32, 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison  at  p.  36).  Reckless 
actions  can  be  described  3s  malicious  if  they  exhibit 
wickedness  of  disposition  (cf.  supra)  a6g  ). 
'Wilful'  has  a  more  precise  meaning  in  Scots  law, 
where  it  seems  to  be  the  word  for  'intentional',  and 
means  more  than  just  'perverse'  or  'obstinate'  (N.  E.  D.  ). 
'Wilfully'  in  the  Salmon  Fishings  Act  of  1844  (7  &8 
Vict.  c.  95,  s.  l)  has  been  interpreted  as  meaning 
'designedly  and  with  a  certain  intent'  (Grant  v.  Wright, 
(1876)  3  Coup.  282,  Lord  Young  at  p.  287).  In  a 
charge  of  wilfully  making  a  false  entry  in  a  register 
contrary  to  the  Registration  of  Births  Act  1854  (1? 
18  Vict.,  c.  80,  ss.  60,62)  'wilfully'  was  said  to 
mean  'with  the  intention  to  do  the  thing  which  is 
prohibited'  (Jas.  Kinnison  (1870)  1  Coup.  45'/, 2'/5 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  r:  oncrieff  at  p.  461).  Lord 
Moncrief:  '  went  on  to  say  'It  can  bear  no  other 
construction...  As  a  general  rule  where  that  which  would 
not  be  in  itself  an  offence  is  made  a  criminal  act 
by  the  addition  of  the  word  wilful,  the  interpretation,  - 
the  legal  interpretation  -  of  that  term  is,  that  it 
implies  an  intention  to  do  the  thing  which  was  pro- 
hibited....  You  must  be  satisfied  that  he  knew  it  was 
false,  and  intended  to  put  in  the  register  an  entry 
which  he  knew  was  false'. 
These  are,  of  course,  examples  of  the  use  of  the  v>ord 
in  a  statute,  but  it  is  suomitted  that  its  common  law 
meaning  is  the  same.  The  common  law  crime  of  wilful 
fire-raising  is  an  intentional  crime,  distinguished 
from  culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  in  that  in  the 
former  the  fire  must  be  raised  'wilfully  and  with 
purpose  to  destroy  the  thing  to  which  it  is  applied' 
and  not  merely  'recklessly,  or  from  misgovernance' 
(Hume,  i.  128).  (The  matter  is  confused  )ecause 
prior  to  188'7  wilful  fire-raising  was  the  nomen  juris 
for  capital  fire-raising,  and  the  crime  was  only 
capital  when  fire  was  wilfully  set  to  certain  specified 
oubjects.  Where  it  was  set  intentionally  to  dther 
subjects  it  was  called  culpable  and  reckless  fire- 
raising  '2f.  Angus  (1905)  4  Adam  640).  For  a  person 
to  be  guilty  of  wilful  fire-raising  he  must  'designedly 
and  in  cold  olood,  set  fire...  Jell  knowing  what  he  was 
about  and  intending  to  do  so'-  Geo.  Macbean  (184/) 
Ark.  262,263.  ) 
"Nilful_negligence'.  The  requirements  of  design, 
intention,  and  knowledge,  clearly  set  wilfulness  apart 
fron  any  fora  of  negligence,  however  gross;  wilfulness 
and  negligence  are  categorically  different.  Yet  in 
Bastable  v.  North  British  Railway  Co.  (1912  S.  C.  555) 2/6 
this  difference  was  ignored  uy  four  out  of  a  Court  of 
five  Judges  in  the  Court  of  Session  who  were  considering 
the  meaning  of  'wilful  misconduct'.  Lord  Dunedin 
spoke  of  'that  degree  of  negligence  which  comes  under 
the  description  of  wilful  misconduct....  the  question 
is  whether  he  is  guilty  of  gross  negligence  which 
comes  to  be  wilful  misconduct'  (at  p.  566).  But 
to  regard  gross  negligence  as  equivalent  to  wilful 
misconduct  is  to  use  'negligence'  in  a  most  peculiar 
way.  As  Lord  Johnston  pointed  out  in  his  dissenting 
opinion,  'In  Wilful  misconduct..  the  will  must  be  party 
to  the  misconduct.  Negligence,  even  gross  and  culpable 
negligence,  dxcludes  the  idea  of  will.  Negligence 
done  on  purpose  is  a  contradiction  in  terms'  (at  p.  562). 
To  regard  gross  negligence  as  a  sort  of  wilfulness  is 
to  use  'negligence'  to  mean  'intention',  and  in  that 
case  'gross  negligence'  is  no  more  a  sort  of  negligence 
than  a  hot  dog  is  a  canine  animal.  And  accordingly 
to  talk  of  degrees  of  negligence  culminating  in 
intention,  is  like  building  a  theory  about  sausages 
by  reference  to  the  behaviour  of  dogs.  (cf.  J.  I.  C. 
Turner,  'The  Mental  Element  in  Crimes  at  Common  Law', 
in  Modern  Approach,  p.  195,  at  p.  208). 
The  matter  is  further  confused  by  the  associations 
of  the  phrase  'wilful  neglect'.  Neglect  is  not  a  form 
of  negligence;  to  neglect  to  do  something  is  simply  to 
omit  to  do  it,  as  is  shown  by  sentences  such  as  'He 
neglected  to  attend  the  meeting,  because  he  prefbrred 
to  go  to  the  cinema  instead'.  Neglect  may  be 
negligent,  ;  or  intentional:  the  mat-  who  neglects  his 
children  by  deliberately  keeping  them  short  of  food 
and  clothing  has  neglected  them  wilfully;  the  man 
who  keepts  them  short  of  food  and  clothing  because 
he  is  too  feckless  to  look  after  then  properly  has 
neglected  them  negligently. 277 
Recklessness. 
Carelessness. 
The  criminal  law  is  concerned  with  recklessness 
only  when  it  involves  objective  carelessness.  Reck- 
lessness,  like  negli;  ence,  is  a  subjective  state  of 
the  agent,  which  becomes  legally  significant  when 
joined  to  a  careless  act.  Sometimes  the  act  is 
described  as  reckless  or  as  negligent,  sometimes 
the  state  of  mind  of  the  agent  is  referred  to  as  care- 
less;  there  is  no  accepted  usage  whereby  'reckless' 
and  'negligent'  can  only  be  used  to  describe  mental 
states,  and  'careless'  only  used  to  describe  actions. 
But  it  is  convenient  to  distinguish  between  a  careless 
act  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  reckless  or  negligent  agent 
on  the  other.  The  same  careless  act  may  be  done 
either  recklessly  or  negligently,  depending  on  the 
mental  state  of  the  agent;  but  unless  the  act  is  care- 
less,  the  fact  that  it  was  done  recklessly  or  negligently 
does  not  make  it  criminal. 
The  reasonable  man.  An  act  is  careless  when  it 
falls  short  of  the  legal  standard  of  care,  which  is  the 
standard  of  the  'reasonable  man'.  The  'reasonable  man' 
does  not  exist,  of  course,  any  more  than  do  the  economic 
man  and  Lthomme  moyen  sensuel.  He  is  merely  a  device 
used  by  the  law  in  an  attempt  to  provide  an  objective 
standard,  to  achieve  uniformity  amid  a  great  variety 
of  circumstances.  (In  practice,  of  course,  the  standard 
is  so  vague  that  reference  to  the  reasonable  man  often 
merely  conceals  the  fact  that  the  Judge  is  applying 
his  own  standards),  t'  Reference  to  the  reasonable 
man  avoids  enquiry  into  the  attitude  of  the  particular 
agent,  at  the  stage  of  determining  an  act's  objective 
carelessness.  The  reasonable  man  is  thought  of  as  an 2'/8 
average.  y  careful  man  who  appreciates  the  risks  involved 
in  his  actions  and  takes  care  accordingly.  Careless- 
ness  always  arises  with  reference  to  a  particular  risk; 
any  risk  which  would  be  foreseen  by  the  reasonable  man 
is  regarded  by  the  law  as  foreseeable  and  a  man's 
acts  are  careless  when  he  behaves  so  as  to  increase 
any  such  risk,  or  so  as  to  fail  to  take  the  precautions 
a  reasonable  man  would  take  against  the  risk. 
Degrees  of  carelessness.  There  are  different 
degrees  of  carelessness,  and  different  scales  by 
which  the  degree  of  carelessness  of  any  act  can  be 
measured.  The  simplest  scale  is  constructed  by 
reference  to  the  number  or  importance  of  the  precautions 
omitted.  It  is  more  careless  for  a  motorist  to  turn 
his  car  to  the  right  from  a  position  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  road  than  merely  to  turn  right  from  the 
proper  position  without  giving  a  signal.;  and  still 
more  careless  to  turn  without  looking  to  see  if  the  way 
is  clear  to  do  so;  and  it  is  more  careless  than  any 
of  these  to  turn  right  from  the  left  of  the  road  without 
giving  a  signal  or  seeing  that  the  way  is  clear. 
Carelessness  can  also  be  measured  by  reference  to 
the  magnitude  of  the  risk  involved.  Dropping  a  lighted 
match  in  an  empty  hut  is  not  as  careless  as  dropping 
it  in  a  crowded  cinema;  messing  about  with  a  gun  is 
more  careless  in  the  presence  of  a  child  than  in  the 
presence  of  a  dog.  Another  important  factor  is  the 
degree  of  the  probability  of  the  risk:  it  is  more  likely 
that  a  drunk  motorist  will  cause  damage  than  that  a 
sober  one  will.  Where  the  degree  of  risk  involved 
is  so  slight,  either  in  magnitude  or  in  likelihood, 
that  the  reasonable  man  would  disregard  it,  then  to 
act  in  disregard  of  it  is  not  careless  -  and  this  will  be 
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fact  foresaw  the  risk  as  likely.  It  has  been  held, 
for  example,  that  the  risk  that  a  cricketer  will 
injure  someone  on  the  road  outside  the  cricket 
ground  by  striking  the  ball  over  a  high  wall  is  so 
slight  that  failure  to  guard  against  such  a  risk  is 
not  careless,  even  although  a  ball  has  once  before  been 
knocked  over  the  wall  (Bolton  v.  Stone,  (19511A.  C.  580. 
cf.  Carmarthenshire  County  Council  v.  Lewis,  [  1955 
A.  C.  549,  Lord  Reid  at  p.  565;  Muir  v.  Glasgow 
Corporation,  1943  S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  3). 
Justifiable  risks.  There  are  also  risks  which 
the  reasonable  man  takes,  not  because  they  are  minimal, 
but  because  they  are  justifiable,  since  an  balance 
the  risk  is  worth  taking  (cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para.  20). 
The  classic  example  of  such  a  risk  is  the  case  of  a 
surgeon  performing  a  dangerous  operation.  Macaulay 
restricts  the  class  of  justifiable  risks  to  cases 
where  the  person  who  takes  the  risk  does  so  for  the 
sake  of  conferring  a  social  benefit,  and  the  victim 
consents  to  the  risk  (Macaulay,  p.  451).  There  may 
however,  be  cases  where  the  consent  of  the  victim  is 
not  necessary.  A  fireman  may  have  to  take  risks  in 
rescuing  people,  conscious  or  not,  without  asking  their 
consent.  The  pilot  of  an  aircraft  which  develops 
engine  trouble  may  have  to  decide  on  a  dangerous  course 
of  action  without  asking  his  passengers'  consent,  or 
that  of  the  people  over  whose  town  he  decides  to  fly, 
or  in  whose  streets  he  tries  to  land.  The  situation 
is  like  that  in  cases  of  necessity  or  compulsion,  even 
if  in  the  particular  case,  e.  g.  that  of  the  surgeon, 
there  is  no  actual  compelling  force.  The  risk  is  a 
'calculated'  one,  justified  by  reference  to  its 
social  usefulness  -  because  it  is  better  to  take  it 
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agent  must  choose  a  course  of  action,  and  provided  his 
choice  is  reasonable  his  action  will  not  be  regarded 
as  careless. 
Recklessness  and  negligence. 
A  person  who  does  sone  tb  ing  careless  may  do  it 
either  recklessly  or  negligently.  (He  may  also,  of 
course,  do  it  with  the  delioerate  intention  of 
creating  or  increasing  the  risk  in  question,  in  which 
his  act  can  be  dealt  with  as  intentional.  )  Theoretically, 
recklessness  and  negligence  are  quite  distinct. 
Recklessness  is  advertent  and  involves  foresight  of  the 
risk;  negligence  is  inadvertent  and  involves  an 
absence  of  such  foresight:  Scots  usage,  however,  is 
very  confused  and  very  confusing.  (So  is  Anglo-American 
usage  -  see  Mall,  pa.  22/-232.  )  Culpable  homicide, 
for  example,  is  a  crime  of  negligence,  and  reckless 
killing  is  murder  (I;  Iacdonald,  p.  89),  but  culpable 
homicide  was  often  libelled  as  'culpable  and  reckless' 
(e.  g.  Robert  Reid,  (1827)  Syme,  235;  dim.  Paton  and  Richd. 
LIcNab,  (1845)  2  Broun  525;  Eliz.  Hamilton,  (1857) 
2  Irv.  738;  Jos.  Calder,  (18'1'l)  3  Coup.  494), 
or  even  as  'culpable,  reckless,  andnegligent'  (e.  g. 
Geo.  Murray,  (1841)  2  Stein.  549n.;  Wm.  Dreyer  and  `Win.  Tyre, 
(1885)  5  Coup.  680),  when  such  words  of  qualification 
were  necessary.  There  is  no  clear  distinction  between 
recklessness  and  negligence,  and  the  general 
impression  is  that  recklessness  is  just  extreme 
negligence.  When  the  distinction  was  discussed  in  a 
charge  of  'reckless  or  negligent'  driving  contrary  to  the 
Motor  Car  Act,  1903  (3  Edw.  VII,  c.  36,  s.  1(1))  in  the 
case  of  Connell  v.  Mitchell  ((1912)  7  Adam  23),  the 
Advocate-Depute  argued  that  the  distinction  did  not 
exist,  and  this  argument  was  rejected  only  on  a  construction 
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Lord  Guthrie  said  that  the  distinction  was  'certainly 
well  recognised  in  Scotch  practice'  (at  p.  30),  but  the 
Scots  attitude  to  any  attempt  to  systematise  the 
distinction  was  probably  represented  by  Lord  Dundas 
who  said  'I  shall  not  attempt  to  follow  the 
lucubrations  of  [defending  counsei3  as  to  the 
distinction  which  (it  appears)  may  or  may  not  exist 
between  the  two  adverbs,  in  what  I  suppose  he  would 
call  "the  subjective  mentality  of  the  perpetrator" 
or  elsewhere'  (at  p.  29). 
It  is  possible  to  construct  a  consistent  usage 
based  on  the  distinction  between  advertence  and  in- 
advertence,  and  though  such  a  usage  cannot  be 
easily  applied  to  the  Scots  cases,  it  does  make  it 
easier  to  analyse  the  cases  if  the  distinction  is 
oorne  in  mind.  A  man  is  said  to  act  recklessly  when 
he  foresees  a  certain  event  as  a  possible  consequence 
of  what  he  is  doing,  but  none  the  less  goes  on  with 
what  he  is  doing.  Recklessness  is  distinguished 
from  intention  by  the  fact  that  in  the  former  the 
conseouence  is  only  foreseen  as  possible,  or  at  most 
as  probable,  and  not  as  virtually  certain. 
In  German  law  recklessness  is  said  to  occur 
when  the  agent  thinks  that  his,  action  may  result  in 
the  creation  of  a  crime,  and  consents  to  this  result 
should  it  happen.  A  man  who  seduces  a  girl  under 
sixteen,  not  knowing  her  age  but  knowing  she  may  be 
under  sixteen,  acts  recklessly  guoad  the  crime  of 
having  carnal  knowledge  of  a  girl  under  sixteen  (see 
H.  Mannheim,  9Mens  rea  in  German  and  English  Law', 
(1935)  1'1  J.  Comp.  Leg.  and  Int.  Law,  82,91-3). 
In  Swiss  law,  again,  there  is  recklessness  'Qýiand 
l'auteur  non  seulement  a  envisage  le  resultat 
domnageable  comae  possible,  mais,  sans  l'exclure,... 282 
l'a  accepts  pour  le  cas  oü  il  se  produirait  comme 
consequence  de  l'acte  auquel  il  ne  veut  pas  renoncer' 
(P,  Logoz,  'Pas  de  Peine  sans  Culpabilite',  (1950) 
2  J.  Cr.  Sc.,  197,202). 
Recklessness  is  often  said  to  involve  indifference 
to  the  risk  foreseen,  and  this  indifference  is  regarded 
as  evidence  of  the  accused's  depravity  (cf.  Macdonald, 
p.  89).  But  indifference,  in  the  sense  of  'couldn't 
care  less'  is  not  essential  to  recklessness.  A  man 
may  be  reckless  even  though  he  wishes  fervently  that 
the  foreseen  possibility  will  not  become  actual;  so 
long  as  he  knowingly  takes  the  risk,  he  is  reckless. 
Hall  says  of  motor  car  drivers,  'And  was  there  not 
a  time  or  two  when  we  deliberately  violated  the  canons 
of  due  care,  when,  late  for  an  engage::  ent,  we  "took 
chances",  knowing  that  we  were  acting  dangerously  - 
though,  of  course,  we  believed  that  no  one  would  be 
harmed?  '  (Hall,  pp.  217-8).  To  act  in  this  way 
is  to  act  recklessly  guoad  the  risk  of  harming 
anyone.  else  on  the  road. 
'Conscious  ITegligence  t.  Some  Contiliental  legal 
systems  have  a  third  category  oetween  recklessness  and 
negligence,  which  is  called  'conscious  negligence'. 
A  person  is  'consciously  negligent'  when  he  foresees 
the  harm  as  possible,  but  does  not  believe  it  will  occur. 
For  example,  the  hunter  who  realises  that  his  shot  may 
kill  a  beater,  but  thinks  he  is  a  good  enough  shot 
to  avoid  this,  is  'consciously  negligent'  (P.  Logoz, 
op.  cit.,  loc.  cit.  ).  So  also  is  the  sdducer  of  the 
fifteen  year  old  girl  if,  having  considered  the 
question  of  the  girl's  age,  he  comes  wrongly  to  the 
conclusion  that  she  is  over  sixteen  (H.  Mannheim,  op.  cit. 
loc.  cit.  ). 
This  concept  allows  a,  distinction  to  be  made 
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dangerous  and  does  his  best  to  avoid  the  danger  by  being 
as  careful  as  he  can  while  still  doing  what  he  wants 
to  do,  and  the  man  who  takes  no  steps  to  minimise  the 
risk  at  all.  A  system  which  does  not  recognise 
'conscious  negligence'  would  have  to  class  the 
'consciously  negligent'  man  as  reckless,  since  he 
foresees  the  risk,  and  would  find  it  difficult  to 
give  him  credit  for  any  efforts  he  makes  to  avoid 
the  danger.  (It  might,  however,  be  able  to  take  these 
efforts  into  account  in  some  cases  by  holding  that 
what  was  actually  done  was  not  careless  because  all 
reasonable  precautions  were  taken  to  prevent  the 
envisaged  harm.  )  The  concept  of  conscious 
negligence  is  a  very  subtle  one,  and  has  proved 
very  difficult  to  apply  in  practice  (ib.  );  it  could 
hardly  find  a  place  in  a  system  whose  attitude  to 
recklessness  and  negligence  is  an  unsophisticated  and 
as  unsystematic  as  is  that  of  Scots  law. 
Is  the  reasonable  man  a  test  or  a  standard  of  reck- 
lessness? 
The  position  of  the  reasonable  man  as  a  standard 
of  carelessness  has  been  discussed;  he  is  also 
important  when  we  cone  to  ask  if  the  accused  in 
a  given  case  acted  recklessly  or  negligently. 
Recklessness,  like  any  other  state  of  mind,  has 
normally  to  be  discovered  by  reference  to  objective 
factors,  unless  the  accused's  own  evidence  of  his 
state  of  mind  is  available  and  is  believed.  But 
whether  or  not  a  confession  is  believed  may  well  depend 
on  whether  it  is  consistent  with  the  inference  drawn 
from  the  objective  facts. 
The  reasonable  man  as  a  test.  The  reasonable 
man  can  be  used  as  a  test  to  help  to  decide  whether 
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the  reasonable  nian  would  have  foreseen  the  risk,  it 
will  be  accepted  as  a  fact  that  the  accused  foresaw 
it,  unless  there  is  strong  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
But  if  the  accused  can  show  that  in  fact  he  did  not 
foresee  the  risk,  then  it  is  illogical  to  characterise 
him  as  reckless  on  the  ground  t'_ýat  a  reasonable  man 
would  have  foreseen  it.  As  Hall  says,  'In  the  deter- 
mination  of  these  questions,  the  introduction  of  the 
"reasonble  man"  is  not  a  substitute  for  the  finding 
that  the  particular  defendant  on  trial  knew  that  his 
conduct  increased  the  risk  of  harm  any  more  than  it  is 
a  substitute  for  the  determination  of  intent,  where 
that  is  material.  It  is  a  method  used  to  determine 
those  operative  facts'  (Hall,  p.  222). 
Since  evidence  of  the  accused's  state  of  mind 
must  normally  consist  of  objective  facts  from  which 
the  jury  will  draw  an  inference  as  to  his  state  of 
mind,  the  more  careless  the  accused's  behaviour,  the 
more  likely  it  is  that  he  will  be  regarded  as  reck- 
less,  since  the  more  likely  it  will  be  that  he  foresaw 
the  risk  involved.  A  man  who  kills  another  by 
punching  him  on  the  jaw  may  be  believed  when  he  says 
that  he  did  not  foresee  the  risk  of  death;  but  a 
man  who  kills  another  by  striking  him  on  the  skull 
with  a  hatchet  will  be  hard  put  to  it  to  persuade 
a  jury  that  he  did  not  realise  that  what  he  was  doing 
might  be  fatal.  In  Robertson  and  Donoghue  (Edinburgh 
High  Court,  28  -  30  Aug.  1945,  unrepd.  This  case 
contains  directions  on  a  number  of  fundamental  questions 
of  criminal  law;  *  that  it  remains  unreported,  even 
although  it  was  appealed,  is  a  sad  commentary  on  the 
interest  shown  by  Scots  lawyers  in  their  criminal  law.  ), 
Lord  Cooper,  then  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  directed  the 
jury  that  'In  judging  whether...  reckless  indifference 
is  present  you  would  take  into  account  the  nature 285 
of  the  violence  used,  the  condition  of  the  victim 
when  it  was  used,  and  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  assault  was  committed'  (Trauscm.  pt  of  Judge's 
Charge,  p.  21).  All  these  are  objective  factors 
affecting  the  degree  of  the  carelessness  of  what  the 
accused  did,  viewed  as  something  likely  to  cause  death. 
The  jury  proceed  by  way  of  syllogism  to  infer  from 
these  objective  factors  that  the  accused  was  reckless, 
and  the  major  premiss  is  that  a  reasonable  man  would 
have  foreseen  the  risk,  So  they  argue:  All  reasonable 
men  would  foresee  the  risk  of  death  as  a  result  of 
what  the  accused  did;  the  accused  is  (ex  hypothesi) 
a  reasonaole  man;  therefore  the  accused  foresaw 
the  risk. 
Suppose  now  that  the  reasonable  man  test  leads 
to  the  inference  t,  -iat  the  accused  foresaw  the  risk, 
but  that  the  accused  strenuously  denies  this,  and 
asserts  that  the  possibility  of  the  harm  never  crossed 
his  mind.  Suppose  it  is  a  crime  to  have  carnal  know- 
lege  of  a  girl  under  sixteen  intentionally  or  recklessly, 
and  A,  who  admits  having  had  carnal  knowledge  of  a 
girl  who  is  in  fact  only  fifteen,  says  that  the 
possibility  that  the  girl  might  have  been  under  sixteen 
never  c--.,  ossed  his  mind.  The  jury  must  then  balance 
his  statement  and  their  impression  of  his  credibility 
against  any  objective  factors  such  as  tiie  girl's 
obvious  childishness  which  make  it  clear  that  a 
reasonable  Lean  would  have  realised  that  the  girl  might 
be  under  sixteen.  If,  on  balance,  they  disbelieve 
the  accused,  because  of  the  unreasonableness  of  his 
statement,  they  are  using  the  reasonable  man  as  a  test, 
as  a  method  of  arriving  at  a  factual  determination 
of  the  accused's  subjective  state.  If,  on  bdance, 
they  believe  the  story,  if  they  think  that  A  is  so 286 
patently  honest  he  must  be  telling  the  truth,  they 
cannot  find  that  he  acted  recklessl,,  -,  just  because  they 
accept  the  view  that  the  reasonable  man  would  have 
suspected  the  girl  ý,  iias  under  sixteen. 
The  reasonable  man  as  a  standard.  There  is  a 
temptation  to  decide  a  priori  that  if  it  ever  becomes 
necessary  to  balance  an  accused's  statement  against  the 
inference  drawn  from  objective  factors  by  the  test 
of  the  reasonable  man,  the  result  of  the  test  will  always 
be  preferred.  To  take  'up  this  attitude  is  to  use  the 
reasonable  man  as  a  standard  and  not  as  a  test,  and  is 
tantamount  to  saying  that  whether  or  not  a  particulr 
accused  is  oelieved  when  he  says  his  mental  state 
was  not  what  the  mental  state  of  the  reasonaole  m&-i 
would  have  been,  he  is  nonetheless  to  be  treated  as 
if  his  mental  state  had  been  the  same  as  that  of  the 
reasonable  man.  Whether  or  not  the  accused  foresaw 
the  risk,  he  is  regarded  as  reckless  because  the 
reasonable  man  would  have  foreseen  it. 
The  result  of  this  use  of  the  reasonable  man  is 
to  make  recklessness  something  as  objective  as  care- 
lessness.  It  elides  the  necessity  of  any  decision 
about  the  accused's  state  of  mind,  it  makes  the  accused's 
statement  about  his  state  of  mind  not  merely  incredible, 
but  irrelevant.  Although  Scots  law  is  not  explicit 
about  this,  it  givesthe  impression  that  the  reasonable 
man  is  used  as  a  standard  in  this  way.  Thus,  we  talk 
of  a  man  using  'reckless  violence'  and  not  of  a  man 
'using  violence  recklessly'  (Fraser  and  Rollins,  1920 
J.  C.  60,  Lord  Sands  at  p.  63),  and  emphasis  is  laid 
on  the  likelihood  of  violence  causing  death  rather 
than  on  the  accused's  foresight  of  death  (see  R.  C. 
Evid.  of  Lord  Keith,  Q.  5130  where  he  talks  of  'violence 
that  might  be  contemplated  as  likely  to  result  in  death' 28'/ 
my  italics).  Macdonald  defines  murder  as  being 
'constituted  by  any  wilful  act...  whether  intended  to 
kill  or  displaying  such  wicked  recklessness  as  to 
imply  a  disposition  depraved  enough  to  be  regardless 
of  consequences'  (Macdonald,  p.  89),  which  again 
places  the  emphasis  on  the  act  rather  than  on  the 
accused's  mental  state. 
The  Scots  tendency  to  regard  recklessness  as 
just  gross  negligence  also  suggests  the  adoption 
ofýmobjective  approach.  If  the  reasonable  man  is  a 
standard  in  this  matter,  anyone  who  does  something 
careless  can  be  said  to  oe  acting  recklessly,  since  in 
doing  what  is  careless  he  is  taking  a  risk  the 
reasonable  man  would  have  foreseen  and  tried  to  avoid, 
and  so  must  be  treated  as  if  he  himself  had  foreseen 
the  risk.  That  being  so,  the  only  difference  between 
recklessness  and  negligence  is  one  of  degree  -  where 
the  act  is  very  careless  the  agent  is  called  reckless, 
where  it  is  not  so  careless  he  is  called  negligent. 
Thus,  phrases  like  'culpable,  reckless,  and  negligent' 
are  not  self-contradictory,  but  only  examples  of  legal 
tautology,  or  at  most  of  a  diminuendo.  The  end 
result  seems  to  be  that  although  recklessness  retains 
some  connection  with  foresight  in  Scots  law,  the 
accused  will  be  deemed  to  have  had  this  foresight  if, 
and  only  if,  his  act  reached  a  certain  degree  of  care- 
lessness.  Where  the  carelessness  is  less  than  this 
degree  he  will  only  be  treated  as  negligent,  whether 
or  not  he  in  fact  foresaw  the  risk.  The  difference 
between  recklessness  and  negligence  thus  ceases  to  be 
one  of  fact  and  becomes  one  of  moral  culpability  -  the 
worse  the  carelessness  the  more  it  exhibits  depravity, 
and  the  more  likely  it  it  that  the  agent  will  be 
regarded  as  reckless.  The  progress  from  the 
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through  the  recklessness  of  section  11  and  the  greater 
recklessness  of  culpable  homicide,  to  the  even  greater 
recklessness  of  murder,  depends  on  the  degree  of  wick- 
edness  involved,  and  that  is  measured  by  reference  to  the 
degree  of  carelessness  present  rather  than  by  reference 
to  the  presence  or  absence  of  foresight  (cf.  Road 
Traffic  Act,  1930,20  21  Geo.  V.  c.  43,  ss.  11  and  12; 
Paton,  1936  J.  C.  19).  The  precise  relationship 
between  recklessness  and  negligence  in  Scots  law 
is  not,  however,  altogether  clear,  and  it  is  made 
more  complicated  by  the  current  tendency  to  depart 
from  the  principle  that  recklessness  is  equivalent 
to  intention,  at  any  rate  in  homicide.  Today 
even  reckless  killing  may  be  only  culpable  homicide, 
so  that  we  are  left  without  any  particular  reason  for 
continuing  to  distinguish  between  recklessness  and 
negligence  ;  cf.  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper,  Q.  541'/). 
The  reasons  for  treating  the  reasonable  man  as  a  standard. 
It  is  worth  considering  why  the  law  treats  the 
reasonable  Haan  as  a  standard  of  recklessness,  or  at 
any  rate  why  the  temptation  to  do  so  is  always 
present.  There  are  two  principal  reasons,  both 
of  which  operate  in  other  branches  of  the  criminal  law 
as  well  as  in  this  question  of  recklessness.  The 
first  depends  on  the  idea  of  general  mens  rea,  the  other 
on  what  I  propose  to  call  the  'principle  of  disfacilitation' 
General  mens  rea.  Recklessness  is  described  by 
Macdonald  by  reference  to  conduct  'displaying  such 
wicked  recklessness  as  to  imply  a  disposition  depraved 
enough  to  be  regardless  of  consequences',  and  as  'wicked 
recklessness'  (Macdonald,  p.  89)"  That  is  to  say, 
it  is  regarded  as  punishable  because  it  exhibits  the 
depravity  of  the  accused's  character,  and  so  reveals 
him  as  a  person  of  criminal  mentality.  Now,  disregard 28y 
of  risk  may  take  one  of  two  forms.  A  risk  may  be 
foreseen  but  disregarded  in  the  sense  that  the  accused 
decides  to  go  on  with  his  plans  in  spite  of  the  risk, 
whether  or  not  he  'cares'  about  the  risk  in  the  sense 
of  hoping  that  it  will  not  become  actual.  On  the  other 
hand,  an  accused  may  disregard  a  risk  in  the  sense 
that  he  does  not  realise  that  the  risk  exists. 
The  latter  situation  is  not  strictly  one  of  recklessness 
out  it  may  well  be  a  pointer  to  the  accuse6  depravity. 
Suppose  A  seduces  a  girl  of  fifteen  and  is  so  intent 
on  satisfying  his  lust  that  he  does  not  even  pause 
to  consider  what  age  the  girl  is,  and  suppose  B  seduces 
a  girl  under  fifteen  realising  that  she  may  be  only 
fifteen  but  not  caring  whether  or  not  she  is  under 
sixteen.  It  is  not  easy  to  conclude  that  A  is  less 
blameworthy  than  B,  yet  on  a  strictly  subjective  view 
of  recklessness  A  cannot  be  said  to  be  reckless,  but 
only  to  be  negligent.  And  if  B  considers  the  girl's 
age  and  decides  wrongly  that  she  is  over  sixteen, 
he  must  still  be  regarded  as  reckless,  (in  the  absence 
of  any  doctrine  of  'conscious  negligence'  -  cf.  supra) 
and  it  becomes  even  more  difficult  to  suggest  that  A 
is  less  culpable  than  B  (cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para.  41). 
Accordingly  both  are  treated  as  equally  reckless,  and 
recklessness  is  imputed  to  A  by  reference  to  the  standard 
of  the  reasonaule  man.  Again,  a  subjective  theory 
would  require  us  to  regard  a  man  who  fires  a  gun 
out  of  his  window  without  even  considering  the 
possibility  that  there  might  be  people  in  the  street, 
as  negligent  only,  and  as  liable  to  less  punishment 
than  the  man  who  realises  that  the  street  may  be  full, 
but  just  does  not  care.  Both  seem  equally  callous, 
the  first  for  not  even  considering  that  he  might 
injure  others,  and  the  second  for  not  caring  whether 
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the  two  as  eo_ually  blamevworthy,  to  equate  the  man 
who  does  not  know  with  the  man  who  does  not  care,  as 
in  the  rule  that  it  is  reckless  fire-raising  to  raise 
fire  'in  such  a  reckless  state  of  excitement  as  not  to 
know  or  care'  what  he  is  about  (Geo.  A:  acbean,  (184'/)  Ark. 
262,263). 
This  tendency  is  encouraged  by  a  feeling  that  even 
if  a  particular  accused  did  not  foresee  the  risk, 
he  ought  to  have  done  so  -the  seducer  ought  to  have 
realised  that  the  girl  might  be  under  age,  the  man 
who  fired  a  gun  into  a  street  ought  to  have  realised 
that  he  might  hit  someone,  the  man  who  went  through 
a  house  waving  a  burning  brand  ought  to  have  realised 
that  he  might  set  the  place  on  fire.  His  lack.  jof 
foresight  is  regarded  as  oeing  in  itself  reprehensible, 
because  it  is  regarded  as  being  a  breach  of  the  general 
duty  to  behave  reasonably,  which  in  the  particular 
case  means  to  foresee  the  risk  in  question.  Such 
a  breach  of  duty,  however,  can  only  amount  to 
negligence,  and  to  treat  it  as  recklessness  is 
illogical,  and  cannot  be  justified  by  reference 
to  the  strict  meaning  of  'reckless'.  For  recklessness 
requires  foresi-;  lit,  and  failure  to  foresee  can  never 
amount  to  foresight.  'A  was  reckless  is  not  fore- 
seeing  that  taking  that  corner  at  40  m.  p.  h.  might 
cause  an  accident'  is  equivalent  to  'A  foresaw  that 
not  foreseeing  that  taking  that  corner  at  40  m.  p.  h. 
would  cause  an  accident',  which  is  nonsense.  The 
equation  of  lack.;  of  foresight  with  foresight 
does  not  depeL1d  on  logic,  but  on  the  feeling  that  the 
two  are  equally  indicative  of  wickedness. 
The  principle  of  disfacilitation.  The  use  of  the 
reasoneole  man  as  a  standard,  and  the  consequent 
refusal  to  accept  any  account  the  accused  gives  of 
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is  not  uncommon  in  the  criminal  law.  It  is  seen 
most  clearly  in  the  law  of  provocation.  The  basis 
of  the  plea  of  provocation  is  that  a  man  who  k 
_1ls 
because  he  has  been  goaded  by  his  victim  into  losing 
self-control,  should  not  be  punished  as  severely  as 
someone  who  kills  in  cold  blood.  Accordin  -,  -ly, 
killing  under  provocation  is  not  murder  but  only 
culpable  homicide.  In  order  to  operate  to  reduce  the 
charge  from  murder  to  culpable  homicide,  however,  the 
'goading'  must  be  such  that  it  would  have  caused  a 
reasonable  man  to  lose  self-control,  and,  since 
the  reasonaale  man  is  a  universal  and  objective 
concept,  the  law  has  been  aale  to  lay  down  the  types 
of  'goading'  which  are  sufficient  to  support  a  plea  of 
provocation.  Any  accused  who  loses  self-control  in 
circumstances  other  than  those  laid  down  by  the  law 
as  sufficient  to  affect  the  reasonable  man  is  not 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  plea  of  provocation. 
The  use  of  the  reasonaole  man  as  a  standard  is 
clear  in  provocation  because  lawyers  are  prepared  to 
admit  that  there  may  be  cases  in  which  it  is  true 
that  the  accused  lost  control  because  of  the 
'provocation'  offered  by  the  victim,  but  where  he  must 
nonetheless  be  treated  as  if  he  had  not  lost  control, 
because  he  has  failed  to  measure  up  to  the  standard 
of  control  set  by  the  reasonable  man.  (See,  e.  g. 
Bedder  v.  D.  P.  P.  [1954)  1  T.  L.  R.  1119;  Russell  on 
Crime,  11th  edn.  ,  p.  594.  The  law  of  provocation 
and  the  reasonable  man  is  discussed  infra,  S'27 
.) 
Where  the  question  is  whether  the  accused  was 
reckless  or  negligent,  the  result  of  this  Approach 
is  that  an  accused  who  fails  to  foresee  what  the 
reasonable  man  would  have  foreseen  is  treated  as  if  he 
had  foreseen  it.  The  practical  difficulties  here 29  2 
are  not  so  acute  as  in  provocation,  nor  are  the  results 
so  unjust,  because  recklessness  is  normally  alleged 
only  where  the  carelessness  is  so  gross  that  it  is 
highly  unlikely  that  the  accused  did  not  foresee  the 
risk.  This  in  itself,  however,  merely  increases  the 
'confusion  of  the  material  mental  state  with  the 
proof  of  its  presence'  (Hall,  p.  223). 
I  propose  to  give  the  name  'principle  of  dis- 
facilitation'  to  the  'rule'  that  w_iere  an  accused's 
account  of  his  mental  state  coi-,  flicts  with  the  standard 
of  the  reasonable  man,  the  accused's  statement  is  to  be 
disregarded.  The  result  of  the  application  of  this 
principle  is,  of  coarse,  that  where  the  accused  is 
telling  the  truth,  and  where  the  true  facts  should 
logically  operate  to  acquit  him,  or  should  at 
least  operate  in  !.  ýitigation,  they  will  not  be  allowed 
to  do  so.  Thus,  for  example,  where  the  truth  is 
that  the  accused  was  goaded  into  loss  of  self-control, 
and  so  ought  to  be  regarded  as  having  acted  under 
provocation  he  will  not  succeed  in  a  plea  of 
provocation  if  the  reasonable  man  would  not  have  been 
provoked  by  what  was  done.  The  basis  of  the 
principle  is  the  deterrent  purpose  of  the  law. 
The  criminal  law  is  designed  to  protect  society  from 
crime  by  punishing  criminals,  and  it  assumes  that 
the  deterrent  effect  of  such  punishment  is  significant. 
It  must  therefore  discourage  easy  excuses,  and 
restrict  the  scope  of  such  exculpatory  or  mitigatory 
pleas  as  it  does  recognise.  Again,  it  is  important 
to  warn  juries  against  too  ready  acceptance  of  the 
accused's  glib  statements  about  his  state  of  mind, 
especially  where  those  statements  conflict  with 
what  one  would  expect  the  state  of  mind  of  a  reasonable 
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So  far  the  principle  is  unobjectionable,  and 
might  be  called  the  'principle  of  deterrence'. 
But  where  it  operates  to  bar  the  jury  from  accenting 
the  accused's  story  even  where  they  are  convixed  of 
his  credibility  and  have  given  proper  weight  to  the 
requirements  of  deterrence,  it  is,  it  is  suomitted, 
oojectionable  in  its  operation.  It  seems  self- 
evident  that  it  is  objectionable  to  say  that  reck- 
lessness  involves  foresight,  but  that  a  man  who  does 
not  have  such  foresight  will  nevertheless  be  regarded 
as  reckless  because  a  legal  fiction  like  the  reasonable 
man  would  have  foreseen  the  risk  in  question.  This 
objectionable  attitude  is  adopted  mainly  because  of  the 
fear  that  if  a  jury  is  allowed  to  -believe  a  particular 
accused  who  is  telling  the  truth,  that  may  lead  to 
other  juries  believing  other  accused  persons  who  may 
or  may  not  be  telling  the  truth,  and  that  if  that 
happens  accused  persons  may  'get  away  with  murder' 
by  telling  an  appropriate  story.  I  have  used  the 
name  'disfacilitation'  because  when  Judges  direct 
juries  that  they  canno 
accept 
the  accused's  statements 
they  often  preface  their  direction.  with  phrases  like 
'It  would  be  too  easy  for  criminals  if..,  ',  or  'It 
would  be  a  very  convenient  place  for  criminals  if...  ' 
an  accused  could  commit  a  crime  and  then  get  away  with 
it  just  by  coming  into  Court  and  sating  he  was  provoked, 
or  mistaken,  , 
or  did  not  mean  it,  or  dice  not  realise  the 
danger  of  what  he  was  doing  (cf.  Dewar,  1945  J.  C.  5, 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Cooper  at  9;  Robertson  and  Donoghue, 
Edinburgh  High  Court,  28-30  Aug.  1945,  unrepd., 
transcript  of  Judge's  charge,  pp.  1'/-18;  Russell, 
1946  J.  C.  37;  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper,  Q.  5418). 
Used  in  this  objectionable  way  the  principle  of 
disfacilitation  is  really  an  example  of  the  principle 
of  the  thin  end  of  the  wedge,  and  is  open  to  all  the 294 
objections  to  which  the  rrinciple  of  the  wedge  is  open. 
The  latter  -  rinciple  has  been  described  as  the 
principle  that  '`you  should  not  act  justly  now  for  fear 
of  raising  expectations  that  you  may  act  still  .;  lore 
justly  in  the  future  -  expectations  which  you  are 
afraid  you  will  not  have  the'  courage  to  satisfy' 
(F.  Cornford,  '?,?  icroscosmogranhia',  15,  quoted 
by  A.  L.  Goodhart  in  'Shock  Cases  and  the  Area  of 
Risk',  (1953)  16  I.  L.  R.  1.14). 
In  applying  the  principle  of  disfacilitation 
the  Courts  confusez  adjective  and  substantive  law. 
As  has  been  said,  it  is  unoojectionable  to  use  the 
reasonable  man  as  a  test  in  the  law  of  evidence  so  as 
to  ensure  that  accused  persons  do  not  escape  punishment 
by  putting  forward  excuses  which  are  not  worthy  of 
credit;  and  some  such  rule  is  probably  necessary  to 
counter  the  rule  that  an  accused  need  not  prove  his 
defence  out  need  only  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to 
whether  the  Crown  have  proved  his  criminal  intent 
(cf.  Owens,  1946  J.  C.  119;  Lennie,  1946  J.  C.  `l9). 
But  to  go  on  to  say  that  because  there  is  a  risk 
of  accused  persons  escaping  by  means  of  plausible 
falsehoods,  they  are  never  to  bebelieved  even  when 
they  are  telling  the  truth,  if  the,  -  truth  conflicts 
with  the  inference  to  be  drawn  by  way  of  the  test  of 
the  reasonable  man,  is  to  change  a  test  of  evidence 
into  a  rule  of  substantive  law.  Glanville  Williams 
points  out  that  'The  danger  of  false  evidence  is  one 
that  the  law  has  to  meet  in  almost  all  situations, 
and  is  not  in  itself  a  sufficient  reason  for  opposing 
a  change  that  is  otherwise  desirable'  (Glanville 
Williams,  The  Sanctity  of  Life  and  the  Criminal  Law, 
p.  275);  in  the  same  way  it  is  not  a  sufficient 
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What  Mackinnon,  L.  J.  said  of  civil  claims  is  equally 
true  of  criminal  defences  -  'Fear  that  unfounded  claims 
may  be  put  for.  'ard,  and  may  result  in  erroneous  conclusions 
of  fact,  ought  not  to  influence  us  to  impose  legal 
limitations  as  to  the  nature  of  the  facts  that  it  is 
permissible  to  prove'  (Owens  v.  Liberpool  Corporation, 
r19391  1  K.  B.  394,400).  But  that  is  just  what  we 
are  doing  when  we  use  the  reasonable  man  to  exclude  as 
irrelevant  an  accused's  evidence  that  his  mental  state 
was  not  that  of  the  reasonable  man.  It  is  too  often 
forgotten  that  the  reasonable  man  is  only  a  legal 
fiction;  he  is  not  a  legislator. 
Recklessness  and  intention. 
As  has  been  pointed  out,  the  law  tends  to  regard 
recklessness  as  equivalent  to  intention,  at  any 
rate  in  regard  to  homicide.  The  reasons  for  this 
equivalence  are  much  the  same  as  those  for  applying 
an  objective  standard  to  questions  of  foresight. 
Recklessness  displays  the  same  wicked  and  depraved 
disposition  as  does  intention;  it  is  very  difficult 
to  believe  an  accused  who  says  that  although  he  hit 
the  old  lady  on  the  head  with  a  hatchet  he  did  not 
mean  to  kill  her,  and  it  is  felt  that  once  juries 
are  allooed  to  believe  such  statements,  any  accused 
will  be  able  to  get  away  with  murder  by  saying  he  did 
not  mean  to  kill  (cf.  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper,  Q. 
5418).  In  any  event,  it  is  felt  that  people 
who  use  great  violence  without  meaning  to  kill  are 
as  dangerous  as  those  who  do  mean  to  kill,  and  should 
be  as  severely  punished.  The  person  who  intends  to 
beat  his  victim  to  within  an  inch  of  his  life,  but 
actually  kills  him,  is  guilty  of  murder,  'Because, 
in  committin';  any  such  desperate  outrage  on  the  body, 
the  panel  shows  an  utter  contempt  of  the  safety  and 
life  of  his  neighbour,  and  if  not  a  determination  to 296 
kill  him,  at  least  an  aosolute  indif_,.  er,?  nce  whether  he 
live  or  die  :  And  because,  fro-.  -i  the  very  exce.  _;  ä  of 
the  injury,  -,  the  case  does  not  admit  any  clear  or 
conclusive  proof  on  the  part  of  the  panriel,  that  3t 
the  _.  io.  ient  of  killin_  he  dia  not  intend  the  very  event 
which  has  actually  ensued'  (Hume,  i.  257).  Tiere  is 
the  further  difficulty  that  it  is  dangerous  to  allow 
an  accused  to  inflict  great  injury  without  incurring 
the  risk  of  guilt  of  murder,  because  in  fact  it  is 
difficult  to  tell  just  how  much  injury  the  victim 
can  undergo  wit'-,  out  loss  of  life  (ib.  ). 
The  identification  of  recklessness  with  in:,  ention 
is  helped  bfr  the  highly  emotive  and  pejorative  nature 
of  the  terminolor  of  recklessness.  Phrases  like 
'utter  disregard',  ':  licked  recklessness',  'a 
disposition  depraved  enough  to  be  regardless  of  the 
consequences'  (iJacdonald,  p.  89),  conjure  up  the 
image  of  a  man  't-ansporte  d  with  rage  and  hatred' 
(Hume,  i.  257)  wildly  and  excitedly  inflicting 
horrible  injuries  on  another  with  a  murderous  weapon. 
Indeed,  this  sort  of  behaviour  is  more  socially  dangerous 
than  that  of  the  husband  who  carefully  poisons  his  wife 
or  her  lover  or  his  rich  uncle,  and  who  is  not  likely 
ever  to  harm  anyone  else  in  his  life.  The  public  at 
large  is  safe  from  such  a  poisoner,  but  all  users 
of  the  streets  are  exposed  to  dangers  from  brawling 
gangs  of  hooligans,  and  all  householders  to  danger 
from  armed  housebreakers. 
Negligence. 
Subjective  and  objective  negligence. 
A  man  is  negligent  when  he  does  not  foresee  a  risk, 
and  consequently  does  something  careless.  Since 
negligence  is  the  absence  of  foresight,  is  inadvertence, 29'/ 
is  a  blank,  it  has  been  said  that  it  is  not  a  state 
of  mind  at  all.  But  a  blank  state  of  mind  is  still 
a  state  of  mind:  ne,  lience  is  not  just  carelessness  - 
it  is  carelessness  accompanied  by  inadvertence 
as  to  the  risk. 
Negligence  is  usually  determined  solely  by 
reference  to  objective  factors,  so  that  whoever 
does  soetaing  careless  is  negligent  (provided 
of  course  he  is  not  reckless).  But  it  is  possible 
to  distinguish  negligence  from  carelessness,  and  some- 
times  useful  to  do  so.  For  negligence  consists  in 
failing  to  take  care  where  there  is  a  duty  to  take 
care,  and  a  person  who  is  incapable  of  taking  care, 
cannot,  strictly  speaking,  be  guilty  of  negligence. 
At  any  rate  he  cannot  be  morally  guilty,  and  it  would 
be  in  accord  with  the  general  principles  of  the  common 
law  that  he  si.  ould  not  be  legally  guilty  either. 
This  difference  between  persons  who  cannot  help  act- 
ing  carelessly,  and  persons  who  could  be  careful  if 
they  took  the  trouble  to  do  so,  is,  of  course,  a 
subjective  one. 
In  practice  this  distirztion  only  arises  in 
extreme  cases;  it  is  unlikely,  for  example,  that  an 
insane  man,  incapable  by  reason  of  his  insanity  of 
taking  care,  would  be  convicted  of  a  crime  of 
negligence,  but  a  person  who  was  too  stupid  to 
take  the  precautions  the  reason  ble  man  would  have 
taken,  would  probably  be  convicted  of  such  a  crime. 
The  nearest  example  to  a  case  in  which  a  subjective 
approach  was  taken  is  the  unusual  case  of  Ritchie 
(1926  J.  C.  45).  The  accused  was  charged  with 
culpable  homicide  caused  by  reckless  (i.  e.  very  careless) 
driving.  There  was  no  doubt  that  his  driving 
had  been  grossly  careless,  but  he  was  acquitted, 298 
in  the  words  of  his  special  defence,  'in  respect  that 
by  the  incidence  of  toxic  exhaustive  factors  he  was 
unaware  of  the  presence  of  the  deceased  on  the  high- 
way,  and  of  his  injuries  and  death,  and  was  incapable 
of  ap-oreciating  his  immediately  previous  and  suusequent 
actions'.  But  such  a  defence  is  probably  restricted 
to  cases  of  mental  abnormality;  the  normal  person 
is  obliged  to  exercise  normal  care,  and  is  assumed  to 
be  capable  of  re1.?  aining  attentive. 
In  the  English  case  of  Hill  v.  Baxter  (L19581 
1  Q.  B.  217)  a  defence  of  automatism  as  a  result  of  a 
sudden  loss  of  consciousness,  i.  e.  of  a  blackout, 
was  offered  to  a  charge  of  careless  driving,  but  was 
rejected  because  the  evidence  showed  no  more  than 
that  the  accused  had  fallen  asleep.  It  was 
s'iggested,  howwever,  that  the  defence  of  incapacity 
was  in  general  restricted  to  'cases  where  the 
circumstances  are  such  that  the  accused  could  not 
really  be  said  to  be  driving  at  all.  Suppose  he  had 
a  stroke  or  an  epileptic  fit,  both  instances  of  what 
may  properly  be  called  acts  of  God;  he  might  well 
be  in  the  driver's  seat  even  with  his  hands  on  the 
wheel,  but  in  such  a  state  of  unconsciousness  that 
he  could  not  be  said  to  be  driving'  (Lord  Goddard, 
C.  J.,  at  p.  283).  This  approach  suggests  that  the 
only  test  of  negligence  is  the  objective  one,  but 
that  in  some  circumstances,  such  as  those  of  a  fit, 
the  matter  can  be  dealt  with  as  one  in  which  the  risk 
is  not  created  by  an  'act'  of  the  accused.  In  the 
same  way,  a  driver  who  does  somet_.  ing  careless  because 
he  is  attacked  by  a  swarm  of  bees,  does  not  act 
negligently,  because  again  he  does  not  act  voluntarily, 
but  under  the  physical  compulsion  of  the  bees'  attack 
(ib.,  where  the  swarm  of  bees  was  said  to  introduce 299 
something  akin  to  a  novus  actus  interveniens). 
In  Ritchie,  however,  it  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
argued  that  the  accused  could  not  be  said  to  have  been 
driving  the  car;  the  argument  was  directed  to  the 
question  of  liens  rea,  and  notof  criminal  conduct. 
Ritchie  is  an  exceptional  case,  and  the  problem 
has  not  been  dealt  with  in  any  reported  case  since. 
It  appears  that  the  Courts  will  rarely  adopt  a  sub- 
jective  ap  roach  to  negligence,  and  may  deal  even 
with  extreme  cases  by  reference  to  the  law  of  insanity. 
If  the  carelessness  occurred  in  the  course  of  sane 
voluntary  be'_iaviour,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  sub- 
jective  approach  will  be  adopted.  Glanville 
Williams  suggests  that  'The  best  solution  is  to 
draw  the  line  between  injury  or  affectation  occurring 
consideraoly  before  the  time  of  the  alleged  offence 
and  an  injury  or  affectation  occurring  substantially 
at  the  saue  time,  and  to  allow  only  the  latter  to 
operate  as  a  defence'.  (Gl.  Williams,  para.  28). 
This  would  account  for  the  application  of  the  objective 
test  to  someone  who  is  congenitally  stupid.  The 
congenital  lunatic  is  a  special  position,  since  the 
standard  of  the  reasonable  man  is  never  applied 
to  someone  who  is  insane. 
An  incapacity  of  long  standing  may  be  regarded 
as  irrelevant,  not  simply  because  of  its  duratiqn 
of  permanence,  but  bec  -use  the  operation  of  the 
incapacity  would  itself  become  foreseeable  in  time, 
and  giere  would  therefore  be  a  duty  to  take  care 
that.  one  did  not  get  into  a  situation  in  which  this 
incapacity  might  prove  dangerous.  A  man  who  knows 
he  is  such  a  bad  driver,  that  he  is  incapable  of 
reacting  carefully  in  situations  of  danger  is  being 
negligent  (strictly  speaking  he  is  being  reckless) 
if  he  drives-at  all.  For  the  same  reason  a  man  may 300 
be  res-oonsible  for  the  consequences  of  fatigue, 
even  although  the  fatigue  does  occur  at  suesiantially 
the  sarLLe  time  as  the  accident  -  for  fatigue  is  a  general 
human  condition,  and  the  reasonable  man  would  realise 
that  if  he  continues  to  drive,  ;;  or  carry  on  any  other 
activity  Which  requires  care,  when  he  is  tired,  he 
may  cause  harm,  and  would  therefore  stop  driving;  when 
he  tires.  As  was  vointed  out  in  Ritchie  (supra), 
the  defence  of  incapacity  only  operates  when  'a  person 
who  would  ordinarily  be  quite  justified  in  driving  a 
car,  becomes  -  owing  to  a  cause  which  he  was  not 
bound  to  foresee,  and  which  :  ras  outwith  his  control  - 
either  gradually  or  suddenly  not  the  master  of  his 
own  action'  (Lord  Murray  at  p.  4'/).  On  this  view 
a  state  such  as  epilepsy  would  only  be  a  defence 
the  first  time  it  occurred;  and  the  incorrigibly 
bad  driver  might  be  'ei,  ititled'  to  at  least  one 
accident  so  that  he  might  acquire  the  knowledge 
that  he  Tipas  incapaAe  of  driving  carefully.  Once 
the  epileptic  knew  of  his  disease  and  the  bad  driver 
of  his  incompetence,  they  would  be  acting  recklessly. 
Even  a  plea  of  involuntariness  would  not  succeed, 
since  the  epilepsy  itself  would  be  regardd  as  a 
foreseeable  consequence  of  the  voluntary  careless 
act  of  driving  in  the  knowledge  of  one's  tendency 
to  have  fits.  The  law  is  probably,  however,  that 
negligence  is  p  purely  objective  matter  except  in  cases 
analogous  to  insanity. 
Degrees  of  negligence. 
Although  negligence  is  generally  regarded  as 
objective,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  law  has  regard 
to  the  accusedts  state  of  mind.  The  greater  the 
degree  of  negligence  the  greater  the  punishment, 
because  the  more  negligent  a  man  is,  the  more  nearly 
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he  is  thought  to  an-,  )roach  a  stete  of  wickedness. 
Strictly  speaking,  there  cannot  be  degrees  of 
negligence,  because  there  cannot  be  degrees  of 
inadvertence,  of  blankness.  (cf.  J.  I.  C.  Turner, 
The  Mental  Element  in  Crimes  at  Co:.  iiaon  Law',  in 
Modern  Approach,  p.  195,  at  p.  211;  and  Kenny  para.  25). 
The  degrees  are  degrees  of  carelessness,  but  the 
degree  of  carelessness  is  regarded  as  indicative 
of  the  accused's  criminality  Which  thus  ranges 
from  minimal  ne  gliSence  to  extreme  recklessness. 
All  blanks  are  equflily  blank,  out  they  may  vary  in 
extent;  the  man  who  omits  one  precaution  is 
not  less  inadvertent  than  the  man  who  omits  twenty, 
but  he  is  inadvertent  with  regard  to  fewer  things. 
Again,  de  rees  of  neglir;  ence  raay  be  measured  by 
reference  to  the  de 
;  rec  of  harm  regardin_,  which 
there  is  inadvertence,  so  that  inadvertence 
of  the  possibility  of  death  is  re  ;  arded  as  more 
criminal  than  inadvertence  of  the  possibility  of  same 
lesser  harr. 
Should  negli,  ence  be  punished? 
It  has  been  argued  that  negligence  is  not  a  form 
of  :  -,  ens  rea  at  all  (Gl.  Yilliaias,  para.  28),  and 
that  it  is  no  concern  of  the  criminal  law  which  is 
concerned  only  with  'the  voluntary  commission  of  moral 
wrongs  forbidden  by  the  penal  lati,  '  (Hall,  p.  235  - 
the  defirrition  ignores  the  possibility  of  forbidding 
thin  s  vj.  'Aich  are  not  regarded  as  morally  wrong). 
Whether  a  negligent  mind  is  to  be  described  as  rea 
depends  on  usage.  It  is  clearly  not  rea  in  the  sense 
of  being  wicked  or  depraved,  and  it  is  completely 
free  of  any  intention  to  do  what  is  forbidden  by  law. 
3ut  it  is  a  state  of  mind,  and  its  presence  is 
sufficient  to  make  certain  acts  criminal  -  it  is 
'a  legally  reprehensible  state  of  aihd'  (Kenny,  para.  11). 302 
The  important  question,  of  course,  is  whether  it 
should  be  legally  reprehensible,  and  that  is  a  questionru 
of  penal  policy.  The  objection  to  making  ne  li;  ence 
criminal  depends  on  the  idea  that  the  negligent 
person  is  not  morally  guilty  of  anything  and  is  not 
amenaole  to  punishment.  Therefore,  it  is  said, 
neither  deontoloRy  nor  utilitarianis-Tri  requires  that 
he  should  be  punished.  But  although  we  sometimes 
say  of  a  negligent  agent,  'It's  all  right,  we  know 
you  didn't  mean  to  do  it;  you're  not  to  blame', 
we  often  regard  a  negligent  person  as  .  iorally 
responsible  for  the  results  of  his  carelessness. 
There  is  nothing  strange  in  imposing  a  duty  to  be 
ordinarily  careful  on  the  ordinary  man,  or  in 
holding  him  res?  onsible  for  a  breach  of  that  duty. 
'::  Ten  do  indeed  resent  what  is  occasioned  through 
carelessness;  but  then  they  expect  observance 
as  their  due,  and  so  that  carelessness  is  considered 
as  faulty'  (Bishop  Butler,  Sermons,  VIII,  pp.  126-'/). 
This  does  not  necessarily  involve  criminal 
responsibility  -  holding  a  man  liable  to  make 
reparation,  for  example,  is  quite  different  from 
punishing  him.  (This  may,  be  arguable  in  theory, 
but  it  is  clearly  true  in  practice  -a  man's 
insurance  company  cannot  go  to  goal  for  him). 
The  law  is  very  reluctant  to  punish  negligence,  and 
usually  does  so  only  where  great  harm  such  as  death 
has  resulted,  or  in  order  to  prevent  risks  w:  iich 
occur  so  frequently  that  they  constitute  a  considerable 
public  danger.  A  person  who  recklessly  drops  a  match 
beside  inflammable  material  will  not  be  prosecuted 
unless  he  actually  causes  a  fire,  but  a  person  who 
drives  a  motor  car  carelessly  is  liable  to 
prosecution  whether  or  not  he  causes  harm.  What 
makes  the  driver  more  criminal  than  the  match-dropper 303 
is  not  that  dazu'ge  is  more  likely  in  his  particular 
case,  but  that  it  is  statistically  more  likely. 
If  damage  from  dropped  matches  were  as  common  as 
damage  from  careless  driving,  careless  dropping  of 
matches  might  become  a  crime  in  itself. 
The  fact  that  the  criminality  of  negligence 
may  depend  on  such  things  as  the  prevalence  of  certain 
dangers  in  the  community  as  a  whole,  shows  that  the 
punishment  of  negligence  is  regarded  as  performing 
an  important  social  function.  It  is  difficult  to 
justify  such  punishment  retributively  -  for  all 
our  resentment  at  the  result  of  carelessness,  we  still 
feel  it  should  be  distinguished  from  intentional 
wrongdoing,  and  the  law  recognises  this  by  providing 
for  a  lesser  penalty  in  the  case  of  negligence. 
Again,  the  negligent  man  may  arouse  sympathy  as  much 
as  indignation,  we  may  feel  that  'There  but  for  the 
grace...  '  A  triounal  conscious  of  its  righteousness 
may  condemn  the  murderer  or  thief  with  a  clear 
conscience,  but  no  one  has  all  that  clear  a  conscience 
when  it  comes  to  negligence.  And  if  the  accused 
is  a  man  who  was  doing  a  job  as  best  he  could,  but 
failed  to  take  certain  precautions,  it  seems  unfair 
to  punish  him  at  all.  'It  is  hard  to  impute  crime, 
and  it  will  require  exce,  Dtional  circumstances  to 
impute  crime,  to  a  man  who  is...  attending  to  his  duty 
to  the  best  of  his  ability  and  to  nothing  else', 
when  'if  there  was  anything  wrong  it  was  the  human 
infirmity  of  a  man  doing  his  best,  not  having  seen 
in  time  what  it  is  such  a  misfortune  that  he  did  not' 
(Vim.  Dreyer  and  47m.  Tyre,  (1885)  5  Coup.  680,68'/, 
Lord  Young  at  2689). 
But  the  punishment  of  negligence  may  have  a 
deterrent  effect  in  that  the  threat  of  it  may  rwke 
people  more  advertent,  more  careful.  It  is  not  quite 304 
correct  to  say  that  you  cannot  deter  someone  from 
being  inadvertent,  since  he  will  only  be  deterred 
if  he  considers  his  position,  in  which  case  he  will 
no  longer  be  inadvertent.  (cf.  Gl.  . 7illiams,  para.  31). 
A  man  can  be  encou-a;  ed  to  be  advertent  by  threat 
of  punishment.  People  set  themselves  to  drive  with 
great  care  because  they  know  that  careless  driving 
may  land  them  in  gaol.  This  form  of  deterrence 
seems  clearly  to  be  within  the  province..  of  the 
criminal  law.  And  it  is  quite  consciously  applied 
by  the  law.  In  the  early  days  of  railways  there  were 
a  number  of  prosecutions  for  culpable  homicide 
arising  out  of  railway  accidents.  In  the  first  of 
these  the  Lord  Advocate  explained  that  because  of  the 
increasing  number  of  rails;  ays  itw,  ias  important  to 
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make  clear  what  the  community  had  a  right  to  expect 
from  railv.  vay  employees,  and  that,  It  was  right  that 
it  should  be  understood  that  accidents  should  be 
strictly  looked  into'  (Jas.  Bord.  (1842)  1  Broun  7,16). 
There  are  a  number  of  examples  of  charges  brought  by 
the  Crown  because  they  felt  it  necessary  to  warn 
people  of  the  possible  consequences  of  particular 
forms  of  carel3  ssrie  ss,  such  as  the  case  of  Alex. 
Dickson  ((184'7)  Ark.  352),  where  the  accused  was 
charged  with  causing  injury  by  erecting  a  faulty 
hustings.  The  Advocate-Depute  asked  for  an  acquittal 
after  leading  evidence,  and  said  he  had  felt  it  his 
duty  to  bring  the  case  before  the  public.  (See  also 
Jas.  Finney,  (1848)  Ark,  432,439,  a  charge  of  causing 
injury  by  careless  rockolasting  on  which  the  accused 
was  sentenced  to  two  months'  imprisonment,  and  Geo. 
Armitage,  (1885)  5  Coup.  6/5,677,  a  charge  of  culpable 
homicide  by  careless  dispensing  of  medicine  in  which 
the  accused  was  acquitted,  more  or  less  by  direction 
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Chapter  7:  Error 
Mistake  and  ignorance. 
Error  may  take  one  of  two  forms  -  mistake,  or 
ignorance.  Glanville  Williams  distinguishes  the  two 
as  follows:  'Every  mistake  involves  ignorance,  but 
not  vice  versa.  Ignorance  is  lack  of  true  knowledge, 
either  because  the  mind  is  a  complete  blank  or  because 
it  is  filled  with  untrue  (mistaken)  knowledge'.  (Gl. 
Williams,  para.  40). 
Glanville  Williams  takes  the  view  that  mistake 
excludes  recklessness,  whereas  ignorance  does  not. 
The  man  who  acts  under  a  mistake  is  not  reckless,  because 
he  has  come  to  the  conclusion,  as  a  result  of  his  mistake, 
that  the  danger  in  question  does  not  exist,  and  so  he 
cannot  be  said  wilfully  to  disregard  it.  On  the  other 
hand.  the  ignorant  man  who  does  not  consider  the  danger 
at  all  may  be  reckless,  or  rather  be  deemed  reckless, 
because  of  his  failure  to  carry  out  his  duty  to  enquire 
if  what  he  is  doing  is  dangerous.  (cf.  Gi.  Williams, 
loc.  cit.  ).  The  following  observations  fall  to  be 
made  on  this  distinction: 
(1)  It  is  correct  that  strictly  speaking  a  mistaken 
man  cannot  be  reckless.  Glanville  Williams  quotes 
Lord  Herschell's  distinction  in  Derry  v.  Peek  ((1889)  14 
App.  Cas.  337,361)  where  he  said  that  'To  make  a  state- 
ment  careless  whether  it  be  true  or  false,  and  without 
any  real  belief  in  its  truth,  appears  to  me  to  be  an, 
essentially  different  thing  from  making,  through  want 
of  care,  a  false  statement,  which-is  nevertheless  honestly 
believed  to  be  true'.  -Again,  if  recklessness  is  given 
its  strict  subjective  meaning  it  can  be  said  that  it  is 
excluded  by  mistake  because  once  the  agent  has  reached 306 
the  erroneous  conclusion  that,  for  example,  a  room  is 
empty,  he  no  longer  foresees  that  he  may  injure  someone 
if  he  fires  a  revolver  into  the  room. 
But  in  Scots  terminology,  where  'reckless'  and'negligent' 
do  not  differ  in  kind  but  only  in  degree,  a  mistake  may 
be  so  careless  as  to  involve  recklessness.  If,  for 
examp'e,  the  accused  reached  the  conclusion  that  a 
room  was  empty  simply  by  looking  through  a  half-open 
door,  his  mistake  would  be  due  to  carelessness,  and  if 
his  intention  was  to  discharge  a  gun  into  the  room,  his 
failure  to  notice  that  there  was  someone  behind  the  door 
might  be  regarded  as  sufficiently  gross  to  amount  to 
recklessness. 
(2)  It  seems  strange  to  call  an  ignorant  man 
reckless,  since  ignorance  is  suggestive  of  inadvert- 
ence.  But  if  a  man  considers  that  there  may  be  present 
in  a  situation  facts  making  his  proposed  action  dangerous, 
and  he  does  not  enquire  wuet  ae  r  or  not  ie  se  aQ-cs  are 
prese.,  t,  his  ignorance  of  their  presence  will  be  reckless. 
Thus,  if  A  picks  something  up  from  the  street,  and 
it  crosses  his  mind  that  it  might  be  explosive,  but  he 
takes  no  step  s  --.  to  find  out  if  it  is  explosive,  his 
ignorance  of  its  explosive  nature  may  be  accounted 
reckless  if  in  fact  the  thing  explodes  and  injures  someone. 
It  will  not  do  for  A  just  to  say  -'II  didn't  know  if  it 
was  dangerous  or  not;  I  was  ignorant  of  its  explosive 
character;  I  had  no  views  either  way  on  the  matter'. 
But  if  it  never  crossed  his  mind  at  all  that  the  thing 
might  be  dangerous,  his  ignorance  can  hardly  be  described 
as  reckless,  since  he  was  completely  inadvertent  as  the 
possibility  of  danger  at-all.  It  may  be  that  he  had  a 
duty  ýo  consider  the  possibility  of  danger,  but  his 
failure  to  do  so  might  not  be  so  gross  as  to  amount  to 
recklessness  in  the  Scots  meaning  of  the  term. 30'1 
(3)  It  appears  therefore  that  the  distinction 
between  ignorance  and  mistake  is  not  important  in  Scots 
law.  In  any  event  cases  of  ignorance  are  very  rare. 
The  only  case  which  is  at  all  common  is  that  where  the 
ignorance  is  of  a  factor  in  the  physical  condition  of 
the  victim  of  an  assault,  which  renders  him  peculiarly 
susceptible  to  danger  from  violence.  In  such  cases 
the  rule  that  an  assailant  takes  his  victim  as  he 
finds  him  is  applied  to  the  exclusion  of  any  consider- 
ations  of  error  or  of  carelessness,  and  the  assailant 
is  always  convicted  of  culpable  homicide.  (see  in  a,  ch-if.  ). 
The  effect  of  error  on  intention. 
Error  vitiates  intention.  A  man's  intention 
cannot  be  separated  from  his  beliefs  about  the  objective 
situation.  I  cannot  intend  to  steal  something  which 
I  believe  to  be  my  own,  or  murder  someone  I  believe 
to  be  an  animal,  or  intend  to  kill  someone  by  shooting 
into  a  room  I  believe  to  be  empty.  As  was  said  in  an 
Australian  case,  'Whenever  a  legal  standard  of 
liability  includes  some  exercise  or  expression  of  the 
will,  some  subsidiary  rules  of  law  m:  gst  be  adopted  with 
respect  to  mistake,  States  of  volition  are  necessarily 
dependent  upon  states  of  fact,  and  a  mistaken  belief 
in  the  existence  of  circumstances  cannot  be  separated 
from  the  manifestation  of  the  will  which  it  prompts'. 
(Thomas  v.  R.  (1937)  59  C.  L.  R.  279,  Dixon,  C.  J.  at  p.  299). 
Error  of  fact.  A  man's  duty  is  to  do  what  is 
right,  or  in  the  case  of  legal  duty  what  is  legally 
right,  in  the  situation  as  he  sees  it.  (cf.  supra.  ). 
The  approach  to  cases  of  error  about  the  objective 
facts  of  a  situation  is  simple  -  the  accused  is  judged 
as  if  the  situation  were  as  he  believed  it  to  be.  (cf. 308 
SchwStGB  art.  19  -  Handelt  der  Täter  in  einer  irrigen 
Vorstellung  uber  den  Sachverhalt,  so  beurteilt  der 
Richter  die  Tat  zugunsten  des  Täters  nach  dem  Sachverhalte, 
den  sich  der  Täter  vorgestellt  hat.  )  If  A  kills  his 
wife  in  the  mistaken  belief  that  she  is  a  hyena,  he  is 
not  guilty  of  murder,  but  if  he  kills  her  under  the 
mistaken  belief  that  she  is  his  mistress  he  is  guilty 
of  murder.  Similarly  if  he  kills  her  in  the  mistaken 
belief  that  she  is  about  to  kill  him  and  that  it  is 
necessary  for  him  to  kill  her  in  self-defence,  he  is 
not  guilty  of  homicide;  (Owens,  1946  J.  C.  119) 
if  he  kills  her  under  the  mistaken  belief  that  she  has 
just  confessed  to  adultery,  he  is  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide;  if  he  kills  her  under  the  mistaken  belief 
that  she  had  committed  adultery  the  previous  week, 
he  is  guilty  of  murder.  In  each  case  we  judge  A  as 
if  the  situation  were  as  he  believed  it  to  be. 
It  follows  from  this  approach  that  for  error  to  be 
relevant  it  must  '  refer  to  some  constituent  part  of  the 
crime  in  question,  to  something  which  affects  the 
identity  or  the  degree  of  the  crime.  Accordingly, 
the  same  mistake  may  be  relevant  with  regard  to  one 
crime  and  irrelevant  with  regard  to  another.  The 
mistake  is  only  relevant  if,  had  things  been  as  the 
accused  believed  them  to  be  he  would  either  have 
committed  no  crime  at  all,  or  would  have  committed 
a  different  crime  (or  a  different  degree  of  the  same 
crime).  This  way  of  reasoning  is  particularly 
important  with  regard  to  two  types  of  error--  error 
regarding  the  victim,  and  error  regarding  the  mode  of 
commission  of  the  crime. 
(a)  Error  as  to  victim.  This  is  generally  thought 
to  be  irrelevant.  If  A  shoots  at  and  kills  B 
believing  him  to  be  C,  then  A  is  guilty  of  murder, 309 
since  to  kill  C  is  just  as  criminal  as  to  kill  B. 
Similarly,  if  A  robs  a  bank  believing  it  to  be  a  ware- 
house,  or  has  intercourse  with  a  fourteen  year  old 
negress  believing  her  to  be  a  fourteen  year  old  white 
girl,  the  mistake  is  irrelevant.  But  this  irrelevancy 
depends  on  the  fact  that  the  crime  is  the  same  in  each 
case  respectively,  on  the  fact  that  the  victims  are 
legally  equivalent.  Where  this  is  not  so,  then  error 
as  to  victim  may  be  relevant.  Oedipus,  as  Donnedieu 
de  Vabres  cryptically  points  out,  was  not  guilty  of 
parricide,  but  only  of  murder  (Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p. 
He  could  no  more  oe  guilty  of  parricide  than  of  incest, 
because  on  the  facts  so  far  as  he  knew  them,  he  was 
not  committing  either  of  these  crimes  (and  his  failure 
to  inquire  into  the  possibility  of  his  parentage  being 
what  it  was  could  hardly  be  called  reckless). 
Error  regarding  the  victim  of  a  crime  is  thus 
relevant  where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  it 
amounts  to  error  as  to  the  crime.  To  kill  a  police- 
man  on  duty  in  the  belief  that  he  is  a  private  citizen 
is  not,  it  is  submitted,  capital  murder,  because  the 
intention  to  commit  capital  murder  is  absent:  it  can 
only  be  ordinary  murder. 
(b)  Error  as  to  mode.  The  position  here  is  the 
same  as  in  the  case  of  error  as  to  victim,  although 
examples  are  rarer.  If  A  sets  out  to  kill  B  by  knocking 
him  on  the  head  and  then  cutting  his  throat  when  he  is 
unconscious,  it  does  not  matter  if  in  fact  the  first 
blow  kills  B.  But  if  A  intends  to  wound  B  by  shooting 
him,  and  then  to  throw  hin  into  the  river  and  drown 
him  alive,  it  may  be  important  if  the  shot  kills  B. 
For  then  A  will  have  created  the  actus  reus  of  capital 
murder  while  intending  only  to  commit  ordinary  murder, 
and  it  will  not  be  possible  to  convict  him  of  capital 
murder  without  showing  that  the  shooting  of  B  was  rcc.  k.  1_ess 310 
uQ  oad  the  possibility  of  its  being  fatal.  Again, 
suppose  A  sets  out  to  rob  a  safe  and  takes  with  him 
a  substance  he  believes  to  be  a  non-explosive  corrosive, 
intending  it  to  use  it  to  melt  the  safe-lock:  In  fact 
the  substance  is  explosive  and  as  a  result  the  safe  is 
blown  up.  In  such  circumstances,  it  is  submitted, 
the  error  would  be  irrelevant  if  A  were  charged  with 
theft  by  opening  lockfast  places,  but  relevant  if  he 
were  charged  with  theft  by  using  explosives. 
Error  as  to  mode  and  causalitZ.  Error  regarding 
mode  may  be  relevant  even  where  there  is  no  question 
of  a  different  crime  being  committed  as  a  result 
of  the  error  from  that  intended.  If  the  actual  cause 
of  death  is  sufficiently  different  from  the  intended 
cause  of  death,  then  A  may  be  absolved  from  responsibility 
for  homicide,  because  of  the  absence  of  any  causal 
connection  between  his  act  and  death.  If  A  intends 
to  kill  B  by  shooting,  but  in  fact  his  shot  is  not 
fatal,  and  B  is  killed  by  a  road  accident  while  being 
taken  to  hospital  in  an  ambulance,  it  may  be  that  A  is 
probably  guilty  only  of  assault  and  attempted  murder. 
(cf.  Hart  and  Honor(,  'Causation  in  the  Law'  (1956)  72 
L.  Q.  R.  58,404;  T.  B.  Smith,  p.  1097).  Even  if  A  puts 
B's  wounded  body  into  his  own  car  and  drives  him  off 
with  the  intention  of  burying  him  somewhere,  and  B 
(who  was  not  in  fact  fatally  injured)  is  killed  in  a 
road  accident  caused  by  A's  negligence,  A  may  only  be 
guilty  of  the  attempted  murder  and  the  actual  culpable 
homicide  of  B.  (cf.  Sdhöanke-Schröder,  pp.  309-10). 
Error  and  transferred  intent. 
The  types  of  situation  just  discussed  from  the 
point  of  view  of  error  can  also  be  considered  from  the 
standpoint  of  what  is  known  as  'transferred  intent', 
with  rather  different  results.  The  doctrine  of X11 
transferred  intent,  briefly,  is  the  doctrine  that  where 
A  intends  to  co  uit  a  particular  crime,  or  to  injure  a 
particular  victim,  or  to  commit  a  crime  in  a  particular 
way,  and  in  fact  commits  it  in  a  different  way,  or 
injures  a  different  person,  or  even  commits  a  different 
crime,  the  difference  is  unimportant,  and  the  original 
intent  can  be  'transferred'  to  what  actually  happened. 
If  Oedipus'  intention  of  killing  a  stranger  is  trans- 
ferred  to  what  actually  happened,  the  result  is  to  make 
him  guilty  of  parricide.  The  transfer  is  explained 
in  this  way  -  Oedipus  intended  to  kill,  and  therefore 
he  had  raens  rea;  he  killed  his  father,  therefore  he 
created  the  actus  reus  of  parricide,  and  did  so  with 
mens  rea.  It  does  not  mater  that  the  mens  rea 
was  that  of  simple  homicide,  because  raens  rea  in  this 
context  means  simplJ  wickedness  of  mina,  and  is  trans- 
ferable  from  one  crime  to  another;  it  is  that  general 
mens  rea  wLich  is  thought  of  as  characterising  all 
criminal  intentions.  If  iriens  rea  is  transferable  in 
this  way  the  rule  that  an-,  error  affecting  the  type  of 
crime  is  relevant  will  cease  to  apply,  and  error  will 
be  relevant  only  when  the  accused  would  have  committed  no 
crime  at  all,  had  the  facts  been  as  he  believed  them  to  be. 
(a)  Transfer  of  intent  among  crimes_.  In  practice 
this  doctrine  is  ouuly  of  L,  iportance  with  regard  to 
homicide,  and  even  then  only  when  the  original  intention 
was  to  commit  a  serious  crime.  Until  recently  any 
homicide  occurring  in  the  course  of  at  any  rate  a  crime 
of  violence  was  murder  in  England;  znd  in  the  United 
States  any  killing,  occurring  in  the  course  of  a  felony 
is  murder,  while  any  occurring  in  the  course  of  a  mis- 
demeanour  is  manslaughter  (Hall,  pp.  454-60). 
It  is  agreed  on  alt  hands  that  this  tyooe  of  transfer 
does  not  exist  in  Scots  law  (e.  g.  R.  C.  para.  92). 312 
(whether  it  is  also  true,  as  the  Report  states,  that  Scots 
law  does  not  recognise  'anything  akin'  to  this  doctrine, 
depends  on  whether  recklessness  is  always  regarded  as 
sufficient  mens  rea  for  murder,  or  thether  it  is  only 
sufficient  mens  rea  where  the  killing  occurs  in  the 
course  of  another  crime.  This  depends  on  the  definitio  n 
of  murder.  So  far  as  the  general  principles  of  the  law 
are  concerned  it  is  sufficient  to  note  that  intention 
cannot  be  transferred  in  this  way  in  Scotland,  but  that 
the  mens  rea  uQ  oad  a  given  crime  whether  recklessness 
or  intention,  must  exist  before  that  crime  can  be  said 
to  have  been  committed.  )  It  should  follow  that 
intent  can  only  be  transferred  from  one  victim  or 
one  mode  to  another  where  the  intended  crime  and  the 
actual  crime  are  the  same. 
(b)  Transfer  of  intent  between  victims.  It 
follows  from  the  above  that  transfer  between  victims 
can  only  be  made  where,  if  the  situation  were  approached 
by  way  of  the  law  of  error,  the  error  would  be  irrelevant. 
Thus  if  A  stabs  B  believing  him  to  be  C,  the  intent.  ' 
to  kill  C  can  be  transferred  to  the  killing  of  B  only 
if  killing  C  is  the  same  crime  as  killing  B,  i.  e.  only 
if  the  error  between  B  and  C  is  irrelevant.  If  B  is  a 
policeman  on  duty,  and  C  an  ordinary  citizen,  the  transfer 
cannot  be  made,  because  it  would  involve  a  transfer 
between  crimes  -  from  ordinary  murder  to  capital  murder. 
(The  argument  remains  sound  even  if  capital  murder 
is  regarded  as  merely  an  aggravated  form  of  murder, 
in  the  way  that  theft  by  explosives  is  an  aggravated' 
form  of  theft,  although  the  additional  penalty  is  mandatory 
in  the  case  of  murder.  Error  regarding  these  aggravations 
is  what  is  called  in  Germany  error  regarding  facts  which 
increase  the  punishabX  y  of  the  offence  -  Tatumständen... 
welche...  die  Strafbarkeitýrhöhen  -  StGB  Art.  59,  and 313 
should  be  taken  into  account.  ) 
It  is  submitted  that  in  view  of  the  actual  identity 
of  result  in  such  case's  whether  that  result  is  reached 
by  way  of  the  rules  of  error  or  the  so-called  rule  of 
transferred  intent,  the'  result  should  be  based  on  error, 
since  this  avoids  the  doctrines  of  constructive  mens  rea 
which  is  involved  in  transferred  intent,  and  which  has 
been  rejected  by  Scots  law  in  the  case  of  transfer 
between  crimes. 
Aberratio  ictus.  So  far  we  have  been  considering 
the  ease  in  which  the  criminal  makes  a  mistake  in  identify- 
ing  his  victim,  where  A  shoots  at  B  believing  him  to  be 
0.  This  is  what  is  called  error  in  objecto.  We 
must  now  consider  the  position  where  the  mistake  is 
not  the  mistake  of  the  criminal  but,  so  to  speak,  the 
mistake  of  the  bullet  -  aberratio  ictus  -  where  A  aims 
at  B  but  accidentally  hits  C  instead. 
Scots  law  treats  this  in  the  same  way  as  it  treats 
error  in  objecto  -  it  regards  the  error  as  irrelevant. 
Thus,  as  Hume  says, 
'A  criminal  charge  may  be  good,  though  there 
is  no  evidence  of  a  purpose  to  injure  the  very 
person  who  has  been  the  sufferer  on  the  occasion. 
For  instance,  in  a  trial  for  fire-  raising,  it 
cannot  affect  the  judgement  of  the  Court,  nor 
ought  it  of  the  Jury,  that  the  house  which  has  been 
consumed  is  not  the  house  of  an  enemy,  which  the 
pannel  meant  to  destroy,  and  to  which  he  applied 
the  fire,  but  that  of  another  person,  to  him 
unknown,  and  to  which,  by  the  shifting  of  the  wind, 
or  some  other  accident,  the  flames  have  been  carried. 
The  same  is  true  in  a  case  even  of  homicide,  that 
crime  to  which  a  special  malice  may  seem  more 
natural  than  to  most  others.  If  John  make  a 
thrust  at  James,  meaning  to  kill,  and  George, 
throwing  himself  between,  receive  the,  thrust  and 
die,  who  doubts  that  John  shall  answer  for  it,  as 
if  his  mortal  purpose  had  taken  place  on  James? 
(Hume,  1.22). 314 
With  respect,  and  some  hesitation,  I  take  leave  to  doubt 
this,  and  would  offer  the  following  observations: 
(1)  We  are  dealing  here  with  cases  in  which  there 
is  neither  intent  nor  recklessness  so  far  as  the  actual 
crime  is  concerned.  Where  A  shoots  at  B  and  kills  C 
whom  he  knew  to  be  standing  beside  B,  he  may  well  be 
guilty  of  murdering  C  because  he  recklessly  disregarded 
the  possibility  that  C  might  be  killed.  In  Matthew  Hay 
(May  1780,  ib.  )  the  accused  was  convicted  of  murder 
because  he  put  poison  in  a  pot  in  which  a  whole 
family's  breakfast  was  being  cooked,  with  the  intention 
of  poisoning  the  daughter,  but  with  the  actual  result 
of  poisoning  her  parents.  This,  as  Hume  recognises, 
was  a  case  of  recklessness,  'as  be  could  not  but  see  the 
hazard  to  the  whole  family'.  In  such  circumstances, 
there  is  no  need  to  invoke  the  doctrine  of  transferred 
intent.  The  doctrine  is  required  where  there  is  no 
recklessness  regarding  the  actual  crime  -  where  the  fire 
laid  to  A's  house  is  carried  to  B's  by  sheer  accident, 
or  where  C  suddenly  throws  himself  between  A  and  B, 
in  circumstances  in  which  A  could  not  have  foreseen 
this,  or  at  any  rate  where  it  was  not  so  likely  as 
to  make  A  reckless.  (cf.  Brown,  (1907)  5  Adam  312,  where 
the  accused  sent  a  poisoned  cake  addressed  to  his 
intended  victim  which  was  actually  eaten  by  the  latter's 
servant.  The  indictment  simply  libelled  the  intent 
to  poison  the  person  to  whom  the  cake  was  addressed  and 
the  actual  death  by  poison  of  the  deceased,  and  it  was 
not  suggested,  so  far  as  the  report  shows,  that  it 
was  necessary  to  ask  if  the  accused  should  have  foreseen 
the  likelihood  of  anyone  else  eating  the  cake.  The 
indictment  certainly  suggests  that  the  charge  was  based 
on  pure  transfer  of  intent.  The  case,  however,  was 
fought  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  ahd  although  an  example 
of,  is  not  an  authority  on,  transferred  intent.  ) 315 
(2)  The  doctrine  depends  on  the  idea  of  general 
wens  rea.  It  is  made  so  to  depend  by  Hume  (ib),  and 
the  only  reason  it  has  not  been  seen  to  conflict  with 
the  Scots  attitude  to  transfer  between  crimes  is  that 
until  the  Homicide  Act  of  1956  (5  &6  Eliz.  II,  c.  11) 
all  victims  were  legally  equal. 
(3)  The  law  as  stated  by  Hume  can  lead  to  some 
most  peculiar  situations.  It  means  that  if  a  man  shoots 
at  his  wife,  and  the  bullet  ricochets  and  kills  his 
child,  who  has  suddenly  come  into  the  room,  he  is 
guilty  of  murdering  the  child.  But  if  he  were 
about  to  shoot  his  wife  because  he  had  found  her  in 
adultery,  he  would  only  be  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide,  since  the  killing  of  his  wife  would  only 
have  been  culpable  homicide.  The  doctrine  means  that  a 
man  may  be  convicted  of  murdering  someone  of  whose 
existence  he  was  unaware,  or  'to  whom  he  bore  all 
manner  of  regard'  (Hume,  ib.  ).  For  these  reasons 
the  doctrine  is  objectionable  (cf.  Gl.  Williams,  paras. 
34-5),  and  for  these  reasons  it  is  unlikely  that  a 
jury  would  ever  follow  it,  as  Hume  appears  to  have 
suspected  when  he  said  that  the  change  of  victim  'ought' 
not  to  affect  the  jury.  The  obvious  solution  is  that 
adopted  by  German  law  -  to  convict  A  of  the  attempted 
murder  of  B,  and  of  the  negligent  homicide  of  C,  if  he 
was  negligent  uQ  oad  C  (H.  Mannheim,  'bens  Rea  in  '*erman 
and  English  Law',  (1935)  17  J.  Comp.  Leg.  and  Int.  Law, 
83,746;  cf.  Schänke-Schroder,  p.  309). 
(4)  The  real  difficulty,  as  Mannheim  points  out 
(op.  cit.  loc.  cit.  )  is  to  juttify  the  distinction  between 
error  in  objecto  and  aberratio  ictus.  Why  should  the 
person  who  aims  at  B  believing  him  to  be  C  be  in  a  worse 
position  than  the  person  who  aims  at  B  and  hits  C  because 
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alike,  but  it  can  at  least  be  said  that  it  is  easier 
to  treat  the  bad  shot  as  only  negligent,  than  it  is  so 
to  treat  the  man  who  makes  an  error  in  ob  ecto.  It  is 
difficult  to  speak  of  error  at  all  in  the  case  of 
aberratio  ictus,  where  A  does  not  intentionally  shoot  C 
under  the  mistaken  belief  that  he  is  B.  The  simplest 
way  of  describing  aberratio  ictus,  is  to  say  just  that  A 
carelessly  shot  C,  and  it  seems  reasonable  for  the  law 
to  deal  with  the  matter  in  that  way.  Where  the  error 
is  in  objecto  it  is  more  difficult,  if  not  impossible, 
to  distinguish  the  intended  act  from  what  happened,  since 
both  the  intended  and  the  actual  shot,  so  to  speak, 
have  the  same  trajectory.  To  say  that  in  error  in 
objecto  A  intended  to  shoot  the  person  in  front  of 
him  is  too  simple,  since  in  neither  type  of  error  did 
he  intend  to  shoot  C,  and  in  both  cases  his  shooting  of 
C  was  in  some  sort  an  accident.  But  the  conviction 
of  A  for  murdering  C  does  not  seem  so  paradoxical 
in  the  case  of  error  in  objecto,  perhaps  because  in 
such  a  case  there  will  usually  be  an..  element  of  reckless- 
ness  uQ  oad  C-a  man  should  make  sure  at  whom  he  is 
shooting,  but  he  cannot  always  make  sure  than  an  out- 
sider  will  not  get  in  the  way  of  his  bullet,  or  that 
his  aim  will  be  perfect. 
I  can,  finally,  see  no  great  objection  to  treating 
error  in  objecto  as  irrelevant  error;  and  in  practice 
it  would  be  very  difficult  to  arouse  any  sympathy  for 
the  accused  in  such  a  case.  But  I  consider  it 
objectionable  to  deal  with  aberratio  ictus  by  way  of 
transferred  intent,  because  I  consider  transferred 
intent  objectionable,  and  I  see  no  great  difficulty 
in  treating  such  situations  in  the  German  way. 
After  all,  if  A  had  aimed  at  a  tree  and  accidentally 
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murdering  C.  In  cases  of  aberratio  ictus  itis  easy 
to  consider  the  situation  without  taking  into  account 
the  original  intention  to  shoot  B-  the  intention  to 
shoot  B  can  be  treated  as  no  more  important  than  the 
intention  to  shoot  at  a  tree.  To  treat  it  as  more 
important  is  very  like  adopting  the  old  English  doctrine 
of  constructive  malice. 
(c)  Transfer  of  intent  between  modes.  The 
position  here  is  the  same  as  that  where  the  transfer  is 
between  victims.  The  transfer  can  only  properly  be 
made  when  the  modes  are  legally  equivalent,  and  where 
the  difference  in  mode  is  not  so  great  as  to  destroy 
the  causal  connection  between  the  criminal's  act  and 
the  actus  reus. 
This  type  of  transfer  is  probably  only  important 
in  cases  of  art  and  pa  rt  guilt.  If  A  and  B  agree 
to  rob  a  safe  without  using  explosives,  and  B,  whose 
job  it  is  to  do  the  actual  safe-breaking  uses  explosives, 
A  cannot  be  art  and  part  in  the  aggravated  crime  of  theft 
by  explosives  -  unless,  of  course,  that  aggravated 
crime  can  be  committed  carelessly,  and  the  circum- 
stances  were  such  that  A  ought  to  have  foreseen  that  B 
would  use  explosives.  The  principle  is  simply  that 
there  the  original  conspiracy  is  so  far  departed 
from  that  a  different  degree  of  crime  is  committed 
from  that  planned,  the  original  conspirators  are  not 
responsible  for  the  deviations  unless  they  participated 
actively  in  them. 
Error  of  law. 
Error  of  law  is  irrelevant.  It  is  not  a  good 
defence  to  a  criminal  charge  that  one  did  not  know  that 
what  one  did  was  against  the  law,  or  that  one  thought 
that  it  was  legal.  Provided  that  one  intentionally 
and  voluntarily  performed  an  act  which  was  in  fact 318 
criminal,  it  does  not  matter  that  one  thought  it  was 
not  a  crime. 
The  recent  case  of  Clark  v.  Syme  (1957  J.  C.  l) 
is  an  example  of  the  irrelevance  of  an  error  of  law. 
The  accused  was  charged  with  maliciously  killing  a  sheep, 
and  pleaded  in  defence  that  he  thought  he  had  a  legal 
right  to  kill  the'sheep  because  it  was  trespassing 
on  his  land.  In  rejecting  this  defence,  Lord  Clyde, 
the  Lord  Justice-General,  said, 
'If..  it  was  not  clear  where  the  [accused] 
knew  that  by  doing  what  he  did  he  was  doing  or 
was  likely  to  do  damage,  the  Crown  night  fail; 
for  the  necessary  wilfulness  might  not  then 
be  present.  But  in  this  case  no  such  doubt 
could  possib]x  arise.  The  [accusedl  in  this 
case  acted  deliberately.  He  knew  what  he  was 
doing...  The  mere  fact  that  his  criminal  act 
was  performed  under  a  misconception  of  what 
legal  remedies  he  might  otherwise  have  had  does 
not  make  it  any  the  less  criminal'  (at  p.  5). 
Although  the  distinction  between  errors  of  fact 
and  of  law  is  clear,  it  is  often  difficult  to  say 
whether  a  particular  error  is  one  of  law  or  of  fact. 
Is  a  belief  that  a  particular  person  is  married,  for 
example,  a  belief  about  law  or  about  fact?  The 
distinction  between  error  of  law  and  error  of  fact 
probably  depends  on  whether  or  not  error  as  to  a  general 
principle  of  law  is  involved.  If  A  commits  bigamy 
in  the  belief  that  his  first  wife  has  divorced  him 
while  in  fact  she  has  only  obtained  a  separation 
decree,  he  acts  under  an  error  of  fact  -  he  knows 
quite  well  that  a  separation  decree  does  not  entitle  him 
to  remarry,  but  that  a  divorce  decree  does,  and  he 
believes  that  in  fact  his  wife  obtained  a  divorce. 
But  if  he  knows  that  she  only  obtained  a  separation 
decree,  and  believes  that  this  entitles  him  to  remarry, 
his  error  is  one  of  law'-  he  knows  the  true  facts  but 319 
wrongly  believes  that  it  is  the  law  that  a  man  whose 
wife  has  a  separation  decree  is  entitled  to  remarry. 
(Cf.  Thomas  v.  R.  (1937)  59  C.  L.  R.  2/9  where  the 
accused  believed  his  first  marriage  to  be  invalid 
because  he  mistakenly  thought  his  wife  had  not  obtained 
a  decree  absolute  against  her  first  husband,  but  only  a 
decree  nisi  -  an  error  of  fact.  )  Again,  suppose  A 
has  intercourse  with  his  sister  B  in  the  belief  that 
she  is  illegitimate.  If  this  belief  is  based 
on  a  mistaken  belief  that  at  the  time  of  B's  conception 
her  parents  were  not  free  to  marry,  then  it  is  a  mistake 
of  fact;  but  if  it  is  based  on  a  mistaken  belief  that 
there  is  no  such  thing  as  legitimation  ehr  subseguencs 
matrimonium  in  Scotland,  it  is  an  error  of  law.  As 
Professor  T.  B.  Smith  points  out  (T.  B.  Smith,  p.  712) 
there  is  no  Scots  authority  for  this  distinction. 
But  the  general  rule  that  error  of  law  is  no  excuse  is 
the  law  of  Scotland,  and  it  is  submitted  that  if  the 
need  arose  the  distinction  between  errors  of  law  and  of 
fact  would  be::  defined  in  this  way. 
There  may  be  cases  in  which  even  error  of  general 
law  is  relevant.  If  a  crime  can  only  be  committed 
where  the  accused  acts  with  a  specific  intention, 
that  intention  may  be  negatived  by  an  error  of  law. 
Theft  is  the  felonious  taking  away  of  someone  else's 
property,  and  if  the  accused  believes  that  the 
property  is  hiw  own,  he  cannot  be  guilty  of  theft 
(Hume,  i.  73-5.  Dewar,  1945  J.  C.  5).  In  Dewar  (1945 
J.  C.  5)  where  the  accused  was  the  manager  of  a  crematorium 
and  was  charged  with  stealing  coffin  lids  it  was  held  to 
be  a  relevant  defence  (although  it  was  unsuccessful) 
that  the  accused  believed  that  he  was  entitled  to  do 
what  he  liked  with  the  lids  after  the  bodies  had  been 
cremated,  because  they  were  ownerless  scrap,  and  that 
it  was  the  custom  in  crematoria  for  them  to  be  regarded 5Z0 
as  perquisites  of  the  person  in  charge. 
The  basis  of  the  irrelevance  of  error  of  law.  The 
rule  that  error  of  law  is  irrelevant  is  very  like  the  rule 
that  in  questions  of  moral  responsibility  a  man's  duty 
is  to  do  what  is  right,  and  not  what  he  believes  to  be 
right  (see  supra,  60).  It  is,  however,  difficult  to 
justify  the  view  than  an  agent  is  morally  blameworthy 
for  doing  what  was  wrong  in  t.  ie  belief  that  it  was 
right,  and  even  more  difficult  to  justify  the  view  that 
a  .,  ian  who  does  something  criminal  in  the  belief  that 
it  is  legal,  should  be  treated  as  if  he  had  deliberately 
committed  a  crime.  lt  is  perhaps  hardly  plausible 
for  the  conscientious  bigamist  to  say  that  he  would 
not  have  committed  bigamy  had  he  known  it  was  :;  roag 
to  marry  two  wives  at  one  time,  because  if  he  is  truly 
conscientious  he  will  not  admit  that  it  was  wrong. 
But  it  is  plausible  for  the  big?;  amist  acting  under  error 
of  law  to  say  tilat  he  would  not  have  done  what  he  did 
had  he  known  it  was  a  crime. 
The  real  basis  of  the  rule  about  error  of  law  is 
projably  that  everyone  nas  a  duty  to  know  the  law  - 
that  iinorantia,  or  error,  juris  neminem  excusat. 
This  duty  depends  partly  on  ideas  of  disfacilitation  - 
'The  law,  which  cannot  know  the  truth  of  his  excuse 
(that  he  thought  he  was  acting  lawfully'  ,  and  which 
perceives  the  advantage  that  might  be  taken  of  such 
gross  pretences,  for  the  indulgence  of  malice,  presumes 
his  knowledge  of  that  which  he  is  not  excusable  for 
being  ignorant  of'(Hume,  i.  26).  This  is  not  altogether 
satisfactory.  To  presume  knowledge  where  none  exists 
is  to  introduce  the  idea  of  constructive  malice. 
The  most  we  can  say  of  the  accused  who  acted  under 
error  of  law  is  that  he  should  have  found  out  the  law 
before  he  acted,  but  his  failure  to  do  so  can  hardly 
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negligence  -  recklessness  if  he  neither  knew  nor  cared 
that  what  he  was  doing  was  unlawful,  negligence  if  he 
came  to  an  erroneous  conclusion  about  the  law.  How 
then  are  we  to  justify  treating  the  accused  as  if  he 
had  acted  intentionally? 
The  only  answer  seems  to  be  that  it  just  is  the  law 
that  all  citizens  must  always  take  the  risk  that  their 
actings  will  turn  out  to  have  been  unlawful,  since 
if  this  were  not  so,  the  result  would  be  anarchy, 
and  every  man  would  make  his  own  law.  Probably 
the  most  that  can  be  done  to  recognise  error  of  law  as 
relevant  is  to  allow  it  to  rank  in  mitigation 
of  the  crime,  since  it  negatives  'malice'  in  the  old- 
fashioned  sense  of  the  word  (cf.  su  ra  68). 
Unreasonable  mistake. 
For  a  mistake  to  be  relevant  it  must  be  reasonable 
(Dewar,  supra).  This  means  that  mistake  is  treated 
objectively.  It  is  not  enough  that  the  accused  acted 
under  a  mistaken  belief,  he  must  have  acted  under  a 
mistaken  belief  which  it  was  reasonable  for  him  to 
have  made.  This  is  because  of  the  principle  of  dis- 
facilitation.  As  Lord  Cooper  said  in  Dewar,  'this 
would  be  a  very  convenient  world  for  criminals  of  all 
kinds  if  a  man  were  to  be  free  to  commit  an  offence 
or  a  crime  of  any  nature  and  then  to  come  forward 
and  in  this  Court,  say  that  he  did  not  believe  it  was 
a  crime  at  all'  (Dewar,  1945  J.  C.  5,9).  (It  is  true 
that  this  is  expressed  with  reference  to  errors  of  law, 
but  the  rule  of  reasonableness  applied  to  all  error,  and 
Dewar's  error  was  tantamount  to  an  error  of  fact  -  of. 
supra,  °,  4?  ). 
The  meaning  of  'unreasonable'.  The  meaning  normally 
attached  to  unreasonable  is  'such  that  the  reasonable 
man  would  not  have  so  acted',  and  if  this  were  its 321a. 
meaning  in  the  law  of  mistake  the  result  would  be  that 
all  careless  mistakes  would  be  unreasonable  and  irrelevant. 
Hall  thinks  that  this  is  the  law  in  America:  and  points 
out  that  it  is  'inconsistent  with  the  ethical  rationale 
of  ignorantia  facti;  it  is  opposed  to  the  prevailing 
rule  of  the  Civilian  system'  (Hall,  pp.  331-2).  In 
Swiss  and  German  law  a  person  who  acts  under  the 
influence  of  careless  error  is  punished  for  negligence, 
provided  that  the  act  is  one  which  is  punishable  when 
committed  negligently  (StGB  Art.  59,  SchwStGB  Art.  20). 
Thus  a  man  who  steals  as  the  result  of  a  careless  error 
will  be  free  from  guilt,  but  a  man  who  kills  as  the 
result  of  a  careless  error  will  be  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide. 
The  Scots  law  is  not  explicit  on  this  question, 
but  it  is  submitted  that  so  far  as  careless  errors  are 
concerned  its  attitude  is  the  same  as  that  of  German  law. 
There  are  a  number  of  cases  in  which_,  persons  who 
killed  because  'of  careless  errors  were  charged  only 
with  culpable  homicide.  In  Williamina  Sutherland 
((1856)  2  Irv.  455)  the  accused  killed  a  child  by 
folding  up  a  bed  in  which,  unknown  to  her,  the  child  was 
lying.  She  was  charged  with  culpable  homicide,  and 
accordingly  her  ignorance  of  the  child's  presence  was 
regarded  as  irrelevant,  but  it  was  said  that  it  would 
have  been  of  'vital  consequence'  had  she  been  charged 
with  murder,  (Lord  Cowan  at  p.  45'1).  Again,  in  Edmund 
Wheatley  ((1853)  1  Irv.  225),  the  accused  killed  someone 
by  carelessly  dispensing  French  instead  of  English 
quantities  of  a  medicine,  and  in  Wood  ((1903)  4  Adam  150) 
death  was  caused  by  a  chemist  who  carelessly  did  not 
read  the  labels  on  his  bottles  and  so  dispensed  strychine 
instead  of  medicine.  In  these  cases  the  accused  were 
not  charged  with  murder  but  only  with  culpable  homicide. 322 
(cf.  also  A.  B.  (1887)  1  Wh.  532  where  the  accused  discharged 
a  gun  he  believed  to  be  empty,  and  similarly,  David 
Buchanan,  April  1817,  Hume  1.192). 
It  seems  clear,  therefore,  that  careless  mistake 
or  ignorance  excludes  intention.  What  then  is  meant 
by  unreasonable  mistake?  An  unreasonable  mistake  is 
one  that  no  reasonable  man  would  make,  but  the  reasonable 
man  in  this  instance  is  not  identified  with  the 
reasonable  careful  man.  To  succeed  in  a  defence  of 
mistake  an  accused  must  have  arrived  at  his  mistaken 
belief  'on  reasonable  grounds'  (Owens,  1946  J.  C.  119 
Lord  Justice-General  Normand,  at  p.  125),  but  that  means 
only  that  he  must  have  had  'rational  and  colourable 
grounds  for  believing'  what  he  did  believe  (Dewar,  1945 
J.  C.  5,  Lord  Justice-General  Normand  at  p.  12). 
Provided  he  has  such  grounds,  he  is  allowed  to  draw 
a  mistaken  conclusion  from  them.  The  only  objective 
limitation  is  that  there  is  excluded  'that  sort  of 
belief,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  which  is  directly 
in  the  face  of  law,  and  grounded  only  in  the  violent 
passions  of  the  man,  or  his  blind  prejudices  in  his  own 
favour',  as  Hume  said  in  talking  of  a  thief's  erroneous 
belief  that  the  stolen  goods  were  his  as  of  right  (Hume, 
i.  74). 
It  seems  that  a  mistaken  belief  will  only  be 
excluded  as  unreasonable  if  it  has  been  arrived  at 
in  spite  of  the  facts,  and  is  without  any  objective 
basis  at  all;  and  such  a  belief  could  probably  not  be 
entertained  without  a  reckless  sregard  of  the  true 
facts.  In  Crawford  (1950  J.  C.  6'j)  it  was  said  that 
for  a  mistake  to  be  relevant  it  'must  have  an  objective 
background  and  must  not  be  purely  subjective  or  of  the 
nature  of  a  hallucination'  (Lord  Justice-General  Cooper 
at  p.  71).  If  it  is  a  hallucination  it  will  probably 323 
be  dealt  with  as  an  insane  delusion,  so  that  the  only 
error  which  is  in  practice  excluded  as  unreasonable 
is  one  which  is  baded  on  an  idea  the  accused  has  got 
into  his  head  for  no  reason  at  all,  something  founded 
on  'fantastic  notions  of  his  own  devising'  (T.  B.  Smith, 
p.  712). 
In  principle  there  is  no  more  ground  for  rejecting 
such  a  belief  when  genuinely  held,  than  there  is  for 
rejecting  a  reasonable  belief  genuinely  held,  although 
of  course  it  will  be  much  more  difficult  to  convince 
a  jury  of  the  genuineness  of  the  former  type  of  belief. 
Indeed,  there  can  be  very  few  cases  in  which  a  jury 
would  accept  such  a  belief  where  the  accused  is  sane, 
and  even  in  these  cases  the  belief  would  probably 
be  the  result  of  culpable  recklessness.  The  exclusion 
of  the  small  class  of  unreasonable  errors  from  the  general 
law  of  error  is  therefore  unlikely  to  lead  to  any 
considerable  injustice. 324 
Chapter  8:  Insanity 
I-  INSANITY  AS  A  DEFENCE. 
The  Scots  law  on  insanity  as  a  defence  to  a 
criminal  charge  is  unsettled  and,  indeed,  in  modern 
times  it  is  almost  unstated.  There  is  no  reported 
decision  of  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  on  the  subject; 
the  reported  cases  conflict  with  each  other,  and  are 
very  few  in  this  century;  the  evidence  given  to  the 
Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment  is  very  vague. 
The  general  tendency  of  the  law  is  to  wash  its  hands 
of  the  whole  matter,  and  abide  by  the  decision  of  medical 
experts.  Lord  Cooper  told  the  Royal  Commission  that, 
'However  much  you  charge  a  jury  as  to  the  M'Naghten 
Rules  or  any  other  test,  the  question  they  would  put 
to  themselves  when  they  retired  is  -  "Is  the  man  mad 
or  not?  "  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper,  Q.  5479).  Lord 
Cooper's  own  suggested  test  'Is  he  not  responsible 
for  his  actions  by  reason  of  a  defect  of  reason?  ' 
(ib.  Q.  5475)  does  focus  attention  on  responsibility 
rather  than  on  madness,  but  it  is  not  more  explicit 
than  'Is  he  mad?  '.  It  asks  a  different  question,  but 
gives  no  help  in  answering  it. 
At  the  same  time  it  is  still  felt  that  there  is 
a  legal  criterion  somewhere  by  which  it  can  be  determined 
whether  or  not  a  man  is  legally  irresponsible  as  a 
result  of  insanity,  that  not  all  insane  men  are 
irresponsible;  although  no  one  can  say  what  the 
criterion  is,  or  just  what  types  of  insanity  do  render  a 
man  irresponsible.  In  this  state  of  affairs  I  deal 
with  the  subject  by  discussing  generally  the  problems 
raised  by  insanity,  before  turning  to  the  Scots  cases 
on  the  subject,  and  I  conclude  by  giving  some  necessarily .52,7 
very  tentative  indication  of  what  the  present  law 
on  the  subject  is. 
Insanity  and  irresponsibility. 
The  basis  of  the  defence  of  insanity. 
Insanity  is  recognised  in  all  advanced  systems 
of  jurisprudence  as  a  factor  which  may  prevent  a  person's 
being  held  responsible  for  his  actions.  Violent 
disputes  have  raged  on  the  question  of  what  degree 
or  type  of  insanity  is  necessary  or  sufficient  to  free 
an  accused  from  criminal  responsibility  for  what  would 
otherwise  be  crimes.  These  disputes  have  been 
intensified  and  very  much  complicated  by  the  great 
advances  made  in  our  knowledge  of  the  human  mind  and 
its  motivations  in  the  past  half  century  or  so,  but  they 
were  present  long  before  that.  In  1800  in  defending 
James  Hadfield,  who  had  shot  at  the  King  in  order  that 
he  might  be  banged  and  so  obey  Divine  command  to 
sacrifice  himself  without  incurring  the  sin  of  suicide, 
Erskine  said,  'It  is  agreed  by  all  jurists,  and  is 
established  by  the  law  of  this  and  every  other  country, 
that  it  is  the  reason  of  man  which  makes  him 
accountable  for  his  actions;  and  that  the  deprivation 
of  reason  acquits  him  of  crime.  This  principle  is 
indisputable,  yet  so  fearfully  and  wonderfully  are  we 
made,...  so  difficult  is  it  to  trace  with  accuracy  the 
effect  of  diseased  intellect  upon  human  action,  that  I 
may  appeal  to  all  who  hear  me,  whether  there  are  any 
causes  more  difficult,  or  which,  indeed,  so  often 
confound  the  learning  of  the  judges  themselves,  as  when 
insanity,  or  the  effects  and  consequences  of  insanity, 
become  the  subjects  of  legal  consideration  and  judgment' 
(Jas.  Hadfield,  (1800)  27  St.  Trials,  Col.  1281  at 
Col.  1309-10). P  ýb 
Legal  and  medical  insanity.  It  has  been  said 
that  criminal  responsibility  is  'purely  an  artifact 
of  the  law',  and  that  it  cannot  therefore  be  directly 
affected  by  new  psychological  knowledge  (cf.  G.  Ellenbogen, 
'The  Principles  of  the  Criminal  Law  Relating  to 
Insanity',  (1948)  J.  of  Cr.  Sc.  Vol.  I,  178,192). 
This  view  can  lead  to  a  sharp  distiation  bdtween 
what  are  sometimes  known  as  legal  and  medical  insanity, 
though  the  distinction  is  really  between  legal 
responsibility  and  medical  insanity.  The'  law  is 
concerned  to  know  not  just  whether  the  prisoner  was 
insane  when  he  committed  the  crime,  but  also  whether 
his  insanity  was  such  as  to  render  him  legally  irresponsible. 
Just  as  a  certified  lunatic  can  make  a  good  will  in  a  sane 
interval,  or  a  person  suffering  from  delusions  about 
his  paternity  contract  a  good  marriage,  so  a  certified 
lunatic  may  be  responsible  for  committing  a  crime  ina 
lucid  interval,  or  the  person  suffering  from  delusions 
be  responsible  for  his  actions  when  these  are  concerned 
with  something  unconnected  with  the  delusion.  Insanity 
is  simply  a  state  of  mind,  a  mental  disease;  what 
the  law  is  concerned  with  is  the  accused's  responsibility, 
and  not  his  mental  health. 
But  although  the  law  asks  'Is  he  responsible?  ', 
and  not  'Is  he  mad?  ',  and  although  that  is  a  legal  and 
not  a  medical  question,  psychological  knowledge  may  be 
of  great  assistance  in  answering  the  legal  question, 
since  it  can  tell  us  whether  the  accused's  mental  state 
was  such  that  he  fulfilled  the  requirements  laid  down  by 
the  law  as  sufficient  to  render  a  person  responsible  or 
irresponsible.  The  law  is,  of  course,  entitled  to  say 
'We  only  hold  a  man  to  be  irresponsible  when,  as  a  result 
of  mental  disease,  certain  conditions,  a,  b,  and  c,  are 
satisfied',  and  then  it  would  not  matter  if  psychologists 
proved  that  certain  people  in  whom  these  conditions  were 32? 
not  present,  were  insane,  because  of  the  presence  of 
other  conditions,  d,  and  e.  But  if  the  law  wishes 
to  keep  pace  with  medical  knowledge,  and  to  conform 
to  certain  general  principles  of  responsibility,  such 
as  the  necessity  for  freewill  as  a  precondition  of 
responsibility,  it  will  not  adopt  this  approach,  and 
psychology  may  lead  the  law  to  recognise  that  conditions 
d,  and  e,  also  exclude  responsibility  because,  for 
example,  they  negative  freewill  in  whatever  sense  the 
law  understands  that  term.  It  will  not  matter  then 
that  at  one  time  the  law  said  'A  man  is  irresponsible 
only  if  his  mental  disease  produces  conditions  a,  b,  and 
at,  since  these  conditions  will  not  be  a  closed  class, 
but  be  capable  of  extension  in  the  light  of  later  know- 
ledge.  It  is  only  if  the  original  conditions  are 
treated  as  ultimate  and  self-justifying  that  develop- 
ment  is  impossible  -  if  they  are  regarded  as  conditions 
which  exemplify  the  general  principles  of  responsibility, 
then  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  additions  being  made 
to  them.  And  if  later  knowledge  shows  that  one  or 
more  of  the  original  conditions  are  not  such  as  to 
exclude  responsibility,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  them 
being  subtracted  from,  either. 
Insanity  and  other  kinds  of  irresponsibility.  One 
can  regard  the  fact  that  an  accused's  irresponsibility 
arose  out  of  his  insanity  as  unimportant,  except  from 
the  point  of  view  of  deciding  how  to  deal  with  him  after 
his  acquittal.  To  say  that  a  man  is  irresponsible 
because  of  insanity  is  just  to  say  that  he  is 
irresponsible,  and  that  the  cause  of  his  irresponsibility 
is  insanity.  The  insane  man  is  not  irresponsible  because 
he  is  insane,  but  because  he  fails  to  measure  up  to  the 
standards  of  responsitil.  ity,  in  just  the  same  way  as  the 
somnambulist  is  irresponsible.  A  man  who  is  rendered X26 
incapable  of  knowing  what  he  is  doing,  is  irresponsible 
because  of  his  incapacity,  whether  this  incapacity  is 
the  result  of  mental  disease,  or  of  some  other  cause. 
The  peculiar  case  of  Ritchie  (1926  J.  C.  45) 
offers  an  example  of  irresponsibility  caused  by  a 
mental  condition  short  of  insanity.  R  was  charged 
with  culpable  homicide  by  reckless  driving,  and  his 
defence  was  that  'by  the  incidence  of  temporary  mental 
dissociation  due  to  toxic  exhaustive  factors  he  was 
unaware  of  the  presence  of  the  deceased  on  the  highway 
and  of  his  injuries  and  death,  and  was  incapable  of 
appreciating  his  immediately  previous  and  subsequent 
actions'.  Lord  k  urray  told  the  jury  that  '  Irre  sponsibilitV 
need  not  be  confined  to  what  to  us  is  the  most  familiar 
example,  viz.,  the  case  of  a  person  who  is,  in  popular 
language  "out  of  his  mind"'  (at  p.  48).  His  Lordship 
went  on  to  describe  the  general  basis  of  the  defence 
of  irresponsibility  as  a:  «ounting  to  this,  that  'owing 
to  some  disordered  condition  of  the  mind,  which  affects 
its  working  the  affected  person  does  not  know  the  nature 
of  his  act,  or,  if  ne  does  know  what  he  is  doing  he 
does  not  know  that  what  he  is  doing  is  wrong'. 
Accordingly,  said  his  Lordship,  turning  to  the  facts 
of  Ritchie,  ',  there  the  defence  is  that  a  person  who 
would  ordinarily  be  quite  justified  in  driving  a  car 
becomes  -  owing  to  a  cause  which  he  was  not  bound  to 
foresee  and  which  was  outwith  his  control  -  either 
gradually  or  suddenly  not  the  master  of  his  own  action, 
a  question  as  to  his  responsibility  or  irresponsibility 
for  the  consequences  of  his  action  arises,  and  may 
form  the  basis  of  a  good  defence'  (ib.  ) 
.  The  jury 
accepted  Ritchie's  defence,  and  he  was  acquitted  and 
discharged  in  the  normal  way  since,  not  being  insane, 
he  could  not  be  detained  under  the  legislation  dealing 
with  persons  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity. 329 
Again,  the  ultimate  reason  for  acquitting  the  man 
who  is  irresponsible  because  of  his  insanity  is  the  same 
as  that  for  acquitting  persons  wno  are  irresponsible 
for  other  reasons,  such  as  intoxication  (if  that  is  ever 
a  ground  of  acquittal  -  see  infra1c4/o),  or  because 
they  acted  under  error  of  fact.  A  person  is  treated 
as  irresponsible,  either  because  the  law  recognises 
that  in  the  circumstances  it  would  be  unfair  to  regard 
him  as  morally  to  blame,  or  because  there  would  be 
no  point  in  punishing  him.  Bentham  includes  insanity 
among  those  rases  where  punishment  is  inefficacious, 
because  it  could  produce  no  preventive  effect  (Bentham, 
XIII,  9).  In  the  same  way  the  Parliamentary 
Commissioners  of  1839  included  the  insane  among  those 
to  whom  the  principle  that  the  object  of  the  penal  law 
is  the  prevention  of  injury  through  fear  of  suffering 
has  no  operation.  (7th  Report  of  Her  Majesty's 
Commissioners  on  the  Criminal  Law,  1842,  Parl.  Papers, 
ix,  p.  17).  As  Dixon,  J.  said  in  R.  v.  Porter  ((1936) 
55  C.  L.  R.  182),  'It  is  perfectly  useless  for  the  law 
to  attempt,  by  threatening  punishment,  to  deter  people 
from  committing  crimes  if  their  mental  condition  is  such 
that  they  cannot  be  in  the  least  influenced  by  the 
possibility  or  probability  of  subsequent  punishment'. 
The  various  theories  and  the  cases  on  insanity  must  be 
viewed  in  the  light  of  two  questions,  which  may  be 
just  two  sides  of  the  one  question  -  'Is  it  fair  to 
blame  the  accused?  ',  and  'Is  there  any  point  in 
punishing  the  accused?  '. 
Cognitive  insanity  and  the  M'Naghten  Rules. 
It  was  recognised  comparatively  early  that  madmen 
are  subject  to  delusions  -  they  saw  things,  or  heard 
voices,  they  might  believe  that  the  devil  was  pursuing 
them  (e.  g.  Robt.  Thomson,  June,  1739,  Hume,  i.  40), 
or  that  they  had  received  Divine  commands  to  sacrifice 330 
themselves  (e.  g.  Jas.  Hadfield,  (1800)  27  St.  Trials, 
1281).  The  simplest  way  to  approach  this  problem  was 
to  treat  insane  delusions  as  analogous  to  errors  of 
fact,  with  this  difference,  that  the  insane  man,  being 
ex  hypothesi  unreasonable,  might  successful  plead 
unreasonable  error,  and  might  plead  error  of  law  if 
he  was  incapable  of  knowing  the  law.  If  the  accused 
killed  a  man  in  the  belief  that  he  was  killing  the 
devil  he  was  entitled  to  be  acquitted  since  it  is, 
presumably,  no  crime  to  kill  the  devil. 
The  rules  regarding  the  application  of  the  law  of 
error  to  the  insane  were  schematised  in  the  notorious 
M'Naghten  Rules.  These  rules  were  set  out  by  the 
English  Judges  in  answer  to  questions  asked  by  the 
House  of  Lords  following  the  acquittal  of  Daniel 
M'Naghten  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  after  he  had 
killed  the  Prime  Minister's  secretary  -  whom  he  took 
for  the  Prime  Minister  -  because  he  had  an  insane 
belief  that  the  Government  were  persecuting  him 
((1843)  10  Cl.  &  F.  200).  Despite  their  unusual 
origin  they  are  regarded  in  England  almost  as  if  they 
were  part  of  a  statute  ;  they  are  followed  in  Canada, 
New  Zealand,  India,  Pakistan,  Ceylon,  and  in  parts  of 
Australia  and  of  the  United  States  (see  R.  C.  App.  9, 
paras.  3-5).  They  have  been  said  to  be  the  law  of 
Scotland  (Jas.  Gibson,  (1843)  2  Broun  332),  although 
today  they  are  probably  not  law  in  Scotland,  or 
at  any  rate  are  not  the  whole  Scots  law  on  insanity. 
They  set  out  clearly  and  definitely  a  particular 
legal  attitude  to  what  might  be  called  insanity  of  the 
intellect,  insanity  affecting  the  patients'  capacity 
of  knowledge,  and  as  such  they  merit  consideration. 
They,  or  something  like  them,  are  almost  bound  to  form 
part  of  any  law  which  lays  down  detailed  rules  for 
judging  the  responsibility  of  the  insane.  In  any 331 
event,  it  is  impossible  to  consider  the  subject  of  insanity 
in  the  criminal  law  in  an  English-speaking  country 
without  discussing  them,  although  there  is  nothing  new 
that  can  be  said  about  them.  They  may  be  accepted, 
criticised,  or  rejected,  but  they  cannot,  perhaps 
unfortunately,  be  ignored. 
The  Rules.  The  essential  parts  of  the  Rules 
are  as  follows: 
1.  Persons  who  labour  under  partial 
delusions  only,  and  are  not  in  other  respects 
insane,  and  who  act  under  the  influence  of  an 
insane  delusion,  of  redressing  or  revenging  some 
supposed  grievance  or  injury,  are  nevertheless 
punishable  if  they  knew  at  the  time  of  committing 
the  crime  that  they  were  acting  contrary  to  the 
law  of  the  land. 
2.  Every  man  is  presumed  to  be  sane  until 
the  contrary  be  proved. 
3.  To  establish  a  defence  on  the  ground  of 
insanity,  it  must  be  clearly  proved  that  at  the 
time  of  committing  the  act,  the  accused  was 
labouring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason,  from 
disease  of  the  mind,  as  not  to  know  the  nature 
and  quality  of  the  act  he  was  doing,  or,  if 
he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not  know  he  was 
doing  what  was  wrong.  If  the  accused  was 
conscious  that  the  act  was  one  that  he  ought 
not  to  do,  and  if  that  act  was  at  the  same  time 
contrary  to  the  law  of  the  land,  he  is  punishable. 
4.  A  person  labouring  w 
delusion  only  and  not  in  other 
must  be  considered  in  the  same 
responsibility  as  if  the  facts 
which  the  delusion  exists  were 
Broun  App.  1). 
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The  strength  of  the  Rules  lies  riot  only  in  their 
similarity  to  the  rules  of  the  ordinary  law  of  error, 
which  makes  them  easily  comprehensible  to  lawyers, 
and  easy  to  use  in  legal  contexts,  but  also  in  their 
apparent  coincidence  with  ordinary  moral  judgment. 332 
The  core  of  the  rules  is  the  requirement  that  the  insane 
person  did  not  'know  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act 
he  was  doing,  or,  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not 
know  he  was  doing  what  was  wrong'.  This  seems  to  be 
in  accord  with  moral  thinking  -  if  a  man  knows  what 
he  is  doing  and  knows  it  is  wrong,  it  seems  proper 
to  blame  him  for  doing  it.  (I  am  not  here  concerned 
with  the  controversy  whether  wrong  means  morally  wrong, 
or  contrary  to  law  -  that  diffculty  can  be  left  to 
Anglo-American  lawyers  -  see  R.  v.  Windle  [1952)  2 
Q.  B.  826).  'You  knew  what  you  were  doing  and  you 
knew  that  Mummy  said  you  weren't  to  do  it'  is  a  familiar 
enough  justification  for  punishment. 
Indeed  the  rules  might  be  thoughtto  be  quite 
indulgent  to  the  criminal  in  some  cases.  They  appear 
to  adopt  a  subjective  attitude  to  right  and  wrong, 
and  allow  the  defence  that  the  accused  did  not  know  he 
was  doing  wrong:  if  Himmler  had  suffered  from  a  mental 
disease  which  led  him  to  believe  that  it  was  right  and 
proper  to  exterminate  certain  people,  he  would  be 
entitled  to  be  regarded  as  morally  irresponsible  for 
his  actings,  were  our  moral  judgments  to  be  based 
on  the  same  principles  as  are  enshrined  in  the  Rules. 
What  more,  it  might  be  asked,  can  be  demanded  in  the 
way  of  consideration  for  the  mentally  ill?  Surely 
someone  who  knowingly  does  wrong  must  be  regarded  as 
blameworthy,  and  in  adopting  the  Rules  the  law  is 
merely  reflecting  this. 
The  weakness  of  the  rules.  The  Rules  rest  however 
on  assumptions  now  rejected  by  all  psychologists. 
They  depend  on  the  view  that  ,a  man  can  be  insane  with 
regard  to  one  matter  and  perfectly  sane  in  regard  to 
everything  else.  They  assume  that  while  a  man's 
judgment  may  be  so  warped  that  he  believes  his  neighbour 333 
is  trying  to  make  his  impotent  by  black  magic,  he  may 
yet  be  sane  enough  to  be  responsible  for  killing  that 
neighbour  (cf.  Taylor's  Principles  of  Medical 
Jurisprudence,  11th  e  dn.  pp.  577-8).  But  'a  delusion 
is  never  an  isolated  disorder,  but  is,  in  fact,  merely 
an  indication  of  a  more  deepseated  widespread 
disorder.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  subject 
of  delusional  insanity  cannot  ever  be  regarded  as 
fully  responsible  for  anti-social  acts;  it  was  a 
failure  to  appreciate  this  that  led  to  the  LT'Naghten 
Rules'  (Smith  &  Fiddes,  Forensic  Medicine,  10th  ed. 
p.  379). 
The  Rules  concentrate  entirely  on  knowledge, 
and  assume  that  the  knowledge  of  an  insane  man  is 
the  same  as  that  of  a  sane  man;  that  the  sufferer 
from  delusions  who  knows  that  it  is  wrong  to  kill 
his  imagined  persecutor  knows  this  in  the  same  way 
as  a  sane  man  knows  it  is  wrong  to  kill  his  real  enemy. 
The  Rules  say  that  the  test  of  responsibility  is  know- 
ledge  of  right  and  wrong,  and  that  therefore  an  insane 
man  who  knows  right  and  wrong  is  responsible.  But 
it  is  not  possible  to  treat  this  knowledge  in  isolation 
from  the  diseased  part  of  the  accused's  mind,  or  to 
regard  it  as  sane  knowledge.  It  is  tempting  to  say 
that  'However  mad  he  was,  he  was  sane  enough  to  know 
he  was  doing  wrong',  but  to  do  so  is  to  forget  that 
his  knowledge  will  have  been  tainted  by  his  insanity. 
The  strict  application  of  the  Rules  leads  to  some 
peculiar  results.  Hadfield,  for  example,  was  so  clearly 
insane  that  after  the  defence  evidence  had  been  led 
the  Judge  advised  the  Crown  to  accept  a  plea  of  insanity, 
but  he  knew  he  was  doing  wrong  -  that  was  why  he  did  it, 
he  wanted  to  be  hanged.  M'Naghten  himself  might  not 
have  been  regarded  as  irresponsible  in  terms  of  the 334 
Rules,  for  had  his  delusion  been  real,  had  the  Government 
really  been  persecuting  him,  that  would  have  been  no 
excuse  for  murdering  the  Prime  Minister.  Cases  like 
Hadfield  ((1800)  2/  St.  Trials,  1281)  show  how  ridiculous 
the  Rules  can  be  in  operation.  As  Maudsley  said  of 
a  similar  case  in  which  the  Judge  applied  the  rules, 
and  said  the  accused's  desire  to  be  hanged  showed  that 
he  knew  the  nature  and  consequences  of  his  act,  'He  was 
in  due  course  executed;  the  terrible  example  having 
been  thought  necessary  in  order  to  deter  others  from 
doing  murder  out  of  a  morbid  desire  to  indulge  in 
the  gratification  of  being  hanged'  (Maudaley, 
Responsibility  in  Mental  Disease,  159). 
Even  if  ire  leave  aside  the  Utilitarian  aspect  of 
the  matter,  and  concentrate  on  the  idea  of  blameworthiness, 
the  Rules  will  clearly  not  do.  An  example  of  this  is 
the  case  of  Straffen  who  killed  little  girls  to  annoy 
the  police,  i.  e.  in  the  knowledge  that  it  was  wrong  to 
do  so.  A  medical  witness  said  of  him  that  'He  might  be 
likened  to  a  child  who  burns  some  very  valuable  docu- 
ments  because  he  likes  to  see  them  blaze,  but  who  does 
not  appreciate  that  they  are  valuable,  although  he 
knows  it  is  wrong  to  do  it'  (Trials  of  John  Thomas 
Straffen,  ed.  Fairfield  and  Fullbrook,  p.  182).  It 
seems  clearly  wrong  to  blame  Straffen  for  what  he  did 
in  the  same  way  as  one  would  blame  a  sane  man  who  went 
about  killing  little  girls. 
'Sane  understanding'.  This  objection  to  the  Rules 
can  be  met  without  fundamentally  altering  them,  and 
without  recognising  any  form  of  insanity  other  than 
intellectual  insanity.  All  that  is  needed  is  to 
recognise  that  an  insane  man  cannot  reason  properly, 
and  thus  can  never  know  the  nature  and  quality  of 
his  act,  or  its  wrongness,  in  the  way  a  sane  man  would. 
The  result  of  this  would  probably  be  to  make  it  the  law 335 
that  to  be  responsible  a  man  must  have  'a  sane  under- 
standing  of  the  circumstances  of  his  act',  with  the 
corollary  that  no  certifiably  insane  person  could  have 
such  an  understanding.  This  would  be  in  line  with  the 
Faculty  of  Advocates'  view  of  the  modern  Scots  law 
as  expressed  in  their  Memorandum  to  the  Royal  Commission 
(R.  C.  Evid.  Memorandum  of  Faculty  of  Advocates,  para.  12). 
It  would  also  accord  with  the  views  expressed  by  Dixon,  J. 
in  his  dissenting  judgment  in  the  Australian  case  of 
R.  v.  Sodeman  ((1936)  55  C.  L.  R.  182,  at  pp.  189-90), 
where  he  said,  'In  general  it  may  be  correctly  said 
that,  if  the  disease  or  mental  derangement  so  governs 
the  faculties  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  particular 
accused  to  reason  with  some  moderate  degree  of  clearness 
in  relation  to  the  moral  quality  of  what  he  is  doing, 
he  is  prevented  from  knowing  that  what  he  does  is  wrong'. 
The  same  result  could  perhaps  be  achieved  by 
concentrating  on  the  need  for  the  accused  to  know  the 
quality  of  his  act.  It  could  be  said  that  an  insane 
man  cannot  know  the  quality  of  his  act,  because  he 
cannot  have  a  sane  appreciation  of  its  nature. 
Straffen,  for  example,  knew  he  was  killing,  but  did 
not  know  the  quality  of  his  act,  in  the  sense  that  he 
did  not  appreciate  the  seriousness  of  what  he  was  doing. 
(He  was  nonetheless  convicted,  but  that  may  have  been 
because  he  had  done  the  same  thing  before  and  succeeded 
in  a  plea  of  insanity  in  bar  of  trial,  and  public 
feeling  ran  high.  He  was  not  hanged  but  repreived 
and  sent  back  to  the  mental  hospital  from  which  he  had 
escaped.  ) 
Volitional  insanity  and  irresponsible  impulse. 
If  the  Rules  are  regarded  as  a  complete  statement 
of  the  law  on  insanity,  and  not  merely  as  a  formulation 
of  the  rules  regarding  delusional  or  cognitive  insanity, 336 
they  are  open  to  a  much  more  fundamental  objection 
than  their  failure  to  recognise  that  knowledge 
of  right  and  wrong  is  insufficient  unless  accompanied 
by  t  sane  understanding  of  the  circumstances  of  the 
crime.  They  are  open  to  the  objection  that  they  treat, 
man  as  a  purely  cognitive  being,  and  ignore  the 
volitional  and  emotional  aspects  of  human  nature. 
Modern  psychology  recognises  that  a  man  may  be  sufficiently 
disturbed  emotionally  to  be  insane  and  yet  have  his 
intellectual  faculties  unimpaired  as  such.  Henderson 
and  Gillespie  point  out  in  their  textbook  that  'There 
is  no  mental  disorder,  however  partial  in  appearancg, 
that  does  not  have  its  reverberations  throughout  the 
rest  of  the  affected  mind.  Consequently,  the  purely 
intellectual  criterion  of  responsibility  falls  to  the 
ground,  for  the  intellect  as  intellect  may  be  unimpaired, 
but  an  emotional  disturbance  will  alter  or  impede  or 
nullify  its  effect  on  conduct.  Conversely,  intellectual 
defect  means  deficient  emotional  control'  (D.  K.  Henderso  n 
and  R.  D.  Gillespie,  Textbook  of  Psychiatry,  7th  edn. 
p.  713).  Since  the  criminal  law  is  not  concerned 
with  thought  but  with  conduct,  any  rules  regarding 
responsibility  which  ignore  volition  cannot  be 
satisfactory. 
Theobvious  solution  to  the  problem  is  to  add  to 
the  Rules  a  statement  that  where  an  accused  is  incapable 
of  controlling  his  actions  as  a  result  of  mental  disease, 
he  shall  not  be  regarded  as  responsible.  This  seems 
to  follow  from  the  general  rule  that  a  person  cannot  be 
blamed  for  failing  to  do  the  impossible;  and  also  from 
the  Utilitarian  consideration  that  punishment  or  the 
threat  of  it  will  no  more  persuade  a  man  to  resist  an 
irresistible  impulse  than  it  will  persuade  a  one-legged 
man  to  win  an  Olympic  race.  Irresistible  impulse  is 33`? 
accepted  as  a  defence  in  parts  of  Australia,  in  South 
Africa,  in  Germany,  and  in  Switzerland.  (See  R.  C.  App. 
9,  paras.  3-12;  StGB  art.  51.  Incidentally  it  is  not 
accepted  in  France.  Although  Art.  64  of  the  Penal 
Code,  which  deals  with  insanity,  also  talks  of  'contraint 
par  une  force  a  laquelle  ii  n'a  pu  resister',  this  has 
been  interpreted  so  as  to  apply  only  to  external 
compulsion  -  Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p.  200).  The 
defence  is  normally  given  expression  by  reference  to  a 
disease  which  renders  the  accused  incapable  of 
acting  according  to  his  knowledge  of  the  wrongness 
of  the  act  (e.  g.  StGB  Art.  51  -  Eine  strafbare  Handlung 
ist  nicht  vorhanden,  wenn  der  Täter....  unfahig  ist,  das 
Unerlaubte  der  Tat  einzusehen,  oder  nach  dieser 
Einsicht  zu  handeln').  It  is  probably  accepted  in 
Scotland  (see  infra),  although  it  has  been  rejected 
in  England  as  'fantastic'  (R.  v.  Kopsch,  (1925)  19 
Cr.  App.  Rep.  50,  Lord  Hewart,  C.  J.  at  p.  51);  it 
has,  however,  the  support  of  the  Royal  Commission 
on  Capital  Punishment  (R.  C.  Recommendation  18). 
The  objections  to  the  acceptance  of  irresistible 
impulse.  Two  difficulties  face  any-attempt  to 
incorporate  the  defence  of  irresistible  impulse  in  the 
law.  The  first  is  the  very  fact  that  it  is  a  defence 
of  a  volitional  nature.  The  law  is  familiar  with 
defences  based  on  faults  of  cognition,  but  irresistible 
impulse  'introduces  a  volitional  exemption  from  liability 
which  is  unknown  to  law'  (G.  Ellenbogen,  op.  cit.  p.  211). 
Motive  is  always  regarded  as  irrelevant  to  responsibility 
-  it  does  not  matter  whether  A  steals  out  of  greed 
or  to  save  his  starving  baby  -  and  irresistible 
impulse  is  a  defence  that  the  motive  of  the  crime  was 
the  desire  to  commit  the  crime.  It  should  be  obvious, 
however,  that  where  this  desire  is  the  result  of  insanity, 338 
the  question  of  motive  does  not  really  enter  at  all, 
unless  insanity  is  to  be  described  as  a  motive.  And 
if  we  say  the  motive  was  insanity,  it  should  be-  obvious 
that  that  means  that  the  accused  was  not  responsible, 
since,  so  to  speak,  'Twas  not  Hamlet  wronged  you  but 
his  madness'. 
The  second  difficulty  is  one  of  proof.  Psychiatrists 
find  irresistible  impulse  an  unsatisfactory  concept 
(cf.  A.  M'Niven,  'Psychoses  and  Criminal  Responsibility' 
in  Mental  Abnormality  and  Crime,  p.  8,  at  pp.  68-71; 
R.  C.  Evid.  of  D.  K.  Henderson,  Q.  6481).  It  is  very 
difficult  for  a  doctor  to  say  that  a  given  impulse  was 
irresistible,  even  if  it  can  be  said  in  general  that 
'there  are  cases  of  mental  disorder  where  the 
impulse  to  do  a  criminal  act  recurs  with  increasing 
force  until  it  is,  in  fact,  uncontrollable',  a  view 
which  was  accepted  by  the  Atkin  Committee  in  1923 
(Report  of  Committee  on  Insanity  and  Crime,  1923, 
Comd.  2005,  p.  8).  For  most  lunatics  are  capable 
of  submitting  to  some  sort  of  control  -  as  Maudsley 
said,  that  is  why  asylums  are  quiet  places.  (Maudsley, 
off-cit.  P.  271).  Even  if  the  impulse  in  question 
was  uncontrollable,  punishment  may  assist  the  control 
of  future  impulses  of  a  like  nature,  and  imprisonment 
will  almost  certainly  remove  the  temptation  which 
provoked  the  impulse,  and  render  satisfaction  impossible. 
Judges  who  are  opposed  to  the  defence  of 
irresistible  impulse  use  the  difficulty  of  proof  in 
order  to  employ  the  principle  of  disfacilitation  to 
counter  any  attempt  to  introduce  the  defence.  As 
usual,  the  use  of  the  principle  is  not  conducive,  to 
sound  thinking.  In  opposing  a  Bill  intended  to 
introduce  the  defence  into  English  law,  Lord  Hewart 
said  that  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  irresistible 
impulse  from  the  desire  for  gain  or  revenge  (Hansard, 339 
House  of  Lords,  15  May  1924,  Vol.  57,  Col.  468); 
Lord  Haldane  said  it  should  not  be  made  a  defence, 
and  assured  the  House  that  no-one  who  killed  under  such 
an  impulse  was  likely  to  be  hanged  (ib.  col.  472); 
while  Lord  Dunedin  said  that  the  defence  was  not  countenanced 
by  Hume  (since  Hume  was  last  edited  in  1844  this  is 
neither  relevant  nor  surprising;  it  may  not  even  be 
correct,  see  infra),  and  that  it  would  'open  the 
door  to  subterfuge  and  impede  the  proper  carrying  out 
of  the  criminal  law'  (ib.  col.  '475).  Lord  Dunedin 
did  not  tell  the  House  that  the  defence  had  been 
introduced  into  Scots  Law  at  least  as  early  as  1853 
without  any  notable  impediment  being  created.  Again, 
in  his  charge  to  the  jury  in  the  case  of  Neville  Heath, 
Morris,  J.  said  'an  inability  to  resist  temptation 
is  not  of  itself  insanity...  The  plea  lof  insanity 
cannot  be  permitted  to  become  the  easy  or  the  vague 
explanation  of  some  conduct  which  is  shocking  merely 
because  it  is  also  startling'  (Trial  of  Neville 
George  Heath,  ed.  Macdonald  Critchley,  p.  218). 
The  need  to  recognise  the  defence.  Unless  the  law  is 
prepared  to  say  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as 
irresistible  impulse  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  can 
refuse  to  accept  it  as  a  defence,  at  any  rate  where  it  is 
'so  irresistible  as  to  leave  the  accused  in  no  better 
position  to  withstand  it...  than  if  some  physically 
stronger  person  had  by  mechanical  compulsion  directed 
his  hand'  (Gardner  and  Lansdowne,  South  African 
Criminal  Law  and  Procedure,  5th  edn.  Vol.  I,  p.  68). 
The  existence  and  strength  of  any  insane  impulse  must 
be  regarded  as  a  question  of  medical  fact,  just  as  the 
existence  and  strength  of  mechanical  compulsion  is 
regarded  as  a  question  of  physical  fact.  To  adopt  any 
other  attitude  is  to  insist  that  the  dogma  of  freewill 340 
means  that  everyone  is  always  free  to  do 
_or 
f'efrain 
fron  any  action  in  any  circumstances,  and  that  is  a  very 
extreme  view.  Thefact,  if  fact  it  be,  that  no  act 
can  be  responsible  unless  it  is  free  no  more  entails 
the  fact  that  all2cts  are  free  than  does  the  fact 
that  every  husband  must  have  a  wife  entail  the  fact 
that  all  men  are  married  (cf.  Hume,  Treatise  on  Human 
Nature,  I,  iii,  3). 
The  only  other  approach  which  excludes  irresistible 
impulse  is  a  naive  religious  one,  such  as  was  adopted  by 
Lord  Hope  in  Scotland,  when  he  told  a  jury  that  they 
might  be  sure  that  the  accused  was  not  tempted  beyond 
what  he  was  able  to  bear.  But  even  Lord  Hope  recog- 
nised  that  an  accused  might  be  'unable,  by  the  visitation 
of  God,  to  do  what  his  duty  to  God  requires  -  to  struggle 
and  overcome  his  passions,  which  every  man  possessed  of 
reason  may'  (Geo.  Lillie  Smith,  (1855)  2  Irv.  1,62, 
cf.  Jas.  Gibson,  (1844)  2  Broun  332,361). 
The  defence  of  irresistible  impulse  may  be  described 
as  the  orthodox  volitional  addition  to  the  Rules. 
It  involves  merely  that  in  addition  to  the  Rules,  which 
remain  the  principal  criterion,  the  law  will  recognise 
the  defence  of  impulse.  And  the  defence  may  be  limited 
to  cases  of  a  single  impulse  operating  on  the  accused 
at  the  time  of  the  crime.  Such  an  impulse  is  comparable 
to  cases  of  extreme  physical  compulsion  and  so,  like 
the  Rules  themselves,  has  an  analogy  in  the  law 
regarding  the  responsibility  of  sane  persons. 
The  Causal  Approach. 
The  best  modern  view  on  the  problem  of  insanity 
and  crime  is  that  the  question  cannot  be  decided  by 
reference  to  rules  or  formulae.  This  view  is 
reflected  in  the  recommendation  of  the  Royal  Commission 
on  Capital  Punishment  that  the  Rules  should  be  abrogated, 341 
and  the  jury  left  to  decide  if  the  accused  was  'suffer- 
ing  from  disease  of  the  mind  or  mental  deficiency 
to  such  a  degree  that  he  ought  not  to  be  held  responsible' 
(R.  C.,  Recommendation  19).  This  is  perhaps  too  vague, 
but  the  suggested  position  can  perhaps  be  described 
by  saying  that  wherever  the  accused's  crime  was  caused 
by  his  insanity  he  should  be  treated  as  irresponsible. 
If  the  accused's  conduct  is  caused  by  insanity,  in  the 
sense  that  it  can  only  be  explained,  or  can  best  be 
explained,  in  terms  of  his  insanity,  punishment  would 
be  pointless,  because  it  would  not  affect  the  cause  of 
the  crime.  Alternatively,  it  can  be  said  that  where 
the  accused's  crime  is  caused  by  disease,  it  is 
caused  by  something  for  which  he  is  not  to  blame  - 
unless  he  lives  in  Erewhon.  If  the  answer  to  'Why 
did  he  do  it?  '  is  'Because  he  was  mentally  diseased', 
there  can  be  no  responsibility.  And  because  every 
mental  disease  affects  a  person's  whole  personality 
this  will  always  be  the  answer  when  an  insane  man 
commits  a  crime.  Where  the  accused  is  mentally 
diseased,  but  not  to  the  extent  of  being  certifiably 
insane,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury,  on  the 
medical  and  other  evidence,  to  decide  whether  the 
disease  was  advanced  enough  to  be  accounted  the  cause 
of  the  crime  -  but  this  raises  the  question  of 
diminisked  responsibility  and  is  discussed  infra  (ßk7). 
Thus  the  distinction  between  medical  insanity  and  legal 
irresponsibility  is  blurred,  and  the  rule  becomes  simply 
that  the  mad  are  not  responsible. 
Unless  this  type  of  approach  is  adopted  it  is 
probably  impossible  to  include  among  the  irresponsible 
those  who  act  not  on  sudden  impulse,  but  after  long 
brooding  on  imagined  wrongs,  or  on  their  own  miserable 
condition,  like  the  man  who  kills  his  family  to  save  them 342 
from  the  result  of  his  poverty  (cf.  Sharp,  1927  J.  C.  66) 
or  the  depressive  who  finally  kills  the  girl  he  has 
seduced,  or  the  woman  who  kills  her  child  while  suffering 
from  puerperal  insanity.  This  approach  is  implicit 
inýpresant  Scottish  practice,  but  it  is  not  expressly 
the  law  of  Scotland. 
Of  the  many  countries  whose  laws  were  considered 
by  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment,  only 
New  Hampshire  expressly  adopted  the  view  that  insanity 
is  to  be  decided  on  the  facts  without  reference  to  any 
special  tests.  The  law  there  is  that  'Neither 
delusion  nor  knowledge  of  right  and  wrong,  nor  design 
or  cunning  in  planning  and  executing  the  killing  and 
escaping  or  avoiding  detection,  nor  ability  to  recognise 
acquaintances,  jor  to  labour  or  transact  business  or 
mannage  affairs,  is,  as  a  matter  of  law,  a  test  of  mental 
disease;  but...  all  symptoms  and  all  tests  of  mental 
disease  are  purely  matters  of  fact,  to  be  determined  by 
the  jury...  Whether  the  defendant  had  a  mental  disease, 
and  whether  the  killing  of  his  wife  was  the  product  of 
such  disease,  are  questions  of  fact  for  the  jury' 
(State  v.  Pike,  (1869)  49  N.  H.  399,  Doe,  J.;  R.  C., 
App.  9).  A  similar  view  seems  now  to  be  taken  by  the 
Federal  Courts  in  the  District  of  Columbia  where  it  has 
been  held  that  an  accused  is  not  responsible  if  his 
crime  was  the  product  of  mental  disorder.  This  was 
said  to  be  because  'The  legal  and  moral  traditions 
of  the  Western  world  require  that...  where  [cri4inal7 
acts  stem  from  and  are  the  product  of  a  mental  disease 
or  defect  ...  moral  blame  shall  not  attach,  and  hence 
there  will  not  be  criminal  responsibility'  (Durham  v.  U.  S. 
(1954)  214  Fd.  2d.  862,  cited  in  H.  Weihofen,  The  Urge 
to  Punish,  pp.  7-8). 343 
The  onus  of  proof.  This  broad  view  is  open  to  the 
objection  that  it  overturns  the  legal  presumption  that 
every  man  is  responsible  unless  he  establishes  the 
contrary,  since  it  presumes  that  where  an  insane 
man  commits  a  crime  the  crime  is  the  result  of  his 
insanity.  The  Medical  Psychological  Association 
suggested  to  the  Atkin  Committee  that  the  proper 
direction  to  a  jury  should  be  that  if  the  accused  was 
insane  they  should  acquit  unless  it  was  proved  that  the 
crime  was  unrelated  to  the  mental  disorder;  But  they 
agreed  that  this  could  never  be  proved,  and  suggested 
as  an  alternative  that  the  Crown  should  have  to  prove 
that  'the  mental  disorder  was  not  calculated  to 
influence  the  commission  of  the  act'  (Report  of  Committge 
on  Insanity  and  Crime,  1923,  Cmd.  2005,  pp.  49  5). 
But  if  in  fact  there  is  a  presumption  that  an  insane 
person's  crime  was  'wholly  or  largely  caused'  by  his 
insanity,  then  the  law  must  take  this  fact  into  account 
(R.  C.  ,  Recommendation  16,  M.  R.  C.  para.  286).  This 
means  that  once  the  accused  has  proved  that  he  is  insane, 
the  Crown  must  displace  the  strong  presumption  that  his 
crime  was  produced  by  his  insanity.  After  all, 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  Crown,  who  must  prove  that 
an  accused  did  not  act  in  self-defence  or  under 
provocation,  if  the  accused  puts  forward  either  of 
these  pleas  (Woolmington  v.  D.  P.  P.,  [1935]  A.  C.  462; 
Owens,  1946  J.  C.  119),  should  not  have  to  negative 
irresponsibility  once  the  accused  has  not  merely 
pleaded  but  actually  proved  the  fact  of  his  insanity. 
Indeed,  if  the  presumption  of  fact  is  overwhelmingly 
strong,  the  onus  probably  is  on  the  Crown  in  practice. 
For  the  accused  need  only  prove  his  defence  on  a  balance 
of  probabilities,  and  it  seems  that  on  balance  it  will 
always  be  prima  facie  more  probable  that  the  crime 
was  the  result  of  the  insanity,  than  that  it  was 3L4 
unconnected  with  it.  This  might  not  be  as  favourable 
to  the  accused  as  the  more  logical  rule  adopted  in 
parts  of  the  United  States,  that  it  is  enough  for  the 
'accused  to  raise  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to  his  sanity 
for  the  onus  to  be  shifted  (Weihofen,  op.  cit.  P.  104), 
but  it  would  probably  work  out  well  enough  in  practice, 
and  it  avoids  the  necessity  of  a  frontal  attack  on  the 
rule  that  the  accused  must  displace  the  presumption 
of  responsibility. 
The  advantages  of  the  causal  approach.  The 
greatest  advantage  of  the  causal  approach  is  that  it 
enables  the  law  to  separate  those  whose  crimes  are 
committed  from  motives  which  are  amenable  to  punishment, 
from  those  who  require  not  punishment  but  medical 
treatment  in  order  to  prevent  a  recurrence  of  their 
crime  -  an  advantage  which  is  increased  by  the 
consideration  that  treatment  of  the  insane  is  more 
likely  to  be  effective  than  punishment  of  the  sane. 
Strict  adherence  to  any  set  of  rules  may  result  in 
the  subjection  of  the  insane  to  punishments  designed 
to  deter  the  sane,  but  useless  when  applied  to  the  in- 
sane. 
The  causal  approach  has  the  further  advantage  that 
it  avoids  the  difficulties  of  attempting  to  define 
what  is  probably  indefinable  -  the  relation  between 
mental  disease  and  responsibility.  It  is  a  flexible 
approach,  and  is  sensible  enough  to  leave  the 
decision  on  the  matter  to  those  who  know  something 
about  it  -  the  medical  experts.  Only  the  doctors 
can  know  whether  an  accused  is  insane,  and  only  the 
doctors  can  know  whether  he  requires  treatment  or  is 
amenable  to  punishment.  Lawyers  and  doctors  have 
always  been  suspicious  of  each  other,  especially 
in  matters  regarding  insanity  and  irresponsibility. 345 
Lawyers  tend  to  throw  up  their  hands  in  horror  at  the 
idea  of  questions  of  legal  responsibility  being  decided 
by  doctors.  But  this  is  a  misleadingly  naive  attitude. 
The  doctors  do  not  decide  responsibility;  they  only 
tell  us  whether  the  accused  was  sane  or  not,  and  if 
he  was  insane,  whether  his  insanity  affected  his  conduct. 
If  it  is  the  law  that  all  insane  criminals  are 
irresponsible,  this  is  a  legal  principle,  just  as  much 
as  the  Rules  are  legal  principles.  All  the  doctors 
do  is  tell  us  if  in  fact  the  accused  was  insane,  a 
fact  the  lawyer  is  incapable  of  discovering  for  himself. 
We  may  all  consider  ourselves  amateur  psychologists, 
and  in  the  old  days  when  only  raving  lunatics  were 
regarded  as  insane  (except  under  the  Rules!  )  it  might 
have  been  easy  for  a  lawyer  to  know  if  a  particular 
accused  was  mad  or  not,  but  today  only  an  expert  can 
pronounce  on  someone's  mental  health.  The  doctor 
who  says  the  accused  committed  the  crime  because  he 
was  a  certifiable  lunatic  suffering  from  paranoia  is 
no  more  answering  a  legal  question  than  is  the  doctor 
who  says  the  deceased  died  from  poison,  or  the  hand- 
writing  expert  who  says  a  particular  signature  is 
forged;  all  they  do  is  to  give  the  law  the  facts  to 
which  the  relevant  legal  principle  is  to  be  applied. 
And  this  is  so  whether  that  principle  is  about 
responsibility  and  insanity,  orabout  the  criminal 
nature  of  poisoning  or  forgery.  It  is  only  when  the 
law  leaves  the  criterion  of  responsibility  to  the  doctors, 
either  expressly,  or  because  it  is  incapable  of  forming 
its  own  criterion  (as  may  be  the  cade  in  Scotland  today) 
that  we  can  talk  of  doctors  deciding  the  law  for  us. 
The  New  Hampshire  rule  is  no  less  a  legal  criterion 
than  the  Rules,  although  it  is  more  intelligible  - 346 
even  under  the  Rules  it  is  usually  necessary  to  call 
medical  evidence  to  discover  whether  the  accused  knew 
that  what  he  was  doing  was  wrong. 
The  Scots  cases. 
From  Hume  to  Lord  Hope. 
Hume  states  that  for  the  plea  of  insanity  to  succeed 
there  must  be  'an  absolute  alienation  of  reason... 
such  a  disease  äs  deprives  the  patient  of  the  knowledge 
of  the  true  aspect  and  position  of  things  about  him  - 
hinders  him  from  distinguishing  fried  or  foe  -  and  gives 
him  up  to  the  impulse  of  his  own  distempered  fancy' 
(Hume,  i.  37).  It  is  interesting  that  this  definition, 
written  before  M'Naghten  was  heard  of,  is  typical  of 
what  may  still  be  the  Scots  approach  to  the  problem. 
We  start  off  by  setting  a  very  high  standard  -  absolute 
alienation  preventing  the  patient  from  knowing  not 
merely  what  he  is  doing,  but  what  is  going  on  around 
him,  and  then  we  tack  on  a  remark  which  may  or  may  not 
be  capable  of  wider  interpretation  -  that  he  should  be 
activated  wholly  by  the  impulse  of  his  own  distempered 
fancy.  Hume  later  distinguishes  between  'want  of 
temper'  and  'alienation  of  reason',  pointing  out 
that  'To  teach  men  to  withstand  the  impulse  of  sudden 
rage,  is  one  great  object  of  criminal  justice;  and  a 
person  cannot  be  considered  as  incapable  of  this 
discipline,  who  lives  at  large,  as  a  member  of  society, 
and.  gains  his  bread  by  the  exercise  of  an  ordinary 
profession'  (ib.  iln.  ).  We  know  now  that  as  a 
statement  of  fact  this  is  too  wide,  but  it  might  be 
inferred  from  what  Hume  says  that  where  someone  is  in 
fact  incapable  of  this  discipline,  he  is  not  a  fit 
object  of  punishment.  At  any  rate  it  seems  to  be  going 34? 
too  far  to  say,  as  did  Lord  Dune  din,  that  nothing  in 
Hume_  countenances  a  defence  of  irresistible  impulse 
(cf.  supra,  33  9)  . 
So  far  as  the  specific  subject  of  delusions  is 
concerned,  Hume  seems  to  take  a  rather  broader  view 
than  that  taken  in  the  Rules.  Hume  says, 
'And  though  the  pannel  have  that  vestige 
of  reason,  which  may  enable  him  to  answer  in 
the  general,  that  murder  is  a  crime,  yet, 
if  he  cannot  distinguish  a  friend  from  an  enemy, 
or  a  benefit  from  an  injury,  but  conceives  every- 
thing  about  him  to  be  the  reverse  of  what  it 
really  is,  and  mistakes  the  illusions  of  his 
fancy  in  that  respect  for  realities,...  these 
remains  of  intellect  are  of  no  sort  of  service 
towards  the  government  of  his  actions,  or 
enabling  him  to  form  a  judgment  of  what  is 
right  or  wrong  on  any  particular  occasion.  If 
he..  is  possessed  with  the  vain  conceit  that  his 
friend  is  there  to  destroy  him,  and  has  already 
done  him  the  most  cruel  wrongs,  and  that  all 
about  him  are  engaged  in  a  conspiracy  to  abuse 
him,  as  well  might  he  be  utterly  ignorant  of 
the  quality  of  murder.  Proceeding,  as  it  does, 
on  a  false  case,  or  a  conjuration  of  his  own 
fancy,  his  judgment  of  right  and  wrong  is,  as  to 
the  question  of  responsibility,  truly  the  same 
as  none  at  all.  It  is  therefore...  only  as 
relative  to  the  particular  thing  done,  and  the 
condition  of  the  man's  belief  and  consciousness 
on  that  occasion,  that  an  inquiry  concerning  his 
intelligence  of  moral  good  or  evil  seems  to  be 
material  -  to  the  issue  of  his  trial'  (ib.  3'f-8). 
It  is  not  altogether  clear  what  this  means,  but 
it  could  be  argued  that  Hume  is  seeking  for  a  criterion 
like  that  of  a  'sane  understanding'  of  what  the  accused 
is  doing;  a  dew  supported  by  his  earlier  remark  that 
insanity  must  be  such  as  to  exclude  a  'competent 
understanding'  of  what  the  accused  is  doing  (Lb.  3'1). 
Most  of  the  cases  of  insanity  which  Hume  cites 
with  'approval  concern  epilepsy  or  something  like  it,  and 
the  epileptic  in  a  fit  is  a  clear  case  of  an  irresponsible, 348 
raving  madman.  (Sir  Archibald  Kinloch,  29  June,  1795,  Hume, 
1.39;  Robert.  Spence,  19  June,  174'/,  ib;  Jean  Blair, 
14  March  1781,  ib.  40.  cf.  Robt.  Thomson,  June,  1739, 
ib.,  who  was  subject  to  fits  and  who  believed  his 
victim  was  the  devil).  In  David  Hunter  (13  March, 
1801,  Hume,  i.  38)  the  accused  believed  his  victim  had 
smothered  his  mother,  and  was  said  accordingly  to  have 
been  'incapable  of  judging  the  propriety  of  his  actions, 
or  of  reasoning  with  propriety  upon  them',  which  again 
sounds  more  like  a  criterion  of  'sane  understanding' 
than  the  stricter  criterion  of  the  Rules.  Hume  also 
seems  to  recognise  the  defence  of  puerperal  insanity 
(ib.  41-2,  and  case  of  Agnes  Crockat,  23  Jul.  1756, 
in  which  the  accused  was  convicted,  apparently,  in  Hume's 
view,  because  of  the  weak  evidence  regarding  insanity, 
and  reprieved),  in  which  case  he  is  in  advance  of  the 
Rules  and  of  Lord  Hope  (cf.  Eliz.  Yates,  (184'1)  Ark.  238). 
The  first  case  after  those  in  Hume  reported  at  any 
length  is  that  of  William  Douglas  ((1827)  Syme  184),  who 
was  found  insane  on  a  charge  of  wilful  fire-raising. 
He  had  formerly  been  in  a  mental  institution,  and  was 
said  to  be  in  such  a  condition  that  his  disease  could 
be  rekindled  by  drink,  and  to  have  been  unconscious  of 
what  had  happened.  The  question  of  drink  does  not 
seem  to  have  worried  the  Court,  and  the  case  contains 
no  discussion  of  principle. 
Eugene  Whelps  ((1842)  1  Broun  3'78)  believed  that 
he  was  a  son  of  the  Duke  of  York,  and  was  the  heir  to 
the  throne;  he  was  also  addicted  to  walking  about  bare- 
legged  and  bearded.  The  Lord  Justice  Clerk,  Lord  Hope, 
accepted  the  view  that  monomania  of  the  kind  the  accused 
suffered  from  'may  proceed  to  such  an  extent  as  to  amount 
to  general  insanity',  but  added  that  the  insanity  must 
be  shown  to  have  led  to  the  crime,  and  that  unless  the 
accused  was  so  insane  'as  not  to  have  been  able  to 349 
distinguish  between  right  and  wrong;  he  was  responsible 
(at  p.  381). 
The  last  case  in  this  group  is  that  of  Adam  Sliman 
((1844)  2  Broun  138).  He  knew  the  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong,  but  could  not  apply  his  knowledge  to 
the  particular  case  since  he  believed  that  there  was 
a  conspiracy  to  injure  him  by  supernatural  means. 
Apparently  also  he  did  not  realise  that  his  victim 
was  dead.  He  was  found  insane. 
Up  to  the  time  the  Rules  were  promulgated  in 
England  it  cannot  be  said  that  they  formed  the  law 
of  Scotland,  for  although  the  Scots  law  seems  to  have 
proceeded  on  similar  lines,  it  had  no  rigid  formula 
and,  its  operation,  like  that  of  the  English  law, 
seems  to  have  been  wider  than  would  be  allowed  by  the 
Rules. 
Lord  Hope  and  the  Rules. 
The  introduction  of  the  Rules  as  such  into  the  law 
of  Scotland  was  the  work  of  Lord  Hope,  who  was  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  from  1841  to  1858,  and  of  whom  it 
has  been  said  that  'from  the  impetuous  and  despotic 
character  of  his  will,  and  his  total  incapacity  for 
philosophical  inquiry'  he  should  have  avoided  such 
difficult  subjects  as  insanity  (C.  Scott,  'Insanity 
in  its  Relation  to  the  Criminal  Law',  (1898)  1  Jur. 
Rev.  23'7,241).  He  certainly  seems  to  have  taken  a 
much  narrower  view  of  insanity  than  any  other  Scots 
Judge,  and  the  driving  force  behind  his  attitude  seems 
not  to  have  been  any  psychological  or  legal  principle, 
but  a  firm  religious  view  that  freewill  was  absolute, 
and  that  people  must  not  be  allowed  to  escape  punishment 
for  their  sinfulness  on  the  excuse  that  they  were  not 
responsible  for  their  acts. 
Lord  Hope  declared  the  Rules  to  be  part  of  the  law 
of  Scotland  in  the  case  of  Jas.  Gibson  ((1844)  2  Broun 350 
332).  Gibson  set  fire  to  a  mill  under  the  delusion 
that  he  was  employed  by  a  local  aristocrat  to  punish 
monopolists,  and  that  the  Queen  would  herself  set  fire 
to  the  mill  if  he  did  not  do  so  (see  C.  Scott,  op.  cit.  ). 
He  also  believed  that  he  was  acting  under  Divine 
command.  Lord  Hope  told  the  jury  that  before  they 
could  find  the  prisoner  insane  they  must  be  satisfied 
that  there  was  an  absolute  alienation  of  reason.  He 
then  put  the  Rules  into  his  own  words  as  follows: 
'The  man  must  believe,  not  that  the  crime 
is  wrong  in  the  abstract  (for  most  madmen  ßo 
admit  murder  to  be  wrong,  and  punishable  in  the 
abstract)  but  that  the  particular  act  committed 
under  the  influence  of  the  motive  which  seems 
to  have  prom  ted  it,  was  not  an  offence  against 
the  law... 
fThe 
question  for  the  jury  is]  if  the 
delusion  really  went  to  that  extreme  length  that 
he  thought  the  particular  act  was  not  only  praise- 
worthy  in  itself  (for  that  is  not  by  any  means 
sufficient)  but  not  a  crime  against  the  law, 
for  which  he  could  be  punished'  (ib.  356-'/). 
As  an  example  of  what  would  be  sufficient  Lord  Hope 
gave  the  case  of  a  man  believing  insanely  that  his  victim 
was  going  to  kill  him  -  i.  e.  an  error  which  if  reason- 
able  would  result  in  the  acquittal  of  a  sane  man. 
Gibson  is  also  authority  for  the  view  that  there 
can  be  a  partial  insanity  which  is  irrelevant  to  the 
question  of  responsibility: 
'The  law  does  not  recognise  partial  insanity 
in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  t  erm...  if  it  appears.. 
that  the  panel,  in  reference  to  the  particular  act 
charged,  and  the  motives  which  are  thought  (on 
the  notion  of  insanity)  to  have  prompted  its 
commission,  still  well  knew  that  he  was 
punishable  for  his  act,  because  it  was  an  offence 
against  the  law,  that  is  enough  to  negative 
insanity  according  to  the  rules  of  law'  (at  pp.  359). 
Gibson  also  contains  an  explicit  rejection  of  the  defence 
of  irresistible  impulse  - 351 
'No  such  principle  is  recpgnised  in  law,  as 
that  a  man,  allowing  a  fancy  or  morbid  feeling  to 
get  possession  of  his  mind  and  temper,  although 
it  disturbs  reason,  while  it  does  not  overthrow 
it,  will  escape  punishment,  because,  ins  ea  or 
resisting  the  temptations  of  such  ill-regulated, 
morbid,  distempered,  and  ungovernable  feelings, 
passions,  and  prejudices,  (whether.  called  delusions 
or  not)  he  gives  way  to  them,  and  indulges  in  their 
gratification  and  satisfaction...  The  man  chooses 
to  commit  the  act,  he  gives  way  to  the  suggests  ns 
and  temptations  which  are  strong,  only  because 
he  has  long  indulged  in  such  thoughts.  Rely 
upon  it,  he  was  not  tempted  above  what  he  was 
able  to  bear'  (Lb.  Pp.  360-1). 
The  'religious'  attitude  is  prominent  in  all  Lord 
Hope's  pronouncements  on  insanity,  He  is  conviced 
that  the  existence  of  temptation,  however  overwhelming, 
is  only  the  result  of  the  patient's  own  wickedness. 
He  gave  strong  expre  ssi  or  %  to  this  view  in  the  case  of 
Eliz.  Yates  ((1847)  Ark.  238),  where  a  distracted  and 
destitute  girl  drowned  her  ten-month  old  illegitimate 
child  after  the  father  had  refused  to  support  it.  The 
jury  were  told, 
'You  are  not...  to  allow  yourselves  to  be 
ledaway  by  the  false  notions  of  what  is  insanity, 
which  seem  to  be  creeping  if  not  into  courts  of 
justice,  at  least  into  moral  discussions  elsewhere. 
The  gambler  who  destroys  himself,  because  ruin  is 
staring  him  in  the  face,  is  a  responsible  agent, 
and  violates  the  laws  of  God.  It  is  not  insanity 
that  is  the  cause  of  his  crime,  -  it  is  the 
distempered  and  disordered  workings  of  a  depraved 
nature  within  him...  There  are  many  cases  arising 
from  moral  depravity  and  moral  wickedness,  which 
pass  in  the  ordinary  language  of  life  as  acts  of 
insanity  which  are  nevertheless  acts  of  a  mind 
rebelling  against  the  decrees  of  God'  (ib.  pp.  240-1). 
It  is  interesting  that  the  suggestion,  which  is  hardly 
more  than  implicit  in  these  directions,  that  insanity 
which  is  the  result  of  the  accused's  own  evil  ways 
is  irrelevant,  was  never  taken  up  by  the  law  -  there 352 
is  no  difference  in  legal  responsibility  between  the 
man  whose  insanity  is  the  result  of  syphilis,  or  even 
of  drink,  and  the  man  whose  insanity  is  the  result  of  a 
wound  received  on  the  battlefield. 
Lord  Hope  expressed  views  similar  to  those  in 
Gibson  (supra)  in  the  case  of  George  Lillie  Smith  ((1855) 
2  Irv.  1-  the  plea  succeeded  in  this  case),  and  the 
Rules  were  followed  in  at  least  two  later  cases, 
although  without  the  religious  overtones.  They  were 
followed  by  Lord  Boyle  in  Geo.  Bryce  ((1864)  4  Irv.  506), 
where  the  accused,  who  was  mentally  subnormal,  had 
killed  a  girl  he  believed  to  have  been  calling  him  a 
dirty  blackguard.  The  test  put  in  Bryce  was  whether 
he  really  believed  'something  had  occurred  which 
would  be  a  ground  for  taking  away  the  life  of  this 
unfortunate  girl'  (at  p.  526)  -  i.  e.  the  test  of  error. 
The  Rules  were  also  followed  in  Andrew  Brown  ((1866) 
5  Irv.  215)  by  Lord  Inglis  who  spoke  of  knowledge 
of  the  act  committed,  or  of  its  nature,  more  or  less 
in  the  words  of  the  Rules  (at  p.  217). 
The  movement  away  from  the  Rules  -  1852-69. 
Although  the  Rules  were  being  followed  as  late  as 
1866,  there  had  been  cases  before  then  in  which  a  broader 
view  had  been  taken.  This  may  be  said  to  have  begun  as 
early  as  1852  ih  the  case  of  Isabella  Blyth  ((1852) 
J.  Shaw,  567),  where  Lord  Cockburn  stopped  the  trial 
of  the  accused  for  matricide  because  he  was  satisfied 
of  her  insanity.  It  appears  that  she  believed  she 
was  wasting  away  and  going  mad,  and  that  she  sometimes 
knew  right  and  wrong  and  sometimes  not.  Nothing  seems 
to  have  been  said  of  her  knowledge  regarding  the  murder, 
and  the  case  seems  to  be  one  of  murder  following  on  a 
period  of  depressive  brooding,  so  that  it  cannot  be 
brought  within  the  Rules  (no  attempt  was  made  to  bring 353 
it  in)  nor  within  the  ambit  of  irresistible  impulse. 
In  Denny  Scott  ((1853)  1  Irv.  132),  in  the  follow- 
ing  year,  Lord  Cockburn  gave  as  one  of  the  classes  of 
insanity  the  case  'where  the  accused  was  under  an 
impulse,  so  irresistible  to  him,  that  he  was  not  a 
free  agent.  A  man  cannot  be  punished  for  doing  an  act, 
which,  from  mental  disease,  he  could  not  avoid  doing' 
(at  p.  142). 
Again,  in  John  M'Fadyen  ((1860)  3  Irv.  650)  Lord 
Cowan  told  the  jury  that  the  law  was  as  laid  down  in 
Gibson  (supra),  but  went  on  to  say  that  they  must  ask 
the  question,  'Did  the  pannel  possess  intellect  enough 
to  know  the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong... 
Or,  if  he  did  know  that  distinction,  was  he  under 
disability  from  want  of  sufficient  rational  power, 
to  govern  his  actions,  and  to  control  his  emotions  and 
desires?  '  (at  p.  665). 
Finally,  in  this  group,  comes  the  case  of  Alex. 
Milne  ((1863)  4  Irv.  301),  in  which  Lord  Inglis,  after 
citing  the  Rules,  said  'If  you  are  once  satisfied  that 
this  man  was  under  the  influence  of  insane  delusions 
at  the  time  this  act  was  committed,  you  have  no  occasion 
to  inquire  farther,  whether  he  knew  what  was  right  from 
what  was  wrong...  because  the  law  at  once  presumes  that 
he  cannot  appreciate  what  he  is  doing'  (at  p.  343). 
This,  of  course,  is  an  acceptance  of  the  modern 
medical  view  that  acts  of  an  insane  man  must  be  presumed 
to  be  caused  by  his  insanity,  although  it  is  restricted 
in  its  terms  to  cases  of  delusional  insanity. 
By  the  1860's,  therefore,  there  were  at  least  two 
laws  of  insanity  in  Scotland,  and  whether  or  not  an 
insane  person  was  convicted  was  likely  to  depend 
more  on  what  Judge  happened  to  try  him,  than  on  any 
accepted  legal  principle.  The  conflict  could  only  be 354 
resolved  by  the  reference  of  a  case  to  the  High  Court, 
but  naturally  in  a  sphere  where  opinions  were  held  as 
strongly  as  they  were  by  Lord  Hope,  for  example,  the 
Judges  preferred  to  apply  their  own  ideas. 
Lord  Moncrieff  and  the  causal  approach. 
In  a  series  of  cases  in  the  early  1870's  Lord 
Moncrieff,  who  was  Lord  Justice-Clerk  from  1869  to  1888, 
attempted  to  clarify  the  law  of  insanity,  mainly  by 
rejecting  any  rigid  criterion,  and  by  emphasising  that 
the  law  must  keep  up  with  the  advances  of  science. 
If  it  is  the  law  today  that  the  only  question  a  jury 
need  ask  in  deciding  the  responsibility  of  an  accused 
who  pleads  insanity,  is  'Is  he  mad?  ',  we  owe  that  law 
to  Lord  Moncrieff. 
The  first  case  in  which  Lord  Moncrieff  discussed 
the  question  of  insanity  was  Eliz.  Clafton  ((1871) 
2  Coup.  73),  who  cut  her  two  children's  tl  ats  and 
then  her  own;  the  children  died  and  she  was  charged 
with  murder.  Lord  Moncrieff  said, 
'When  the  doctors  speak  of  a  person  doing 
a  thing  from  uncontrollable  impulse,  they  do  not 
mean  an  impulse  which  his  mental  constitution 
is  not  strong  enough  to  combat,  or  an  impulse  which 
the  individual  will  not  control;  but  one  which 
through  mental  disease  he  has  not  the  power  of 
controlling,  and,  in  the  doctors'  view  also,  before 
a  case  can  be  brought  under  that  category,  mental 
disease  must  be  proved  to  have  been  present... 
The  question  here  is  whether  the  unsoundness  of 
the  prisoner's  mind  prevented  her  from  having 
the  power  to  resist  the  impulse  to  kill  her 
children  when  it  occurred.  It  is  certainly 
amply  proved  that  there  is  such  a  form  of  insanity 
recurrent  on  pregnancy  and  lactation,  and  which  is 
sometimes  accompanied  with  homicidal  and  suicidal 
paroxysms.  And  if  you  can  find  that  the  pannel 
at  the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  crime,  was 
labouring  under  such  a  paroxysm,  I  know  of 
nothing  in  the  shape  of  a  legal  proposition  that 
can  possibly  prevent  you  from  finding  that  she  was 
of  unsound  mind'  (at  p.  93). 355 
The  whole  tenour  of  this  charge  is  in  violent  contrast 
to  that  of  the  charge  in  Yates  (supra):  on  this  matter 
Lord  Hope  and  Lord  Moncrieff  belong  to  different  worlds. 
On  the  test  of  knowledge  of  right  and  wrong  Lord 
Moncrieff  said, 
'I  doubt  this  test  will  not  advance  us  far; 
for  the  definition  of  what  constitutes  the  know- 
ledge  of  right  and  wrong,  may  be  as  hard  as  (the 
definition  of  her  mental  condition].  It  must  be 
in  a.,  sane  knowledge'.  (at  p.  91). 
In  Archibald  Miller  ((1874)  3  Coup.  16)  Lord 
Moncrieff  gave  the  following  direction: 
'It  is  entirely  imperfect  and  inaccurate  to 
say  that  if  a  man  has  a  conception  intellectually 
of  moral  or  legal  obligation,  he  is  of  sound  mind. 
Better  knowledge  of  the  phenomena  of  lunacy 
has  corrected  some  loose  and  inaccurate  language 
whichlawyers  used  to  apply  in  such  cases.  A 
man  may  be  entirely  insane,  and  may  yet  know 
well  enough  that  an  act  which  he  does  is  forbidden 
by  law...  It  is  not  a  question  of  knowledge,  but  of 
unsoundness  of  mind.  If  the  man  have  not  a  sane 
mind  to  apply  his  knowledge,  the  mere  intellectual 
apprehension  of  an  injunction  or  prohibition 
may  stimulate  his  unsound  mind  to  do  an  act  simply 
because  it  is  forbidden.  If  a  man  has  a  sane 
appreciation  of  right  and  wrong,  he  is  certainly 
responsible;  but  he  may  form  and  understand  the 
idea  of  right  and  wrong,  and  yet  be  hopelessly 
insane.  You  may  discard  these  attempts  at 
definition  altogether.  They  only  mislead'  (at  p.  18) 
Lord  Moncrieff  again  expressed  his  dislike  of  tests 
of  insanity  in  the  case  of  Jas.  Macklin  ((18'16)  3  Coup. 
25'j)  where  he  said, 
'It  may  be  asked,  what  are  the  indications 
om  which  unsoundness  of  mind  may  be  inferred? 
I  can  lay  down  no  general  test  which  can  be  applied 
to  solve  such  a  question.  At  one  time  lawyers 
were  apt  to  avoid  all  difficulties  by  enquiring 
whether  a  prisoner  knew  right  from  wrong;  and  as, 
in  point  of  fact,  except  in  acute  mania  or  idiocy, 
there  are  very  few  lunatics  who  do,  not  know  right, 
from  wrong  in  the  sense  of  being  capable  of 
appreciating  and  even  acting  on  the  distinction, 356 
much  unreasoning  inhumanity  has  been  the  result  of 
this  unscientific  maxim.  If  it  be  said  that  a 
man  is  sane  if  he  can  form  sound  judgments  on  the 
subject  of  moral  duty,  that  is  only  stating  the 
problem  in  another  form,  and  is  not  solving  it; 
for  a  sane  judgment  on  right  and  wrong  can  only  be 
formed  by  a  man  of  sound  mind'  (at  pp.  259-60). 
Lastly,  in  the  case  of  Thos.  Barr  ((1876)  3  Coup.  261) 
Lord  Moncrieff  stressed  that  the  problem  was  one  of 
medical  fact,  and  more  or  less  expressly  stated  the 
causal  criterion  adopted  in  New  Hampshire  and  the 
Federal  Courts  of  the  United  States  (cf.  su2ra,,  3  ). 
His  Lordship  said, 
'A  man  is  said  to  be  of  unsound  mind  when 
his  mind  is  diseased,  so  that,  in  some  at  least 
of  the  ordinary  relations  of  life,  he  is  incapable, 
by  reason  of  disease,  of  controlling  his  conduct 
and  actions... 
The  question  is,  was  this  man's  mind  diseased  - 
was  he  the  victim  of  unsound  thought  -  thought 
which  was  the  product  of  the  working  of  an 
unsound  mind... 
If  the  prisoner  was  acting  under  a 
conclusion  that  was  not  only  unsound  in  the  sense 
of  not  being  well.  founded,  but  that  it  was  a 
conclusion  he  had  formed  because  his  mind  was 
insane,  that,  no  doubt...  would  amount  tb 
evidence  of  insanity  (at  pp.  264-5). 
The  effect  of  these  cases  is  to  make  the  Rules 
quite  irrelevant  to  the  problem,  and  to  replace  them 
with  the  very  general  rule  that  the  insane  are  not 
responsible  for  acts  which  are  the  product  of  their 
insanity.  Lord  Moncrieff's  views  accord  with  the  views 
of  modern  psychologists  and  criminologists.  Whether 
or  not  they  accord  with  the  view  of  the  modern  law  of 
Scotland  is  a  very  difficult  question.  Judges  have 
been  loth'  to  discard  the  misleading  attempts  at 
definition  of  which  Lord  Moncrieff  spoke,  and  seem 
still  to  be  attached  to  the  Rules.  Indeed,  Lord 
Moncrieff  may  be  regarded  as  an  eccentric  in  this 35'1 
branch  of  the  law  -a  view  which  seems  to  have  been 
adopted  by  Lord  Keith  when  he  said  of  the  cases  quoted, 
'one  Judge...  a  long  time  ago...  more  or  less  gave  the 
go-by  to  the  M'Naghten  Rules'  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Keith 
Q.  5190),  which  rather  suggests  that  Lord  Keith 
thought  it  was  so  long  ago  that  little  heed  need  be 
paid  to  it. 
The  modern  cases. 
The  later  cases  are  few  and  by  no  means  clear. 
It  seems  that  when  a  brief  direction  of  a  more  or 
less  formal  nature  was  required,  the  Rules  were 
treated  as  the  best  way  of  expressing  the  law  (e.  g. 
Alex.  Dingwall,  (186,  ')  5  Irv.  466,4'/6;  Thos.  Ferguson, 
(1881)  4  Coup.  552,557;  in  both  of  which  the 
live  issue  was  one  of  diminished  re  sponsibilitA  but 
where  insanity  was  dealt  with  in  any  detail,  the  common 
approach  was  by  way  of  the  Rules  together  with 
irresistible  impulse.  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  the 
view  that  at  any  rate  in  the  early  part  of  this  century 
the  law  was  as  stated  by  Lord  Cockburn  in  Denny  Scott 
in  1853  (1  Irv.  132,142)  -  that  insanity  was  relevant 
if  it  deprived  the  accused  of  the  capacity  to  know  he 
was  doing  wrong,  or  to  know  the  nature  acid  quality  of 
his  act;  or  if  it  deprived  him  of  'the  power  of 
controlling  his  actions,  impelling  him  irresistibly  to 
commit  certain  actions'.  (This  was  said  to  represent 
the  developed  law  in  an  article  in  1916  'Insanity  in  its 
Relation  to  Crime',  by  H.  H.  Brown,  (1916)  28  Jur.  Rev. 
119,138.  It  seems  still  to  be  the  law  in  about 
fifteen  of  the  United  States  -  see  J.  Soshnick,  'Insanity 
as  a'Defence'  in  'Mental  Illness  and  the  Law',  (1956) 
36  Boston  Univ.  Law  Rev.,  254,255)  Sometimes, 
however,  as  in  M'Clinton  ((1902)  4  Adam  1)  the  Judge 358 
added  to  Denny  Scott  a  reference  to  Miller  (supra) 
without  apparently  realising  that  Miller  represented 
a  wholly  different  approach  to  the  question,  and  could 
not  just  be  tacked  on  to  the  Rules  as  could 
irresistible  impulse. 
There  are  a  number  of  unreported  modern  cases  which 
suggest  that  the  influence  of  the  Rules  is  still  strong. 
It  seems  that  many  Judges  start  off  with  the  Rules 
as  the  basic  law  of  insanity,  and  then  say  something 
which  sounds  not  unlike  an  admission  of  the  defence 
of  irresistible  impulse,  after  which  they  may  or  may 
not  add  a  reference  to  Miller  (supra).  As  a  result 
the  only  clear  impression  given  is  that  the  Rules 
are  the  law,  though  in  some  cases  they  may  not  be  the 
whole  law. 
Macdonald  is  typical  of  this  approach.  He  begins 
by  stating  the  Rules,  and  gives  the  case  of  the  : _.  man 
who  believes  he  is  acting  in  self-defence  or  killing 
an  evil  spirit  as  an  example  of  someone  irresponsible 
through  insanity,  and  then  quotes  from  Miller.  (He 
also  gives  the  impression  that  not  only  Gibson  ((1844)  2 
Broun  332)  but  also  Milne  ((1863)  4  Irv.  301)  support  the 
Rules  (Macdonald,  p.  9).  ) 
In  the  case  of  Savage  (Edinburgh  High  Court,  21 
May  1923,  reported  on  another  point  in  1923  J.  C.  49) 
Lord  Alness  approved  the  passage  on  insanity  in  the 
third  edition  of  Macdonald,  which  is  in  the  same  terms 
as  that  in  the  present  edition.  In  Newall  (Glasgow 
High  Court,  18  and  19  Sep.  1927),  Lord  Alness  adopted 
the  same  'package'  approach.  He  quoted  Macdonald's 
statement  of  the  Rules,  and  then  quoted  Milne,  Dingwall, 
and  M'Clinton,  giving  the  general  impression  that 
the  test  was  the  Rules,  and  indeed  he  seems  to  have 
referred  to  M'Clinton  in  order  to  support  the  'nature  and 359 
quality'  test  (Transcript  of  Proceedings,  pp.  186  ff.  ). 
Again,  in  1933,  in  the  case  of  Muir  (Dumfries 
High  Court,  11-13  April,  1933,  reported  on  another 
point  in  1933  J.  C.  46),  Lord  Moncrieff  said 
'The  old  definition  which  has  been  again 
and  again  adopted  is  this  -a  man  shall  be 
released  from  the  consequences  of  his  criminal 
acts  as  not  being  responsible  for  them  if  he  was 
insane  in  the  sense  of  not  being  able  to  under- 
stand  the  nature  or  quality  of  the  act...  (or] 
if  so  insane  that  although  he  understands...  ythe 
nature,  or  quality,  of  the  act,  he  does  not  know 
that  what  he  is  doing  is  wrong...  for  example... 
one  who  knew  that  he  was  taking  a  human  life 
but  thought  that  he  was  a  messenger  from  heaven 
to  do  so,  and  was  obeying  a  divine  order.  That 
is  an  overmastering  impulse  associated  with 
disease  which  makes  a  man  no  longer  responsible 
for  his  actions'  (Transcript  of  Proceedings, 
pp.  266-7). 
This  appears  to  confuse  the  second  branch  of  the  Rules 
with  irresistible  impulse,  but  is  at  least  an 
improvement  on  Stephen's  remark  that  'If  a  special 
Divine  order  were  given  to  a  man  to  commit  murder, 
I'should  certainly  hang  him  unless  I  got  a  specific 
Divine  order  not  to  hang  him'  (2  H.  C.  L.  p.  160n.  ). 
The  Rules  die  hard,  but  there  are  a  number  of 
cases  in  which  they  have  been  dispensed  with.  Perhaps 
the  most  important  of  these  is  Sharp  (192/  J.  C.  66). 
The  point  at  issue  was  insanity  in  bar  of  trial,  but 
the  test  was  treated  as  being  the  some  as  that  for  the 
plea  of  insanity  at  the  time  of  the  crime.  In  Sharp 
the  accused  was  intelligent  and  sane  in  most  matters, 
but  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the  only  way  out  of 
his  poverty  was  to  kill  two  of  his  children  so  as  to 
relieve  his  wife  of  the  burden  of  their  support.  He 
knew  that  this  was  criminal,  but  regarded  it  as  a 
necessary  sacrifice.  Sharp  was  clearly  suffering 360 
from  depressive  insanity  (cf.  A.  McNiven,  92.  cit.  p.  15;  ' 
W.  C.  Sullivan,  Crime  and  Insanity,  p.  41),  but  was 
equally  clearly  not  insane  in  terms  of  the  Rules. 
Nor  could  he  be  said  to  have  acted  under  irresistible 
impulse  -  there  was  no  sudden  impulse  forcing  him  to 
commit  the  crime  at  a  particular  time,  but  a  course  of 
brooding  which  culminated  in  murder.  But  his  plea 
of  insanity  was  sustained. 
In  Brown  ((1907)  5  Adam  312),  where  the  real 
question  was  again  fitness  to  plead,  Lord  Dunedin 
dealt  with  the  question  of  insanity  at  the  time 
of  the  crime  by  'telling  the  jury  that  they  could 
acquit-the  accused  on  the  grounds  of  insanity  if  they 
found  that  he  was  not  'really  responsible  for  his 
actions'  (at  p.  346).  In  Cameron  (Perth  High  Court, 
11-12  June,  1946,  see  1946  S.  N.  'j4),  where  there  was 
again  a  question  of  unfitness  to  plead  as  well  as  one 
of  insanity  at  the  time  of  the  crime,  Lord  Birnam 
directed  the  jury  on  the  latter  point  by  merely 
telling  them  that  if  on  the  evidence  they  came  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  accused  had  been  insane  at  the  time 
of  the  crime  they  should  find  accordingly.  These 
cases  are  to  some  extent  authority  for  the  view  that 
there  is  no  legal  test  of  insanity  in  modern  Scots  law. 
This  view  gains  further  support  from  the  only  recent 
reported  case,  although  the  defence  there  was  that 
the  crime  had  been  committed  during  an  epiliptic  fit, 
which  is  fairly  clearly  a  state  of  irresponsibility 
on  any  view  (Mitchell,  1951  J.  C.  53).  Lord  Thomson, 
the  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  said  that  in  the  circumstances 
there  was  no  need  for  any  detailed  direction  on  insanity, 
and  told  the  jury  merely  that  since  in  a  seizure, 
'when  the  patient  is  subject  to  the  attack,  his 
consciousness  is  so  clouded  that  he  does  not  know 
what  he  is  doing  and  consequently  cannot  be  responsible 361 
for  his  actions'  (at  54),  they  need  only  ask  them- 
selves  if  in  fact  he  was  in  a  fit  when  he  committed 
the  crime. 
The  modern  law. 
On  these  authorities  it  is  impossible  to  formulate 
any  definition  of  the  insanity  which  will  be  sufficient 
to  render  an  accused  legally  irresponsible.  It  was 
suggested  by  the  Faculty  of  Advocates  in  their 
evidence  before  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment  that  the  law  would  hold  a  man  responsible 
if  he  had  'a  sane  understanding  of  the  circumstances 
of  his  act'  (R.  C.  Evid.  Memorandum  of  Faculty  of 
Advocates,  para.  12),  but  this  is  question  begging, 
unless  it  means  that  all  insane  persons  are  irresponsible, 
in  which  case  it  should  have  said  so.  It  also  ignores 
the  question  of  volition,  and  indeed  the  Faculty  gave 
it  as  their  view  that  'internal  compulsion  was  not  a 
defence'  (ib.  para.  6). 
The  Rules  loom  large  in  the  evidence  of  Lord 
Cooper  and  of  Lord  Keith.  But  it  is  not  clear  if 
this  was  because  the  Rules  were  regarded  as  a  concise 
expression  of  the  law  of  cognitive  insanity,  and 
adopted  to  that  extent  in  Scotland,  or  whether  it  was 
just  that  they  were  a  natural  stalling  point  for  any 
discussion,  especially  in  the  comparative  absence  of 
modern  Scots  authority.  Lord  Cooper  said  at  one 
point,  '...  if  you  had  the  whole  fourteen  Scottish 
Judges  here  and  asked  them  to  produce  the  M'Naghten 
formula  they  would  probably  not  be  able  to  because  it 
is  not  part  of  our  law.  We  talk  about  it,  but  we  do 
not  use  it  as  an  authoritative  formula'  (R.  C.  Evid. 
of  Lord  Cooper,  Q.  5506),  but  neither  Lord  Cooper 
nor  Lord  Keith  could  produce.  such  a  formula. 
Lord  Keith  said  that  '...  the  M'Naghten  Rules  would 362 
be  considered,  but  my  impression  is  that  the  law  is 
perhaps  developing  and  is  rather  more  flexible  in  that 
matter  than  it  used  to  be,  and  that  more  regard  would 
probably  be  paid  to  the  actual  evidence  that  was  led 
by  specialists  on  insanity,  and  that  the  jury  would  be 
directed  in  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case' 
(Q.  5189),  which  seems,  with  respect,  to  sum 
up  the  present  unsatisfactory  situation,  although  it 
gives  little  weight  to  the  views  of  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
Moncrieff. 
Lord  Cooper's  evidence  was  that,  if  he  had  to 
direct  a  jury 
'I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  I  would  charge 
in  the  exact  terms  of  the  M'Naghten  rules...  I 
would  take  as  a  broad  rule  only  the  third  one, 
that  insanity  arises  when  a  person  is  labouring 
under  such  defect  of  reason  from  disease  of 
mind  that  he  dows  not  know  the  nature  and  quality 
of  the  act  he  is  doing,  or  if  he  does  know  it, 
he  does  not  know  he  is  doing  wrong...  I  would 
embroider  and  elaborate  that  a  bit  and  not  leave 
it  as  if  the  last  word  of  the  decalogue 
had  been  uttered  in  the  M'Naghten  rules,  which 
are  not  part  of  the  law  of  Scotland.  You  will 
appreciate  my  difficulty  in  answering  more 
specifically  because  the  question  so  rarely 
arises  and  in  fact  has  never  arisen  in  my 
judicial  experience'  (Q.  5465). 
..  However  much  you  charge  a  jury  as  to  the 
M'Naghten  Rules  or  any  other  test,  the  question  they 
would  put  to  themselves  when  they  retired  is 
*Is  the  man  mad  or  not"'  (Q.  5479). 
The  nearest  Lord  Cooper  came  to  committing  himself  to  any 
definite  statement  was  to  enlarge  the  Rules  into  a 
tautology  when  he  said  that  in  directing  a  jury, 
. 
'I  would  certainly  have  to  give  ...  an  explanation 
of  the  essence  of  what  is  in  the  M'Naghtön  Rules, 
probably  with  some  embroidery  to  the  effect  that 
the  matter  for  their  consideration  was  whethr, 
on  the  expert  testimony  and  the  factual  evidence 
the  accused  had  shown  the  probability  to  be  that 
he  was  not  responsible  for  his  actions  by  reason 
of  a  defect  of  reason'  (Q.  5475). 363 
But  this,  with  respect,  really  tells  us  only  that  the 
burden  is  on  the  accused  to  establish  his  irresponsibility, 
and  that  he  must  do  so  not  quite  by  reference  to  the 
Rules,  but  yet  in  some  way  by  reference  to  theRules, 
which,  it  is  submitted,  takes  insufficient  notice  of 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Moncrieff's  rejection  of  the  Rules 
altogether.  (The  Crown  Office,  incidentally,  said 
that  the  Rules  as  laid  down  in  Gibson  (supra) 
represented  the  law,  and  here  as  elsewhere  their 
Memorandum  merely  followed  the  inaccuracies  of 
Macdonald  -  R.  C.  Evid.  Memorandum  of  Crown  Agent, 
App.  (d)  para.  2.  This  statement  is  sufficiently 
belied  by  Crown  Office  practice  to  lose  all  value,  and 
the  Crown  Agent  was  constrained  in  his  oral  evidence 
to  admit  that  the  rules  had  been  modified  in  some 
Judge's  charges  -  Q.  1998). 
Conclusion.  All  that  can  be  said  in  conclusion 
is  that  although  the  Rules  are  not  the  law  of  Scotland, 
most  of  what  is  in  them  is  the  law;  that  anyone  who 
would  be  irresponsible  under  the  Rules  would  be 
irresponsible  under  Scots  law;  that  there  may  be  cases 
where  a  person  though  not  irresponsible  under  the 
Rules,  would  be  irresponsible  in  Scotland,  and  that  these 
cases  include  irresistible  impulse,  and  may  include 
persons  suffering  from  extreme  depressive  insanity, 
and  probably  include  persons  incapable  of  a  sane 
understanding  of  the  situation;  and  that  as  Lord 
Cooper  said,  anyone  who  is  'not  responsible  for  his 
actions  by  reason  of  a  defect  of  reason'  is  not  respons- 
ible  for  them;  and  that  it  does  not  matter  anyway 
since  the  jury  will  ask  merely  if  the  accused  is  mad. 
So  far,  therefore,  as  'our  friend  the  bad  man'  is 
concerned,  the  law  is  that  if  the  jury  think  he  is  mad 
they  will  acquit  him  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  and 364 
that  the  Judge  will  leave  them  free  to  do  so,  either 
expressly,  or  by  reason  of  the  vagueness,  inconsistency, 
or  tautological  nature,  of  whatever  directions  he  gives 
on  insanity. 
II.  INSANITY  AS  A  PLEA  IN  BAR. 
One  reason  for  the  absence  of  authority  on  the 
defence  of  insanity  is  the  great  use  *hich  is  made 
of  the  plea  of  insanity  in  bar  of  trial.  This  is  a 
plea  that  at  the  time  of  the  trial  the  accused  is, 
though  insanity,  unable  properly  to  instruct  his 
defence.  On  such  a  plea  the  merits  of  the  charge 
are  not  usually  considered  at  all,  and'-the..  önly 
evidence  led  is  evidence  of  the  accused's  mental  state. 
If  the  plea  is  upheld  the  accused  is  not  tried,  but 
is  ordered  to  be  detained  to  await  Her  Majesty's 
pleasure,  although  he  can  be  tried  at  a  later  date 
if  he  recovers  his  sanity  (Bickerstaff,  1926  J.  C.  65). 
It  is  thus  distinguishable  from  the  plea  of  insanity 
as  a  defence  in  three  ways:  -  (a)  it  is  concerned  with 
the  accused's  mental  state  at  the  time  of  trial  and  not 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  offence,  and  is  quite 
independent  of  any  question  of  the  accused's 
responsibility  for  the  offence;  (b)  a  finding  that 
the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead  tells  one  nothing  about 
the  circumstances  of  the  alleged  offence,  and  is  quite 
neutral  on  the  question  of  whether  the  accused  committed 
the  act  charged;  (c)  it  does  not  prevent  the  trial 
of  the  accused  at  a  later  date  -  except  perhaps  in  the 
unusual  case  where  the  question  of  fitness  to  plead  is 
decided  by  a  jury  (infra,  360. 365 
The  procedure. 
The  plea  that  the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead  may  be 
stated  by  the  defence  or  by  the  Crown,  or  may  be  raised 
by  the  Court  ex  proprio  motu.  Normally  the  plea  is 
entered  by  the  defence  on  information  supplied  by  the 
Crown.  Whenever  there  is  any  doubt  as  to  the  mental 
condition  of  a  person  charged  with  a  serious  offence 
the  Crown  authorities  have  him  examined  by  mental 
specialists,  and  the  resit  of  these  examinations,  if 
they  show  that  the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead,  are  made 
available  to  the  defence.  (This  procedure  is  not  un- 
like  that  adopted  in  Massachusetts  under  the  Briggs 
Law  -  R.  C.  App.  9,  para.  19(c).  )  The  doctors  concerned 
are  then  led  as  defence  witnesses.  Their  evidence 
is  heard  by  the  Judge  alone,  before  the  jury  is 
empanelled,  and  is  usually  not  challenged  by  the  Crown, 
or  indeed  by  the  Court.  The  Judge  then  finds  the 
accused  unfit  to  plead  and  no  trial  takes  place  (cf. 
Renton  and  Brown,  pp.  435  ff.  ). 
This  is  the  usual  procedure,  and  is  very  common, 
Occasionally,  however,  things  are  not  so  simple.  Where 
there  is  any  dispute  as  to  the  fitness  of  the  accused 
to  plead,  the  practice  may  not  be  uniform.  In  one 
case  where  the  accused  maintained  that  he  was  fit 
to  plead  while  the  Crown  offered  evidence  of  his  unfit- 
ness  to  do  so,  the  matter  was  dealt  with  by  the  Judge 
in  the  ordinary  way,  and  the  accused  found  unfit  to 
plead  (Robertson,  (1891)  3  Wh.  6).  This  procedure 
was  declared  to  be  competent  by  the  High  Court  in  Brown 
((190'1)5  Adam  312),  but  the  procedure  actually  adopted 
in  Brown  is  the  more  normal  one  in  such  a  case.  That 
is  to  leave  the  matter  to  be  decided  by  the  jury  who 
hear  the  whole  evidence,  and  not  merely  that  relating  to 
insanity.  This  procedure  has  since  been  adopted  in 366 
two  cases  -  that  of  Wilson  in  1942  (1942  J.  C.  '!  5),  and 
that  of  Cameron  in  1946  (Perth  High  Court,  11-12  June, 
1946,  see  1946  S.  N.  74). 
Where  the  Judge  is  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence, 
led  in  support  of  the  plea  at  the  preliminary  enquiry, 
then,  even  where  the  plea  is  offered  by  the  accused 
and  not  opposed  by  the  Crown,  he  may  reject  the  plea, 
and  in  that  event  the  jury  are  precluded  from 
considering  it,  although  they  may  of  course  still 
consider  whether  the  accused  was  insane  at  the  time 
of  the  crime  (Russell,  1946  J.  C.  37,45,  where  the  Appeal 
Court  criticised  the  trial  Judge  for  allowing  the  plea 
in  bar  to  go  to  the  Jury  after  he  had  rejected  it). 
It  is  probably  also  open  for  the  Judge  to  decline  to 
decide  the  question,  in  which  case  it  may  go  to  the 
jury,  or  the  matter  may  be  continued  to  enable  further 
information  to  be  obtained  for  a  subsequent  additional 
preliminary  enquiry.  (Cf.  Cameron,  supra,.  and  the 
Report  of  Proceedings  at  Perth  High  Court  on  21  May 
1946.  ) 
The  trial  of  the  plea  in  bar  by  a  jury.  Where 
the  question  of  the  accused's  fitness  for  trial  goes 
to  the  jury  they  must  decide  whether  the  accused  is 
fit  to  plead,  whether  he  committed  the  acts  charged, 
and  if  so,  whether  he  was  insane  at  the  time  of  the 
crime.  They  hear  all  the  evidence,  and  must  decide 
the  questions  in  that  order,  so  that  if  they  find  that 
the  accused  was  unfit  to  plead,  they  make  no  finding 
regarding  his  guilt  or  innocence  (Brown,  Wilson,  Cameron, 
supra).  This  has  the  advantage  that  the  accused  is 
not  judged  in  a  trial  at  which  he  was  unfit  to  plead, 
but  it  is  open  to  two  serious  objections.  In  the 
first  place  it  seems  to  be  patently  illogical  and  to 
be  a  waste  of  time,  to  have  a  trial  before  it  is  known 36'/ 
whether  the  accused  is  fit  to  be  tried.  (The  Scots 
procedure  is  different  from  any  procedure,  such  as  is 
adopted  on  the  Continent,  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
evidence  against  the  accused's  possible  recovery  -  cf. 
T.  B.  Smith,  'Mental  Abnormality  and  Responsibility  in 
International  Criminal  Law'  (1952)  3'/  Transactions  of 
Grotious  Society,  99,105.  In  Scotland  there  is  a 
proper  trial,  and  any  further  trial  is  probably  precluded). 
Secondly,  as  Mr.  J.  R.  Christie  pointed  out  in  an 
article  in  190`  ('Insanity  in  Recent  Criminal  Practice', 
(1907)  19  Jur.  Rev.  165)  to  which  I  am  indebted  for  much 
of  the  material  in  this  part  of  this  chapter,  if  the 
accused  is  found  unfit  to  plead  he  is  detained  as  a 
criminal  lunatic.  Mr.  Christie  says  that  in  the  case 
of  Brown  (supra)  the  verdict  would  have  been  at  least 
not  proven  had  the  accused  been  fit  to  plead.  In  other 
words  the  accused  was  denied  his  right  to  an  acquittal, 
and  was  treated  in  the  same  way  as  if  he  had  committed 
the  act  charged  while  insane.  His  position  is  worse 
than  that  of  the  person  whose  unfitness  to  plead  is 
determined  by  the  Judge  in  the  normal  pre-trial 
procedure.  In  the  latter  case  it  is  clear  that  there 
is  no  question  of  any  decision  having  been  reached 
on  the  merits  of  the  charge,  but  in  the  former  case 
the  facts  have  been  put  before  the  jury,  and  the  man 
in  the  street  may  well  regard  the  accused  as  having 
committed  the  act  charged  since  he  has  been  dealt  with 
as  a  criminal  lunatic  after  trial  by  jury. 
Whether  the  position  of  the  person  found  unfit  to 
plead  by  a  jury  is,  in  addition,  'legallyi  worse  than 
that  of  someone  found  unfit  to  plead  by  a  Judge  depends 
on  whether  there  is  any  possibility  of  the  former's 
being  retried  and  so  having  a  chance  to  assert  his 
complete  innocence  of  the  acts  charged.  Accordag 368 
to  Renton  and  Brown  the  course  to  be  adopted  when  a  jury 
find  the  accused  unfit  to  plead  is  to  desert  the  diet 
pro  loco  attempore  as  is  done  when  a  Judge  decides  the 
matter,  so  that  a  later  trial  remains  possible  (Renton 
and  Brown,  p.  440).  But  in  Brown  ((190'1)  5  Adam  312, 
346)  the  diet  was  deserted  simpliciter,  so  that  any 
retrial  was  rendered  impossible,  and  Brown  was  deprived 
of  any  chance  of  his  asserting  that  he  had  nothing 
whatever  to  do  with  the  murder. 
The  meaning  of  the  plea. 
In  the  normal  case  where  the  plea  is  disposed  of 
without  a  jury,  the  Court  accepts  the  expert  evidence 
that  the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead.  (Exceptions  to  this 
are  very  rare,  but  one  occurred  in  the  case  of  Cameron. 
-  Perth  High  Court,  21  May,  1946,  see  1946  S.  N.  73  - 
where  the  diet  was  deserted  pro  loco  et  tempore  after 
the  Judge  had  expressed  himself  dissatisfied  with  the 
medical  evidence.  The  plea  in  bar  was  withdrawn  at  the 
subsequent  diet,  and  a  plea  of  not  guilty  entered.  The 
evidence  of  the  accused's  mental  condition  was  none  the 
less  left  to  the  jury  who  held  that  he  was  fit  to  plead. 
The  evidence  of  insanity  at  the  earlier  diet  was  slight 
being  based  on  the  accused's  lack  of  awareness  of  his 
position,  which  was  said  to  be  pathological,  and  on  his 
having  attempted  suicide.  He  was  able  to  offer  an 
account  of  the  killing  which  he  said  was  accidental 
and  he  subsequently  gave  evidence  to  that  effect. 
Nevertheless  his  plea  of  insanity  was  sworn  to  by  the 
superintendent  of  Perth  Criminal  Lunatic  Asylum,  and 
Lord  Cooper's  refusal  to  find  at  any  rate  without  further 
enquiry,  that  the  statutory  requirements  had  been 
satisfied,  or  to  take  'the  extreme  step'  of  ordering 
the  accused's  detention,  may  have  been  due  to  the  fact 
that  one  expert  had  read  the  other's  report  before  giving 369 
his  own.  Lord  Cooper  expressly  refrained  from 
commenting  on  the  medical  evidence.  )  No  questions 
of  law  are  raised,  and  the  witnesses  are  usually 
asked  if  they  think  the  accused  is  capable  of  instruct- 
ing  counsel  or  of  understanding  evidence.  As  a 
result,  as  Lord  Cooper  told  the  Royal  Commission  on 
Capital  Punishment,  'If  Sir  David  Henderson  and  one 
or  two  other  alienists  are  satisfied  that  he  is  inane, 
then  the  thing  is  finished'  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper, 
Q.  5491).  If  the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead,  the 
whole  question  of  responsibility  is  sidetracked, 
and  as  every  insane  person  is  regarded  as  unfit  to 
plead,  the  question  of  the  responsibility  of  the 
insane  for  their  'criminal'  acts  arises  in  practice 
only  in  the  very  few  cases  in  which  an  accused  who  is 
sane  at  the  time  of  his  trial  offers  a  defence  of 
insanity  at  the  time  of  the  offence.  The  medical 
witnesses  who  support  pleas  in  bar  do  not  usually  give 
evidence  that  the  accused  is  insane  in  terms  of  the 
M'Naghten  Rules  or  of  any  other  criterion,  but  merely 
that  he  is  unable  to  instruct  a  defence.  Again,  in 
Brown  ((1907)  5  Adam  312,346)  Lord  Dunedin  told  the 
jury  simply  that  they  must  decide  whether  the  accused 
could  'maintain'  in  sober  sanity  his  plea  of  innocence 
and  instruct  those  who  defend  him  as  a  truly  sane  man 
would  do'.  In  Cameron  (Perth  High  Court,  11-12  June, 
1946  discussed  supra  )  Lord  Birnam  told  the  jury 
merely  that  they  must  decide  whether  the  accused  was 
sane  or  not  (Transcript  of  Judge's  Charge,  pp.  24-6). 
The  law  of  insanity  is  therefore  very  flexible  in 
practice,  and  is  bound  to  develop  along  with  the 
development  of  psychological  medicine. 3'/0 
It  cannot  be  said  definitely  what  standards  the 
medical  profession  adopt  with  regard  to  pleas  in  bar 
of  trial.  There  seems  little  doubt  that  anyone 
who  is  certifiably  insane,  or  is  grossly  defective 
mentally,  will  be  regarded  as  unfit  to  plead  (R.  C. 
paras.  254,342),  and  it  can  be  said  that,  whatever  the 
law,  no  certifiable  lunatic  is  ever  convicted  of  a 
crime  in  Scotland.  It  is  probably  also  true  that 
something  short  of  certifiable  insanity  may  in  some 
circumstances  be  sufficient  to  set  up  a  plea  of 
insanity  in  bar  of  trial,  but  it  is  impossible  to 
lay  down  tules  or  even  definite  standards.  (Cf.  e.  g. 
Edwards  High  Court,  Edinburgh,  6  Feb.  1958,  unrepd. 
where  the  evidence  of  unfitness  to  plead  seemed  to 
amount,  if  my  memory  is  correct,  to  little  more  than 
the  evidence  of  psychopathic  personality.  The  accused 
was  a  young  man  who  had  shot  a  policeman,  and  who  was 
found  unfit  to  plead.  ) 
The  general  principle  of  unfitness  to  plead.  The 
general  principle  behind  the  plea  in  bar  extends 
to  cases  other  than  those  of  mental  disease  -  in 
particular  it  may  extend  to  deaf-mutes,  or  perhaps 
to  people  who  speak  a  language  for  which  it  isimpossible 
to  find  an  interpreter.  The  basic  principle  involved 
is  that  everyone  is  entitled  to  a  fair  trial,  and  that 
the  exercise  of  this  right  presupposes  that  the  accused 
is  capaole  of  instructing  a  defence  and  of  understanding 
the  proceedings  (cf.  T.  B.  Smith,  ol=it.  p.  104).  A 
man  who  is  'unable  either  from  mental  defect  of  physical 
defect,  or  a  combination  of  these,  to  tell  his  counsel 
what  his  defence  is  and  instruct  him  so  that  he  can 
appear  and  defend  him;  or  if,  again,  his  condition 
of  mind  and  body  is  such  that  he  does  not  understand 
the  proceedings  which  are  going  on...  and  cannot 3'11 
intelligibly  follow  what  it  is  all  about',  is  not  in 
a  fit  state  to  be  tried  (Wilson,  19+2  J.  C.  75,  Lord 
Wark  at  p.  79).  Insanity  is  thus,  in  theory,  only 
one  of  a  number  of  conditions  which  may  render  a 
person  unfit  to  plead,  and  there  is  no  necessary 
connection  between  the  insanity  required  to  substantiate 
a  plea  in  bar  and  that  required  to  substantiate  a  defence 
of  irresponsibility.  In  fact,  however,  there  is  no 
reported  case  of  a  successful  plea  of  unfitness  to 
plead  founded  on  anything  other  than  mental  disease 
amounting  to  or  approaching  insanity. 
The  case  of  Russell.  The  nature  of  the  plea  in 
bar  was  considered  in  the  case  of  Russell  (1946  J.  C.  3'/) 
which  is  the  most  recent  authority  on  the  question. 
The  accused  was  charged  with  a  series  of  frauds 
allegedly  perpetrated  between  1940  and  1943,  and  when 
she  came  to  trial  in  1946  she  lodged  a  plea  in  bar  of 
trial  on  the  ground  that  she  had  suffered  from 
hysterical  amnesia  for  the  period  from  1937  to  1944, 
and  could  not  remember  anything  about  the  alleged 
frauds,  so  that  she  was  unable  properly  to  instruct  a 
defence.  It  was  agreed  that  she  was  sane  at  the 
time  of  the  trial.  The  Crown  were  initially  prepared 
to  accept  the  plea  in  bar,  but  after  medical  evidence 
had  been  led  Lord  Sorn  rejected  it.  The  accused 
was  then  tried  by  the  jury  on  the  plea  in  bar,  a  plea 
of  not  guilty,  and  a  special  plea  of  insanity  at  the 
time  of  the  offences  and  was  convicted. 
Lord  Sorn  rejected  the  plea  because,  he  said,  the 
accused  'could  undoubtedly  understand  the  charge,  and 
[the 
plea)  involves  her  capacity  to  appreciate  the 
proceedings  and  there  is  no  doubt  of  her  capacity  to 
appreciate  them  and  to  communicate  with  her  counsel 
in  the  course  of  the  proceedings'  (at  p.  39).  The 
Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  supported  these  vieasr  and 372 
refused  to  apply  as  a  general  rule  Lord  Dunedin's 
statement  in  Brown  ((1907)  5  Adam,  312,344)  that  an 
accused  who  cannot  clearly  remember  what  happened 
at  the  time  of  the  offence  is  unfit  to  plead.  Lord 
Cooper,  then  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  said  that  the  only 
effect  of  the  accused's  amnesia  would  be  to  increase 
the  onus  of  proof  on  the  Crown,  so  as  to  prevent  the 
jury  founding  on  the  absence  of  any  explanations 
by  the  accused  (1946  J.  C.  3'/,  45). 
The  ratio  of  Russell  is  that  so  long  as  a  person 
can  follow  a  trial  and  appreciate  the  nature  of  the 
charge  made  against  him,  he  is  fit  for  trial,  even 
though  he  cannot,  because  of  mental  disease  short 
of  insanity,  remember  anything  of  what  happened  at  the 
time  of  the  alleged  offence.  It  was  pointed  out  that 
to  allow  the  plea  would  mean  that  anyone  who  had 
committed  a  crime  while  drunk  might  escape  trial  by 
claiming  that  he  could  not  remember  what  had  happened 
(Russell,  supra  at  p.  48).  It  may  be,  however,  that  a 
distinction  can  be  made  between  persons  whose  loss  of 
memory  is  due  to  drunkenness,  and  those  whose  loss  of 
memory  is  due  to  mental  disease;  and  it  may  also  be 
that  a  distinction  can  be  made  between  cases  in  which  tie 
facts  are  simple  and  easily  ascertainable  from  third 
parties,  as,  for  example,  in  cases  of  drunken  assaults, 
and  cases,  like  fraud,  where  the  facts  are  complex 
and  it  is  very  difficult  for  counsel  to  defend  the 
accused  without  having  her  explanation  of  the  circt  - 
stances.  It  must  be  said  that  in  Russell  most  of  the 
evidence  was  documentary  and  not  capable  of  innocent 
explanation,  but  although  this  was  adverted  to  it 
does  not  seem  to  form  part  of  the  ratio  decidendi. 3'/3 
Although  the  result  of  Russgll  seems  inescapable, 
especially  because  of  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
alternative,  it  is  none  the  less  a  little  disturbing. 
Acceptance  of  Russell  is  made  more  difficult  because 
the  decision  proceeds  in  part  upon  the  principle  of 
disfacilitation.  Lord  Cooper  said  that  two  consider- 
ations  were  involved  in  deciding  a  plea  in  bar  - 
'fairness  to  the  pannel,  who  should  not  be  tried  if 
and  so  long  as  he  is  not  a  fit  object  for  trial',  and 
'the  public  interest  which  requires  that  persons 
brought  before  a  criminal  Court  by  a  public  prosecutor 
should  not  be  permitted  to  purchase  complete  immunity 
from  investigation  into  the  charge  by  the  simple 
expedient  of  proving  the  existence  at  the  diet  of 
trial  of  some  mental  or  physical  incapacity  or 
handicap'.  (Russell,  supra,  at  p.  47). 
It  is  submitted,  with  diffidence  and  respect, 
that  the  important  thing  is  the  nature  of  the  handicap, 
urovided  it  be  a  genuine  one;  an  accused  person  should 
not  be  put  on  trial  if  the  handicap  is  such  as  to 
prevent  the  trial  being  fair,  just  because  this  may 
encourage  other  people  to  pretend  to  unreal  handicaps. 
There  is  a  tendency,  perhaps  based  on  the  justified 
reputation  of  the  Crown  Office  for  fairness,  to  regard 
the  accused  person  in  such  a  position  as  guilty,  and 
as  'getting  off'  by  means  of  the  plea  in  bar.  It 
would  be  more  logical,  even.  if  less  often  true,  to 
regard  him  as  in  innocent  person  deprived  by  his  handicap 
of  the  opportunity  of  establishing  his  innocence. 
These  considerations,  however,  lead  to  a  discussion 
of  the  way  in  which  persons  unfit  to  plead  are  dealt  with: 3'/L+ 
III  -  THE  DISPOSAL  OF  INSANE  ACCUSED. 
The  procedure  for  dealing  with  insane  accused  is 
laid  down  in  the  Lunacy  (Scotland)  Act,  185'/,  (20  &  21 
Vict.,  c.  71)  sections  87  and  88.  Section  87  provides 
that  a  person  found  unfit  to  plead  shall  be  detained 
'until  Her  Majesty's  pleasure  be  known'  (i.  e.  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Executive),  and  in  a  criminal  lunatic 
asylum,  now  known  as  a  State  Mental  Hospital  (Criminal 
Justice  (Scotland)  Act,  1949,12,13  &  14  Geo.  VI,  c.  94, 
s.  63(2)).  Section  88  provides  that  where  a  person  is 
tried  and  found  to  have  been  insane  and  irresponsible 
at  the  time  of  the  crime,  the  jury  shall  find  that  he 
committed.  the  acts  charged  but  that  he  is  not  guilty 
by  reason  of  insanity  (see  Mitchell,  1951  J.  0.53). 
He  is  thereupon  ordered  to  be  detained  in  the  same  way 
as  the  person  found  unfit  to  plead.  These  provisions 
raise  difficulties  and  are  open  to  a  number  of 
objections  to  which  I  now  turn.  (Cf.  J.  R.  Christie, 
'Insanity  and  Recent  Criminal  Practice',  (1907)  19 
Jur.  Rev.  165,  which  deals  with  most  of  these  objections.  ) 
Where  the  accused  is  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity. 
The  requirement  that  an  accused  who  is  acquitted 
because  of  insanity  shall  be  sent  to  a  State  Mental 
Hospital  presumably  rests  on  the  assumption  that  such 
a  person  is  insane  at  the  time  of  his  acquittal  -  an 
assumption  which  is  contrary  to  the  provisions  of 
section  87  which  prevent  his  trial  if  he  is  insane. 
As  a  result  the  person  who  is  ex  hypothesi  presently 
bane  is  ordered  to  be  detain  d  in  a  State  Mental 
Hospital  because  he  was  insane  at  an  earlier  date. 
(It  is  very  much  as  if  acquittal  on  the  ground  of 
insanity  is  only  regarded  as  a  partial  acquittal,  and  as 
if  detention  in  a  criminal  lunatic  asylum  is  regarded  as 37  5 
the  type  of  punishment  appropriate  to  such  an  'acquittal', 
just  as  imprisonment  rather  than  death  is  regarded  as  the 
appropriate  punishment  for  persons  committing  homicide 
when  of  diminished  responsibility;  the  illogicality 
of  this  is  obvious,  but  that  does  not  mean  that  it  does 
not  represent  a  prevalent  legal  attitude.  )  No'  doubt 
if  he  is  sane  at  the  time  of  his  detention  he  will  be 
immediately  released,  but  this  is  a  matter  overwhich 
the  Courts  have  no  control,  although  their  order  could 
no  doubt  be  produced  to  defeat  any  attempt  made  by  the 
patient  or  his  friends  to  secure  his  release. 
In  any  event,  what  the  Court  is  doing  under  section 
88  is  committing  someone  who  has  just  been  declared 
free  of  guilt  to  a  criminal  lunatic  asylum  and  to  the 
mercy  of  the  authorities.  The  reductio  ad  absurdum 
of  the  whole  procedure  is  seen  in  the  case  of  Maclelland 
(Edinburgh  High  Court,  21  May,  1907,  see  J.  R.  Christie, 
o.  cit.  at  p.  171).  Maclelland  was  found  unfit  to 
plead  in  1899  and  committed  to  a  criminal  lunatic 
asylum:  in  1907  he  had  recovered  sanity  and  he  was 
brought  to  trial  so  that  he,  might  have  the  benefit  of 
a  verdict  of  acquittal  on  the  ground  of  insanity. 
The  jury  found  him  not'  guilty  on  the  ground  of  insanity, 
and  this  man,  who  had  just.  been  declared  innocent,  was 
promptly  returned  to  the  place  whence  he  had  been 
discharged  as  sane  l  And  his  release  therefrom  depended 
just  as  much  on  the  goodwill  of  the  Executive  as  it  had 
done  during  his  first  confinement.  (The  only  result 
of  this  demonstration,  so  far  as  reported  cases  show, 
is  that  the  Crown  have  not  again  adopted  this  course 
of  action  but  have  left  the  accused  to  bear  the  stigma 
of  the  charge,  and  liable  to  retrial.  ) 
Since  the  person  who  is  acquitted  as  insane  is 
innocent,  the  justification  for  detaining  him  in  an 3'?  6 
asylum  must  be  the  same  as  that  for  detaining  anyone 
else  in  an  asylum  -  that  it  is  necessary  for  his  health 
and  safety,  and  for  that  of  the  public.  It  may  be 
that  where  the  accused  is  a  serious  danger  to  society 
detention  in  an  ordinary  institution  is  insufficient 
and  it  is  necessary  to  provide  for  his  detention 
in  a  place  specially  designed  for  such  persons,  in  a 
State  Mental  Hospital.  (Cf.  Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p.  206 
where  Professor  de  Vabres  disapproves  of  the  French 
system  of  treating  insane  criminals  in  the  same  way 
as  ordinary  insane  people,  because  of  the  social  danger 
and  the  special  supervision  necessary  in  the  case  of  the 
criminal.  )  Such  detention  should  be  restricted,  however, 
to  the  case  of  lunatics  who  are  so  dangerous  that  their 
detention  in  such  an  institution  is  necessary  for  the 
safety  of  society.  (Cf.  StGB  Art.  42b,  Schänke-Schröder, 
p.  164).  Where  the  accused  is  not  dangerous  he  could 
be  released  into  the  case  of  his  relatives,  as  was 
sometimes  done  before  1857  (Hume,  i.  44-5),  or  be 
certified  in  the  ordinary  way. 
At  present  the  criminal  law  takes  note  of  the 
distinction  between  dangerous  lunatics  and  others 
only  with  regard  to  summary  procedure.  Section  23  of 
the  Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act,  1949  (12,13  & 
14  Geo.  VI,  c.  94)  provides  that  where  the  summary 
Court  is  satisfied  that  an  accused  committed  the  offence 
charged,  but  is  of  unsound  mind,  and  is  a  proper  person 
to  be  detained,  it  shall  order  his  detention  in  a  mental 
hospital,  or,  if  he  is  dangerous,  and  cannot  be  suitably 
detained  in  a  mental  hospital,  in  a  State  Mental  Hospital. 
It  is  further  provided  that  detention  under  this  section 
shall  be  similar  in  effect  to  detention  under  sections 
14  and  15  of  the  Lunacy  (Scotland)  Act,  1862  (25  &  26 
Vict.,  s.  54)  respectively.  These  sections  provide 37? 
respectively  for  the  detention  of  ordinary  insane  persons, 
and  of  insane  persons  found  by  the  Fiscal  in  a  state 
dangerous  to  the  lieges  or  offensive  to  public  decency. 
(Section  15  is  somewhat  confusing  in  itself,  and  may 
be  regarded  as  at  any  rate  ug  asi-criminal.  But  it 
does  provide  for  enquiry  into  the  patient's  condition 
and  for  representations  by  any  of  his  relatives 
who  object  to  his  committal  -  see  M'Knight  v.  Ramsay, 
1935  J.  C.  94). 
These  provisions,  it  is  submitted,  are  preferable 
to  those  of  the  1857  Act,  since  they  do  not  treat  the 
insane  accused  as  a  criminal,  but  as  an  insane  person 
who  happens  to  be  brought  before  the  Court  and  so  ca 
be  conveniently  dealt  with  there;  and  also  because  they 
allow  the  detention  only  of  dangerous  persons  in  State 
Mental  Hospitals.  There  seems  no  good  reason  why 
these  provisions  should  not  be  applied  to  solemn 
procedure. 
Where  the  accused  is  unfit  to  plead. 
The  same  considerations  apply  to  persons  found 
unfit  to  plead.  Section  15  of  the  1862  Act  is  sometimes 
used  to  deal  with  such  persons,  but  in  serious  cases, 
the  usual  practice  is  to  bring  them  before  the  Court 
and  apply  the  1857  Act. 
The  objections  to  dealing  with  persons  unfit  to 
plead  under  the  1857  Act  are  even  greater  than  the 
objections  to  dealing  under  the  Act  with  those  acquitted 
on  the  ground  of  insanity.  At  least  the  latter  have 
been  shown  to  have  committed  an  act  which  would  be 
criminal  if  committed  by  a  sane  person;  the  person 
found  unfit  to  plead  is  treated  as  if  he  were  a 
criminal  lunatic,  and  sent  to  an  institution  specially 
designed  for  criminal  lunatics,  there  to  remain  at  the 
discretion  of  the  Executive  -  all  without  trial. 3'/8 
It  seems  clear  that  dangerous  lunatics  who  are  unfit  to 
plead  should  be  dealt  with  under  section  15  of  the  1862 
Act. 
Where  the  accused  is  not  dangerous  there  is  no 
reason  for  not  leaving  him  in  the  care  of  relatives,  or 
having  him  certified  in  the  usual  way.  In  Walsh 
(1922  J.  C.  82)  an  accused  who  became  insane  during  his 
trial  was  handed  over  to  bis  relatives.  It  is  difficult 
to  see-why  the  accused  who  is  never  brought  to  trial  at 
all  should  be  in  any  worse  position. 
The  objections  to  the  present  system  appear  even 
stronger  when  we  consider  the  case  of  the  sane  person 
who  is  unfit  to  plead.  The  sane  person  who  is  acquitted 
on  the  ground  of  irresponsibility  caused  by  a  mental 
disease  not  amounting  to  insanity,  is  apparently 
discharged  in  the  normal  way  (Ritchie,  1925  J.  C.  45;  cf. 
R.  V.  Kemp,  [195'l]  1  Q.  B.  399);  he  is  not  detained  in 
an  asylum  or  anywhere  else.  According  to  Russell 
(1946  J.  C.  37)  the  sane  person  who  is  unfit  to  plead 
cannot  walk  out  of  Court  free  with  an  absolute  discharge 
which  is  reasonable  enough  so  far  as  it  goes,  since 
an  absolute  discharge  would  mean  that  he  could  not  be 
tried  if  he  later  became  fit  to  plead.  But  it  seems 
to  have  been  assumed  in  Russell  that  he  must  therefore 
be  detained,  albeit  not  necessarily  in  an  asylum, 
apparently  indefinitely  and  at  the  whim  of  the  Executive 
without  recourse  to  the  Courts.  This  is  very  high 
punishment  indeed  for  being  a  deaf-mute  suspected 
by  the  Crown  Office  of  a  serious  crime.  The  reason 
for  the  attitude  of  the  Court  in  Russell  was  the 
principle  of  disfacilitation  -  something  must  be  done  to 
discourage  people  from  advancing  unfounded  pleas  in  bar 
of  trial,  and  the  way  to  do  this  is  to  make  it  plain 
that  success  in  such  a  plea  does  not  mean  that  the  accused 379 
'gets  off'.  (The  obvious  way  of  discouraging  unfounded 
pleas  is  to  reject  them  -  as  was  done  in  Russell, 
rather  than  to  behave  harshly  to  those  whose  pleas 
are  well-founded,  but  that  is  by  the  way.  )  Lord 
Cooper  said  'When  fairness  to  the  accused  requires  that 
the  trial  should  not  there  and  then}  proceed,  the  public 
interest  equally  requires  that  the  accused  should  not 
there  and  then  be  virtually  acquitted  untried'  (at  p.  47). 
But  surely  it  does  not  require  that  he  be  there  and  then 
virtually  convicted  untried,  or  at  least  treated  as  if  he 
had  committed  the  offence  charged  while  insane. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  best  course  to  adopt  with 
regard  to  persons  unf  it  to  plead  who  are  not  dangerous 
or  certifiable  -  whether  as  insane  or  as  mentally 
defective  -  is  to  release  them  on  bail,  like  any  other 
untried  accused;  then  they  would  be  neither  acquitted 
nor  convicted  without  trial,  nor  would  they  languish 
in  detention  untried.  The  only  objection  I  can  see 
to  this  course  is  that  murder  is  not  a  bailable  offence, 
but  that  can  easily  be  remedied,  especially  as  most 
murders  are  no  longer  capital  offences.  In  any  event, 
it  should  not  be  beyond  the  ingenuity  of  a  willing 
legislature  to  make  provision  for  the  cases  of  murder 
and  capital  murder. 380 
Chapter  9:  Diminished  Responsibility. 
The  general  principle. 
The  doctrine  of  diminished  responsibility  has  been 
said  to  be  so  simple  that  'it  can  be  mastered  by  a 
simple  morning's  comfortable  reading'  (A.  Koestler, 
Reflections  on  Hanging,  p.  83),  but  it  is  not  quite 
so  easy  to  describe  its  precise  status  and  scope. 
Essentially,  the  doctrine  is  that  there  are  states 
of  mind  which,  while  they  do  not  amount  to  insanity, 
are  yet  serious  enough  to  affect  a  person's  responsibility, 
so  that,  while  not  insane,  he  cannot  ue  regarded  as 
responsible  to  the  same  degree  as  a  mentally  normal 
person. 
Is  it  illogical? 
  
The  doctrine  has  been  criticised  as  being  illogical 
because  it  offends  against  the  principle  of  non- 
contradiction  which  requires  that  a  man  be  either 
responsible  or  not  responsible.  'The  defence  of 
impaired  responsibility'  said  Lord  Normand,  then  Lord 
Justice-General,  'is  somewhat  inconsistent  with  the 
basic  doctrine  of  our  criminal  law  that  a  man,  if  sane, 
is  responsible  for  his  acts,  and,  if  not  sane,  is  not 
responsible'  (Kirkwood,  1939  J.  C.  36,40).  In  a  later 
case  Lord  Normand  described  the  doctrine  as  'anomalous' 
(Carraher,  1946  J.  C.  108,118).  The  result  of  this 
attitude  which,  incidentally,  takes  no  account  of  the 
fact  that  the  doctrine  is  recognised  in,  e.  g.  Germany, 
France,  and  Switzerland  (see  StGB  Art  51,  Donnedieu  de 
Vabres,  p.  208,  SchwStGB  Art  il),  has  been  a  tendency 
to  treat  the  doctrine  as  a  peculiar  rule  without  any 
basis  in  general  principle,  and  to  refuse  to  extend 
its  ambit  beyond  those  particular  types  of  examples  of 381 
diminished  responsibility  which  have  been  recognised 
in  the  past.  These  examples  are  regarded,  not  as 
a  species  of  a  genus,  but  as  each  an  ultimate  type  of 
diminished  responsibility  (or  perhaps  as  examples 
of  one  type  of  diminished  responsibility  which  is 
regarded  as  the  only  possible  type),  and  the  class 
of  cases,  like  that  of  re;  atives  entitled  to  sue  for 
solatium  (cf.  Laidlaw  v.  N.  C.  B.,  195'/  S.  C.  49),  is 
considered  to  be  closed.  That  at  any  rate  is  the 
purport  of  the  leading  case  on  the  subject,  the  case 
of  Carraher  (supra),  which  will  be  discussed  in  detail 
later. 
This  approach  to  the  subject  fails  to  take  proper 
account  of  the  psychological  basis  of  the  rule,  or  of 
its  place  in  the  legal  system.  There  is  ample 
medical  authority  for  the  existence  of  states  in  which 
it  is  reasonable  to  talk  of  diminished  responsibility. 
Degrees  of  mental  illness  produce  degrees  of  culpability 
(cf.  Norwood  East,  Society  and  the  Criminal,  pp.  37-9). 
Again,  it  is  easy  to  appreciate  that  there  may  be 
cases  of  impulses  which  exert  such  an  influence  on  the 
patient  that  he  cannot  be  considered  to  be  as  much 
a  free  agent  as  the  normal  man,  even  although  they 
may  not  be  irresistible  impulses.  We  are  familiar 
at  the  present  time  with  many  serious  mental  illnesses 
which  do  not  amount  to  insanity,  and  where  these  lead 
to  crime,  or  influence  the  criminal's  actions,  it  seems 
only  reasonable  to  take  regard  of  that  fact. 
So  far  as  the  legal  system  is  concerned,  diminished 
responsibility  is  only  illogical  if  it  is  accepted 
a  priori  that  a  person  must  be  characterised  as 
responsible  or  as  irresponsible,  and  that  no  further 
distinction  can  be  made.  This  seems  plausible,  but 
if  we  substitute  'blameworthy',  or  'punishable'  for 382 
'responsible',  its  plausibility  diminishes,  and  the 
place  of  the  doctrine  becomes  clearer.  There  is 
nothing  illogical  in  distinguishing  the  degrees  of 
blameworthiness  or  of  liability  to  punishment  of  two 
persons  who  have  joined  together  to  commit  the  same 
crime.  If  A  and  B  steal  £1,000,  A  because  he  is  greedy 
and  wants  a  holiday  in  Monte  Carlo,  and  B  because  he 
needs  the  money  to  pay  his  rent  and  save  the  life  of 
his  tubercular  child,  both  are  equally  responsible 
in  the  sense  that  both  are  guilty  of  theft,  but  there 
would  be  nothing  illogical  in  giving  Aa  much  heavier 
punishment  than  was  given  to  B. 
Diminished  responsibility  operates  as  a  mitigating 
factor  which  justifies  the  Court  in  imposing  a  punish- 
ment  which  is  less  than  the  normal  punishment  for  the 
particular  crime,  in  the  same  way  as  does  any  other 
mitigating  factor.  The  doctrine  has  come  into 
prominence  because  it  may  operate  to  reduce  a  charge 
of  murder  to  one  of  culpable  homicide,  so  that  a 
person  who  would  be  convicted  of  murder  were  he  normal 
is  only  convicted  of  culpable  homicide  if  he  is  of 
diminished  responsibility.  But  this  is  just  a 
particular  application  of  the  more  general  doctrine  - 
in  murder  cases  the  Judge  cannot  reduce  the  sentence 
unless  the  jury  first  reduce  the  crime  to  culpable 
homicide,  because  the  penalty  for  murder  is  fixed.  This 
use  of  the  doctrine  'is  not  anomalous,  but  was  intro- 
duced  to  correct  an  anomaly  in  the  law  regarding 
punishment'  (T.  B.  Smith,  p.  728).  It  is  merely 
a  special  case  of  the  rule  that  personal  factors 
mitigate  sentence.  (R.  C.  Evid.  Memorandum  of  Faculty 
of  Advocates,  para.  13). 383 
Were  it  not,  however,  for  this  peculiarity  of  the 
law  of  murder,  it  would  have  been  unnecessary  to  have  a 
doctrine  of  diminished  responsibility.  There  are  no 
legal  rules  on  which  a  Judge  must  rely  in  deciding 
the  amount  of  good  character,  jor  the  number  of 
dependent  children,  or  years  of  distinguished  service, 
a  criminal  must  have  before  he  is  entitled  to  be  treated 
with  leniency.  And  dimirhed  responsibility  relates 
to  the  question  of  penalty.  (Cf.  SchwStGB  Art  11, 
which  empowers  the  Judge  to  'impose  a  less  severe 
penalty',  where  there  is  diminished  responsibility  - 
verminderte  Zurechnungsfähigkeit.  )  The  difficulty 
arises  because  murder  and  culpable  homicide-are 
thought  of  as  different  crimes,  and  it  is  thought 
therefore  that  diminished  responsibility,  which  'trans- 
forms'  the  one  into  the  other,  must  be  clearly  definable. 
A  similar  situation  exists  with  regard  to  provocation. 
But  voluntary  culpable  homicide,  and  we  are  not  here 
concerned  with  involuntary  culpable  homicide,  is  just 
another  name  for  'murder  under  mitigating  circumstances' 
and  so  is  no  more  different  from  murder  than  is  assault 
committed  under  provocation  from  premeditated  assault, 
or  theft  by  a  starving  man  from  theft  by  a  greedy  one. 
Diminished  responsibility  and  the  mens  rea  of  murder. 
None  the  less  it  must  be  recognised  that  the  doctrine 
grew  up  in  the  context  of  the  law  of  homicide,  and  that 
with  a  few  exceptions  it  has  not  been  expressly  applied 
outside  that  context.  It  is  unnecessary  to  have  a 
doctrine  for  other  crimes  because  normally  there  is 
no  limit  to  the  discretion  of  the  Court  in  passing 
sentence  for  common  law  crimes;  and  conversely  the 
fact  that  murder  was  until  recently  capital  led  Judges 
to  seek  a  way  of  avoiding  the  death  penalty  in  cases  of 
mental  weakness  short  of  insanity.  (Cf.  what  is 384 
apparently  the  contrary  situation  in  Germany.  There 
diminished  responsibility  operates  in  general  to  allow 
a  lesser  scale  of  penalties  to  be  applied  than  the 
scale  set  down  for  the  given  crime  in  normal  circumstances. 
But  since  the  punishment  for  murder  is  fixed,  the 
doctrine  cannot  apply  to  it  -  Schänke-Schröder,  pp. 
285-6.  If  we  start  with  a  general  idea,  it  is 
possible  to  restrict  it  to  cases  where  the  sentence  is 
discretionary;  but  if  we  start  with  homicide  or 
any  crime  with  a  fixed  punishment,  it  does  not  seem 
logical  to  restrict  it  to  homicide.  )  As  a  result 
it  has  sometimes  been  wrongly  thought  that  the  doctrine 
was  in  fact  restricted  to  homicide  (R.  C.  para.  413.  It 
is  so  restricted  in  England  -  where  it  is  statutory, 
Homicide  Act,  1957,5  &6  Eliz.  II,  cll,  s.  2),  and 
attempts  have  been  made  to  explain  it  by  reference 
to  the  law  of  murder. 
This  is  usually  done  by  pointing  to  some  particular 
requirement  necessary  to  constitute  the  wens  rea  of 
murder,  and  showing  that  a  state  of  diminished 
responsibility  excludes  this  requirement.  Lord 
Ardmillan  suggested  in  John  Tierney  ((18'/5)  3  Coup.  152, 
166)  that  'The  man's  control  over  his  own  mind  might 
have  been  so  weak  as  to  deprive  the  act  of  that  wil- 
fulness  which  would  have  made  it  murder'.  Again,  Lord 
M'Laren  in  Abercrombie  ((1896)  2  Adam,  163,166)  said 
that  'the  accused  may  have  been  guilty  of  an  attack... 
which  was  illegal  and  criminal,  and  yet  may  have  done  so 
without  realising  an  intention  of  taking  life'.  But 
what  is  lacking  in  the  case  of  a  killing  committed 
by  someone  of  diminished  responsibility  is  not  mens  rea 
in  the  strict  sense  of  intent  to  kill  -  if  that  were 
absent  there  would  be  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  the 
doctrine  in  order  to  avoid  a  murder  conviction  -  but 385 
mens  rea  in  the  old  sense  in  which  it  meant  depravity 
of  mind,  or  malice,  the  sense  I  call  'general  mens  rea' 
(suprad[Z).  But  the  absence  of  malice  cannot  affect 
guilt;  since  it  is  only  a  question  of  motive,  it  can 
only  operate  as  a  mitigating  factor. 
The  approach  by  way  of  mens  rea  of  murder  in  the 
strict  sense  of  mens  rea  is  possible  only  in  systems 
which  define  murder  so  as  to  include  a  particular 
element  which  is  inconsistent  with  diminished 
responsibility.  Where,  for  example,  there  are 
different  degrees  of  murder,  and  the  first  degree  - 
capital  murder,  so  to  speak  -  is  defined  so  as  to  require 
'wilful,  deliberate,  malicious  and  premeditated  killing' 
(Hopt  v.  People,  (1881)  104  U.  S.  631),  it  may  be 
possible  to  define  diminished  responsibility  strictly, 
as  a  state  of  mind  excluding  these  factors,  and  accord- 
ingly  to  class  all  homicides  by  persons  of  diminished 
responsibility  as  at  most  second-degree  murders. 
Although  voluntary  culpable  ho*icide  is  the  Scots 
equivalent  of  second-degree  murder,  there  is  no  definition 
of  first-degree  murder  in  Scots  law,  which  includes  any 
necessary  element  of  malice  or  premeditation,  or  any 
othe,  r  element  which  is  lacking  in  the  case  of  diminished 
responsibility.  The  concept  of  murder  is  to  a  large  extent 
defeasible,  and  murder  can  be  defined  as  'intentional 
homicide  (or  perhaps  also  reckless  homicide)  except 
where  the  killing  is  committed  under  provocation,  or  by 
someone  of  diminished  responsibility,  or...  '.  The 
positive  wens  rea  of  murder  is  present  in  cases  of 
diminished  responsibility;  what  makes  these  cases  culpable 
homicide  is  the  presence  of  another  factor,  the  'defeasing' 
factor  of  diminished  responsibility,  and  this  factor 
must  therefore  be  defined  independently  of  the  definition 
of  murder.  It  follows  also  that  this  factor  does  not 386 
operate  to  exclude  guilt  of  murder  since  it  is  not 
inconsistent  with  the  definition  of  murder,  but  only  to 
mitigate  the  penalty  of  murder. 
The  doctrine  is  humanitarian.  The  ultimate  basis 
of  diminished  responsibility  is  much  broader  than  any 
legal  inference  whether  from  the  law  of  murder  or  from 
the  law  of  any  other  crime.  The  doctrine  exists  and 
is  used  because,  as  has  been  said  of  provocation, 
the  law  shows  'a  tenderness  to  the  frailty  of  human 
nature'  (Cmwth.  v.  Webster,  (1850)  5  Cush.  296,  Sayre, 
p.  785  at  p.  788).  In  its  particular  application 
to  homicide  it  is,  in  the  words  of  Lord  Kethh,  'probably 
a  reaction  against  imposing  the  capital  sentence  mall 
cases  of  murder,  or  what  might  be  treated  as  murder  if 
the  defence  of  diminished  responsibility  did  not 
prevail'  (R.  C.  Evid.  Q  5206).  In  a  word,  it  is  based 
on  human  sympathy  with  the  mentally  ill. 
The  development  of  the  doctrine. 
Its  development  tp  to  1900. 
Before  Dinvall.  The  idea  of  diminished 
responsibility  occurred  to  Sir  George  Mackenzie  who 
wrote: 
'It  may  be  argued,  that  since  the  Law 
grants  a  total  Impunity  to  such  as  are  absolutely 
furious,  that  therefore  it  should  by  the  Rule  of 
Proportion,  lessen  and  moderate  the  punishments 
of  such,  as  though  they  are  not  absolutely  mad, 
yet  are  Hypochondrick,  and  Melancholy  to  such 
a  Degree,  that  it  clouds  their  Reason'  (Mackenzie, 
Laws  and  Customs  of  Scotland  in  Matters  Criminal, 
I,  1,8,2). 
But  although  the  idea  was  present  in  1699  its  develop- 
ment  can  only  be  traced  from  a  later  date.  It  seems 
to  have  started  in  practice  with  an  understanding  that 
certain  cases  of  mental  weakness  should  be  dealt  vi  th 361 
by  way  of  a  conviction  accompanied  by  a  recommendation 
to  mercy.  The  earliest  example  of  this  practice  offered 
by  Hume  is  the  case  of  Robt.  Bonthorn  (Nov.  29  1763, 
Hume,  i,  38),  a  case  of  assault  by  a  smuggler  on  a 
revenue  officer,  in  which  the  jury  found  'that  the 
intellects  of  the  pannel  are  most  remarkably  weak, 
irregular  and  confused,  and  therefore  recommend  him 
to  the  mercy  of  the  Court'.  This  form  of  verdict 
was  approved  of  by  Hume,  who  also  approved  of  the 
exercise  of  mercy  in  cases  of  weak  intellect  even  where 
the  jury  had  not  specifically  made  any  recommendation 
to  mercy  (Alex.  Campbell,  18  Dec.  1809,  Hume,  i.  38; 
Susan  Tinny,  11  March  1816,  Hume,  i.  41;  Robt  Thomson, 
June,  1739,  Hume,  1.40;  Agnes  Crockat,  23  July, 
1756,  Hume  i.  42  -  both  the  letter  earlier,  -  it  will  be 
noted,  than  Bonthorn  -  which  suggests  that  the  verdict 
with  recommendation  followed  on  a  practice  of  exercising 
mercy  in  cases  of  weak  intellect).  That  this  was  a 
recognised  way  of  dealing  with  the  mentally  weak 
also  appears  from  Hume's  comment  on  the  acquittal  on  the 
ground  of  insanity  of  Jas.  Cummings  who  killed  a  fellow- 
soldier  apparently  when  under  the  influence  of  melancholia 
and  drink.  Hume,  who  disapproved  of  treating  drunken- 
ness  like  insanity,  said,  'It  may  be  questioned  whether, 
under  the  whole  circumstances  of  this  case,  it  would  not 
have  been  a  more  correct  and  a  more  salutary  judgment 
to  convict  him  of  the  murder  and  recommend  him  to  the 
royal  mercy'  (Hume,  i.  40-1). 
Bell's  Notes  to  Hume  state  that  'In  offences 
inferring  arbitrary  pains,  weakness  of  intellect  is  a 
relevant  plea  to  use  in  mitigation'  (p.  5),  and  the 
cases  cited  in  support  of  this  statement  (Win.  Braid, 
12  March,  1835;  Thos.  Henderson,  13  March,  1835; 
Jas.  Ainslie,  (1842)  1  Broun  25)  were  said  by  Lord  Normand 388 
in  Kirkwood  (1939  J.  C.  36,39)  to  be  the  origin  of  the 
doctrine.  This  reference  is  useful  in  showing  that 
the  plea  was  regarded  as  mitigatory  and  as  having 
nothing  to  do  with  the  specialties  of  the  law  of  murder, 
but  the  cases  in  Hume  make  it  clear  that  it  was  not 
confined  (except  formally)  to  'offences  inferring 
arbitrary  pains',  i.  e.  to  non-capital  offences. 
The  law  is  made  explicit,  so  far  as  capital 
offences  are  concerned,  by  Alison  who  states  that,  'If 
it  appear  from  the  evidence  that  the  pannel,  though 
partially  deranged,  was  not  so  much  so  as  to  relieve 
him  entirely  from  punishment,  the  proper  course  is  to 
find  him  guilty;  but,  on  account  of  the  period  of 
infirmity  of  mind,  which  he  could  not  control,  recommend 
him  to  the  royal  mercy'  (Alison,  i.  652).  Alison 
takes  the  view  that  there  are  cases  where  the  law  more 
or  less  requires  that  there  be  mitigation,  and  so 
requires  a  recommendation  to  mercy,  'since  the  only 
way  of  mitigating  the  capital  penalty  was  by  means 
of  the  Royal  prerogative  of  ;  ercy. 
In  two  mid-19th  century  cases  the  jury  were  more  or 
less  directed  to  bring  in  a  recommendation  to  mercy 
on  the  ground  of  the  accused's  weakness  of  intellect. 
In  Denny  Scott  ((1853)  1  Irv.  132)  Lord  Cockburn  told 
the  jury  that  'a  conviction,  though  obstructed  in  its 
result  by  a  recommendation,  was  the  safest  for  the 
public,  and  the 
. 
least  opposed  to  the  truth  of  the  case' 
(at  p.  143).  In  John  M'Fadyen  ((1860)  3  Irv.  650) 
lord  Cowan  said  that  'the  safest  verdict  would  probably 
be  one  of  guilty,  accompanied  by  such  recommendation 
as  the  undoubted  weakness  of  the  panel's  intellect 
might  appear  to  them  to  justify'  (at  p.  666).  In 
both  cases  the  recommendation  was  accepted. 389 
Dingwall  and  after.  Fron  this  it  was  but  a  short 
step  to  ask  the  jury  to  bring  in  a  verdict  of  culpable 
homicide  instead  of  a  verdict  of  murder  with  a 
recommendation.  A  culpable  homicide  verdict  obviated 
any  risk  that  the  recommendation  might  be  rejected,  and 
also  left  the  treatment  of  the  accused  in  the  hands  of 
the  Judge  who  could  impose  what  he  considered  to  be 
a  suitable  sentence,  giving  what  weight  he  thought 
proper  to  the  accused's  mental  state.  This  step  was 
taken  (although  not  expressly  for  these  reasons)  by 
Lord  Deas  in  1867  in  the  case  of  Alex.  Dingwall  ((186'1) 
5  Irv.  466)  which  is  generally  recognised  as  the  origin 
of  the  modern  law  on  the  subject.  Although  the  doctrine 
was  recognised  by  the  High  Court  in  the  non-capital 
case  of  John  M'lean  in  1876  (3  Coup.  334),  it  owes 
its  existence  in  its  modern  form  almost  entirely  to  Lord 
Deas  who  delivered  the  observations  of  the  Court  in 
M'Lean,  and  who  was  the  Judge  in  six  of  the  nine  cases 
between  186'7  and  1882  in  which  the  application  of  the 
doctrine  to  homicide  was  evolved.  (His  influence, 
like  that  of  Lord  Moncrieff  in  the  case  of  insanity, 
shows  how  a  single  Judge,  if  he  happened  to  preside  at 
appropriate  trials,  could  influence  the  law  and  create 
a  body  of  authority  by  repeating  his  views  in  a  number 
of  cases.  ) 
The  accused  in  Dingwall  was  an  alcoholic  who 
stabbed  his  wife  on  Hogmanay  after  a  quarrel  which  was 
caused  because  :  fie  had  hidden  his  liquor  and  his  mores  y. 
He  was  kind  to  her  when  he  was  sober;  he  had  suffered 
from  occasional  attacks  of  delirium  tremens;  he  was 
sober  at  the  time  of  the  killing  but  remembered  nothing 
about  it.  In  suggesting  to  the  jury  that  they  might 
bring  in  a  verdict  of  culpable  homicide  Lord  Deas 
mentioned  the  accused's  mental  condition  as  one  among 390 
a  number  of  mitigating  factors.  He  set  out  the  grounds 
which  would  justify  a  verdict  of  culpable  homicide  as 
being  '1st,  the  unpremeditated  and  sudden  nature  of  the 
attack;  2d,  the  prisoner's  habitual  kindness  to  his 
wife,  of  which  there  could  be  no  doubt,  when  drink 
did  not  interfere;  3d,  There  was  only  one  stab  or  blow, 
this,  while  not  perhaps  like  what  an  insane  man  would 
have  done,  was  favourable  for  the  prisoner  in  other 
respects;  4th,  the  prisoner  appears  not  only  to  have 
been  peculiar  in  his  mental  constitution,  but  to  have 
had  his  mind  weakened  by  successive  attacks  of  disease... 
The  state  of  mind  of  a  prisoner  might  be  an  extenuating 
circumstance,  although  not  such  as  to  warrant  an  acquittal 
on  the  ground  of  insanity'  (at  pp.  479-80). 
The  ne7:  t  case,  that  of  John  Tierney,  in  1875, 
(3  Coup.  152)  is  of  interest  only  because  the  question 
of  diminished  responsibility  was  raised  by  the  Crown 
and  not  the  defence,  and  was  left  to  the  jury  by  Lord 
Ardmillan,  although  he  said  he  did  not  see  much  ground 
for  it  in  the  evidence.  No  reference  was  made  to 
Dingwall,  and  Tierney  suggests  that  that  at  least  by 
1875  the  climate  of  professional  opinion  was  not 
unfavourable  to  reducing  murder  to  culpable  homicide 
on  the  ground  of  mental  weakness.  Lord  Deas'  views 
gained  ready  acceptance,  it-would  appear,  from  his 
contemporaries,  and  were  not  seriously  challenged 
until  the  twentieth  century. 
The  most  important  case  after  Dingwall  is  that  of 
John  MM.  'Lean  ((1876)  3  Coup.  334).  The  accused  was  an 
imbecile  who  had  been  weak-minded  from  childhood, 
and  had  at  one  time  been  a  certified  lunatic.  He 
was  charged  with  housebreaking  and  was  convicted  with  a 
recommendation  to  leniency  because  of  the  medical 
evidence  given  at  the  trial  regarding  his  'weak  intellect'. 391 
The  case  was  reported  to  the  High  Court  on  the  question 
of  sentence,  and  another  medical  report  was  obtained. 
The  sentence  of  the  High  Court  was  imposed  by  Lord 
Deas  in  a  speech  in  which  he  pointed  out  that  it  was 
quite  proper  for  a  Judge  to  take  mental  weakness  into 
consideration  in  passing  sentence,  whether  or  not  there 
was  a  recommendation  to  leniency.  He  went  on  to  say 
that, 
'without  being  insane  in  the  legal  sense, 
so  as  not  to  be  amenable  to  punishment,  a  prisoner 
may  yet  labour  under  that  degree  of  weakness 
of  intellect  or  mental  infirmity,  which  may  make 
it  both  right  and  legal  to  take  that  state  of  mind 
into  account,  not  only  in  awarding  the  punishment 
but  in  some  cases  even  in  considering  within 
what  cate  ory  of  offences  the  crime  shall  be  held 
to  fall' 
(at 
p.  337). 
Lord  Deas  then  referrod  to  Dingwall  and  said  'It  would  be 
dangerous  to  lay  down  rules  which  should  limit  the 
discretion  of  the  Judge  in  the  matter  of  arbitrary 
punishment'  (at  p.  339). 
It  seems  clear  from  M'Lean  that  diminished 
responsibility  was  regarded,  primarily  if  not  wholly,  as 
a  mitigating  factor  -  Lord  Deas  seems  to  consider  its 
use  in  determining  the  category  of  the  offence  as 
secondary  to  its  iise  in  awarding  punishment,  and  this, 
as  has  been  submitted,  is  the  logical  way  of  appvoaching 
the  situation.  The  matter  did,  however,  later  become 
less  discretionary,  less  a  matter  of  human  sympathy 
than  of  legal  categorisation.  There  are  signs  of  this 
later  approach  in  statements  which  compare  the  situation 
with  the  rather  more  rigid  state  of  affairs  subsisting 
in  countries  with  different  degrees  of  murder.  Lord 
Deas  said  in  the  case  of  Thos.  Ferguson  ((1881)  4  Coup. 
552,558)  that  the  doctrine  was  'founded  on  a  principle 
of  natural  justice  which  recognised  a  distinction  between 392 
what  in  other  countries  equally  enlightened  as  ours 
was  termed  murder  in  the  first  and  in  the  second  degree, 
and  which  under  our  own  humane  system  we  could  act  upon 
better  and  more  conveniently  by  the  distinction  between 
murder  and  culpable  homicide'.  (Cf.  Helen  Brown,  (1882) 
4  Coup.  596,597.  Ferguson  was  said  to  be  a  less  siitable 
case  for  dim.  iribLed  responsibility  than  Dingwall  because 
there  was  deliberate  preparation  and  great  ferocity  in 
Ferguson,  not  specifically  because  of  any  difference  in 
mental  condition  -  another  pointer  to  the  idea  of  diminished 
responsibility  as  one  among  a  number  of  mitigating  factors. 
Ferguson  was  convicted  of  murder  with  a  recommendation 
to  mercy,  presumably  because  the  jury  were  influenced 
by  these  factors  and  yet  felt  that  the  accused  did  not 
deserve  to  hang.  )  But  there  is  still  in  the  19th 
century  cases  an  emphasis  on  humanity,  and  a  feeling 
that  the  Scots  system  of  general  mitigating  factors  is 
preferable  to  the  logical  definition  of  degrees  of 
murder. 
The  other  19th  century  cases  (John  Wilson,  (1877) 
3  Coup.  429;  John  Small.,  (1882)  4  Coup.  388;  Ferguson, 
(1893)  1  Adam  517  -  none  of  these  cases  was  capital  - 
and  Andrew  Grainger,  (1878)  4  Coup.  87  and  Margt.  Brown, 
(1886)  1  Wh.  93  which  are  really  concerned  with 
intoxication)  add  little  to  the  law,  and  only  the  case 
of  Smith  ((1893)  1  Adam  34)  requires  special  mention. 
Smith  was  a  farm-worker  who  was  charged  with  murdering 
a  fellow-worker  and  pleaded  insanity.  He  was  a 
sensitive  man,  much  given  to  brooding.  His  fellow- 
servants  had  subjected  him  to  a  campaign  of  continual 
annoyance,  and  eventually  he  lost  control  when  the 
deceased  said  'Boot  to  him,  and  he  shot  him.  Lord 
M'Laren  applied  the  law  of  diminished  responsibility 
saying,  with  reference  to  Dingwall  (supra  ), 393 
'Now,  if  it  were  the  law  that  a  state  of 
mental  disturbance  brought  on  by  a  man's  own 
fault,  'by  his  own  intemperance,  going  the 
length  of  producing  a  physiological  disturbance 
of  the  brain,  might  to  that  extent  excuse  him, 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  same  result  must  follow 
when  the  disturbance  of  the  mental  equipdse  was 
not  due  to  a  man's  own  fault,  but  to  his  being 
subjected  to  a  system  of  incessant  persecution' 
(at  p.  50). 
Lord  M'Laren  laid  stress  on  physiological  disturbance, 
and  also  relied  on  evidence  that  the  accused  had  been 
'physiologically  unable  to  resist'  (at  p.  52)  the 
provoeation  offered  by  the  deceased.  It  is  not 
clear  just  what  'physiological'  means  here.  It  may 
be  a  sign  of  a  tendency  to  distrust  merely  'mental' 
conditions  which  cannot  be  shown  to  have  any  physiologimal 
foundation,  in  which  case  it  foreshadows  the  modern 
attitude.  On  the  other  hand  if  the  accused  was  in 
fact  'physiologically  unable'  to  resist,  his  plea  of 
insanity  should  have  succeeded,  since  a  man  physically 
incapable  of  controlling  his  actions  cannot  be  convicted 
of  a  common  law  crime. 
The  20th  century  cases. 
Aitken  to  Carraher.  The  20th  century  cases  show 
an  increasing  distrust  of  the  concept  of  diminished 
responsibility.  The  judicial  approach  to  the  plea, 
which  was  favourable  in  the  19th  century,  becomes 
affected  by  the  fear  that  it  will  lead  to  many 
murderers  escaping  their  just  deserts,  and  by  the  view 
that  the  doctrine  is  illogical  and  anomalous,  attitudes 
adopted  by  Lord  Cooper  and  Lord  Normand  respectively, 
and  as  a  result  the  doctrine  has  been  restrictively 
interpreted  in  this  century.  The  modern  approach 
is  due  partly  to  the  fact  that  modern  psychology  has 
discovered  many  abnormal  conditions  unknown  in  the  19th 394 
century,  which  doctors  consider  as  creating  a  state  of 
diminished  responsibility.  Lawyers  are  afraid  of  these 
'new  (angled'  notions  (cf.  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper, 
Q.  5468),  and  are  also  afraid  that  if  they  allow 
psychologists  to  determine  the  question  of  diminished 
responsibility,  they  will  find  that  all  criminals 
will  be  characterised  as  being  of  diminished 
responsibility.  (The  law  is  in  part  a  reaction  to  the 
extreme  claims  made  by  some  psychiatrists.  In  Braithwaite 
Edinburgh  High  Court,  30th  Nov.  1944,  repel.  at  1945 
J.  C.  55,  one  witness  said  that  all  persons  who 
committed  crimes  of  violence  were  not  fully  responsible  - 
Transcript  of  Evidence,  p.  98;  and  in  Carraher, 
Glasgow  High  Court,  28  Feb.  -  2nd  March,  1946,1946 
J.  C.  108,  a  witness  said  t:  -iat  2%  of  the  population 
were  not  fully  responsible  -  Trials  of  Patrick  Carraher, 
ed.  Blake,  p.  225.  )  Such  a  result  would  destroy 
the  doctrine  entirely  because  there  would  then  be  no 
norm  against  which  to  measure  diminution. 
It  should  also  be  remembered  that  diminished 
responsibility  is  in  practice  usually  an  alternative 
to  a  plea  of  insanity  in  murder  cases,  and  the  main 
reason  for  pleading  insanity,  at  any  rate  until  1957,  was 
to  escape  hanging.  This  result  can  be  achieved  more 
easily  by  a  plea  of  diminished  responsibility,  and  can 
in  that  way  also  be  achieved  without  any  risk  of 
incarceration  in  a  criminal  lunatic  asylum  for  an 
indefinite  period,  so  that  diminished  responsibility 
is  thought  of  as  a  way  out  of  the  difficulties  of 
insanity,  as  a  means  of  escape  for  the  criminal  who 
is  not  insane,  and  who  should  really  be  convicted  of 
murder.  Viewed  in  this  way,  it  is  naturally  not 
regarded  by  Judges  with  much  favour. 395 
Signs  of  this  tendency  appear  earlier  than  the 
spread  of  modern  psychiatric  ideas.  The  restrictive 
outlook  is  present  in  the  first  reported  20th  century 
case  on  the  subject,  the  case  of  Aitken  ((1902)  4  Adam  8a). 
The  charge  was  one  of  murder  and  a  plea  of  insanity 
was  lodged,  but  the  defence  asked  only  for  a  verdict 
of  culpable  homicide  on  the  ground  of  diminished 
responsibility.  Lord  Stormonth  Darling  said  that  the 
doctrine  of  diminished  responsibility  'required  to  be 
applied  with  great  caution',  that  the  jury  must  be 
satisfied  of  the  presence  of  'something  amounting  to 
brain  disease',  and  that  the  accused's  mind  must  have 
been  'morbidly  aifected'(at  pp.  94-5).  The  insistence 
on  brain  disease  and  the  reluctance  to  apply  the 
doctrine  are  indicative  of  the  later  law.  The 
reluctance  amounted  in  one  case,  that  of  Higgins  ((1913) 
7  Adam  229)  to  a  co,  liplete  refusal  to  reoognise  that 
diminished  responsibility  could  ever  operate  to 
reduce  murder  to  culpable  homicide.  Such  a  refusal, 
fifty  years  after  Dingwall  (supra)  was  only  possible 
because  of  the  absence  of  any  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal, 
but  in  any  event  the  remarks  of  Lord  Johnson  in  Higgins 
are  not  merely  idiosyncratic,  but  also  obiter,  since 
there  was  no  evidence  of  diminished  responsibility 
in  the  case. 
The  most  important  case  on  the  whole  subject  since 
Ding  wall(supra)  is  that  of  Savage  (1923  J.  C.  49). 
This  is  not  because  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case  -  the 
accused  was  a  coL-,  firmed  drunkard  and  a  methylated 
spirits  addict,  and  his  defence  was  really  one  of 
intoxication  although  he  pleaded  insanity:  the  evidence 
regarding  his  state  of  mind  at  the  time  of  the  crime 
was  conflicting,  and  he  was  in  fact  hanged  (see  transcript 
of  evidence,  Edinburgh  High  Court,  21  lay,  1923)  -  but 396 
because  the  directions  which  the  Lord  Justice  Clerk, 
Lord  Alness,  gave  on  the  question  of  diminished 
responsibility  have  been  adopted  as  the  basis  of  the 
modern  law,  and  come  near  to  being  the  M'Naghten 
Rules  of  diminished  responsibility.  Lord  Alness  first 
told  the  jury  that 
'That  there  may  be  such  a  state  of  mind  of  a 
person,  short  of  actual  insanity,  as  may  reduce 
the  quality  of  his  act  from  murder  to  culpable 
homicide,  is,  so  far  as  I  can  judge  from  the 
cases  cited  to  me,  an  established  doctrine  in  the 
law  of  Scotland.  It  is  a  comparatively  recent 
doctrine,  and,  as  has  at  least  twice  been  said 
from  the  bench  to  a  jury,  it  must  be  applied  with 
care.  Formerly  there  were  only  two  classes  of 
prisoner  -  those  who  were  completely  responsible 
and  those  who  were  completely  irresponsible. 
Our  law  has  now  come  to  recognise  in  murder 
cases  a  third  class...  who,  while  they  may  not 
merit  the  description  of  being  insane,  are 
nevertheless  in  such  a  condition  as  to  reduce 
the  quality  of  their  act  from  murder  to  culpable 
homicide'  (at  p.  50). 
Thus,  before  defining  the  m  aning  of  the  term  'diminished 
responsibility'  Lord  Alness  set  out  his  attitude  to  it, 
an  attitude  which  is  typical  of  that  adopted  by  his 
successors.  We  start  off  by  regarding  the  doctrine  as 
an  upstart,  something  new  and  therefore  to  be  regarded 
suspiciously:  this  although  a  doctrine  at  least  as 
old  as  1867  was  not  all  that  new  even  in  1923  in  a  legal 
system  which  only  began  properly  in  1797  -  with  the 
first  edition  of  Hume.  Then  we  talk  of  the  doctrine 
as  doing  something  to  the  'quality  of  the  act'  as  if 
it  were  a  form  of  exculpatory  plea  like  self-defence 
or  necessity,  and  not  a  plea  in  mitigation  of  sentence; 
and  we  go  on  from  this  to  regard  it  as  something  special 
to  homicide,  and  so  as  something  which  must  be  capable 
of  definition  since  it  takes  the  accused's  act  out  of 
one  legal  category  into  another.  Moreover,  one  has 
the  impression,  an  impression  given  more  strongly  by 39'r 
Lord  Normand  in  later  cases,  that  if  older  Judges 
had  not  been  so  rash  as  to  recognise  the  doctrine 
as  often  as  they  did,  the  modern  law  would  dispense 
with  it  altogether.  ' 
After  his  introductory  remarks  Lord  Alness  went 
on  to  define  the  doctrine  in  a  passage  which  has 
become  the  locus  classicus  of  the  subject.  He  said, 
'It  is  very  difficult  to  put  it  in  a  phrase, 
but  it  has  been  put  in  this  way:  that  there  must 
be  aberration  or  weakness  of  mind;  that  there 
must  be  some  form  of  mental  unsoundness;  that 
there  must  be  a  state  of  mind  which  is  bordering 
on,  though  not  amounting  to,  insanity;  that  there 
must  be  a  mind  so  affected  that  responsibility 
is  diminished  from  full  responsibility  to 
partial  responsibility  -  in  other  words,  the 
prisoner  in  question  must  only  be  partially 
accountable  for  his  actions.  And  I  think  one 
can  see  running  through  the  cases  that  there 
is  implied...  that  there  must  be  some  form  of 
mental  disease'  (at  p.  51). 
The  only  authority  quoted  by  Lord  Alness  for  this 
definition  is  Aitken  (supra),  but  the  definition,  which 
might  be  called  the  Savage  formula,  has  itself  become 
the  authoritative  origin  of  the  modern  law  independently 
of  its  consistency  or.!  otherwise  with  the  19th  century 
cases.  It  was  accepted  by  a  Pull  Bench  of  the  High 
Court  in  Carraher  (1946  J.  C.  108),  and  before  that 
had  been  adopted  by  Lord  Cooper,  who  was  not  of  the 
Court  in  Carraher,  in  Braithwaite  (1945  J.  C.  55)  so  that 
it  has  the  authority  both  of  Lord  Normand  and  of  Lord 
Cooper;  the  recognised  way  of  directing  juries  on 
diminished  responsibility  is  to  quote  the  Savage 
formula  to  them. 
In  Braithwaite  Lord  Cooper  also  described  the 
doctrine  in  his  own  words,  which  were  approved  in 
Carraher.  He  said, 398 
'Our  law  does  recognise  -  although  it  is 
only  latterly  that  it  has  done  so  -  that,  if  he 
was  suffering  from  some  infirmity  or  aberration 
of  mind  or  impairment  of  intellect  to  such  an 
extent  as  not  to  be  fully  accountable  for  his 
actions,  the  result  is  to  reduce  the  quality 
of  his  offence'  (1945  J.  C.  55,56-'1). 
These  words  echo  the  Savage  attitude,  even  to  repeating 
twenty  years  later  the  allegation  of  arrivisme. 
Lord  Cooper  went  on  to  emphasise  the  stress  laid  on 
'weakness  of  intellect,  aberration  of  mind,  mental 
unsoundness,  partial  insanity,  great  peculiarity 
of  mind  and  the  like'  (at  pp.  56-7).  He  also  spoke 
in  terms  of  disfacilitation,  saying  that, 
'It  will  not  suffice  in  law...  merely 
to  show  that  an  accused  person  has  a  very  short 
temper,  or  is  unusally  excitable  and  lacking 
in  self-control.  The  world  would  be  a  very 
convenient  place  for  criminals  and  a  very 
dangerous  place  for  other  people,  if  that  were 
the  law...  there  must  be  something  amounting 
or  approaching  to  partial  insanity  and  based 
on  mental  weakness  or  aberration'  (at  pp.  57-8). 
It  is  at  once  the  merit  and  the  defect  of  the 
Savage  formula  that  it  is  largely  tautologous.  (It 
is  not,  however,  as  tautologous  as  the  question  put 
to  the  jury  in  Muir  -  Dumfries  High  Court,  11-13 
April,  1933,  see  1933  J.  C.  46,48,  -  'was  he,  owing 
to  his  mental  state,  of  such  inferior  responsibility 
that  his  act  should  have  attributed  to  it  the  quality 
not  of  murder  but  of  culpable  homicide?  '.  )  As 
Professor  Weihofen  says  of  Lord  Cooper's  summary  in 
Braithwaite,  it  is  'somewhat  amorphous  and  even 
circular,  for  it  seems  to  say  only  that  he  is  not  to  be 
held  fully  accountable  if  he  was  not  fully  accountable' 
(The  Urge  to  Punish,  p.  192  -  note  22  to  Chapter  IV). 
The  only  significant  parts  of  the  formula  are  those 
referring  to  the  type  ofmentql  state  which  is  relevant, 3:  )a 
and  they  consist  of  phrases  life  'mental  weakness', 
'mental  aberration',  and  'unsoundness  of  mind',  w_lich 
are  all  very  vague.  Even  'mental  disease'  is  capable 
of  wide  and  varying  interpretations.  'Disease'  just 
means  'illness',  except  when  it  is  used  to  distinguish 
infectious  diseases  from  other  forms  of  illness,  a  use 
which  is  irrelevant  here.  Even  'partial  insanity' 
is  a  rather  vague  phrase,  and  if  what  is  required  is 
only  'something...  approaching  to  partial  insanity' 
(Braithwaite,  supra),  tiie  vagueness  is  increased. 
But  although  it  is  tautologous  and  lie,  thus  oe 
thoutht  to  have  the  effect  of  making  the  law  of 
diminished  responsibility  as  open  a  matter  as  that 
of  insanity,  the  formula  is  regarded  as  restrictive, 
and  does  operate  restrictively  to  some  extent.  The 
requirements  of  disease  and  a  condition  bordering 
on  Lisanity  pro.;  ably  exclude  mental  defect  and 
psZ,  chopathic  personality,  since  neither  condition  is  a 
disease,  and  neither  is  li'c.  ely  to  develop  into  insanity, 
which  is  presumably  what  is  meant  by  'bordering  on 
insanity'.  (Despite  the  formulae  serious  mental  defect 
is  in  fact  regarded  as  a  form  of  diminished  responsibility  - 
R.  C.  para.  34ý.  )  However,  if  there  is  to  be  a  formula 
at  all,  and  there  is  no  warrant  in  the  earlier  cases 
for  a  'foruiulistic'  approach,  the  Savage  one  is 
fairly  innocuous,  since  its  denotation  is  wide  and 
flexible.  Unless  she  requirement  of  disease  or  that 
of  borderline  insanity  is  unduly  stressed,  it  would 
probably  allow  the  doctrine  to  keep  pace  with  medical 
science.  ghat  must  be  guarded  against  is  any 
tendency  to  treat  it  as  if  it  were  the  M'Naghten 
Rules  of  diminished  responsibility. 400 
The  case  of  Carraher.  The  case  of  Carraher 
((1946  J.  C.  108),  a  Full  Bench  case  (Lord  Justice- 
General  Normand,  Lord  Carmont,  Lord  Jamieson, 
Lord  Stevenson,  and  Lord  Birnam)  may,  however,  have 
had  the  effect  of  making  the  law  of  diminished 
responsibility,  at  any  rate  in  theory,  rigid,  and 
incapable  of  further  development.  It  is  the  most 
important  of  all  cases  on  diminished  responsibility  - 
it  is  a  Full  Bench  case,  it  is  as  recent  as  1948, 
and  it  purports  to  say  the  last  word  about 
diminished  responsibility. 
The  case  appears  to  have  decided 
(1)  That  'the  plea  of  diminished  responsibility, 
which...  is  anomalous  in  our  law,  should  not  be 
extended  or  given  wider  scope  than  has  hitherto 
been  accorded  to  it  in  the  decisions'  (Lord  Normand 
at  p.  118); 
(2)  That,  in  particular,  persons  suffering  from 
the  condition  known  as  psychopathic  personality 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  of  diminished 
responsibility. 
I  say  'appears  to  have  decided'  for  the  following 
reasons  which  cast  doubt  on  the  authority  of  the  case. 
(a)  As  Professor  T.  B.  Smith  points  out,  the  case 
proceeds  on  the  false  assumption  that  the  doctrine 
of  diminished  responsibility  is  anomalous  (T.  B.  Smith, 
p.  728).  Moreover,  the  history  and  purpose  of  the 
doctrine  show  that  it  is  incapable  of  being  confined 
within  a  list  of  closed  categories.  As  Professor 
Smith  says,  . -it  is  too  protean  for  that  (ib.  P.  727). 
It  seems  to  be  accepted  that  the  law  regarding  insanity 
must  keep  pace  with  scientific  developments  (ib.  pp  727-8; 
of.  Brown  (190'7)  5  Adam  312,343);  and  if  the  categories 
of  diminished  responsibility  are  closed,  the  strange 
result  is  reached  that  a  system  which  has  no  rigid 
criterion  for  distinguishing  the  sane  from  the  insane, 401 
the  guilty  from  the  innocent,  has  such  a  criterion 
for  decidin'  whether  an  accused's  mental  condition 
is  such  as  to  merit  some  mitigation  of  punishment. 
And  the  criterion  it  has  is  the  worst  possible  - 
nothing  can  ever  amount  to  diminished  responsibility 
in  the  future  unless  there  is  an  example  of  its 
having  done  so  in  the  past.  Moreover,  Carraher 
would  adopt  this  criterion  at  a  time  when  the 
legislature  is  takici  modern  psychological  knowl- 
edge  more  and  more  into  account  in  dealing  with 
criminals  (cf.  Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act, 
1949,12,1  x  14  Geo.  VI,  c.  94). 
For  substantially  these  reasons  Professor  Smith 
takes  the  view  that  Carraher  does  not  in  fact  close 
the  categories  of  diminished  responsibility,  and 
that,  'the  Judges  will  be  prepared  to  recognise  the 
consensus  prudentium  in  matters  of  science'(T.  B.  Smith, 
p.  127).  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  is  so,  but  it 
must  be  pointed  out  that  psychopatnic  personality 
was  not  something  new  in  1946,  but  was  as  well 
recognised  as  it  was  a  few  years  later  when  the 
Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment  cast  doubt 
on  the  wisdom  of  Carraher,  and  accepted  that  at  any 
Late  some  psychopaths  could  properl;,  be  regarded 
as  of  diminished  responsibility  (R.  C.  para.  401). 
The  decision  in  Carraher  was  not,  in  any  event, 
confined  to  the  special  case  of  the  psychopath,  which 
is  admittedly  a  difficult  one.  The  Court  in  Carraher 
set,  itself  against  any  extension  of  the  doctrine  because 
it  disapproved  of  the  doctrine  itself  and  not  merely 
of  some  advanced  psychiatric  views.  So  far  from 
being  interested  in  the  consensus  prudentium  the 
Court  refused  to  appoint  a  psychiatric  assessor  for 
fear  of  substituting  trial  by  doctors  for  trial  by  jury. 
(b)  It  is  not  clear  how  much  of  the  judgment 402 
in  Carraher  is  obiter.  The  trial  Judge  had  left 
the  question  of  diminished  responsibility  to  the  jury, 
and  the  appeal  was  concerned  with  the  relation  between 
intoxication  and  diminished  responsibility.  The 
Court  suggested  that  it  would  not  have  disapproved  had 
diminished  responsibility  been  withdrawn  from  the  jury 
but  these  remarks  are  obiter.  In  particular  the 
position  of  psychopathic  personality  in  general  was 
not  before  the  Court;  it  was  enough  for  them,  having 
dealt  with  the  drink  question,  to  accept  that  on  the 
evidence  the  jury  were  entitled  to  hold  that  Carraher 
was  not  a  psychopath,  or  was  not  of  diminished 
responsibility.  The  suggestion  that  a  psychopath  can 
never  be  of  diminished  responsibility  is  obiter. 
Indeed  it  could  be  said  that  the  statement  that  the 
categories  of  diminished  responsibility  were  closed 
was  also  obiter.  But  it  must  be  conceded  that  the 
case  has  been  regarded  as  containing  general 
authoritative  pronouncements  on  diminished  responsibility 
and  on  psychopaths  (cf.  R.  C.  para.  382;  T.  B.  Smith,  726-8). 
(c)  The  case  was  decided  in  an  atmosphere 
of  fear  -  fear  that  violence  would  reach  alarming 
proportions  in  Glasgow  unless  the  Courts  took  a  firm 
hand,  and  fear  that  psychiatrists  were  undermining 
the  whole  structure  of  the  criminal  law. 
The  case  was  decided  only  a  short  while  after  the 
first  execution  in  Scotland  for  seventeen  years,  and 
belonged  to  the  same  class  of.  crime  as  that  for  which 
hanging  had  been  reintroduced.  (The  first  case  was 
that  of  John  Lyon,  one  of  the  accused  in  Crosbie  and  Ors. 
-  Glasgow  High  Court,  11-15  Dec.  1945,  unrepd.  discussed 
supra  x/81 1. 
It  is  in  point  to  note  that  the  main 
reason  for  the  lack  of  executions  between  1929  and  1945 
was  the  readiness  with  which  the  Crown  and  juries 403 
reduced  charges  of  murder  to  culpable  homicide.  ) 
Carraher  was  a  much  worse  and  older  criminal  than  the 
hanged  man,  and  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  the 
Court  to  hold  that  Carraher,  a  lifelong  criminal 
who  had  killed  a  man  on  an  earlier  occasion  (cf. 
R.  C.  App.  4,  para.  14)  was  not  wholly  responsible. 
To  have  allowed  him  to  'escape  hanging'  would  have 
looked  like  giving  a  licence  to  habitual  criminals 
to  continue  the  sort  of  gang  warfare  the  authorities 
had  rightly  determined  to  stamp  out.  It  may  therefore 
have  been  thought  important  to  impress  upon  criminals 
that  the  defence  of  psychopathic  personality  was 
not  open  to  them. 
This  attitude  was  also  due  to  fear  that  psychiatrists 
were  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  all  habitual 
criminals  were  psychopaths,  and  that  to  allow  psychopathic 
personality  to  count  as  diminished  responsibility  would 
mean  that  the  worse  a  man  was  the  less  punishment  he  would 
receive.  Lord  Cooper  told  the  Royal  Commission  on 
Capital  Punishment  that,  'At  the  time  of  the  Carraher 
judgement  the  lawyers  had  become  alarmed  at  a  flood 
of  psychological  or  psychiatric  evidence  introducing, 
or  attempting  to  introduce,  as  new  special  defences, 
all  kinds  of  psychological  and  mental  abnormalities 
with  names  which  were  unknown  to  us  and  to  the  man  in 
the  street.  It  was  in  reaction  to  that,  I  think, 
that  the  Carraher  decision  was  pronounced'  (R.  C.  Evid. 
of  Lord  Cooper,  Q.  5468).  As  Professor  Smith  puts  it, 
the  Court  was  anxious  about  'the  danger  that  unverified 
hypotheses  of  individual  psychiatrists  might  lead  to 
abuse  of  the  defence  of  diminished  responsibility'  (T.  B. 
Smith,  p.  727). 
(d)  Carraher  must  now  be  regarded  as  quite  out  of 
date  so  far  as  the  problem  of  the  psychopath  is  concerned, 404 
or  rather,  it  is  now  clear,  as  it  should  then  have  been, 
that  Carraher  was  out  of  date  about  this  even  in  1946. 
This  is  abundantly  shown  by  the  evidence  given  to  the 
Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment  which  makes 
it  plain  that  psychopathic  personality  is  by  no  means 
an  unverified  hypothesis  of  a  few  crack-brained 
psychiatrists,  but  is  a  condition  recognised  by  those 
same  eminent  medical  men  whom  Lord  Cooper  was  prepared 
to  accept  as  proper  judges  of  an  accused's  fitness  to 
plead  (see  R.  C.  para.  398;  cf.  R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord 
Cooper,  Q.  5491).  Thesychopath  is  about  to  receive 
statutory  recognition  in  England  (Mental  Health  Bill, 
1959,  s.  4(4),  and  the  Committee  on  Mental  Health 
Legislation  set  up  the  Department  of  Health  for 
Scotland  recognised  the  need  for  special  penal 
institutions  for  psychopaths  although  they  were 
averse  from  creating  a  special  statutory  class  of 
psychopaths  (Report  of  Committee  of  Scottish  Health 
Services  Council  on  Mental  Health  Legislation,  1958, 
paras.  8-9). 
The  case  also  proceeds  on  a  general  view  of  the 
whole  problem  which,  it  is  submitted,  is  becoming 
outmoded.  It  regards  diminished  responsibility  as 
something  whereby  a  criminal  'gets  away'  with  a 
crime,  instead  of  regarding  the  separation  of  criminals 
into  the  wholly  responsible  and  the  partially  responsible 
as  an  important  step  in  safeguarding  society  from  people 
like  Carraher  who  are  not  amenable  to  ordinary  punishment. 
Psychopathic  personiity 
The  problem  of  the  psychopath  is  one  of  the  most 
difficult  and  important  in  modern  criminal  law  and 
penology.  Although  I  am  not  concerned  with  penology 
as  such,  the  problem  is  important  enough  on  its  own 
account  to  merit  consideration. 405 
Psychopaths  were  described  by  Sir  David  Henderson, 
in  his  evidence  before  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment  as  follows:  (There  are  various  types  of 
psychopaths,  but  we  are  concerned  here  only  with  the 
potential  criminals,  usually  agressive  psychopaths, 
although  inadequate  psychopaths  may  turn  to  fraud 
and  similar  crimes  -  see  R.  C.  para.  396;  Neustatter, 
Psychological  Disorder  and  Crime,  88) 
'They  are  social  misfits  in  every  sense  of 
the  term,  persons  who  have  never  been  able  to 
adapt  themselves  satisfactorily  to  their  fellow- 
man,  and  appear  to  be  entirely  lacking  in 
altruistic  feeling...  They  are  the  "sports"  of 
the  human  race...  they  are  persons  who  have  failed 
in  the  psycho-biological  development.  Such 
a  failure...  is  essentially  constitutional, 
something  which  is  inborn,  something  which  is 
akin  to  the  lack  of  intellectual  development 
which  characterises  the  mental  defective... 
they  remain  at  an  immature,  individualistic, 
egocentric  level...  they  fail  to  appreciate 
reality,  they  are  fickle,  changeable,  lack 
persistence  of  effort  and  are  unable  to  profit 
by  experience  or  punishment.  They  are  dangerous 
when  frustrated.  They  are  devoid  of  affection, 
are  cold,  heartless,  callous,  cynical,  and  show 
a  lack  of  judgment  which  is  almost  beyond  belief. 
They  may  be  adult  in  years,  but  emotionally  they 
remain  as  dangerous  children  whose  conduct  may 
revert  to  a  primitive,  subhuman  level...  If  our 
ethical  code  feels  justified  in  sending  them 
to  the  gallows  then  let  it  be  so,  but  at  the  same 
time  let  us  clearly  understand  that  such  persons 
are  driven  by  what  may  be  called  their  collective 
unconscious  to  deeds  of  violence  which  are  as 
uncontrollable  as  a  tidal  wave'  (R.  C.  Evid. 
Memorandum  of  Sir  D.  K.  Henderson,  para.  1'/). 
This  is  plainly  a  difficult  type  of  person  to  define 
with  legal  exactitude,  or  to  place  in  a  legal  pigeon-hole. 
He  is  not  'insane,  neurotic  or  mentally  defective' 
(R.  C.  para.  396),  his  condition  exhibits  no  physical 
symptoms,  except  that  his  electro-encephalograph 
readings  may  be  abnormal.  (The  electro-encephalograph,  - 406 
EEG  -  is  a  means  of  recording  electrical  impulses 
given  out  by  the  brain.  There  is  a  normal  graph  for 
such  impulses  in  various  states,  e.  g.  calm,  anger,  etc. 
The  EEG  of  a  person  in  an  epileptic  fit  is  clearly 
abnormal,  and  persons  subject  to  epilepsy  may  show 
abnormalities  even  when  not  having  a  fit.  According 
to  Neustatter  the  EEG  of  more  than  half  the  aggressive 
psychopaths  show  abnormalities  -  Neustatter,  Psychological 
Disorder  and  Crime,  p.  90.  Cf.  R.  C.  para.  399.  )  The 
psychiatrist  must  rely  on  the  general  impression 
he  derives  from  the  patient's  history  and  attitudes 
for  his  diagnosis  of  psychopathic  personality. 
Neustatter  points  out  that  'in  the  psychopath  there  are 
no  other  sufficiently  distinctive  abnormalities,  as 
there  are  in  the  insane,  to  help  substantiate  the 
patient's  contention  that  he  has  really  been  unable 
to  resist  his  impulses.  '.  But  he  adds  immediately, 
'But...  it  is  my  personal  belief  that  some  psychopaths, 
especially  those  with  abnormal  electric  rhythms  of  their 
brains  genuinely  cannot  resist  their  urges,  for  otherwise  - 
why  should  they  incessantly  get  themselves  into  needless 
trouble  in  spite  of  repeated  punishment'  (op.  cit.  p.  96). 
This,  of  course,  would  be  enough  to  support  a  finding 
of  insanity  if  irresistible  impulse  arising  from  a 
mental  condition  is  regarded  as  coming  under  the  defence 
of  insanity.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  that  far  to 
allow  psychopaths  to  be  dealt  with  as  persons  of 
diminished  pesponsibility. 
Because  of  the  vagueness  of  the  concept  of  psychopathic 
personality  -  although  it  hardly  lies  in  the  mouth  of 
the  lawyer  to  complain  of  the  vagueness  of  other  experts' 
concepts,  and  because  of  the  distrust  and  fear  of  psychiatry 
which  is  common  to  lawyers  and  laymen,  the  whole  idea 
of  psychopathic  personality  is  distrusted.  The  lawyer 40`1 
can  no  more  be  expected  to  understand  the  technical 
phraseology  of  a  psychiatric  conclusion  than  can  a  dis- 
appointed  legatee  or  taxpayer  be  expected  to  understand 
or  sympaiihise  with  the  technicalities  of  succession 
or  revenue  law.  And  in  each  case  the  layman  thinks 
that  the  expert,  doctor  or  lawyer,  is  'putting  something 
over'  him.  But  the  psychopath  is  not  as  new  to  the  law 
as  Carraher  suggests.  He  is  only  a  modern  version 
of  the  moral  imbecile  who  is  defined  in  the  Mental 
Deficiency  Act  of  1913  as  someone  'who  from  an  early 
age  displays)  some  permanent  mental  defect  coupled 
with  strong  vicious  or  criminal  propensities  on  which 
punishment  has  had  little  or  no  deterrent  effect'  (3  c 
4  Geo.  V  c.  28,  s.  l(d)).  The  main  difference  between 
the  statutory  moral  imbecile  and  the  psychopath  is 
that  the  former  is  thought  of  as  being  mentally  deficient, 
but  this  is  the  result  of  bad  psychology.  It  is  now 
recognised  that  the  1913  definition  is  outmoded,  and 
that  'moral  imbeciles'  are  really  psychopaths  (R.  C. 
para.  358).  'Moral  insanity'  is  a  psychological 
phenomenon,  and  moral  imbeciles  are  often  highly 
intelligent  (cf.  Trial  of  Neville  George  Heath,  e  d. 
M'Donald  Critchley,  Introdn.  P.  39).  The  leading 
characteristic  of  such  a  person  is  'the  early  appearance 
of  vicious  and  mischievous  tendencies,  their  persistence 
in  spite  of  the  repeated  experience  of  the  unpleasant 
results  to  the  moral  imbecile  himself  which  follow  their 
indulgence,  and  the  absence  of  any  sort  of  moral  feeling 
in  relation  to  them....  Viewed  as  a  whole,  his  conduct 
is  patently  absurd;  his  life  is  not  only  evil,  it  is 
foolish'  (W.  C.  Sullivan,  Crime  and  Insanity,  pp.  198-9). 
Psychopaths  have  been  defined  in  the  English  Mental  'Health 
Bill  of  1959  as  persons  suffering  from  'a  persistent 
disorder  of  personality  (whether  or  not  accompanied  by 
subnormality  of  intelligence)  which  results  in 408 
abnormally  aggressive  or  seriously  irresponsible 
conduct'  (s.  4(4)). 
The  psychopath  and  the  habitual  criminal.  Lawyers 
usually  ascribe  their  difficulty  in  dealing  with 
psychopaths  to  the  similarity  between  the  description 
of  the  psychopath  and  that  of  the  ordinary  habitual 
criminal.  As  the  representatives  of  the  Faculty  of 
Advocates  told  the  Royal  Commission  with  reference  to 
Carraher,  'A  man  who  acts  habitually  without  any  self- 
control  is  just  a  man  who  exhibits  gross  abnormality' 
in  social  behaviour  and  emotional  reaction...  the 
difficulty  there  was  to  find  anything  in  the  medical 
evidence  that  could  be  distinguished  from  the  ordinary 
description  of  a  criminal'  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Faculty  of 
Advocates,  Q.  5626).  Cross-examination  of  an 
expert  witness  who  is  giving  evidence  that  an  accused 
is  a  psychopath  is  child's  play.  Counsel  simply  puts 
to  him  severally  the  indiciae  of  the  condition  and  asks 
of  each  -  'Is  a  man  like  that  a  psychopath?  '.  He  may 
ask,  'Is  a  man  of  diminished  responsibility  because  he 
likes  getting  his  own  way?  '.  'Is  he  a  psychopath 
because  he  is  liable  to  lose  his  temper?  'Is  he  to  be 
immune  from  punishment  because  he  is  an  egoist,  or 
because  he  will  not  brook  contradiction?  '  'Because 
he  is  "casual  and  jaunty  about  the  whole  thing,  about 
his  whole  life  indeed"?  '  (The  last  phrase  was  used 
by  Dr.  M'Niven  in  the  Carraher  case  -  Trials  of  Patrick 
Carraher,  ed.  Blake,  p.  220).  The  expert  is  then 
usually  asked  the  irrelevant  question,  Does  he  know 
right  from  wrong?  ',  and  has  to  admit  that  he  does, 
whereupon  counsel  sits  down  with  an  air  of  triumph. 
This  sort  of  cross-examination  is  unfair  and  ill- 
directed  -  it  only  set.  sup  and  knocks  down  a  lot  of 
Aunt  Sallys.  (For  typical  examples  see  Trials  of 409 
Patrick  Carraher,  ed.  Blake,  pp.  215-225;  Trial  of 
Neville  George  Heath,  ed.  M'Donald  Critchley,  pp.  147- 
158).  What  the  doctors  are  trying  to  say  is  that  there 
may  be  a  combination  of  these  and  other  factors  -a  syndrome 
present  throughout  a  man's  life,  constantly  recurring, 
and  present  to  such  a  degree  that  the  man  must  be  considered 
abnormal,  and  not  just  a  normal  man  who  happens  to  be 
bad-tempered  or  selfish.  The  real  difficulty  on  this 
aspect  of  the  matter  is  that  the  psychopath  does  not 
differ  from  the  normal  person  in  kind  but  only  in  degree 
and  that  among  psychopaths  themselves  there  is  a  great 
variation  in  degree  of  abnormality.  'The  abnormaltty 
is  a  statistical  abnormality;  that  is  to  day,  the 
psychopath  differs  from  a  normal  person  only  quantitatively 
or  in  degree,  not  qualitatively'  (R.  C.  para.  396). 
It  is  true  that  'If  an  aggressive  psychopath,  for 
example,  is  regarded  simply  as  a  person  of  exceptionally 
violent  and  ungovernable  temper  differing  only  in 
degree  and  not  in  kind  from  other  hot-tempered  and 
impulsive  persons,  there  may  be  no  justification  for 
considering  that  his  criminal  responsibility  is 
negatived,  or  even  diminished,  by  his  mental  condition', 
but  as  the  Royal  Commission's  Report  goes  on  to  say 
'It  seems  clear,  however,  that  those  who  have  had  most 
experience  in  dealing  with  aggressive  psychopaths 
regard  them  as  significantly  less  able  to  control  their 
actions  and  restrain  their  violent  impulses  than  a 
normal  person'  (R.  C.  para.  398).  If  that  is  so,  it  is 
difficult  to  see  any  reason  for  denying  that  such  a 
significant  deviation  can  constitute  diminished 
responsibility.  (It  is  no  doubt  true  that  the  insane 
only  differ  from  the  sane  in  degree,  but  the  difference 
would  have  been  regarded  as  one  of  kind  in  the  days 
when  the  law  of  insanity  developed.  It  is  no  doubt 
also  arguable  that  all  differences  in  kind  are,  or  can  be 
viewed  as,  merely  extreme  differences  in  degree. 410 
But  it  is  possible  to  talk  of  the  psychopath  as 
'significantly'  different  from  the  normal,  whether  the 
difference  is  regarded  as  being  one  of  degree  or  of 
kind.  Of  course  'significant'  is  vague,  but  mathematiel 
precision  of  terminology  is  not  possible  in  any  of  the 
sciences  of  human  behaviour.  ) 
It  follows  from  the  descriptions  of  psychopathic 
personality  set  out  above  that  a  person  cannot  be 
classified  as  a  psychopath  on  the  evidence  of  one  act 
only.  The  fear  that  anyone  who  commits  a  particularly 
horrible  or  motiveless  crime  will  be  able  to  plead 
mental  abnormality,  and  that  murderers  will  therefore 
deliberately  make  their  killings  as  horrible  as 
possible,  has  no  application  to  the  case  of  the  psychopath. 
Psychopathic  personality  can  only  be  discovered  by 
reference  to  the  accused's  whole  history  and  outlook. 
'The  more  widely  a  man  displays  a  lack  of  moral  sense 
or  a  lack  of  social  responsibility  the  more  inclined 
you  would  be  to  classify  him  as  a  psychopathic 
personality'  (Dr.  A.  M'Niven,  agreeing  with  the  cross- 
examiner,  in  Trials  of  Patrick  Carraher,  ed.  Blake,  p.  216). 
There  is  a  difference  between  a  man  like  Braithwaite 
who  'although  he  has  had  an  unfortunate  upbringing, 
has  since  he  attained  adult  life  apparently  been  able 
to  discharge  the  duties  and  responsibilities  of  an 
ordinary  person  in  an  ordinary  way'  (Braithwaite, 
Edinburgh  High  Court,  30  Nov.  1944,  Transcript  of 
Judge's  Charge,  p.  11  -  the  passage,  in  which  Lord 
Cooper  summarised  the  medical  evidence,  does  not 
appear  in  the  report  at  1945  J.  C.  55),  and  a  man  like 
Carraher  who  spends  his  whole  life  in  and  out  of  prison. 
The  law's  dislike  of  psychopathic  personality  rests 
partly  on  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  habitual 
criminals  are  alleged  to  be  psychopaths,  and  partly 
on  the  fact  that  the  more  crimes  a  man  commits  the 411 
more  likely  he  is  to  be  classed  as  a  psychopath. 
But  this  amounts  to  no  more  than  saying  that  a  man  who 
is  not  cured  of  nis  criminal  tendencies  by  ordinary 
punishment  is  not  amenable  to  ordinary  punishment,  which 
is  self-evident.  The  whole  basis  of  the  lawyer's 
attempt  to  distinguish  the  habitual  criminal  froia  the 
psychopath,  and  his  claim  that  he  cannot  :  cake  any 
distinction,  rests  on  the  belief  that  all  habitual 
criminals  are  normal  and  amenable  to  normal  punish- 
ment.  This  belief  rests  on  the  glib  assumption 
that  all  bad  people  are  bad  because  they  have 
deliberately  and  rationally  chosen  to  be  so,  which 
is  as  objectio.  iable  as  the  view  that  all  bad  people 
are  bacL  because  they  are  mentally  abnormal. 
The  treatment  of  persons  of  diminished 
responsibility. 
From  the  sociological  point  of  view  the  most 
important  problem  in  the  law  of  diminished  responsibility 
is  the  problem  of  what  to  do  with  persons  who  are  in 
that  condition.  They  are  ex  hypothesi  not  to  be 
treated  exactly  as  ordinary  offenders;  they  are  not 
insane  and  so  cannot  be  treated  under  the  Lunacy  Acts; 
and  it  seems  that  they  are  not  altogether  unamenable 
to  punishment,  for  they  can  at  least  understand  and 
foresee  the  effects  of  punishment(cf.  Donnedieu 
de  Vabres'  discussion  of  the  problem  of  the  fou  moral, 
at  p.  201). 
The  original  idea  of  diminished  responsibility 
suggests  that  the  answer  to  the  problem  is  very  simple  - 
punish  them  in  proportion  to  their  responsibility. 
As  Alison  put  it,  'In  such  cases  there  is  a  mixture  of 
guilt  and  misfortune;  for  the  former  he  should  be 
severely  punished,  for  the  latter  the  extreme  penalty 412 
of  the  law  should  be  remitted'  (Alison,  i.  652). 
This  naive  approach  may  be  satisfactory  from  the  point 
of  view  of  retribution,  but  even  if  we  confine  ourselves 
to  the  question  of  punishment  it  is  unsatisfactory  from 
the  point  of  view  of  deterrence.  It  fails  to  take 
account  of  Bentham's  point  that  'The  quantum  of  the 
punishment  must  rise...  with  the  strength  of  the 
temptation'  since  a  strong  temptation  cannot  be 
offset  by  a  slight  degree  of  threatened  harm  (Bentham, 
XIV,  9).  It  can  therefore  be  said  that  in  at  any  rate 
some  cases  the  person  of  diminished  responsibility 
should  be  punished  more  severely  than  the  normal  person. 
So  far,  we  have  been  concerned  with  the  treatment 
by  punishment  of  the  responsible  part  of  the  criminal, 
so  to  speak,  and  that  is  a  difficult  enough  problem. 
But  the  important  problem,  one  which  does  not  seem 
to  have  concerned  the  older  authorities,  is  the 
problem  of  what  ä.  o  do  about  the  irresponsible  part  of 
the  criminal.  This  problem,  it  is  submitted,  only 
arises  when  the  accused  is  a  danger  to  society,  when 
because  of  his  diminished  responsibility  he  is  more 
likely  to  commit  other  crimes  than  he  would  be  were 
he  normal.  This,  of  course,  strictly  speaking, 
has  nothing  to  do  with  punishment.  It  has  been  dealt 
with  under  the  head  of  punishment  because  there  is  no 
other  kind  of  machinery  for  dealing  with  it  at  present, 
but  like  the  detention  of  the  dangerously  insane,  or 
preventive  detention,  or  the  disqualification  of  a 
dangerous  motorist  from  driving,  it  is  a  matter  of  the 
protection  of  society,  and  requires  to  be  dealt  with, 
not  by  punishment,  but  by  what  are  known  in  France  as 
mesures  de  surete  (Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p.  201),  and 
in  Germany  as  Massregeln  der  Sicherung  und  Besserung 
(StGB  Art.  42a).  Whether  such  measures  are  called 
for  depends  on  the  dangerous  character  of  the  criminal, 413 
and  is  thus  quite  separate  from  the  question  whether  ' 
he  should  also  or  instead  be  punished  in  the  ordinary 
way  according  to  the  extent  of  his  responsibility  for 
the  crime. 
The  propriety  of  dealing  in  this  way  with  persons 
of  diminished  responsibility  was  asserted  in  the  case 
of  Kirkwood  (1939  J.  C.  36).  In  that  case  a  man  who 
had  been  charged  with  murder  succeeded  in  a  plea 
of  diminished  responsibility  and  was  sentenced  to  l1b 
imprisonment  for  culpable  homicide.  He  appealed 
against  his  sentence  on  the  ground  that  it  failed  to 
take  into  account  the  diminution  of  responsibility. 
In  dismissing  the  appeal  Lord  Normand  said  that  to 
maintain  that  'although  an  insane  person  might  properly 
be  detained  indefinitely,  a  person  who  was  not  insane, 
but  whose  responsibility  was  impaired  in  a  high  degree, 
should  be  leniently  treated  without  regard  to  the 
safety  of  his  fellows  ...  is...  the  reductio  ad  absurdum 
of  the  argument  that  the  punishment  should  be  measured 
by  the  responsibility  of  the  criminal  to  the  exclusion 
of  other  considerations'  (at  40).  It  was  pointed 
out  in  Kirkwood  that  the  accused's  ultimate  release 
would  depend  on  the  state  of  his  mental  health,  and  the 
best  way  of  dealing  with  cases  of  diminished 
responsibility  may  be  to  detain  them  until  they  are 
sufficiently  cured  to  be  no  longer  a  danger  to  society. 
Such  an  approach  is,  however,  open  to  serious 
objections.  These  objections  are  perhaps  stronger 
if  the  detention  is  regarded  as  a  form  of  punishment 
than  if  it  is  regarded  as  a  mesure  de  surete  since, 
at  any  rate  in  theory,  the  conditions  of  detention 
should  be  different  in  the  latter  case  and  should  not 
involve  the  more  unpleasant  features  of  imprisonment; 
but  even  if  we  regard  the  detention  and  treatment  of 414 
the  person  of  diminished  responsibility  as  a  form  of 
treatment'or  security  measure,  we  must  recognise  that 
we  are  depriving  him  of  his  liberty  and/or  subjecting 
him  to  forced  treatment,  and  that  therefore,  as  was 
impliedly  recognised  in  Kirkwood,  we  cannot  leave 
retribution_iout  of  the  question  altogether.  To 
impose  an  indeterminate  sentence  on  a  criminal  is 
to  place  his  liberty  in  the  hands  of  the  State; 
to  combine  that  detention  with  psychological  treatment 
is  to  place  his  mind  at  the  disposal  of  the  State. 
At  present  the  State  has  such  powers  with  respect 
to  the  insane,  but  they  have  always  been  regarded  as 
a  special  class  and  any  attempt  to  extend  compulsory 
detention  to  persons  not  insane  would  meet  with  strong 
opposition.  This  will  be  especially  so  if  the 
'sentence'  is  to  depend  solely  on  the  mental  state 
of  the  criminal,  without  reference  to  the  gravity 
of  the  offence.  Such  a  course  would  abandon  the 
retributive  approach  completely,  and  reduce  punishment 
to  Erewhonian  terms.  The  retributive  theory  is 
perhaps  the  citizen's  main  defence  against  the  power 
of  the  Executive  to  incarcerate  him,  brainwash  him, 
sterilise  him,  remove  his  prefrontal  lobes,  or  other- 
wise  reduce  him  to  a  condition  of  social  acceptability. 
Public  opinion  would  not  stand  for  a  long  period  of 
compulsory  treatment  in  cases  where  the  normal  offender 
gets  only  a  short  sentence. 
In  practice,  therefore,  the  indeterminate  sentence 
could  be  imposed  only  in  cases  of  homicide  or  other 
very  serious  crimes,  or  in  the  case  of  very  persistent 
offenders.  But  it  is  submitted  that  in  such  cases 
it  should  be  made  clear  that  the  indeterminate  sentence 
is  not  a  punishment,  but  a  mesure  de  surete.  The 
importance  of  keeping  the  two  distinct  is  not  just  a 
theoretical  one,  nor  even  a  matter  of  fairness  to  the 415 
accused.  The  position  today  is  that  in  most  homicide 
cases  persons  of  full  responsibility  can  and  must  be 
sentenced  to  life  imprisonment,  i.  e.  receive  an 
indeterminate  sentence.  What  then  is  to  be  the 
position  of  the  person  of  diminished  responsibility 
who  is  convicted  of  culpable  homicide  on  a  charge  of 
non-capital  murder?  Kirkwood  recognises  that  there 
must  be  some  diminution  of  penalty,  and  in  non-capital 
cases  the  result  may  now  be  that  the  person  of 
diminished  responsibility  cannot  be  given  an  indeterminate 
sentence,  since  to  do  so  would  be  to  ignore  the  fact 
that  the  jury  have  found  him  not  fully  responsible. 
It  is  therefore  important  that  in  such  cases  the 
Court  should  have  power  to  commit  the  accused  to  a 
special  institution  for  treatment  or  detention,  if  it 
is  shown  that  he  is  dangerous. 
It  may  be  that  so  far  as  murder  charges  in 
general  are  concerned  the  position  does  not  represent 
a  serious  danger.  The  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment  were  averse  from  the  introduction  of  an 
indeterminate  sentence  in  such  cases,  because  they 
did  not  think  that  the  statistics  regarding  the  after- 
conduct  of  persons  imprisoned  for  culpable  homicide 
because  of  diminished  responsibility  showed  that  there 
was  any  danger  to  society  warranting  such  a  course. 
(cf.  R.  C.  paras.  403-7). 
Where  the  position  is  serious,  and  very  difficult 
to  deal  with,  is  in  the  case  of  the  psychopath. 
Psychopaths  appear  to  begin  with  small  crimes  and  work 
up  to  bigger  ones,  and  as  the  law  is  at  present  they 
cannot  be  properly  dealt  with  until  they  have  committed 
a  very  serious  crime,  usually  murder;  and  by  that  time 
public  opinion  is  so  incensed  against  them,  andtheir 
character  has  so  few  redeeming  features  that,  if  possible, 
they  are  hanged.  Whatever  the  solution  to  the  problem 416 
of  the  psychopath  is,  it  is  not  the  present  one,  which 
consists  in  imposing  a  succession  of  fairly  short 
sentences.  The  best  illustration  of  the  complete 
futility  of  the  present  law  is  the  case  of  Carraher 
himself.  By  the  time  he  was  hanged  he  had  fourteen 
previous  convictions  including  one  for  culpable 
homicide  on  a  charge  of  murder  in  1939,  and  indeed., 
he  was  on  licence  at  the  time  of  the  murder  following 
on  a  sentence  for  serious  assault.  He  had  also  led 
a  prison  riot  (cf.  R.  C.  App.  4  para.  14).  In  the 
course  of  his  life  he  had  had  the  benefit  of  every  form 
of  treatment  then  available  for  persuading  a  man  to  give 
up  crime  -  he  had  been  cautioned,  he  had  been  sent  to 
Borstal,  to  prison,  and  to  penal  servitude,  and  with 
each  effort  the  State  made  he  became  a  more  hardened 
criminal,  until,  after  having  permitted  him  to  kill 
two  people,  the  State  killed  him.  One  cannot  help 
feeling  that  it  might  have  been  better  even  to  have 
killed  him  at  an  earlier  stage  -  it  would  at  least 
have  been  an  honest  admission  of  defeat.  (Cf.  J.  G. 
Wilson,  The  Trial  of  Peter  Manuel,  pp.  235-8). 
What,  then  is  to  be  done  with  the  psychopath? 
The  obvious  answer  is  to  provide  separate  institutions 
for  such  people,  especially  as  it  appears  that  most  of 
them  can  be  rendered  less  dangerous  to  some  extent,  given 
time  and  the  proper  facilities  (R.  C.  para.  402).  The 
only  difficulty  is  that  of  sentencing  a  man  to  a  long 
period  of  ddtention  for  a  comparatively  trivial  offence. 
But  this  is  done  in  the  case  of  preventive  detention, 
and  it  should  be  possible  to  provide  for  it  in  the  case 
of  psychopaths  who  have  committed  a  given  number  of 
crimes,  or  crimes  of  a  certain  type,  even  although  they 
are  not  eligible  for  preventive  detention.  Such  a 
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by  the  consideration  that  a  man  is  only  characterised 
as  an  aggressive  psychopath  because  of  his  tendency 
to  commit  crimes.  It  should  be  possible  to  balance 
the  safety  of  society  against  the  right  of  the  individual 
by  reference  to  the  type  and  number  of  the  particular 
psychopath's  crimes  in  the  same  '  way  as  is  done  in 
awarding  sentences  of  preventive  detention. 
This,  of  course,  would  only  apply  where  the 
criminal  is  a  danger  to  society  because  of  his  condition. 
Where  he  is  not  dangerous,  or  not  sufficiently 
dangerous  to  warrant  this  type  of  treatment,  diminished 
responsibility  would  still  operate  to  reduce  his 
punishment  in  rough  proportion  to  the  diminution 
of  his  responsibility.  And  it  may  be  that  even  where 
he  is  dangerous  he  should  receive  an  ordinary  sentence 
of  imprisonment  in  addition  to  or  alongside  his 
period  of  treatment.  This  may  seem  to  be  an  unnecessary 
piling  of  Pelion  upon  Ossa,  but  if  the  doctrine  is  to 
be  given  scope  and  the  Courts  to  be  encouraged  to  adopt 
means  other  than  imprisonment  for  dealing  with  abnormal 
prisoners  and  particularly  with  psychopathp;  it  is 
important  to  make  it  clear  that  by  so  doing  they  are 
not  making  the  world  easy  for  criminals  and  dangerous 
for  other  people  (cf.  Braithwaite,  1945,  J.  C.  55,58), 
but  in  fact  are  doing  precisely  the  opposite,  and  doing 
it  more  effectively  than  is  possible  under  the  present 
system. 418 
Chapter  10:  Intoxication. 
Introduction. 
The  law  regarding  intoxication  as  a  defence 
to  a  criminal  charge  is  an  unsatisfactory  compromise 
among  a  number  of  attitudes  and  principles.  On 
one  hand  it  is  felt  that  intoxication  should  never 
be  taken  into  account  in  ascribing  responsibility 
for  crime,  because  intoxication  is  a  voluntary  condition, 
and  is,  moreoever,  a  reprehensible  one.  Drinking  is 
a  vice  and  it  is  a  man's  ovm  fault  if  he  commits  a 
crime  under  the  influence  of  drink.  As  Hume  says, 
'One  cannot  well  lay  claim  to  favour,  on  the  ground  bf:, 
that  which  itself  shews  a  disregard  of  order  and 
decency'  (Hume,  i,  45-6).  On  the  other  hand,  the  man 
who  gets  drunk  and  commits  a  crime  sometimes  arouses 
sympathy  rather  than  indignation.  Take,  for  example, 
the  young  man  who  commits  a  crime,  say  rape,  or 
indecent  assault,  as  a  result  of  drinking  too  much 
at  his  first  alcoholic  party.  Talk  of  vice  and  wicked- 
ness  seems  out  of  place  in  such  a  situation,  and  it 
seems  unduly  harsh  to  treat  him  as  if  he  were  a 
deliberate  criminal.  This  feeling  is  strongest  where 
the  crime  he  commits  is  a  capital  one,  and  indeed  it 
is  only  with  regard  to  capital  offences  that  the  law 
takes  it  into  account,  and  then  only  grudgingly. 
The  law  is  further  confused  by  its  occasional 
recognition  of  the  logical  necessity  of  acquitting 
someone  who  acted  without  mens  rea,  whatever  the  reason 
for  the  absence  of  mens  rea.  Where  such  recognition 
would  involve  the  acquittal  of  the  accused  and  his 
consequent  discharge,  the  consideration  that  drunk 
men  are  dangerous,  and  must  be  punished  and  placed  under 419 
restraint  prevails  over  thelogic  of  the  matter.  But 
where  the  accused  has  been  rendered  permanently  and 
not  merely  temporarily  insane  by  drink  (or  by  any  other 
vice,  such  as  syphilis),  it  is  recognised  that  he 
must  be  acquitted.  This  is  partly  because  insanity 
is  always  regarded  as  an  overriding  consideration, 
and  partly  because  an  accused  who  is  acquitted  on  the 
ground  of  insanity  does  not  'get  off  scot  free',  but  is 
detained  as  a  criminal  lunatic.  (And  this  is  still 
true  even  if  he  is  called  a  State  Mental  Patient  instead  - 
Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act  1949,12,13,  &  14 
Geo.  VI,  c.  94,  s.  63(2)). 
These,  briefly,  are  the  factors  which  must  be  taken 
into  account  in  dealing  with  the  law  of  intoxication. 
The  law  itself  is  easy  to  state,  but  it  is  so  self- 
contradictory  and  illogical  -  one  feels  tempted  to 
say  meaningless  -  that  it  is  difficult  to  discuss  it 
coherently.  Before  trying  to  do  so,  I  wish  to  make 
some  introductory  observations  of  a  general  kind 
which  will,  I  hope,  provide  some  sort  of  background  for 
an  analysis  of  the  present  law. 
(1)  The  intoxication_must_be  the  cause  of  the  crime. 
In  discussing  intoxication  as  a  plea  in  defence 
to  a  criminal  charge  we  are  concerned  only  with  gross 
intoxication.  It  is  not  suggested  that  the  fact  that 
a  criminal  was  merely  under  the  influence  of  drink 
at  the  time  of  the  crime  is  relevant  to  the  question  of 
his  legal  responsibility.  We  are  concerned  only 
with  those  cases  in  which  the  crime  would  not  have  been 
committed  but  for  the  drink.  Drink  is  relevant  only 
where  it  can  be  said  that  the  crime  was  produced  by  it, 
in  much  the  same  way  as  a  plea  of  insanity  may  be 
relevant  where  the  crime  was  the  product  of  the  insanity. 
Naturally,  this  can  only  be  said  where  the-intoxication 
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(2)  Intoxication  asan  exculpatory  factor. 
Actus  non  facit  reus  nisi  wens  sit  rea  -  if  there  is 
no  mens  rea  there  is  no  crime,  whatever  the  reason 
for  the  absence  of  the  wens  rea.  If  A  is  too  drunk 
to  intend  to  commit  theft,  but  goes  about  a  room 
gaily  pocketing  any  object  he  sees,  or  even  taking 
things  out  of  other  people's  pockets  and  putting  them 
in  his  own,  he  cannot  be  guilty  of  theft.  Similarly, 
if  he  does  not  intend  to  kill  he  can.  aot  be  guilty  of 
murder,  whether  the  absence  of  intention  is  due  to 
drink  or  to  error.  It  may  be  possible  to  take  this 
further,  by  analogy  with  insanity:  if  irresistible 
impulse  caused  by  insanity  is  a  defence,  then  irresistible 
impulse  caused  by  drink  should  also  be  a  defence. 
If  A  forms  the  intention  of  committing  a  crime  only 
because  he  is  drunk,  and  is  too  drunk  to  resist  the 
promptings  of  that  drunken  impulse,  he  should,  by 
analogy  with  insanity,  be  acquitted.  This  means 
only  that  temporary  insanity  caused  by  drink  -  i.  e.  a 
state  of  gross  intoxication  -  should  be  regarded  as 
the  same  as  permanent  insanity  caused  by  drink,  at  any 
rate,  for  the  purpose  of  the  ascription  of  responsibility. 
(3)  Intoxication  as  a  mitigatofactor.  An 
accused  who  is  not  so  drunk  as  to  be  comparable  to  an 
insane  person  may  be  drunk  enough  to  be  comparable 
to  one  of  diminished  responsibility.  If  the  main 
reason  for  his  crime  is  drink,  the  element  of  malice, 
of  general  wens  res,  may  be  absent,  in  which  case  it 
would  be  proper  to  reduce  his  punishment  accordingly, 
and,  in  the  case  of  murder,  to  convict  him  only  of 
culpable  homicide.  Although  a  man  who  kills  under 
provocation  kills  intentionally,  with  mans  rea,  he 
does  not  kill  maliciously  but  because  he  was  provoked, 
and  so  he  is  convicted  of  culpable  homicide  only.. 421 
In  the  same  way  it  can  be  said  of  the  drunk  man  that 
he  did  not  kill  maliciously,  but  because  he  was  drunk, 
and  so  is  guilty  oral-  of  culpaile  homicide. 
(4)  The  treatment  of  drunk  criminals.  One 
-------------------------------- 
important  differencc  bet,  veen  the  drunk  and  the  insane 
is  that  the  drunk  are  clearly  responsible  for  their 
own  condition.  :.:  oreover,  the  drunk  are  not  liable 
to  undergo  the  protective  measures  which  can  be 
applied  to  the  insane.  these  differences  can,  however, 
be  recognised  without  encroaching  on  the  general 
rinciples  of  criminal  resDaonsibility  by  punishing 
the  drunk  for  something  for  which  they  are  not 
responsible  -  their  drunken  crimes.  That  they  should 
be  punished  for  is  Setting  drunk. 
(5)  Actioliberain_causa.  Judges  wino  do  not 
-----  ------  -- 
wish  to  give  effect  to  a  plea  of  intoxication  sometimes 
try  to  j,.  zsti  y  their  refusal  to  do  so  by  saying  that 
if  intoxication  were  a  valid  plea,  '  ...  if  anybody  was 
going  to  commit  a  crime,  all  he  would  need  to  do 
would  be  to  take  sufficient  liquor  and  commit  it,  and 
then  say  110h,  you  can't  hold  :e  for  this,  because  I 
had  drink"  (Kenne 
, 
1944  J.  C.  171,  Lord  Carmont  at  p. 
172).  But  a  distinction  can  be  easily  made 
between  the  man  who  gets  drunk  and  then  decides  to 
commit  a  ctime,  and  the  man  who  decides  to  commit  a 
crime  and  then  gets  drunk  to  give  himself  Dutch  courage. 
The  latter  situation  is  described  on  the  Continent  as 
one  of  actio  libera  in  causa  (cf.  Schänke-Schröder,  pp. 
286,1106-7).  It  is  clear  that  in  such  a 
situation  the  accused  is-guilty  of  an  intentional 
crime,  since  he  formed  a  sober  intention  of  committing 422 
the  crime.  If  A  decides  to  kill  B  and  then  takes 
drink  in  order  to  steal  himself  to  commit  the  deed, 
he  is  guilty  of  murder,  whatever  his  state  of 
intoxication  at  the  time  of  the  killing. 
The  concept  of  actio  libera  in  causa  is  also 
applied  in  relation  to  negligence,  so  that  where  the 
ultimate  crime  is  one  that  can  be  committed 
negligently  the  accused  will  be  guilty  of  its  negtigeht 
commission  if  it  was  foreseeable  that  his  becoming 
drunk  would  lead  to  the  crime.  If  A  ought  to  know 
that  he  will  become  violent  when  drunk  -  if,  for 
example,  he  has  done  so  on  prior  occasions  -  but 
nonetheless  gets  drunk  and  kills  someone,  he  will 
be  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  or  of  murder,  depending 
on  whether  he  is  regarded  as  negligent  or  as  reckless. 
But  if  A  knows  he  is  liable  to  stell  things  when  drunk, 
and  gets  drunk  and  steals  something,  he  will  not  be 
guilty  of  theft,  because  theft  can  be  committed  only 
intentionally.  If,  of  course,  he  at  any  time  formed 
the  intention  to  steal,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider 
whether  that  intention  was  so  affected  by  drink  as  to  be 
nullified,  or  as  to  entitle  him  to  mitigation  of  penalty. 
The  law  'of  Scotland. 
Chronic  and  acute  alcoholism.  The  effect  of  the 
law  is  to  distinguish  between  chronic  and  acute 
alcoholism,  and  a  brief  description  of  these  states 
may  be  helpful.  The  distinction  is  the  same  as  that 
between  what  are  sometimes  called  industrial  and  convivial 
drinking  (w.  C.  Sullivan,  Crime  and  Insanity,  p.  59). 
The  chronic  alcoholic  gradually  drinks  himself  to 
death  or  madness  over  a  period  of  years,  without 
necessarily  ever  being  at  any  time  drunk  in  theordinary 
sense  of  the  word;  acute  alcoholism  is  just  the 
ordinary  state  of  drunkenness.  The  man  who  gets  mad 423 
drunk  on  occasions  but  is  quite  normal  otherwise  is  a 
donvivial  drinker;  the  man  who  is  never  mad  drunk  (or 
only  so  very  rarely  that  this  can  be  discounted  in  an 
analysis  of  his  condition),  but  is  a  drink-addict, 
an  alcoholic,  who  is  never  wholly  sober,  and  who  cannot 
live  without  drink,  is  an  industrial  drinker.  The 
industrial  drinker  drinks  frequently  and  in  small  doses, 
and  so  accumulates  and  maintains  in  :  his  blood  stream 
a  steadily  growing  amount  of  alcoholic  poison, 
until  he  eventually  goes  mad  and/or  dies.  The  convivial 
drinker  never  gets  intothis  poisoned  condition.  The 
law  is  that  the  state  of  the  industrial  drinker  may  be 
taken  into  account  when  he  is  charged  with  a  crime; 
but  that  that  of  the  convivial  drinker  who  commits 
a  crime  in  one  of  his  drunken  moments  is  irrelevant. 
This  distinction  in  treatment  is  due  at  any  rate  in 
part  to  the  fact  that  the  chronic  alcoholic  is  not 
'drunk'  when  he  commits  his  crime,  and  it  is  drunken- 
ness  itself  rather  than  the  long  term  effects  of  drink 
which  the  law  abhors. 
The  distinction  appeared  very  clearly  in  the  American 
case  of  U.  S.  v.  Drew  ((1828)  5  Mass.  28;  Fed.  Case.  14993; 
Sayre,  p.  521).  D.  was  a  sailor  who  while  suffering 
from  delirium  tremens  killed  a  man  five  days  after  all 
the  alcohol  on  the  ship  had  been  thrown  overboard. 
Story,  J.  said, 
'In  general,  insanity  is  an  excuse  for  the 
commission  of  every  crime,  because  the  party  has 
not  the  possession  of  that  reason,  which  includes 
responsibility.  An  exception  is,  when  the  crime 
is  committed  by  a  party  while  in  a  fit  of  intox- 
ication,  the  law  not  permitting  a  man  to  avail 
himself  of  the  excuse  of  his  own  gross  vice  and 
misconduct....  But  the  crime  must  tale  place  and  be 
the  immediate  result  of  the  fit  of  intoxication, 
and  while  it  lasts;  and  not,  as  in  this  case, 
a  remote  consequence,  superinduced  by  the  ante- 
cedent  exhaustion  of  the  party,  arising  from 
gross  and  habitual  drunkenness'  (at  p.  522). 424 
Lord  Deas  made  a  similar  distinction  in  discussing  the 
case  of  Alex.  Dingwall  ((1867)  5  Irv.  466)  in  the  later 
case  of  John  M'Lean  ((1876)  3  Coup.  334,338).  He 
pointed  out  that  although  Dingwall's  diminished 
responsibility  was  the  result  of  alcoholism  he  had 
been  sober  at  the  time  of  the  crime,  and  that  had  he 
been  drunk  that  would  have  afforded  neither  excuse  for 
nor  palliation  of  his  crime. 
Insanity  caused  by  chronic  alcoholism.  It  is 
accordingly  clearly  recognised  that  insanity 
caused  by  drink  is  as  good  a  defence  to  a  criminal 
charge  as  any  other  insanity.  'If  the  mind  is 
diseased...  then  that  is  insanity,  which  will  take 
away  criminal  responsibility.  If  there  be  such 
insanity,  it  matters  not...  what  was  the  exciting  cause.. 
It  may  be  drunkenness  or  it  may  be  indulgence  in  any 
other  vicious  propensity  -  it  is  of  no  consequence 
which  it  is,  if  insanity  is  actually  produced  and  is 
present  at  the  time'  (Alex.  Milne,  (1863)  4  Irv.  301 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Inglis  at  p.  X44).  The  reason 
fob  the  rule  was  given  by  Lord  Macdonald  as  being 
that  'to  hold  him  responsible  for  that  which  he  does  when 
his  mind  is  overthrown  by  disease  would  be  to  visit 
him  with  the  consequences  of  an  act  which  he  could  not 
estimate  when  he  did  it,  because  the  presence  of  an 
actual  disease  prevented  his  having  sane  control  of  his 
actions'  (M'Donald,  (1890)  2  Wh.  517,521).  This  is 
straightforward  and  in  itself  unexceptionable;  what 
is  puzzling  is  that  no  one  has  explained  why  it  should 
not  equally  be  the  law  that  one  cannot  hold  a  man 
responsible  for  what  he  does  when  his  mind  has  been 
overthrown  by  one  bout  of  drinking  instead  of  by  a  long 
and  deliberate  indulgence  in  this  vicious  habit. 425 
Diminished  responsibility  caused  by  chronic 
alcoholism.  Although  strictly  speaking  the  analogy 
with  insanity  is  not  exact  since  insanity  is  exculpatory 
and  diminished  responsibility  merely  a  plea  in  mitigation, 
it  is  clearly  the  law  that  if  a  man  drinks  himself 
into  a  permanent  state  which  is  just  short  of  insanity, 
and  so  is  classifiable  as  a  state  of  diminished 
responsibility,  then,  despite  the  general  view  that 
drink  can  never  palliate  an  offence,  he  is  treated  as 
being  of  diminished  responsibility  without  any  regard 
to  the  cause  of  his  condition  (Dingwall  (1867)  5  Irv. 
466;  Thos.  Ferguson,  (1881)  4  Coup.  552). 
Acute  intoxication. 
The  law  before  1921.  It  is  difficult  to  say 
just  what  the  law  was  on  this  matter  prior  to  the  case 
of  Campbell  in  1921  (1921  J.  C.  l),  but  there  are 
indications  that  acute  drunkenness  was  regarded  as 
a  relevant  mitigating  factor,  in  the  same  way  as 
provocation  or  diminished  responsibility.  Indeed 
intoxication  and  diminished  responsibility  are 
almost  inextricably  mingled  in  a  number  of  cases.  Even 
Hume,  who  was  no  friend  to  the  plea  of  intoxication, 
seems  to  have  accepted  that  the  proper  course  to  adopt 
in  cases  of  homicide  committed  under  the  influence 
of  drink  was  to  convict  the  accused  of  murder  and 
recommend  him  to  mercy,  in  the  same  way  as  in 
diminished  responsibility  cases.  (Cf.  James  Cummings, 
12  Jan.  1810,  Hume,  i.  40-1.  The  accused  seems  to 
have  been  somewhat  melancholic  and  apt  to  be  quarrel- 
some  in  liquor.  He  killed  a  man  apparently  when 
drunk,  and  was  acquitted  on  the  ground  of  insanity. 
Hume  criticised  the  verdict  because  'a  constitution 
that  is  liable  to  violent  and  sudden"irritatiön  from 
liquor,  is  no  defence',  and  suggested  that  he  should 426 
have  been  convicted  with  a  recommendation.  )  Alison 
took  the  view  that  this  was  'the  proper  way  of 
resolving  those  cases,  unhappily  too  numerous,  in 
which  a  fatal  act  has  been  committed  in  the  course 
of  a  temporary  fit  of  insanity,  arising  from  excessive 
drinking',  provided  of  course  that  the  accused  did  not 
know  that  he  was  liable  to  be  maddened  by  drink  (Alison, 
i.  654). 
As  we  have  seen,  Lord  Deas  drew  a  distinction 
between  chronic  and  acute  alcoholism  with  reference 
to  diminished  responsibility,  but  even  Lord  Deas 
allowed  the  plea  of  diminished  responsibility  to 
operate  in  the  case  of  Andrew  Grainger  ((18'/8) 
4  Coup.  552)  in  which  the  accused  had  committed 
homicide  while  suffering  from  delirium  tremens  caused 
by  a  drinking  bout,  but  was  perfectly  sane  and  harmless 
when  not  actually  under  the  influence  of  drink. 
The  question  of  drink  as  a  mitigating  factor 
arose  in  three  late  nineteenth  century  cases, 
independently  of  the  general  question  of  diminished 
responsibility.  In  two  of  these  (Macdonald,  (1890) 
2  Th.  517,52k;  Kane,  (1892)  3  Wh.  386,388) 
Lord  Macdonald,  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  expressed  the 
low  as  being  that  drink  could  be  taken  into  account 
in  considering  whether  or  not  the  accused  was  actuated 
by  malice.  In  other  words,  if  the  crime  was  caused 
by  drink  this  might  show  that  the  element  of  malice 
necessary  for  a  conviction  of  murder  was  absent, 
and  so  the  jury  could  return  a  verdict  of  culpable 
homicide  only. 
The  possibility  that  a  person  might  be  so  drunk 
as  to  be  completely  lacking  in  mens  rea  does  not  seem 
to  have  been  considered-at  all  in  these  cases,  nor  even 
in  the  case'  of  Margt.  Brown  ((1886)  1  MTh.  93)  in  which 42/ 
one  would  expect  it  to  have  been  raised  acutely.  The 
accused  was  an  old  woman  who  had  been  left  in  charge  of 
her  grandchildren.  She  got  drunk,  and  in  a  'momentary 
hallucination'  put  the  children  on  the  fire  where  they 
were  burned  to  death.  She  was  charged  with  murder  and 
pleaded  insanity  or  somnambulism.  The  jury  were 
directed  that  if  her  hallucination  was  caused  by  insanity 
they  should  acquit  her,  but  that  if  it  was  caused  by 
drink  they  might  reduce  the  crime  to  culpable  homicide 
since  there  would  then  be  an  absence  of  the  'malice 
which  was  essential  to  the  constitution  of  the  crime  of 
murder'  (Lord  L1'Laren  at  p.  104).  But  if  the  accused 
acted  under  a  hallucination  she  cannot  have  had  any 
mens  rea  at  all,  and  her  conviction  for  culpable 
homicide  can  logically  be  based  only  on  the  view  that 
it  was  culpable  for  her  to  get  drunk  while  in  charge 
of  the  children,  i.  e.  on  the  principle  of  ac  do  libera 
in  causa.  Something  like  this  may  have  been  in  Lord 
LI'Laren's  mind  when  he  spoke  of  the  death  having  been 
caused  by  the  accused's  'fault'  (at  p.  105),  but  it 
is  nowhere  made  explicit,  and  the  case  gives  the  general 
impression  that  the  possibility  of  exculpation  because 
of  drink  was  not  considered,  because  the  view  was  taken 
that  drink  could  never  operate  in  exculpation. 
The  modern  law.  The  modern  law  has  no  connection 
with  the  cases  just  discussed.  It  stems  entirely 
from  the  English  case  of  D.  P.  P.  v.  Beard  ([1920])  A.  C. 
479),  which  laid  down  the  rule  that  intoxication  could 
not  operate  either  in  exculpation  or  in  mitigation, 
except  that  where  it  was  shown  that  a  person  charged 
with  murder  had  been  so  drunk  at  the  time  of  the 
crime  as  to  have  been  incppable  of  forming  an  intention 
to  kill  or  do  serious  bodily  harm  he  should  be  convicted 428 
of  culpable  homicide  -  Angl.  manslaughter.  This 
rule  was  adopted  in  Campbell  (1921  J.  C.  1)  and  was 
approved  by  a  full  bench  of  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal 
in  Kennedy  (1944  J.  C.  171).  It  now  apparently 
represents  the  whole  law  of  acute  intoxication  in 
Scotland.  Even  a  plea  of  diminished  responsibility 
will  now  fail  if  the  position  is  that  the  accused  is 
not  of  diminished  responsibility  when  sober,  but  only 
when  drunk  (Carraher,  1946  J.  C.  108;  M'Leod,  1956 
J.  C.  20),  contrary  to  the  older  view  which  seems  to 
have  allowed  for  cases  where  diminished  responsibility 
was  due  to  a  combination  of  mental  weakness  and  acute 
intoxication,  as  in  Grainger  ((1878)  4  Coup.  552; 
cf.  Alison,  i.  654). 
The  rule  in  Beard  is  replete  with  difficulties 
which  can  be  summed  up  by  saying  that  it  just  does 
not  'add  up',  does  not  make  sense.  This  makes  it 
difficult  to  discuss,  but  I  would  offer  the  following 
observations. 
(1)  The  rule  falls  into  two  parts.  The  first 
part  is  exculpatory  -  persons  who  lack  the  mens  rea 
of  murder  are  not  to  be  convicted  of  murder.  The 
second  part  is  perhaps  best  described  as  punitive  - 
persons  who  kill  when  incapable  because  of  drink  of 
intending  to  do  so  will  be  convicted  of  culpable 
homicide.  The  rule  is  nota  whole,  and  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  whole.  In  prticular  it  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  version  of  the  earlier  Scots  idea  that 
drink  can  mitigate  the  penalty  of  murder.  For  Beard 
only  operates  when  mens  rea  in  the  strict  sense  of 
intention  or  recklessness  is  absent.  Where  it  is 
present,  but  general  mens  rea,  or  malice,  is  absent, 
the  rule  does  ntt  operate  to  reduce  the  crime  from 
murder  to  culpable  homicide.  Since  the  rule  is  regarded 429 
as  representing  the  whole  law,  drink  can  never  operate 
in  mitigation  of  the  penalty  of  murder.  The 
conviction  for  culpable  homicide  must  therefore 
logically  be  a  conviction  for  involuntary,  and  not  for 
voluntary,  culpable  homicide  -  someone  incapable  of 
intending  to  kill  cannot  kill  voluntarily. 
(2)  The  formula  maybe  meaningless.  The 
formula  set  out  in  Beard  as  a  test  of  drunkenness 
is  an  artificial  one,  based  on  the  legal  defintion 
of  the  mens  rea  of  murder,  and  not  on  any  empirical 
tests  of  the  actual  or  possible  effects  of  overdrinking. 
It  assumes,  for  example,  that  a  man  may  be  incapable 
of  intending  to  do  serious  injury,  and  yet  be  capable 
of  doing  it:  it  seems  more  likely  that  anyone  so 
drunk  as  to  be  incapable  of  intending  serious  injury 
would  not  be  capable  of  standing  on  his  feet,  far  less 
of  killing  someone.  The  formula  may  be  empty  of 
content,  or  there  may  be  only  a  very  few  cases  in  which 
it  can  arise,  but  neither  of  these  considerations 
affected  its  formulation.  The  formula  also  suggests 
that  incapacity  to  intend  serious  injury  may  co-exist 
with  intention  to  cause  lesser  injury,  which  again 
seems  unlikely,  and  no  doubt  any  jury  which  was 
satisfied  that  there  was  an  intention  to  do  some  injury 
would  go  on  to  hold  that  the  accused  was  capable  of 
intending  serious  injury. 
There  is  the  further  point  that  the  formula 
talks  of  incapacity  to  intend,  and  not  of  absence 
of  actual  intention.  This  is  probably  because  of  the 
evidential  position  regarding  proof  of  intent.  Beard 
is  unnecessary  if  it  is  clear  on  the  evidence  that  the 
accused  did  not  intend  to  kill  or  seriously  injure, 
since  in  that  event  he  cannot  be  convicted  of  murder 
whether  he  was  drunk  or  sober,  sane  or  mad,  and  the 430 
rule  does  not  allow  of  anything  less  than  a  conviction 
for  culpable  homicide.  The  rule  is  designed  for  cases 
in  which  the  jury  would  have  believed  that  serious 
injury  was  intended,  but  for  the  evidence  of  drink. 
That  being  so,  they  will  ohly  change  their  minds 
about  intention  if  they  are  conv  red  that  the  accused 
could  not  have  had  such  an  intention,  because  he  was 
too  drunk  to  be  capable  of  it.  Thus,  in  Campbell 
(1921  J.  C.  1)  the  jury  were  told  by  Lord  Scott-Dickson 
that  'evidence  of  drunkenness  which  renders  the 
accused  incapable  of  forming  the  specific  intent 
required  to  constitute  the  crime...  should  be  taken 
into  consideration  with  the  other  facts  proved  in 
order  to  determine  whether  or  not  he  had  that  intention' 
(at  p.  4). 
(3)  Beard  and  exculpation.  The  first  half  of  the 
rule  faces  up  to  the  principle  that  a  person  cannot  be 
convicted  of  a  crime  in  the  absence  of  mens  rea, 
and  applies  to  acute  intoxication  the  same  reasoning 
which  is  used  to  allow  alcoholic  insanity  to  operate 
as  a  defence.  As  Lord  Normand  said  in  Kennedy,  'The 
essence  of  the  thing  is,  not  the  intoxication,  but  the 
resulting  incapacity  to  form  the  intent'  (1944  J.  C. 
171,177). 
(4)  The  conviction  for  culpable  homicide.  The 
obvious  difficulty  about  the  rule  is  its  imposition 
of  an  automatic  conviction  for  culpable  homicide. 
In  Beard  itself  Lord  Birkenhead  said  that  the  reason 
for  this  was  not  clear,  that  it  might  be  because  the 
accused  had  committed  'unlawful  homicide  without  malice 
aforethought',  or  it  might  be  because  of  an  older  view 
of  the  law  that  'in  truth,  it  may  be  that  the  cause  of 
the  punishment  is  the  drunkenness  which  has  led  to  the 
crime,  rather  than  the  crime  itself'  ([1920]  A.  C.  4'19,500). 431 
The  automatic  nature  of  the  rule  suggests  that  the 
latter  is  the  reason.  It  should  be  noted  at  the 
outset,  however,  that  both  these  suggested  reasons 
are  drawn  from  English  law. 
There  are  three  conceivable  justifications  for 
conviction  of  culpable  homicide  in  a  given  case,  but 
none  of  these  is  a  good  reason  for  an  automatic 
conviction  in  all  cases.  They  are: 
(a)  The  concept  of  actio  libera  in  causa.  That 
would  require  an  enquiry  in  each  case  into  the  fore- 
seeability  that  the  accusedts  becoming  drunk  would 
lead  to  serious  injury  to  others,  and  there  is  no 
suggestion  in  Beard  or  the  cases  which  follow  it  that 
any  such  enquiry  is  necessary  or  even  relevant.  The 
question  of  the  actio  libera  in  causa  was  mentioned 
in  Campbell  (1921  J.  C.  1),  strangely  enough,  by  the 
defence,  who  pleaded  the  accused's  unusual  susceptibility 
to  alcohol.  Lord  Scott  Dickson  dealt  with  this  by 
saying  'That  is  in  law  no  excuse  whatever  for  a  man. 
It  may  be  a  good  reason  for  his  taking  the  advice 
given  to  the  accused  more  than  once,  that  he  should 
not  indulge  in  drink  at  all,  but  it  would  be  a  dangerous 
view  to  set  afloat  that,  ih  the  case  of  a  man  who 
knows  that  drink  has  that  effect  on  him,  it  is'-to  be 
an  excuse  for  anything  he  does  after  he  has  wilfully 
and  wittingly  put  himself  in  the  position  of  having 
too  much  drink'  (at  p.  3).  But  it  was  not  suggested 
that  it  was  because  of  this  knowledge  that  it  was  open 
to  the  'jury  to  convict  of  culpable  homicide.  The 
question  was  not  raised  in  Kenne  (1944  J.  C.  171)  at  all. 
(b)  By  showing  that  the  accused  was  negligent 
at  the  time  of  the  crime.  But  again,  enquiry  is 
not  made  into  this.  In  any  event  negligence  requires 
some  deliberate  act  and  some  minimal  capacity  on  the 432 
part  of  the  accused  to  appreciate  the  risks  involved 
(cf.  supra291)  and  it  is  unlikely  that  either  of  these 
would  be  present  in  a  man  who  was  so  drunk  as  to  be 
incapable  of  intending  to  do  serious  injury. 
(c)  By  reference  to  the  rule  that  any  death 
following  on  an  assault  is  culpable  homicide  (Rutherford 
1947  J.  C.  1).  But  again  this  requires  a  deliberate 
assault,  and  it  is  unlikely  that  a  man  incapable. 
of  intending  serious  injury  would  be  capable  of 
any  sort  of  deliberate  assault. 
The  'reason'  for  the  conviction  in  Scotland,  insofar 
as  it  is  not  just  that  the  law  parrots  the  English 
rule,  is  that  the  rule  has  become  confused  with  the 
earlier  law  which  allowed  drink  to  operate  to  reduce 
murder  to  voluntary  culpable  homicide.  The  law  has 
developed  as  follows:  drunkenness  can  reduce  the 
charge  because  it  is  a  plea  in  mitigation;  this 
drunkenness  was  never  defined  in  the  Scots  cases; 
drunkenness  which  reduces  murder  to  manslaughter 
was  defined  in  Beard;  therefore  drunkenness  so  defined 
is  the  drunkenness  which  operates  to  reduce  murder  to 
culpable  homicide.  The  flaw  in  this  argument  is 
clear  once  it  is  appreciated  that  the  Beard  formula 
rests  on  the  idea  of  the  absence  of  intent,  and 
once  one  appreciates  the  distinction  between  the  two 
types  of  culpable  homicide.  These  factors  have  not, 
however,  been  fully  appreciated  by  the  Scots  Courts. 
(5)  'fhe_exclusiveness  of  the  rui'e.  The  failure 
to  distinguish  exculpation  and  mitigation  has  led  to 
the  rule  in  Beard  being  regarded  as  the  whole  '  law 
of  Scotland  on  drink  as  a  defence  to  a  criminal  charge. 
It  would  have  been  possible  to  adopt  the  first  half 
of  the  rule  as  the  test  for  exculpatory  intoxication, 
and  to  retain  a  rule  that  a  lesser  degree  of  intoxication 117 -1-33 
could  operate  in  mitigation,  but  Beard  appears  to  have 
been  treated  as  universally  applicable,  and  no  attention 
has  been  paid  to  the  question  whether  the  conviction 
for  culpable  homicide  is  for  voluntary  or  involuntary 
culpable  homicide.  The  practical  result  of  this  is 
that  drink  cannot  operate  in  mitigation  except  in 
one  case,  that  in  which  logically  it  should  operate 
in  exculpation. 
(6)  Drunkenness  in  crimes  other  than  homicide. 
The  question  whether"Beard  drunkenness"  exculpates 
or  only  mitigates  is  not  of  practical  importance  in 
homicide,  but  it  is  important  in  other  crimes. 
Suppose  A  commits  theft  or  assault  -  both  of  which 
can  be  committed  only  intentionally  -  then  he  is 
incapable  of  forming  the  intention  to  commit  them. 
If  Beard  drunkenness  exculpates  he  must  be  acquitted 
and  discharged,  since  there  is  no,,  procedure  for 
reducing  assault  to  culpable.  and  reckless  wounding, 
or  theft  to  culpable  and  reckless  taking.  (There 
is  a  crime  of  culpable  and  reckless  wounding  but  it 
appears  that  it  must  be  specifically  libelled  before 
a  jury  can  convict  of  it  as  an  alternative  to  assault  - 
Macdonald,  p.  115,  cf.  infra  rryb  ;  there  is  no  such 
crime  as  reckless  theft.  )  But  if  Beard  drunkenness 
is  mitigatory,  A's  state  could  only  be  taken  into 
account  in  sentencing  him  -  he  would  be  convicted 
but  receive  a  lesser  sentence  than  he  would  have  done 
had  he  been  sober  at  the,  time  of  the  crime.  Any 
drunkenness  of  a  lesser  degree  than  the  Beard  kind 
would  be  of  no  effect  at  all,  since  Beard  is  exclusive, 
whatever  its  meaning. 
There  is  very  little  authority  on  this  matter. 
In  one  old  case  an  accused  who  was  charged  with  'cursing 
and  beating  of  parents'  -a  capital  offence  at  the  time 
was  convicted  of  common  assault,  although  the  assault, r74 
in  which  he  scratched  his  father's  lips  was  described 
as  just  the  waving  of  a  drunk  man's  hand  (John  Alves, 
(1830)  5  Deas  and  Anderson,  147).  A  logical 
application  of  Beard  would  result  in  acquittal  where 
an  accused  charged  with  assault  proved  that  he  had  been 
too  drunk  to  be  able  to  form  the  intention  of  assaulting 
the  victim,  and  Lord  Hill  Watson  gave  a  direction 
to  this  effect  in  the  case  of  Alex.  Winchester  (Glasgow 
High  Court,  31  Oct.  1955,  unrepd.  -I  am  indebted  to 
Mr.  A.  A.  Macdonald,  defence  counsel  in  the  case,  for 
this  information).  It  is  submitted  that  this 
direction  represents  the  law,  but  there  is  no  binding 
authority  on  the  question. 
In  Jas.  Kinnison  ((1870)  1  Coup.  457),  the  matter 
was  decided  in  favour  of  exculpation  without  any 
doubt  at  all,  but  the  case  involved  a  statutory 
offence,  and  of  course,  was  heard  long  before  Beard. 
The  accused  was  a  registrar  who  was  charged  with  making 
false  entries  in  his  register,  and  his  defence  was 
that  he  had  been  drunk  when  he  made  the  entries.  The 
statute  required  the  false  entries  to  have  been  made 
wilfully  for  an  offence  to  be  committed,  and  Lord 
4oncrieff  told  the  jury  that  the  question  for  them 
was  '...  not  whether  the  prisoner  did  wrong  in  being  in 
the  state  in  which  he  was  when  he  was  required  to  attend 
to  that  business;  nor  that  he  did  wrong  in  the  error 
which  he  made  in  filling  up  the  resiste,  but  that  when 
he  made  these  errors  he  meant  not  to  make  a  true  entry, 
but  meant  to  make  a  false  one'  (at  p.  462),  and  the 
accused  was  acquitted.  The  application  of  this  logic 
to  common  law  crimes  would  have  resulted  in  something 
very  different  from  the  confusions  of  Beard,  but  it  is 
more  difficult  to  apply  logic  in  crimes  like  homicide 
where  the  result  of  its  application  might  be  the 
acquittal  of  the  accused,  'than  it  is  to  apply  it  to 435 
achieve  the  sarge  result  in  the  case  of  statutory 
offences  of  a  minor  character. 
Proposals  for  reform. 
Any  consideration  of  what  the  law  should  be  on  this 
matter  must  take  into  account  two  matters  -  the 
advisability  of  having  rules  which  are  logical  and 
consonant  with  general  principles  of  responsibility; 
and  the  necessity  of  satisfying  the  public  indignation 
which  is  aroused  by  the  commission  of  a  serious 
crime  by  a  drunk  man,  and  of  protecting  the  public 
against  drunken  criminals.  Alison  pointed  out 
in  1832  that  'such  is  the  tendency  to  this  brutalising 
vice,  among  the  lower  orders  in  this  country,  that 
if  it  were  sustained  as  a  defence,  three-fourths 
of  the  whole  crimes  in  the  country  would  go  unpunished; 
for  the  slightest  experience  must  be  sufficient  to 
convince  everyone,  that  almost  every  crime  that  is 
committed,  is  directly  or  indirectly  connected  with 
whisky'  (Alison,  i.  662).  Allowing  for  modern  social 
class-attitudes,  and  for  the  price  of  whisky,  this 
statement  is  probably  still  true  so  far  as  crimes  of 
violence  are  concerned,  and  it  is  a  matter  to  which  the 
law  must  have  regard  in  dealing  with  the  defence  of 
drunkenness.  The  great  advantage  of  Beard  is  that  it 
satisfies  the  desire  to  punish  drunk  criminals,  while 
appearing  to  satisfy  the  maxim  actus  non  sit  reus;  and 
while  also  making  a  concession  to  the  hamanitarian 
outlook  by  declining  to  hang  drunkards.  But,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  Beard  will  not  do.  And  one 
reason  for  this  is  perhaps  that  Beard  is  trying  to  do 
two  things  at  once.  The  problem  of  making  provision 
for  the  effect  of  drink  on  mens  rea  is  in  a  way  separate 
from  the  problem  of  dealing  with  the  drunken  criminal, 
and  should  be  separately  dealt  with.  If  this  is 436 
accepted,  then  it  should  be  possiole  to  construct  a 
law  which  is  consistent  with  itself  and  the  nineteenth 
century  cases,  and  at  the  same  time  protects  the 
public  and  satisfies  their  indignation. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  effect  of  drink  on  a  man's 
responsibility  for  what  he  does  when  under  its  influence 
can  be  treated  as  follows.  Where  a  crime  is  wholly 
the  product  of  intoxication,  i.  e.  where  it  can  be  shown 
that  but  for  drink  the  accused  would  never  have 
considered  committing  it,  then  whether  or  not  he  was 
capable  of  intending  to  commit  it,  and  whether  or  not 
in  his  drunken  state  he  did  intent.  to  commit  it,  he 
should  be  acquitted  of  that  crime.  Where  a  man  is 
very  drunk  and  his  criminal  actings  have  been  influenced 
by  drink  to  a  great  extent,  although  he  has  not 
completely  lost  control  of  himself,  it  should  be  open 
to  the  Judge  or  jury  to  treat  this  as  an  element  in 
mitigation,  if  in  the  whole  circumstances  of  the  case 
it  seems  just  to  do  so. 
it  is  submitted  that  the  analogies  with  insanity 
and  diminished  responsibility  provide  authority  for 
such  an  approach  to  the  question.  I  would  also  pray 
in  aid  the  observations  of  a  South  African  Judge  who 
said, 
'Our  law  does  not  take  a  sufficiently  human 
view  of  the  effect  of  liquor  on  the  mind  of  a 
person  where  it  is  laid  down  that  when  one  in  a 
state  of  drunkenness  kills  another,  the  offence 
will  not  be  reduced  from  murder  to  culpable 
homicide  unless  the  drunkenness  was  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  deprive  him  of  the  power  of 
appreciating  what  he  was  doing  and  of  realising 
the  probable  consequence's  of  his  act,  so  that 
he  could  not  be  said  to  have  the  intention  to  kill. 
A  person  who  is  very  much  under  the  influence 
of  liquor  cannot  be  said  to  be  in  full  command 
of  his  reason;  his  mind  is  bound  to  be  affected 
by  it...  it  can  only  be  in  a  vague,  blurred  and 
confused  way  that  he  can  appreciate  or  realise 
what  he  is  doing  or  the  probable  consequences 43'/ 
of  his  act.  He  cannot  be  said  to  be  fully 
capable  of  appreciating  and  realising  what  he 
is  doing'  (R.  v.  N  obese  [  1936]  A.  D.  296, 
Curlewis,  C.  at  p.  005. 
The  public  interest.  What  then  of  the  public 
interest?  There  are  at  least  three  ways  in  which 
this  can  be  protected,  and  they  can  be  adopted  cumulatively. 
(1)  By  using  the  concept  of  actio  libera  in  causa. 
This  would  satisfy  the  fear  that  men  might  deliberately 
get  drunk  in  order  to  commit  crimes  with  impunity. 
It  would  also  allow  the  Beard  rule  to  operate  in  cases 
where  the  accused  should  have  foreseen  the  possibility 
that  he  might  do  violence  when  drunk.  It  would 
permit  a  conviction  for  culpable  homicide  in  such 
a  case  whether  or  not  the  accused  was  incapable  of 
intending  to  do  injury;  and  if  a  man  ever  did  drink 
himself  into  a  Beard  condition  with  the  intention 
of  killing  someone  and  succeeded  in  killing  him,  he 
would  be  guilty  of  murder  on  this  view,  though  on 
the  Beard  rule  he  would  be  guilty  only  of  culpable 
homicide. 
(2)  The  concept  of  the  acii  libera  in  causa  is 
probably  not  sufficient  in  itself  to  meet  the  claims 
of  public  feeling  and  public  safety.  For  one  thing, 
it  may  lead  to  unpopular  acquittals,  and  it  was  partly 
for  this  reason  that  German  law  created  the  offence  of 
deliberately  or  negligently  drinking  oneself  into  a 
state  of  irresponsibility  and  then  committing  a  crime. 
This  is  a  specific  offence  in  itself,  and  is  independent 
of  the  ultimate  crime  which  is  ex  hynothesi  not 
punishable.  If  A  gets  so  drunk  as  to  be  irresponsible, 
and  then  kills  B  in  circumstances  not  covered  by  the 
concept  of  actio  libera  in  causa  he  cannot  be  convicted 
of  homicide,  but  he  is  guilty  of  the  crime  of  becoming 
drunk  and  then  committing  a  criminal  act.  There  would 438 
appear  to  be  nothing  in  principle  to  prevent  the 
creation  of  such  a  crime  in  this  country  by  means  of 
legislation.  (The  relevant  section  of  the  StGB  -  Art. 
330a  -  provides  'Wer  sich  vorsätzlich  oder  fahrllssig 
durch  den  Genuss  geistiger  Getränke  oder  durch  andere 
berauschende  Mittel  in  einen  die  Zurechnungsfähigkeit 
ausschliessenden  Rausch  versetzt,  wird...  bestraft,  wenn 
er  in  diesem  Zustand  eine  mit  Strafe  bedrohte  Handlung 
begeht'.  H.  Mannheim  cites  a  case  in  which  a  man  who 
was  unusually  susceptible  to  drink  committed  a  brutal 
murder  when  drunk.  He  had  once,  years  before,  been 
involved  in  a  drunken  brawl,  since  when  he  had  not 
taken  alcohol,  but  on  the  night  of  the  murder  he  had 
been  persuaded  by  a  friend  to  have  a  small  quantity 
of  drink.  In  the  circumstances  the  authorities  did 
not  prosecute  him,  and  he  was  forced  to  seek  police 
protection  -  Group  Problems  in  Crime  and  Punishment, 
pp.  293-6.  StGB  330a  is  designed  to  deal  with  this 
sort  of  situation.  ) 
(3)  Although  the  German  solution  takes  public 
indignation  into  account,  it  does  not  provide  any  degree 
of  public  protection,  since  it  only  operates  when  a 
crime  has  been  committed.  It  is  submitted  that  the 
best  way  of  protecting  the  public  from  drunk  criminals 
is,  as  Glanville  Williams  suggests  (Gl.  Williams,  para. 
112),  by  creating  a  crime  of  being  drunk  and  dangerous. 
The  analogy  with  the  crime  of  being  drunk  in  charge 
of  a  vehicle  is  obvious,  and  sufficient  to  show  that 
there  is  no  great  difficulty  in  creating  such  an 
offence.  There  might  be  some  practical  difficulties  - 
it  cannot  be  assumed  that  every  drunk  man  is  dangerous 
in  the  way  in  which  it  is  assumed  that  every  drunk 
driver  is  dangerous,  but  it  should  not  be  difficult  to 
set  up  a  practice  whereby  only  men  of  known  violent 439 
character  where  charged  with  this  crime.  The 
advantages  of  such  a  course  are  obvious,  since  it  would 
enable  the  police  to  arrest  such  a  man  -  if  only 
to  take  him  into  the  cells  till  he  cooled  down  -  before 
he  did  any  harm.  A  man  arrested  on  such  a  charge 
would,  of  course,  be  more  severely  dealt  with  if  he  had 
a  record  of  violence,  than  if  he  had  not. 
Involuntary  intoxication. 
So  far  we  have  been  concerned  only  with  voluntary 
intoxication,  and  most  of  what  has  been  said  cannot  be 
applied  to  cases  in  which  a  person  has  become  drunk 
involuntarily,  for  example,  where  someone  else  has  given 
him  drink  without  his  knowledge.  It  seems  inevitable 
that  a  state  of  involuntary  intoxication  must  operate 
either  as  a  defence  or  in  mitigation  when  it  produces  a 
state  of  mind  generally  recognised  by  the  law  as 
excluding  or  reducing  responsibility. 
In  the  absence  of  authority  it  is  impossible  to 
say  what  amounts  to  involuntary  intoxication.  It  is 
likely,  however,  that  the  limits  of  involuntariness 
will  be  strictly  defined,  and  that,  as  was  said  in  a 
case  in  Oklahoma,  'involuntary  intoxication  is  a  very 
rare  thing  and  can  never  exist  where  the  person 
intoxicated  knows  what  he  is  drinking,  and  drinks  the 
intoxicant  voluntarily,  and  without  being  made  to  do  so 
by  force  or  coercion'  (Perryman  v.  State,  (1916)  12 
Okla.  Cr.  App.  500,159  Pac.  93'1,  Hall,  pp.  439-40). 
The  emphasis  too  may  be  laid  on  the  voluntary  nature 
of  the  drinking  rather  than  on  its  viciousness  or  lack 
of  viciousness.  In  one  American  case  it  was  held  that 
drink  taken  to  relieve  toothache  was  to  be  regarded  as 
taken  iroluntarily,  and  that  its  effects  could  not  be 440 
pleaded  in  defence  to  a  charge,  at  any  rate  where  it  was 
taken  without  medical  advice  (Johnson  v.  Cmwth.,  (1924) 
135  Va.  524;  115  S.  E.  6`/3;  30  A.  L.  R.  V55).  This  case 
was  decided  in  the  period  of  prohibition,  but  its  ratio 
is  generally  applicable  -  'no  man  may  be  allowed  to 
expose  the  public  to  the  danger  of  harm  of  violence 
caused  by  his  own  misconduct  in  voluntarily  rendering 
himself  dangerous'  (at  p.  '160).  In  other  words, 
whoever  drinks  does  so  at  his  own  risk,  and  must  just 
take  the  consequences  if  he  commits  a  crime  as  a  result. 
'He,  and  not  others,  must  take  the  risk'  (ib.  p.  761). 
The  similarity  between  this  and  the  Beard  attitude 
is  sufficient  to  enable  one  to  say  that  the  ratio 
of  Johnson  would  probably  be  accepted  in  Scotland. 
Addiction.  The  problem  of  the  addict  is  allied 
to  that  of  involuntary  intoxication.  There  seems 
to  be  no  authority  in  support  of  the  view  that  his 
drinking  is  involuntary,  and  the  ratio  of  Johnson  is 
against  such  a  view,  but  compulsive  drinking  can  hardly 
be  regarded  as  voluntary.  The  nearest  the  law  comes 
to  recognising  this  is  by  way  of  its  recognition  of  the 
effects  of  chronic  alcoholism  as  a  relevant  defence. 
But  it  makes  no  effort  to  distinguish  between  the 
habitual  voluntary  drinker  and  the  addict  whose 
drinking  is  involuntary  and  indeed  the  symptom  of  his 
disease.  (But  see  Wm.  Wylie  (1858)  3  Irv.  218,  in 
which  Lord  Cowan  observed,  obiter,  since  the  case  was 
one  of  insanity  that  'Drunkenness,  caused  by  his  own 
qct,  would  be  no  defence.  But  the  peculiarity 
of  the  present  case,  even  had  such  a  point  been  raised 
by  the  proof,  was,  that  according  to  the  medical 
evidence,  the  prisoner's  drinking  habits  were  not 
the  cause,  but  the  effect,  of  his  insanity'  -  at  p.  234.  ) 
It  was  assumed  in  Campbell  (1921  J.  C.  1)  that  the 441 
accused,  who  had  been  rendered  neculiariy  susceptible 
to  alcohol  ,  gis  the  result-  of  an  accident,  was  able  to 
control  reis  desire  for  drink,  and  to  control  it  as 
effectively  as  a  normal  healthy  man.  It  was  not 
suggested  that  if  the  accident  had  made  him  an 
addict  he  could  have  pleaded  that  as  a  defence  or  in 
mitigation. 
The  problem  of  the  'self-made'  addict  is  even 
more  difficult  than  that  of  the  man  whose  addiction 
is  the  result  of  accident  or  disease.  Sullivan 
states  that  most  drunken  killers  are  pathological 
drunkards,  suffering  from  nervous  instability  which 
predisposes  them  to  pathological  drunkenness,  although 
this  predisposition  may  itself  be  the  result  of  chronic 
intoxication  (W.  C.  Sullivan,  Insanity  and  Crime, 
pp.  66-7).  If  the  effects  of  chronic  alcoholism 
are  relevant  when  they  produce  insanity  or  diminished 
responsibility,  they  should  also  be  relevant  when 
they  lead  to  an  inability,  or  to  a  diminished  ability, 
to  keep  away  from  drink,  and  so  render  the  accuused's 
drinking  wholly  or  partly  involuntary.  It  may 
not  be  easy  to  aistinguish  the  habitual  drink-,  r  from 
the  addict,  but  if  the  distinction  exists  an  attempt 
should  be  made  to  recognise  it,  if  only  because  the 
appropriate  way  of  dealing  with  the  addict  is  not  by 
punishment  but  by  some  form  of  treatment. 442 
Chapter  11:  Necessity,  Coercion  and 
Superior  Orders. 
In  the  context  of  the  criminal  law  the  word  'necessity' 
has  rather  a  loose  meaning.  The  law  is  concerned  only 
with  voluntary  actions,  and,  strictly  speaking,  no 
voluntary  action  is  ever  necessary.  Where  the  agent 
is  totally  deprived  of  volition  so  that  his  acts  are 
wholly  the  result  of  causes  other  than  his  will,  there 
is  no  occasion  to  advance  the  plea  of  necessity  or 
coercion,  since  in  such  cases  there  is  no  'act'  at  all. 
The  plea  of  necessity  or  coercion  arises  where  A  does 
something,  intentionally  and  voluntarily,  which,  unless 
it  can  be  justified  or  excused  by  the  plea,  is  punishable. 
It  applies  to  acts  done  in  situations  where  the  accused's 
defence  is  'I  did  it,  because  I  had  to;  I  had  no 
alternative':  and  where  'I  had  no  alternative'  means, 
'The  only  alternative  was  one  I  was  not  obliged  to 
adopt'. 
Necessity  is  therefore  necessity  for  something. 
It  is  not  the  necessity  of  physical  causality  which, 
for  example,  makes  it  necessary  that  water  will  boil 
at  a  certain  temperature  under  certain  pressure,  but 
is  teleological  necessity  (cf.  Hall,  p.  388).  In 
situations  of  necessity  the  accused  isced  with  a 
choice  between  two  courses  of  action,  and  he  is 
required  to  choose  by  referencd  to  the  relative  value 
attached  by  the  law  to  each  course  of  action  and  its 
result.  The  essential  feature  of  the  situation  is  the 
conflict  of  values;  and  it  is  the  accused's  duty  to 
choose  that  course  of  action  which  will  realise  the 
greater  value  (cf.  Schänke-Schröder,  p.  2'/O; 
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These  situations  may  arise  independently  of  the  will 
of  any  person  whose  life  or  property  is  involved  in  the 
balance  of  values,  or  they  may  be  created  by  one  of  the 
persons  so  involved.  Hall  describes  teleological 
necessity  as  implying  'voluntary  conduct  in  the  face 
of  serious  danger  threatened  by  the  impact  of  physical 
forces'  (Hall,  loc.  cit.  ),  but  this  is  too  narrow 
if  it  excludes  situations  contributed  to  by  human  action, 
or  treats  them  as  essentially  different  from  those 
caused  solely  by  physical  forces.  Coercion,  where  the 
choice  is  forced  on  the  agent  by  someone  whose 
interests  are  not  involved  in  the  value  calculation, 
is  essentially  the  same  as  necessity  occasioned  by 
natural  events.  When  a  man  has,  for  example,  to 
choose  between  his  own  life  and  that  of  others,  the 
situation  is-governed  by  the  same  principles  whether 
it  is  the  result  of  a_;  natural  disaster  such  as  a 
shipwreck  caused  by  storm,  or  of  the  coercive  action 
of  a  human  being.  The  important  distinction  is  that 
between  situations  which  can  be  accepted  as  'given', 
because  none  of  those  whose  interests  are  threatened 
is  responsible  for  them,  and  situations  where  the 
person  who  created  the  situation  is  involved  in  the 
value-conflict,  so  that  it  is  necessary  to  take  his 
responsibility  into  account  in  balancing  the  values 
involved.  The  typical  example  of  the  latter  type 
of  situation  is  the  case  of  self-defence  against 
a  criminal  attack. 
The  defence  of  superior  orders  is  probably  a 
subject  in  itself,  but  the  situation  which  gives  rise 
to  it  resemble  cases  of  coercion,  and  it  is  sometimes 
treated  as  an  example  of  necessity  (e.  g.  Hume,  i.  53-5; 
Alison,  i.  672-5). I-  NECESSITY 
The  plea  of  necessity  in  one  form  or  another  is 
fairly  generally  recognised  in  Continental  law  (e.  g. 
StGB  Art.  54,  SchwStGB  Art,  34,  Donnedieu  de  Vabres, 
p.  218.  of.  International  Convention  on  the  High 
Seas,  1958,  Art.  27,  reprinted  in  Report  on  the  first 
United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Law  of  the  Sea,  Cmd- 
584,1958),  but  there  is  hardly  any  authority  on  or 
discussion  of  the  question  in  Scotland,  and  not  very 
much  in  England.  In  these  circumstances  I  shall 
first  consider  the  problem  in  general,  then  deal  with 
the  law  of  England  as  expressed  in  the  two  famous  cases 
of  R.  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens  ((1884)  14  Q.  B.  D.  2/4)  and 
R.  v.  Bourne  ([19391  1  K.  B.  68'j),  and  finally  I  shall 
consider  the  position  in  Scots  law. 
The  general  problem 
The  scone  of  the  plea. 
The  plea  of  necessity  is  one  which  is  not 
regarded  with  enthusiasm  by  the  law.  The  possibilities 
of  abuse  are  considerable,  and  accordingly  the  plea 
will  only  be  allowed  to  operate  where  it  is  clear  that 
the  otherwise  criminal  action  taken  was  the  only  means 
of  preserving  the  value  in  question.  If  there  are 
two  courses  open  each  of  which  would  preserve  the  value 
in  question,  and  one  of  them  is  criminal,  then  the 
agent  must  adopt  the  non-criminal  one,  even  if  the 
criminal  one  is  easier,  or  more  likely  to  succeed. 
The  criminal  course  of  action  may  only  be  adopted 
where  there  is  no  other  way  out.  Again,  the  danger 
must  be  imminent  and  considerable.  A  is  not  entitled 
to  steal  Bts  gun  today  because  he  thinks  he  may  need  a 
gun  to  defend  himself  against  C  to-morrow.  The 445 
necessity  must  probably  be  such  that  A  can  be  said  to 
have  acted  in  the  agony  of  the  moment,  and  this  is  so 
even  although  ,  A's  action  is  justified  or  excused, 
not  by  his  agonisod  state  of  mind,  but  by  the  fact  that  in 
a  situation  of  necessity  he  adopted  the  legally 
approved  course  of  action.  Before  the  law  comes  to 
consider  the  relative  values  involved  it  must  be  satis- 
fied  that  the  situation  truly  was  one  of  necessity  - 
that  danger  was  imminent  and  that  no  other  way  of 
avoiding  it  was  open  to  the  accused.  Only  after  that 
has  been  decided  does  it  turn  to  ask  if  the  accused  did 
the  right  thing  in  the  situation.  If  there  was  no 
imminent  danger  and  no  necessity  to  commit  the  crime, 
no  question  of  conflict  of  values  arises. 
The  negative  value  of  a  prima  facie  crime. 
Where  there  are  two  possible  ways  of  preserving 
x  units  of  value,  and  one  of  these  is  criminal,  it  is 
clear  that  the  whole  situation  constituted  by  the 
preservation  of  x  by  the  commission  of  a  crime,  is  less 
in  value  than  the  whole  situation  constituted  by  the 
preservation  of  x  by  a  non-criminal  act.  This  is 
because  the  commission  of  a  crime  is  itself  regarded 
as  of  negative  value,  so  that  the  whole  situation 
constituted  by  the  preservation  of  x  by  the  commission 
of  a  crime  will  in  fact  have  a  lesser  value  than  x- 
its  total  value  will  be  the  value  of  x  less  the 
negative  value  of  the  commission  of  the'  crime.  Suppose 
now  that  an  agent  is  faced  with  a  choice  between  preserv- 
ing  something  valued  at  x  and  something  valued  at  x±_, 
and  that  in  order  to  preserve  the  latter  he  would  have 
to  commit  a  crime.  Then,  if  the  negative  value  of 
the  crime  in  -y,  the  two  courses  of  action  will  be  equal, 
and  if  the  negative  value  of  the  crime  is  greater  than 
it  will  be  his  duty  not  to  preserve  the  greater  value 446 
x+y,  since  in  so  doing  he  will  create  a  total 
situation  valued  at  less  than  x  which  is  the  alternative 
value  which  can  be  preserved  without  the  commission 
of  a  crime.  It  is  only  where  the  total  situation 
created  by  the  crime  is  of  greater  value  than  the 
alternative  situation  that  the  'crime'  is  justified 
or  excused,  and  so  ceases  to  be  a  crime.  Prima  facie 
it  is  criminal,  and  this  factor  must  be  included 
in  any  calculation  of  values. 
If  obedience  to  the  law  were  regarded  as  the 
supreme  value,  and  as  an  absolute  value,  there  would  be 
no  room  for  the  plea  of  necessity  at  all,  since  it  would 
not  be  possible  for  a  situation  involving  a  breach  of 
the  law  to  be  more  valuable  than  one  which  did  not 
involve  such  a  breach.  It  would  never  be  permissible 
to  break  the  law,  because  no  other  value  would  be  as 
great  as  the  value  involved  in  not  breaking  the  law. 
It  would  never,  for  example,  be  permissible  to  borrow 
someone  'else's  car  in  an  emergency  to  take  a  sick  man 
to  hospital,  since  even  the  value  of  his  life  would 
not  compensate  for  the  breach  of  the  law.  The 
deontological  version  of  this  situation  is  more  familiar  - 
if  every  imperative  of  the  law  is  categorical,  there  can 
never  be  any  conditions  in  which  it  is  right  to  disobey 
any  of  them. 
This,  however,  would  be  an  impossible  situation. 
It  cannot  be  the  law  that  it  is  a  crime  to  steal  a 
lifebelt  to  save  a  drowning  man.  The  dilemma  is  the 
same  as  that  in  the  well-knowiT  example  which  is  always 
used  in  attacking  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  categorical 
nature  of  the  moral  law.  Suppose  A  who  is  standing  at 
a  street  corner  sees  someone  running  past  him,  obviously 
in  fear  of  his  life;  he  is  followed  very  soon  after- 
wards  by  someone  running  along  the  street  brandishing 
a  hatchet.  The  man  with  the  hatchet  asks  A,  'Which 44'/ 
way  did  he  go?  '  Unless  the  necessity  of  saving  the 
first  man's  life  is  regarded  as  paramount,  A  will 
be  obliged  to  tell  the  truth  to  the  pursuer,  since 
otherwise  he  would  be  breaking  the  categorical 
obligation  to  tell  the  truth. 
There  seems  no  reason  for  regarding  legal  rules 
as  categorical,  or  as  being  all  of  equal  value  -  there 
is  no  reason  why  some  legal  rules  should  not  be 
regarded  as  more  important  than  others,  or  why  in  some 
cases  other  considerations  should  not  allow  a  legal 
rule  to  be  broken.  The  law  is  not  the  embodiment  of 
absolute  wisdom  but  merely  a  means  of  social  control, 
and  it  would  be  socially  disadvantageous,  for  example, 
to  prevent  the  preservation  of  a  building  by  action 
involving  the  theft  of  a  ladder  and  a  fire  extinguisher. 
The  pc5ssible  situations. 
Situations  of  necessity  can  be  divided  into  three 
main  groups  by  reference  to  the  concept  of  value-chnflicts. 
These  are  (i)  Where  one  value  is  clearly  greater  than 
another,  (ii)  where  the  values  involved  are  equgl, 
(iii)  where  the  values  involved  are  absolute. 
(i)  In  such  a  situation  it  should  be  clear  that 
the  agent's  duty  is  to  preserve  the  greater  value,  and 
where  this  involves  the  commission  of  a  crime,  the 
crime  should  be  justified  by  the  necessity  of 
preserving  the  greater  value.  It  should  not  be  a 
crime,  for  example,  to  steal  a  fire-extinguisher  in 
order  to  save  a  burning  building  (cf.  Gl.  Williams, 
para.  1?  5).  Indeed  there  may  be  occasions  on  which 
there  is  a  legal  obligation  to  commit  a  crime  in  order 
to  preserve  a  value.  If  it  is  accepted  that  abortion 
is  a  lesser  crime  than  homicide,  then  a  doctor  who 
refuses  to  save  a  pregnant  woman's  life  by  performing 
an  abortion  may  be  guilty  of  culpable  homicide  (cf. 448 
R.  v.  Bourne  [19391  1  K.  B.  687,  Macnaghten,  J.  at  p.  693). 
(ii)  Donnedieu  de  Vabres  suns  up  his  views  on 
necessity  as  follows:  -  'Le  delit  necessaire  ne  pout... 
etre  considere  comme  un  acte  antisocial;  il  a  ete 
socialement  utile,  si  le  Bien  sauvegarde  etait  superieur 
ä  celui  qui  a  ete  sacrifie,  et  socialement  indifferent, 
s'il  etait  de  valeur  gale'  (Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p.  218). 
This,  it  is  submitted,  is  an  appropriate  approach, 
provided  that  the  calculation  includes  the  negative 
value  of  lawbreaking  in  arriving  at  the  equivalence 
of  values. 
(iii)  The  most  difficult  questions  arise  in 
the  case  of  absolute  values,  which,  by  definition,  cannot 
be  related  to  any  other  values.  Probably  the  only 
absolute  value  is  the  preservation  of  life.  This  means 
that  any  lesser  crime  than  homicide  will  be  justified 
by  the  preservation  of  life,  but  it  makes  it  very 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  allow  any  circumrtanc  es 
to  justify  homicide.  It  is  possible  to  adopt  a  rule 
of  'quantitive  necessity'  (cf.  Schänke-Schröder,  p.  2/1), 
but  to  do  so  would  not  be  consistent  with  the  idea  that 
each  human  life  is  of  absolute  value,  and  would  offend 
against  the  feeling  that  no  human  being  has  a  right  to 
decide  which  of  his  fellows  should  survive  in  any 
situation.  Nor  is  there  any  way  of  determining  what 
preponderance  of  saved  lives  is  necessary  to  overcome 
the  great  negative  value  of  the  crime  of  murder.  At 
the  same  time  there  are  situations,  such  as  that  of  the 
shipwreck,  in  which  it  would  be  grossly  wasteful 
to  insist  that  all  should  drown  and  refuse  to  allow 
any  to  be  saved  at  the  expense  of  the  rest. 
The  problem  is  a  little  easier  in  two  special 
situations;  (a)  where  the  person  making  the  choice 
has  a  legal  duty  towards  one  or  more  of  the  persons 449 
whose  lives  are  in  danger,  and  (b)  where  the  particular 
persons  sacrificed  would  necessarily  have  died  anyway. 
(a)  Suppose  A  is  in  a  boat  with  B  his  child, 
and  C,  a  stranger.  If  it  becomes  necessary  for  one 
of  the  three  to  be  sacrificed  in  order  to  save  the  other 
two,  it  may  be  permissible  for  A  to  sacrifice  C  in 
order  to  perform  his  legal  duty  to  protect  B.  although 
it  would  not  be  permissible  for  him  to  sacrifice  C 
in  order  to  protect  himself,  or  to  sacrifice  B 
to  protect  himself  or  C.  That  is  to  say,  it  may  be 
possible  to  resolve  the  conflict  of  values  by  means  of 
the  value  involved  in  A's  performance  of  his  duty  to 
protect  B. 
(b)  Suppose  three  men,  A,  B  and  C,  are  climbing 
a  mountain,  roped  together  in  that  order,  with  A  as 
leader.  A  is  only  able  to  pull  one  of  the  other  two 
up  behind  him,  and  therefore  he  cuts  the  rope  between 
B  and  C,  and  so  kills  C.  A's  action  is  regarded  as 
justifiable  (Schänke-Schroder,  p.  2'11;  Gl.  Williams, 
para.  176);  because  A's  only  choice  is  between  losing 
both  B  and  C,  and  'sacrificing'  C  in  order  to  save  B, 
and  because  the  'choice'  of  C  as  the  sacrifice  is 
made  not  by  A  but  by  the  relative  positions  of  the 
three  men.  Perhaps  the  real  distinction  between 
this  case  and  that  where  two  shipwrecked  men  decide 
to  put  a  third  out  of  a  lifeboat  which  can  hold  only 
two  people,  is  that  in  the  mountain  case  it  is  clear 
that  C  will  die  whatever  A  does,  so  that  A  cannot  be 
said  to  have  killed  him,  but  only  to  have  saved  B. 
The  effect  of  the  plea. 
It  is  possible  to  regard  necessity  as  a  justification, 
an  excuse,  or  a  mitigating  factor.  The  words 
'justification'  and  'excuse'  are  often  used  loosely 
and  interchangeably,  but  I  propose  to  use  then  to 450 
distinguish  between  factors  ý,, vhich  deprive  an  act  of 
its  criminal  nature,  and  factors  which  merely  render 
it  unpunishable.  A  killing  which  is  carried  out 
under  a  valid  judicial  order  is  justified,  it  is  not 
crime;  a  killing  committed  by  a  lunatic  or  by  someone 
under  the  age  of  criminal  responsibility  is  a  crime, 
but  it  is  not  punishable,  it  is  like  an  'unenforceable 
crime'  (cf.  supra  Y7  ).  The  important  difference  is 
this  -  it  is  lawful  to  defend  oneself  or  one's  property 
against  an  excusable  act,  but  not  against  a  justifiable 
one.  It  is  justifiable  self-defence  to  kill  a  luntic 
in  order  to  save  one's  life  from  his  attack,  but  it  is 
murder  to  kill  the  public  hangman  in  order  to  prevent 
him  from  carrying  out  a  death  sentence  (cf.  the 
distinction  in  German  law  between  Rechtf  ertigungsgrUnde 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Schuldausschliessungsgründe, 
sometimes  called  Entschuldigungsgründe,  on  the  other  - 
Schönke-Schroder,  pp.  276-7). 
Necessity  should  probably  operate  as  a  justification 
wherever  the  law  lays  down,  or  recognises,  a  clear  scale 
of  values.  The  owner  of  a  fire-extinguisher  can  hardly 
be  justified  in  preventing  someone  else  from  using  it 
to  put  out  a  fire  which  has  caught  a  woman's  dress  (cf. 
Gl.  Williams,  para.  177).  Similarly,  if  there  is  a 
rule  that  in  a  shipwreck  sailors  must  give  precedence 
to  women  and  children,  a  sailor  would  not  be  entitled 
to  resist  anyone  who  removed  him  from  a  boat  in  order 
to  make  room  for  a  `child. 
It  is  submitted  that  where  the  law  lays  down  no 
rule  of  choice,  anyone  who  kills  another  to  save  himself 
is  excusable.  If  the  law  gives  no  rules  at  all  for  a 
situation  it  can  hardly  blame  people  for  making  their 
own  rules,  and  at  the  same  time  cannot  expect  anyone 
who  is  picked  out  for  sacrifice  not  to  resist  the  attack 451  _. 
on  him.  In  the  classic  situation  of  two  men  making 
for  a  raft  only  strong  enough  to  hold  one  of  them, 
if  the  law  can  provide  no  principle  of  choice,  each 
will  be  excusable  for  attacking  the  other  and  trying 
to  keep  him  away  from  the  raft,  and  each  will  be  entitled 
to  protect  himself  against  the  other's  attempts  to  drown 
him  (cf.  Schänke-Schroder,  p.  278). 
It  may  be  said  that  such  a  difficulty  cannot  arise 
in  English  law,  since  it  provides  a  rule  for  such  a 
situation  -  the  rule  that  neither  may  attack  the  other, 
but  each  must  await  his  fate  passively,  or  sacrifice 
himself  (Dudley  and  Stephens,  (1884)  14  QJ.  B.  D.  2/4). 
But  this  raises  the  question  whether  the  law  ought  to 
lay  down  or  to  enforce  such  a  negative  rule  (Since 
suicide  is  not  a  crime  in  Scotland,  we  can  ignore  the 
further  difficulty  involved  where  suicide  is  criminal). 
The  sacrifice  demanded  by  the  rule  is  one  which  can 
hardly  be  enforced  by  threat  of  punishment  -  you  cannot 
mhke  a  man  into  a  martyr  by  threatening  him  that  if 
he  saves  himself  now  at  the  cost  of  someone.,  else  *s 
life,  he  may  be  punished  at  a  future  date.  As 
Macaulay  points  out,  'An  eminently  virtuous  man 
indeed  will  prefer  death  to  crime;  but  it  is  not  to 
our  virtue  that  the  penal  law  addresses  itself;  nor 
would  the  world  stand  in  need  of  penal  laws  if  men  were 
virtuous'  (Macaulay,  p.  455).  On  Benthamite 
principles  therefore,  punishment  should  not  be  inflited 
in  such  cases  since  it  would  be  wholly  inefficacious 
(cf.  Bentham,  XIII,  3).  The  law  should  therefore  not 
enforce  the  negative  rule,  and  so,  since  it  does  not  lay 
down  any  positive  rule,  and  probably  cannot  do  so,  it 
should  recognise  its  impotence,  and  regard  anyone  who 
takes  the  law  into  his  own  hands  as  excusable  (cf 
Schänke-Schroder,  be.  cit.  ). 452 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that,  since  justification 
is  an  objective  matter,  concerned  with  the  actus  reus, 
and  exculpability  a  subjective  matter,  concerned  with 
mens  rea,  a  person  who  acts  out  of  a  reasonable  error 
of  fact  regarding  necessity  can  be  only  excusable. 
This  can  be  seen  most  clearly  by  reference  to  a 
situation  of  self-defence.  If  A  attacks  B  under  the 
mistaken  berief  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  so  in  order 
to  avert  a  threatened  fatal  attack  by  B,  A  is  excusable, 
but  B  is  entitled  to  defend  himself  against  A,  since 
in  fact  B  was  not  about  to  attack  A,  and  A's  actions 
are  therefore  not  justifiable,  nor  is  B  under  any  duty 
to  submit  to  them. 
The  operation  of  necessity  as  a  plea  in  mitigation 
is  quite  different  from  its  operation  as  an  excuse  or 
justification.  It  is  submitted  that  necessity  may 
operate  in  mitigation  in  the  same  way  as  does 
provocation  -  by  showing  that  the  accused  lacked 
malice  and  acted  under  a  stress  which  entitles  him 
to  be  treated  sympathetically. 
Two  English  cases. 
The  case  of  the  Mignonette. 
The  classic  example  of  the  plea  of  necessity 
in  a  charge  of  murder  is  the  case  of  R.  v.  Dudley  and 
Stephens,  known  also  as  the  case  of  the  Mignonette 
((1884)  14  Q.  B.  D.  274).  D,  S,  and  an  eighteen  year 
old  cabin  boy  got  into  a  lifeboat  after  the  sinking 
of  the  Mignonette.  After  they  had  been  in  the 
boat  eighteen  days,  for  seven  of  which  they  had  been 
without  food,  and  for  five  without  water,  D  proposed 
to  S  that  one  of  the  three  should  be  killed  and  eaten 
by  the  survivors  and  that  the  victim  should  be  chosen 
by  lot.  Later,  however,  it  was  decided  to  kill  the  boy 453 
as  he  had  the  least  chance  of  survival.  This  was  done 
on  the  twentieth  day,  and  the  two  men  ate  the  boy  until. 
they  were  picked  up  on  the  twentyfourth  day.  On  their 
return  to  England  they  were  charged  with  murder.  The 
jury  brought  in  a  special  verdict  in  which  they  found 
the  abovefacts  proved,  and  that  '...  there  was  no 
appreciable  chance  of  saving  life  except  by  killing  some 
one  for  the  others  to  eat.  That  assuming  any 
necessity  to  kill  anybody,  there  was  no  greater 
necessity  for  killing  the  boy  than  any  of  the  other 
two  men'.  On  these  facts  the  Court,  in  a  judgment 
delivered  by  Lord  Coleridge,  C.  J.,  had  no  doubt 
that  the  men  were  guilty  of  murder. 
Dudley  proceeded  on  the  view  that  'the  broad 
proposition  that  a  man  may  save  his  life  by  killing, 
if  necessary,  an  innocent  and  unoffending  neighbour... 
certainly  is  not  law  at  the  present  day'  (at  p.  286). 
The  suggestion  that  one  could  save  one's  life  at  the 
expense  of  another  was  said  to  be  'at  once  dangerous, 
immoral,  and  opposed  to  all  legal  principle  and  analogy' 
(at  p.  281).  The  effect  of  Dudley  is  that  in 
situations  where  only  some  of  a  group  of  people  can 
survive,  no  one  is  allowed  to  sacrifice  anyone  else, 
and  all  must  let  matters  take  their  course. 
The  decision,  which  in  Scotland  is  at  highest 
only  of  persuasive  authority,  is  further  weakened  by 
two  considerations  which  render  it  of  doubtful  value 
as  a  precedent.  The  first  is  that  in  fact  the  accused 
were  not  hanged  but  only  imprisoned  for  six  months, 
and  that  the  Court  knew  that  they  would  not  be  hanged 
(cf.  G1.  Williams,  para.  176).  The  second  is 
that  the  Court  may  have  been  influenced  by  the  peculiarly 
revolting  facts  of  the  case  which  involved  not  merely 
murder  but  cannibalism,  although  the  latter  was  not 454 
charged  as  a  crime  nor  made  an  explicit  ground  of  judgment. 
The  decision  is  objectionable  mainly  because  it 
proceeded  on  moral  and  religious,  and  not  on  legal, 
considerations.  The  Court  appear  to  have  assumed 
that  the  law  must  enforce  the  same  high  standards 
as  are  laid  down  by  the  Christian  religion.  The  Court 
accepted  that,  'We  are  often  tompelled  to  set  up 
standards  we  cannot  reach  ourselves'  (at  p.  288).  But 
even  if  it  is  ethically  or  religiously  right  to  insist 
on  self-sacrifice  and  on  that  'moral  necessity,  not  of 
the  preservation,  but  of  the  sacrifice  of  their  lives 
for  others,  from  which  in  no  country,  least  of  all, 
it  is  to  be  hoped,  in  England,  will  men  ever  shrink' 
(at  p.  287),  it  does  not  follow  that  the  law  must 
enforce  the  same  standards  as  those  of  morality.  The 
decision  also  fails  to  take  into  account  the  unlike- 
lihood  of  anyone  being  persuaded  to  accept  such 
standards  by  means  of  the  threat  of  legal  punishment. 
To  try  to  prevent  crimes  like  that  in  Dudley  by  hanging 
is  probably  futile,  since  the  possibility  of  future 
hanging  will  not  outweigh  the  certainty  of  present 
death;  to  try  to  prevent  them  by  a  sentence  of  six 
months  imprisonment  is  merely  ludicrous. 
One  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  decision  in  Dudley 
was  the  difficulty  of  answering  the  question  'Who  is 
to  be  the  Judge  of  this  sort  of  necessity?  By  what 
measure  is  the  comparative  value  of  lives  to  be  measured? 
' 
(at  p.  28/).  It  is  feared  that  to  allow  one  man  to  make 
such  a  choice  among  others  is  to  let  people  take  the 
law  into  their  own  hands,  and  to  invite  anarchy. 
But  Dudley  fails  to  face  up  to  the  difficulty  that  there 
are  situations  in  which  people  will  not  in  fact  remain 
passive,  and  await  their  fate  with  folded  hands.  By 
refusing  to  lay  down  any  rules  of  action  for  them,  it 
invites  a  situation  in  which  it  will  be  'every  man 455 
for  himself?,  and  in  which  no  one  will  be  punishable 
for  what  he  does,  or  at  any  rate  will  be  punishable 
only  to  a  slight  degree,  because,  as  was  in  fact 
recognised  by  the  way  in  which  Dudley  and  Stephens 
were  dealt  with,  his  actions  will  appear  excusable. 
But  if  there  are  rules,  then  whoever  is  in  charge  of 
the  situation  will  be  fortified  by  the  rules  and  be 
helped  by  them  to  enforce  order,  and  those  who  disobey 
the  rules  will  be  open  to  charges  of  acting  wholly  un- 
justifiably.  Of  course,  this  will  not  prevent  them 
so  acting  if  they  are  determined  to  do  so,  but  it 
will  give  those  of  them  who  wish  to  abide  by  the  law, 
a  law  by  which  to  abide  which  is  not  wholly  negative 
in  character,  but  will  allow  some  people  to  be  saved. 
In  one  American  case  an  attempt  was  made  to  lay 
down  such  a  rule.  This  was  the  case  of  U.  S.  v.  Holmes 
((1841)  26  Fed.  Cas.  360,  No..  15,383;  Hall,  p.  391ff.  ), 
which  arose  out  of  the  wreck  of  the  William  Brown. 
Some  passengers  and  all  the  crew  got  into  two  life- 
boats.  One  of  these  boats,  commanded  by  the  mate, 
was  overloaded  so  that  it  became  necessary  to  put  some 
people  overboard  to  prevent  it  sinking.  Holmes  helped 
to  put  sixteen  male  passengers  overboard  under  the 
mate's  orders.  He  was  convicted  of  manslaughter, 
the  Grand  Jury  having  refused  to  indict  him  for  murder. 
The  defence  of  necessity  which  he  pleaded  was  not 
rejected  out  of  hand;  the  Court  accepted  the 
principle  but  held  that  the  choice  of  victims  had 
been  wrongly  made.  It  was  held  that  passengers  should 
have  been  preferred  to  sailors,  and  only  as  many  seamen 
saved  as  were  required  to  sail  the  boat.  As  among  the 
passengers  it  was  held  that  the  victimes  should 
have  been  chosen  by  lot,  that  being  the  fairest  method 
and  'in  some  sort,  an  appeal  to  God'. 456 
The  preference  given  the  passengers  is  an  example 
of  the  application  of  a  recognised  rule,  referred  to 
in  Dudley  as  an  example  of  self-sacrifice,  and  described 
by  Glanville'  Williams  as  the  'etiquette  of  the  sea' 
(Gl.  Williams,  para.  176).  Its  foundation  is  probably 
the  sailor's  contractual  duty  to  look  after  his 
passengers.  But  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  rule  of  law 
that  this  duty  involves  the  further  duty  to  sacrifice 
himself  for  the  sake  of  the  passengers.  After  all, 
the  sailor  does  not  explicitly  contract  to  sacrifice 
his  life  if  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  passengers, 
and  even  if  he  did,  that  in  itself  would  not  matter, 
since  no  one  can  consent  to  be  killed  so  as  to  free 
his  killer  from  punishment.  A  captain  who  forcibly 
removed  an  unwilling  sailor  from  a  boat  to  make  room 
for  a  passenger  would  not  be  guilty  of  homicide  if 
the  sailor  was  drowned  as  a  result,  but  this  would 
be  so,  not  because  of  the  sailor's  implied  consent  to 
be  drowned,  but  because  of  a  rule  of  law  governing  the 
choice  of  victim  in  situations  of  shipwreck.  That 
there  is  an  'etiquette  of  the  sea'  shows  that  it  is 
possible  to  construct  rules  for  choice  of  victim 
despite  the  moral  and  religious  difficulties  involved; 
and  shows  also,  that  where  a  situation  occurs  often 
enough,  rules  will  be  created.  One  reason  the  law 
manages  to  do  without  rules  for  situations  like  that 
in  Dudley  is  that  such  cases  rarely  occur.  Were  they 
frequent  the  law  might  well  find  that  its  negative 
attitude  was  unworkable  and  produced  undesirable 
results,  and  would  set  about  trying  to  lay  down  and 
enforce  rules. 
The  case  of  U.  S.  v.  Holmes  (supra)  was  summarily 
dismissed  in  Dudley  as  unsatisfactory,  mainly  because 
of  the  suggestion  of  a  lottery.  It  may  seem  wrong, 
or  frivolous,  to  decide  such  a  matter  by  lot  - 45'% 
it  might,  for  example,  be  better  to  apply  the  convention 
of  women  and  children  first,  or  to  give  the  young 
preference  over  the  aged,  and  so  on.  But  in  the 
absence  of  any  other  principle  of  choice  a  lottery 
does  prevent  an  unseemly  scramble  for  survival  which 
can  lead  only  to  the  survival  of  the  physically 
strongest,  and  it  is  an  admission  that  the  situation 
has  got  beyond  the  power  of  human  judgment;  it  is  as 
much  a  committal  of  the  matter  into  the  hands  of  a 
higher  power  as  is  the  fatalistic  inactivity  required 
by  Dudley,  and  has  the  advantage  of  making  possible  the 
survival  of  some  of  the  persons  involved.  It  has  the 
further  advantage  that  it  would  often  be  difficult  to 
reach  agreement  on  any  alternative  mode  of  selection, 
while  in  the  absence  of  agreement,  drawing  lots,  or 
spinning  coins,  or  picking  cards,  or  any  other  such 
method,  seems  an  obvious,  if  a  last,  resort.  The 
most  important  thing  about  Holmes  however,  is  that 
it  recognises  that  there  should  be  some  rules,  and 
that  it  is  the  function  of  the  law  to  decide  what  they 
should  be.  Until  that  much  is  recognised,  and  it  is 
not  recognised  in  Dudley,  we  cannot  go  on  to  decide 
what  the  rules  ought  to  be. 
The  case  of  R.  v.  Bourne. 
The  case  of  R.  v.  Bourne  ([1939  ]1K.  B.  687)  may 
be  regarded  as  authority  for  the  view  that  lesser 
crimes  are  justified  by  the  necessity  of  preserving 
life.  Bourne  itself  deals  with  the  rather  special 
case  of  therapeutic  abortion,  but  it  would  seem  that 
a  fortiori  lesser  crimes,  such  as  theft,  would  be 
similarly  justified.  It  must  be  pointed  out,  however, 
that  Bourne  was  only  a  trial  at  first  instance  before 
a  single  Judge  and  a  jury,  and  that  the  circumstances 
of  the  case  were  particularly  favourable  to  an  acquittal. 458 
The  abortion  -aas  carried  out  by  an  eminent  surgeon 
on  a  girl  who  had  been  the  victim  of  a  series  of  rapes; 
and  before  carrying  out  the  abortion  the  accused  had 
given  the  police  notice  of  his  intention  to  do  so. 
In  his  charge  to  the  jury  Llacnaghten,  J.  applied 
to  abortion  the  provision  of  the  English  Infant  I,  ife 
(Preservation)  act,  192)  (1)  y  20,  Geo.  V,  c.  34),  section 
1(1),  that  the  destruction  of  a  child  during  birth  was 
not  crimiljal  if  done  'in  good  faith  for  the  purpose  of 
preservir1t  the  life  of  the  mother'.  Just  what 
'preserving  the  life  of  the  mother'  means  is  not 
clear,  so  Uhal;  the  precise  scope  of  the  rule  that 
therapeutic  abortion  is  not,  criminal  is  undefined 
(cf.  Glanville  Milliams,  The  Sanctity  of  Life  and  the 
Criminal  Law,  on.  153  ff.  ).  biacnaghten,  J.  said 
that  it  covered  more  than  the  prevention  of  imminent 
death,  and  that  the  doctor  need  not  wait  till  the 
L  ,  Other  was  on  the  point  of  death  befoi.  e  terminating 
the  pregnancy  ([1)3  ý1K.  3.681,693)  .  He  also  pointed 
out  that  it  was  difficult  to  distinguish  the  preservation 
of  life  from  that  of  health,  since  life  depends  on 
health  lib.  at  p.  692).  The  defence  do  not  appear  to 
have  claimed  mote  than  that  the  continuation  of  the 
pregnancy  would  have  made  the  girl  a  physical  wreck. 
(ILIacnaghten,  J.  also  pointed  out,  at  p.  693,  that 
a  doctor  who  refused  to  save  his  patient's  life  because 
of  religious  or  other  objections  to  abortion  might  be 
guilty  of  manslaughter.  This  may  be  so,  but  Bourne 
can  probably  be  applied  in  situations  where  failure 
to  abort  would  not  be  manslaughter.  Indeed,  the 
facts  in  Bourne  could  hardly  have  involved  such 
a  charge.  Dr.  Bourne  appears  to  have  performed  the 
operation  as  a  volunteer,  and  not  because  ne  was  the 
girl's  doctor.  A  surgeon  who  undertakes  to  attend 459 
a  pregnancy  may  be  obliged  to  destroy  the  foetus 
to  save  the  mother,  but  no  surgeon-is  bound  to  offer 
to  perform  an  abortion  some  time  before  the  due  date 
of  birth.  ) 
Even  if  Bourne  is  restricted  to  the  preservation 
of  the  mother  from  almost  certain  death,  it  offers  an 
example  of  the  law  laying  down  a  rule  regarding  the 
choice  of  values  in  circumstances  of  necessity  -  the 
life  of  the  mother  is  preferred  to  that  of  the  unborn 
child.  Bourne  is  not  authority  for  the  view,  e.  g. 
that  the  life  of  a  fully  born  child  should  be 
sacrificed  if  that  is  necessary  to  save  the  life  of  the 
mother.  (The  approach  by  way  of  balance  of  values 
is  seen  very  clearly  in  Rabbinic  law  where  it  is 
provided  that  'If  a  woman  suffer  hard  labour  in  travail 
the  child  must  be  cut  up  in  her  womb  or  brought  out 
piecemeal,  for  her  life  takes  precedence  over  its  life; 
if  its  greater  part  has  already  come  forth  it  must  not 
be  touched;  for  the  claim  of  one  life  cannot  supersede 
that  of  another  life'  -  1ishna,  Oholoth,  7,6.  English 
law  now  postpones  the  stage  of  equality  until  birth  is 
complete,  but  the  principle  is  the  same.  )  This  is  the 
core  of  the  decision,  although  it'  is  somewhat  obscured 
by  the  surrounding  circumstances,  such  as  the  fact  that 
abortion  is  a  surgical  ibperation  and  operations  have  a 
peculiar  position  in  the  criminal  law,  and  the  fact  that 
the  choice  in  question  did  not  involve  the  life  of  the 
accused.  The  absence  of  any  suggestion  of  selfishness 
on  the  part  of  the  accused,  who,  indeed,  put'  his  professional 
future  in  jeopardy,  and  the  fact  that  he  was  acting  as  a 
doctor  probably  made  it  easier  for  Macnaghten,  J.  to 
give  the  directions  he  gave,  and  for  the  jury  to  follow 
them;  but  the  case  depends  on  the  rule  that  the  mother 
is  to  be  preferred  to  the  foetus,  and  it  would  be 460 
unfortunate  if  this  were  to  be  subordinated  to  the 
other  features  in  the  case.  If  Bourne  is  correct  then 
an  abortion  carried  out  by  an  unqualified  person  for  a 
fee  would  be  justified,  if  it  was  necessary  to  save  the 
mother's  life;  if  Bourne  is  wrong,  an  operation 
carried  out  by  a  distinguished  surgeon  without  a  fee 
would  be  criminal,  even  although  performed  to 
preserve  the  mother's  life. 
The  law  of  Scotland. 
Hume  deals  with  the  defence  of  necessity  only 
in  connection  with  the  old  plea  of  Burthensack.  He 
interprets  the  law  of  Burthensack  as  meaning  that  the 
theft  of  as  much  meat  as  a  man  can  carry  on  his  back 
is  not  capital  -  i.  e.  that  the  defence  of  want  or 
necessity  may  mitigate  the  punishment  of  theft.  Hume 
rejects  even  this  restricted.  operation  of  the  plea  of 
necessity  because  of  the  difficulty  of  calculating  'the 
due  measure  of  distress',  of  distinguishing  genuine 
cases  from  those  of  'pretended  necessity'  and  because 
such  a  rule  would  make  every  man  the  judge  of  his  own 
needs  (Hume,  i.  55). 
Hume's  reasoning  can  be  applied  a  fortiori  to  the 
situation  in  R.  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens  ((1884)  14 
Q.  B.  D.  286),  and  Professor  Smith  thinks  it  likely 
that  the  reasoning  of  Dudley  would  be  adopted  in  Scotland 
(T.  B.  Smith,  p.  714).  There.  is,  however,  room 
in  Scotland  for  the  acceptance  of  necessity  as  a  plea 
in  mitigation.  Hume  (i.  55-6)  and  Alison  (i.  6'74)  both 
propose  that  genuine  cases  of  want  should  be  dealt  with 
by  supplication  to  the  Royal  Prerogative  in  capital  cases, 
and  Alison  says  that  in  non-capital  cases  the  Judge. 
may  take  the  necessity  into  account  in  imposing  sentence 
(ib.  675).  It  is  probably  therefore  open  to  a  modern 461 
jury  to  reduce  a  murder  charge  to  one  of  culpable 
homicide  on  this  ground  in  the  same  way  as  they  can 
in  cases  of  diminished  responsibility.  -  Such  a  course 
would  be  consistent  with  the  actual  result  of  Dudley, 
if  not  with  its  reasoning.  It  is,  however,  still 
open  to  the  Scots  Courts  to  accept  necessity  as  a 
justification  or  excuse  in  appropriate  cases  of  murder 
or  other  crimes,  since  there  is  no  authority  on  the 
point.  Should  the  matter  arise  it  may  be  preferable 
to  decide  it  by  reference  to  modern  European  practice, 
rather  than  to  the  case  of  Dudley. 
The  only  Scottish  authority  in  support  of 
necessity  as  an  exculpatory  plea  is  concerned  with  the 
crime  of  abortion,  and  is  far  from  conclusive. 
Anderson  states  baldly  that  abortion  'is  criminal  if 
done  feloniously  and  not  as  a  necessary  medical  operation' 
but  cites  no  cases  (Anderson,  p.  156);  Macdonald  says 
that  in  abortion  'there  must  be  criminal  intent,  for 
it  may  be  necessary  to  cause  abortion  '  (Macdonald, 
p.  114)  and  cites  the  cases  of  Minnie  Graham  ((1897) 
2  Adam  412)  and  of  R.  v.  Bourne  (p.  9393  1  K.  B.  687  ). 
Professor  T.  B.  Smith  cites  Graham  as  showing  that 
criminal  intent  is  a  necessary  ingredient  of  abortion, 
and  says  that  this  indicates  that  'the  law  of  necessity 
is  in  Scotland  regarded  in  such  cases'  (T.  B.  Smith,  p. 
714)  -  he  adds  that  the  Scots  Courts  might  follow  Bourne 
in  rejecting  a  narrow  interpretationoof  necessity. 
The  judgment  in  Graham  does  not  even  mention 
necessity,  and  it  seems  clear  from  the  short  report 
of  the  trial  in  the  'Scotsman'  newwpaper  ('Scotsman' 
Newspaper,  14  Dec.  1897)  that  the  defence  of  necessity 
was  not  in  fact  raised  in  the  case  -  the  accused  was 
not  a  Doctor,  but  seems  to  have  been  a  typical  part- 
time  professional  abortionist.  She  was  indicted 
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of  drugs  and  an  instrument.  It  was  argued  that  the 
indictment  was  irrelevant  in  that  it  did  not  specifically 
libel  an  intention  to  cause  abortion.  This  argument 
was  rejected  because  it  was  held  that  the  words 
'wickedly  and  feloniously'  were  to  be  implied  in  terms 
of  the  Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act,  188'/  (50 
51  Vict.,  c.  35,  s.  8),  and  that  the  indictment  was 
therefore  relevant.  The  point  taken  was  a  technical 
point  of  procedure,  and  not  a  general  point  of 
principle.  The  only  reference  to  necessity  in  the 
report  of  the  case  is  a  passing  one  by  defence  counsel 
to  the  effect  that  the  abortion  might  have  been  lawful 
and  necessary  in  the  circumstances  (2  Adam  at  p.  413). 
All  that  the  case  decided  was  that  under  the  indictment 
as  it  stood,  'there  is  no  crime  at  all  in  using  drugs 
or  instruments  even  if  they  caused  abortion,  unless 
they  were  used  criminally'  (Lord  Justice-Clerk 
Macdonald  at  p.  415).  This  of  course  is  tautologous, 
and  devoid  of  any  indication  of  what  it  is  that 
makes  the  use  of  instruments  which  cause  abortion 
criminal  -  it  may  be  merely  using  them  with  intent  to 
cause  abortion.  It  is  arguable  that  the  dictum 
shows  that  the  concept  of  abortion  is  defeasible,  and 
that  if  so,  the  necessity  of  saving  life  would  be  a 
defeasing  circumstance,  since  one  would  not  normally 
describe  the  use  of  abortifacients  for  that  purpose 
as  a  criminal  use;  but  the  question  was  not  properly 
raised  in  the  case  at  all. 
Nor  does  it  follow  from  the  fact  that  abortion, 
like  most  other  crimes,  requires  a  criminal  intention, 
that  the  plea  of  necessity  can  prevent  conviction  for 
abortion.  A  person  in  Dr.  Bourne's  position  has  the 
necessary  intent  -  he  intended  to  cause  an  abortion. 
Whether  than  intent  was  criminal  or  not  depends  on 
whether  the  termination  of  the  girl's  pregnancy 463 
in  the  circumstances,  was  a  crime,  and  not  vice  versa. 
Indeed,  Dr.  Bourne  did  what  he  did  in  the  knowledge 
that  it  might  be  criminal,  and  with  the  intention  of  having 
himself  arrested  and  tried,  so  that  the  law  of  abortion 
might  be  clarified,  or  be  shown  to  be  in  need  of  alteration. 
Not  only  did  he  intend  to  do  what  he  did,  but  he 
realised  it  might  be  criminal,  and  accepted  that  in  that 
event  he  would  be  guilty  of  a  crime,  a  crime  he  intended 
to  commit.  (See  Lillian  Jyles,  A  Woman  at  Scotland 
Yard,  pp.  221ff.  for  an  account  of  the  circumstances 
of  the  case.  )  What  was  distinctive  in  Dr.  Bourne's 
mental  state  was  the  absence,  not  of  intention,  but 
of  wickedness  and  of  selfishness,  and  their  absence 
goes  only  to  mitigation,  and  not  to  exculpation. 
Although  there  are  no  cases  which  support  the 
view  that  Bourne  is  law  in  Scotland,  it  is  accepted 
as  being  such  by  Professor  Glaister  in  his  textbook 
of  medical  jurisprudence  (Glaister,  Medical  Juris-.. 
prudence  and  Toxicology,  10th  edn.  P.  358),  and  also, 
with  some  hesitation,  by  Professor  Smith  and  Dr.  Fiddes 
in  theirs  (Smith  and  Fiddes,  Forensic  Medicine,  10th 
edn.,  p.  323).  The  position  isjrobably  that  where 
the  Crown  Office  discover  a  case  of  a  genuine 
therapeutic  abortion  performed  by  reputable  surgeons, 
they  do  not  prosecute.  Had  Dr.  Bourne  carried  out 
his  operation  in  Scotland  he  would  probably  have 
failed-in  his  purpose  of  clarifying  the  law  and  giving 
guidance  to  his  profession,  because  the  authorities 
would  have  declined  to  prosecute.  " 
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II  -  COERCION 
Coercion  and  necessity. 
There  is  considerably  more  authority  on  the  defence 
of  coercion  than  on  that  of  necessity,  and  the  former 
is  much  more  favourably  regarded  by  the  law.  This  is 
perhaps  because  the  typical  situation  in  coercion  - 
where  the  accused  is  forced  to  commit  a  crime  at  the 
point  of  a  gun  -  is  similar  to  the  situation  ih  which 
the  accused  is  altogether  deprived  of  volition,  as 
where  a  knife  is  put  into  his  hand  and  forcibly 
guided  into  the  victim's  body.  The  presence  of  such, 
an  anology  makes  it  easier  for  the  law  to  accept 
coercion  than  it  is  to  accept  necessity  where  there 
is  no  such  analogy.  Another  reason  for  the  acceptance 
of  the  defence  of  coercion  is  that  coercion  is  often 
thought  of  as  involving  the  overpowering  of  the  accused's 
will  by  the  force  of  the  threats  made  against  him. 
There  is  here  again  an  analogy  with  the  case  in  which  a 
man's  will  is  completely  overpowered,  a  situation  in 
which  -  if  it  can  ever  occur  -  his  actions  would 
clearly  not  be  voluntary.  But  in  such  situations,  as 
in  that  of  the  man  who  is  physically  propelled  by  a 
stronger  force,  there  is  no  need  to  invoke  the  defence 
of  coercion,  since  there  is  no  criminal  conduct  at 
all  on  the  part  of  the  accused.  Coercion,  like 
necessity,  is  concerned  with  situations  in  which  the 
accused  chooses  to  commit  a  crime  because  he  prefers 
to  do  so  rather  than  submit  to  the  threatened  altern.  -Iva. 
Whether  or  not  the  defence  of  coercion  succeeds, 
assuming  the  threat  to  have  been  sufficiently  serious 
to  create  a  situation  of  necessity,  will  depend  on 
whether  or  not  the  law  approves  of  the  accused's  choice 465 
of  action.  It  is  this  objective  choice  which  is 
important.  To  prefer  treason  to  imminent  death  is 
justifiable,  to  prefer  it  to  the  destruction  of  one's 
property  is  not  (Alex.  M'Growther,  1'x46,18  St.  Tr.  391, 
Lee,  C.  J.  at  pp.  393-4;  cf.  R.  v.  Purdy,  (1946)  10 
J.  Cr.  L.  182)  -  and  it  would  not  make  any  difference 
if  the  particular  accused  preferred  the  preservation 
of  his  property  to  that  of  his  life,  so  that  a  threat 
to  the  former  would  be  more  likely  to  affect  his 
mind  than  a  threat  to  the  latter. 
The  same  considerations  which  make  punishment  futile 
in  certain  situations  of  necessity  apply  equally  to 
coercion.  'A  man  who  refuses  to  commit  a  bad  action, 
when  he  sees  preparations  made  for  killing  or  torturing 
him  unless  he  complies,  is  a  man  who  does  not  require 
the  fear  of  punishment  to  restrain  him.  A  man,  on 
the  other  hand,  who  is  withheld  from  committing 
crimes  solely  or  chilly  by  the  fear  of  punishment, 
will  never  be  withheld  by  that  fear  when  a  pistol  is 
held  to  his  forehead  or  a  lighted  torch  applied  to 
his  fingers  for  the  purpose  of  forcing  him  to  commit 
a  crime'  (Macaulay,  p.  455). 
The  only  fundamental  distinction  between  coercion 
and  necessity  is  that  coercion  can  operate  only  as  an 
excuse.  The  reason  for  this,  it  is  submitted,  is  as 
follows.  The  man  who  commits  a  crime  under  coercion 
does  so  az  the  agent,  albeit  the  innocent  agent,  of  the 
criminal  who  is  coercing  him.  Anyone,  therefore, 
who  defends  himself  against  him  is  defending  himself 
against  a  crime  -  the  crime  committed  by  the  coercer 
through  the  agency  of  the  coerced  person.  It  is 
unlikely  that  this  right  of  defence  against  a  crime 
can  be  taken  away  from  the  victim  merely  because  the 
criminal  operates  by  way  of  coercing  another  person 466 
into  committing  the  crime  rather  than  by  committing 
it  himself.  If  this  is  so,  then  the  defence  is  some- 
thing  special  to  the  coerced  person,  and  does  not  affect 
third  party  rights,  so  to  speak,  and  accordingly  coercion 
can  operate  only  as  an  excuse,  and  not  as  a  justification. 
This  consideration  may  also  raise  particular 
difficulties  where  A  is  threatend.  d  with  death  if  he  will 
not  kill  or  rape  another,  since  it  is  lawful  to  kill 
an  assailant  to  save  another  from  these  crimes.  As 
it  is  put  in  the  Talmud,  since  a  man  is  allowed  to 
save  a  woman  from  rape  by  killing  her  assailant,  he 
should  allow  himself  to  be  killed  rather  than  commit 
the  crime  of  rape  (Babylonian  Talmud,  Tractate  Yoma, 
82a).  This  may  be  too  wide,  however,  unless  it 
postulates  a  duty  to  save  another  from  rape.  Suppose 
A  is  in  a  situation  in  which  he  is  able  to  prevent 
B  from  raping  C,  but  can  only  do  so  by  killing  B. 
If  in  such  a  situation  it  is  his  duty  to  kill  B,  it 
follows  that  where  A  and  B  are  the  same  person,  A  has 
a  duty  to  allow  himself  to  be  killed  rather  than  rape  C. 
But  such  a  situation  would  only  arise  in  Scots  law  if 
A  had  a  prior  duty  to  preserve  C-  because  shu  was 
his  ward,  for  example  -  as  otherwise  he  would  be 
entitled,  but  not  bound,  to  intervene  on  her  behalf. 
It  seems  therefore  that  murder  or  rape  committed 
under  coercion  cannot  be  regarded  as  universally 
inexcusable  on  principle  -  provided  A  and  C  are  not 
related  by  a  duty  of  protection  on  A's  part,  A  may 
be  excused  for  preferring  his  own  life  to  that  of  C, 
and  a  fortiori  for  preferring  his  oyin  life  to  C's 
chastity. 
Allowing  for  these  specialities,  the  law  regarding 
codrcion  should  run  parallel  with  that  regarding 
necessity,  so  that  if  a  particular  choice  of  values 46'f 
is  regarded  as  proper  or  excusable  when  made  under 
necessity,  the  same  choice  should  be  regarded  as  excusable 
when  made  under  coercion. 
Public  coercion. 
Hume  deals  with  coercion  under  two  heads,  which  he 
calls  public  and  private  coercion  (Hume,  i.  51-2). 
(Hume  also  deals  with  what  he  calls  the  defence  of 
subjection  -  that  the  accused  acted  under  the  influence 
of  someone  to  whom  he  stood  in  the  relation  of  wife 
to  husband,  child  to  father,  or  servant  to  master. 
Hume  accepts  the  possibility  of  such  a  plea  being 
successful  in  the  case  of  a  child  instigated  to  a  minor 
crime  by  a  parent,  but  rejects  it  in  any  other  relation- 
ship  except  where  in  addition  to  the  relationship  there 
is  an  actual  threat  of  violence.  The  plea  thus 
becomes  an  instance  of  coercion  -  see  Hume,  i.  47-51.  ) 
Public  coercion  arises  in  situations  where  the 
accused's  actings  are  almost  involuntary  -  as  where 
he  is  forced  by  a  mob  to  join  them.  In  such  a  case 
the  accused  will  not  be  responsible  for  being  part 
of  the  mob,  or  even  for  taking  part  in  their  activities, 
while  he  was  in  their  power.  If  he  remains  with  then 
after  he  could  have  ý  made  his  escape,  his  further 
actions  will,  of  course;  be  treated  as  voluntary  and 
criminal.  In  the  case  of  Robert  Main  (11  Oct.,  1725, 
Hume,  i.  52)  the  Court  found  the  defence  'That  he  was 
forced  to  take  a  gun  by  the  disorderly  people  who  were 
running  that  way,  and  who  threatened  to  knock  him  down 
if  he  would  not  take  it,  relevant  to  exculpate  him  as 
to  his  being  in  arms,  by  having  the  said  gun  in  that 
place  where  he  was  so  forced,  but  not  relevant  as  to 
his  having  the  gun  in  any  other  place,  unless  the  force 
was  so  continued,  that  he.  could  not  with  safety  lay 
his  gun  aside,  or  withdraw  from  the  company  who  force. 
him'.  This  reasoning  is  the  same  as  that  of  Lee,  C,  J. 468 
in  M'Growther  (supra,  p.  394),  a  charge  of  joining  the 
rebel  army  in  11/45,  where  he  said  that  force  and  fear 
alleged  as  a  defence  'must  continue  all  the  time  the 
party  remains  with  the  rebels.  It  is  incumbent  on 
every  man  who  makes  force  his  defence,  to  show  an 
actual  force  and  that  he  quitted  the  service  as  soon 
as  be  could'.  (Cf.  R.  v.  Crutchley  (1831)  5  C.  P. 
133.  ) 
In  such  a  case,  as  in  the  case  of  a  man  pressed 
into  the  service  of  pirates  (cf.  Hume,  i.  52),  or  even 
complying  with  the  orders  of  a  rebel  army  when  living 
in  an  area  under  their  control,  there  is  an  element 
not  merely  of  threats  but  of  actual  physical  compulsion. 
Indeed,  the  admission  of  compulsion  as  a  defence  to 
treason  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  members  of  rebel 
armies  were  frequently  pressed  into  service,  and  it 
was  thought  unfair  to  punish  them  in  such  circumstances. 
Private  coercion. 
Hume  takes  the  view  that  such  situations  -  where  a 
man  is  coerced  into  doing  a  particular  act  by  threats 
of  one  or  more  individuals,  and  not  merely  caught  up 
in  a  mob  or  pressed  into  service  -  are  unlikely  to  occur 
in  a  society  where  law  enforcement  is  effective. 
He  gives,  however,  an  example  of  such  coercion  being 
accepted  in  defence  to  a  charge  of  robbery,  although 
the  facts  of  the  case  seem  to  lie  somewhere  between 
public  and  private  coercion.  The  case  is  that  of 
James  Graham  (1717,  Hume,  is  52-3)  who  was  forced  to 
join  Rob  Roy's  gang  and  take  part  in  a  robbery,  under 
threat  of  violence.  He  was  dragged  out  of  his  house 
by  the  gang,  and  threatened  with  a  pistol  and  other 
weapons,  threats  which  were  repeated  when  he  tried  to 
escape.  The  jury  found  'That  he  was  present  in  arms 
along  with  Roy  and  others  at  the  time  when  the  robbery 469 
was  committed,  but  that  he  was  forced  into  the  service 
in  manner  mentioned,  and  that  he  was  not  possessed 
of  arms  tomake  resistance  at  the  time',  and  he  was 
acquitted. 
Although  Hume  seems  to  accept  the  authority  of 
this  case  he  goes  on  to  state  his  own  view's  as 
follows:  - 
'But  generally,  and  with  relation  to  the 
ordinary  condition  of  a  well-regulated  society, 
where  every  man  is  under  the  shield  of  the  law, 
and  has  the  means  of  resorting  to  that  protection, 
this  is  at  least  somewhat  a  difficult  plea,  and 
can  hardly  be  serviceable  in  the  case  of 
a  trial  for  any  atrocious  crime,  unless  it  have 
the  support  of  these  qualifications:  an 
immediate  danger  of  death  or  great  bodily  harm; 
an  inability  to  resist  the  violence;  a  backward 
and  an  inferior  part  in  the  perpetration;  and  a 
disclosure  of  the  fact,  as  well  as  restitution 
of  the  spoil,  on  the  first  safe  and  convenient 
occasion'  U.  53). 
It  would  appear  from  this  that  in  Scotland  as  in  other 
countries  fear  of  imminent  death  or  serious  injury 
may  operate  as  a  defence  even  to  a  serious  crime 
(cf.  StGB  art.  52,  Gardner  and  Lan  sdown,  South 
African  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure,  'Vol.  I,  p.  84). 
But  Hume  does  not  deal  in  terms  with  the  problem  of 
balance  of  values,  and  it  is  not  clear  (a)  if  homicide 
is  excused  by  threat  even  of  instant  death  (The  Inch  an 
Penal  Code  allows  threat  of  instant  death  to  excuse 
all  crimes  except  murder  and  capital  offences  against 
the  State  -  s.  94),  or  (b)  what  threats  are  sufficient 
to  excuse  lesser  crimes.  Hume's  reference  to 
restitution  of  property  suggest  that  he  is  thinking  of 
crimes  against  property  rather  than  of  crimes  of 
violence,  and  his  requirement  that  the  coerced  person 
take  a  'backward  and  inferior  part'  in  the  crime 
suggests  that  in  his  view  coercion  would  not  operate 
as  a  defence  where,  for  example,  the  accused  was  coerced 470 
into  himself  shooting  someone,  or  opening  a  safe. 
It  is  difficult  to  draw  any  firm  conclusions  as  to  Hume's 
views  on  the  subject,  especially  as  he  seems  to  be 
thinking  in  terms  of  someone  forced  to  join  a  criminal 
gang  rather  than  of  someone  forced  to  commit  a  crime 
by  himself. 
There  is  very  little  Scots  authority  on  the  subject 
after  Hume,  although  the  defence  does  seem  to  have  been 
accepted.  Alison  says  that  'The  excuse  of  compulsion 
will  only  avail  if  the  pannel  was  in  such  a  situation 
that  he  could  not  resist  without  manifest  peril  to  his 
life  or  property'  (Alison,  i.  6'72)  ;  but  he  does  not 
elaborate  this,  and  his  examples  are  the  same  as 
those  given  in  Hume.  It  is  not  clear  on  what  he  bases 
the  view  that  a  threat  to  property  may  suffice,  and 
he  does  not  say  when  peril  to  property  is  sufficient 
and  when  there  must  be  peril  to  life.  Anderson 
says  that  'Compulsion,  vis  major,  or  necessity,  is  a 
valid  plea,  if  threats  have  been  used  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  overcome  the  resolution  of  an  ordinarily 
constituted  person  of  the  same  age  and  sex  as  the 
accused.  The  threats  must  have  had  reference  to 
present,  not  to  future  injury'  (Anderson,  p.  16). 
This  seems  eminently  reasonable  so  far  as  it  goes, 
but  again  does  not  help  in  deciding  whether  any 
particular  choice  made  under  coercion  is  a  proper 
one,  and  indeed  seems  more  applicable  to  a  plea 
in  mitigation  than  to  a  plea  in  exculpation.  Nor  is 
it  clear  where  the  line  is  to  be  drawn  between  present 
and  future  injury  (cf.  infra  ).  Macdonald  merely 
says  that  the  defence 
. 
'scarcely  ever  applies  except 
where  a  large  body  of  persons  force  individuals  to 
act  with  them  by  absolute  compulsion,  or  by  threats 
of  death  or  serious  injury'  (Macdonald,  p.  11),  which 
incidentally  confuses  cases  where  there  is  physical 
. 4'/l 
force  depriving  the  accused  of  the  ability  to  act, 
and  cases  where  he  acts  voluntarily  under  coercion. 
None  of  these  statements  helps  in  deciding  what 
particular  crimes  will  be  excused  by  what  nature  of 
threat,  and  on  that  matter  there  is  no  specific 
Scottish  authority  other  than  the  case  of  James  Graham 
(supra)  and  even  there  it  is  not  altogether  clear 
whether  the  accused's  life  was  in  danger,  or  indeed 
whether  the  decision  proceeded  on  the  view  that  escape 
was  impossible  because  of  the  superior  physical  force 
of  the  gang,  or  on  the  view  that  there  was  coercion  by 
threats,  the  verdict  speaks  both  of  threats  and  of 
'restraint  by  force'  (Hume,  i.  53).  (The  Scots  law 
of  treason,  is,  however,  the  same  as  that  of  England  - 
Treason  Act,  1708,7  Anne,  c.  21  -  and  the  English 
cases  which  held  that  fear  of  death  was  a  defence 
to  treason  would  be  followed  in  Scotland  -  M'Growther 
and  Purdy,  supra.  ) 
Some  foreign  cases. 
There  is  Irish  authority  that  fear  of  violence  is 
a  defence  to  a  charge  of  reset.  The  case  is  that 
of  A.  G.  v.  Whelan  (1193L1-]  Ir.  Rep.  518)  in  which  the 
Court  said:  - 
'It  seems  to  us  that  threats  of  immediate 
death  or  serious  personal  violence  so  great  as 
to  overbear  the  ordinary  power  of  human  resistance 
should  be  accepted  as  a  justification  for  acts 
which  would  otherwise  be  criminal.  The 
application  of  this  general  rule  must  however 
be  subject  to  certain  limitations.  The 
commission  of  murder  is  a  crime  so  heinous  that 
murder  -should  not  be  committed  even  for  the 
price  of  life  and  in  such  a  case  the  strongest 
duress  would  not  be  any  justification.  We  have 
not  to  determine  what  class  of  crime  other  than 
murder  should  be  placed  in  the  same  category... 
Where  the  excuse  of  duress  is  applicable  it  must 
further  be  clearly  shown  that  the  overpowering 
of  the  will  was  operative  at  the  time  the  crime 4'/2 
was  actually  committed,  and,  if  there  were 
reasonable  opportunity  for  the  will  to  reassert 
itself,  no  justification  can  be  found  in  ante- 
cedent  threats'  (at  p.  526). 
This  statement  is  not,  it  is  submitted,  inconsistent 
with  Scots  principle,  and  might  well  be  followed, 
although  for  the  reasons  given  above,  coercion  should 
be  regarded  as  an  excuse  rather  than  a  justification. 
The  reasoning  in  Whelan  is,  however,  a  little 
narrow  in  the  following  respects:  - 
(a)  It  excludes  murder  altogether  from  the  scope 
of  the  plea.  This  is  in  accordbnce  with  the  principle 
of  R.  v.  Dudley  and  Stephens  ((1884)  14  Q.  B.  D.  286); 
and  with  the  case  of  R.  v.  Tyler  ((1838)  8  C.  &  P.  616). 
But  if  U.  S.  v.  Holmes  ((1841)  26  Fed.  Cas.  360,  No.  15, 
383)  is  preferred  to  Dudley,  it  may  be  that  at  any  rate 
where  the  threat  is  to  kill  several  people  unless  tim 
accused  kills  one,  he  would  be  excusable  for  killing 
that  one.  Even  if  this  is  not,,  accepted  as  a  general 
principle,  it  may  be  possible  to  hold  that  a  father 
is  entitled  to  kill  a  stranger  in  order  to  preserve 
one  or  at  any  rate  more  than  one  of  his  immediate 
family.  It  is  clear  that  a  person  in  such 
a  position  would  be  able  to  advance  a  very  strong  plea 
in  mitigation,  but  it  is  submitted  that  the  possibility 
of  his  exculpation  cannot  be  ruled  out  a  priori  by 
excluding  murder  from  the  scope  of  the  plea  of  coercion. 
The  question  of  coercion  as  a  defence  to  murder 
has  been  discussed  in  a  number  of  American  cases,  and 
the  general  view  is  that  coercion  is  not  a  defence  in 
murder  cases,  although,  as  Hall  points  out,  the  Courts 
have  usually  found  that  in  any  event  the  facts  did'  not 
disclose  a  sufficiently  imminent  danger  to  constitute  a 
situation  of  coercion  (Hall,  pp,  409-11).  In  ArD  v.  State 
((1892)  917  Ala.  5,38  Am.  St.  Rep.  137),  for  example, 473 
it  was  held  that  the  accused  could  have  escaped 
from  those  who  were  coercing  him,  before  the  time  at 
which  he  had  to  commit  the  murder.  It  can  probably 
always  be  said  in  cases  of  coercion  that  the  necessity 
was  not  absolute  -  the  coercer  might  have  had  a  heart 
attack  had  the  accused  held  out  a  moment  longer,  or 
the  police  might  have  arrived  and  so  on.  Even  if  one 
accepts  that  what  matters  is  a  reasonable  belief  that 
the  necessity  is  absolute,  coercion  offers  the  Courts 
considerable  scope  for  finding  that  a  reasonable  man 
would  not  have  taken  the  same  view  as  the  accused 
of  the  imminence  or  inevitability  of  danger.  Coercion 
is  thus  more  difficult  to  establish  than  simple 
necessity,  and  it  may  be  because  of  this  that  the  law 
is,  at  any  rate  in  theory,  more  favourably  inclined 
to  coercion  than  it  is  to  necessity. 
(b)  Whelan  (supra  )  lays  too  much  stress  on  the 
overpowering  of  the  accused's  will.  The  exclusion 
of  antecedent  threats  and  the  requirement  that  'it 
must  be  clearly  shown  that  the  overpowering  of  the 
will  was  operative  at  the  time  the  crime  was  actually 
committed'  suggest  that  the  Court  intended  to  restrict 
the  defence  to  situations  where  the  accused  was  forced 
into  making  a  sudden  decision  at  the  point  of  a  gun 
(as  he  was  in  fact  in  Whelan),  in  which  his  will  was 
not  really  active  because  he  had  no  chance  to  deliberate 
and  think  things  over.  But  these  considerations  waiuld 
go  to  mitigation  and  not  to  exculpation,  and  so  would 
be  important  only  where  the  accused  made  a  wrong  choice 
of  action  under  such  stress.  It  is  important  to 
establish  that  there  was  in  fact  coercion,  but  that  does 
not  depend  on  the  state  of  the  accused's  will,  but  on 
whether  he  believed  that  unless  he  committed  the  crime 
the  threat  was  bound  to  be  carried  out.  If  there  was 
such  a  situation  of  necessity  then  the  accused  is 474 
entitled  to  acquittal  if  his  preference  of  the  crime 
to  the  threatened  harm  was  a  right  one,  whether  he 
made  his  choice  deliberately  and  on  reflection,  or 
under  the  immediate  stress  of  a  gun  in  his  back. 
These  comments  on  Whelan  are  illustrated  by  the 
case  of  R.  v.  Steane([194'1]  1  K.  B.  99,  /).  Steane 
and  his  family  were  in  Germany  during  the  war  and 
Steane  was  asked  to  broadcadt  for  the  Germans.  He 
was  told  that  if  he  did  not  do  so  his  wife  and 
children  would  be  taken  to  a  concentration  camp.  In 
face  of  this  threat  he  made  a  series  of  broadcasts, 
and  was  ultimately  charged  with  a  breach  of  the 
Defence  Regulations.  He  was  acquitted,  on  the 
ground  that  he  lacked  criminal  intent,  but  the  case  is 
really  one  of  coercion,  since  there  is  no  doubt  that 
he  made  the  broadcasts  intentionally,  although  his 
motive  was  the  safety  of  his  family  and  not  a  desire 
to  assist  the  enemy.  (Cf.  Gl.  Williams,  para.  13. 
There  *as  also  some  question  of  physical  violence 
to  Steane  himself,  but  the  Court  were  concerned  mainly 
with  the  threat  to  his  family.  )  Steane's  will  was 
not  'clearly  shown  to  be  overpowered'  each  time  he  made 
a  broadcast,  and  there  was  plenty  of  opportunity  for 
his  will  to  reassert  itself  between  broadcasts.  The 
proper  basis  for  his  acquittal  is  that  rjhat  he  did 
was  necessary  to  protect  his  family,  danger  to  a  man's 
family  being  equivalent  to  danger  to  himself  (cf. 
StGB  Art.  52;  Gardner  and  Landdown,  South  African 
Criminal  Law  and  Procedure,  Vol.  I,  p.  84).  Indeed, 
a  threat  to  his  family  may  be  a  better  basis  for  the 
defence  than  a  threat  to  himself  since  a  man  has  legal 
duty  to  protect  his  family,  and  only  a  right  to  defend 
himself. 
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Conclusion 
It  is  submitted  that  the  law  of  Scotland  can  be 
stated  in  something  like  the  following  terms:  - 
Coercion  is  a  defence  to  a  criminal  charge  where 
the  accused  acted  in  a  situation  created  by  a  threat 
which  he  had  reason  to  believe  and  did  believe 
would  be  carried  out,  and  which  he  could  not  reasonably 
have  expected  to  be  able  to  prevent;  provided  that 
the  law  regards  the  prevention  of  that  threatened 
harm  as  more  valuable  in  the  circumstances  than 
forbearance  from  the  crime.  Where  the  law  regards 
forbearance  from  the  crime  cnarged  as  more  important 
than  the  prevention  of  the  threatened  harm,  coercion 
may  operate  in  mitigation  of  penalty.  if  the  accused 
acted  under  the  influence  of  threats  of  such  a  nature 
that  although  he  was  still  able  to  act  voluntarily, 
he  was  so  affected  by  the  threat  as  to  be  unable  to 
act  with  deliberation. 
III  -  SUPERIOR  ORDERS. 
The  scope  and  basis  of  the  defence. 
This  defence  is  dealt  with  by  Hume  as  a  form  of 
compulsion  or  subjection,  the  subjection  of  soldiers 
to  officers,  or  of  law-enforcement  officers  to 
magistrates  (Hume,  i.  53-5).  What  is  involved  is 
not,  strictly  speaking,  coercion,  but  the  right  or 
duty  of  a  soldier  to  carry  out  his  orders  without  thereby 
incurring  liability  under  the  criminal  law.  The 
soldier  who  kills  someone  in  pursuance  of  an  order  by 
a  superior  officer  does  not  have  to  show  that  he  was 
in  fear  that  if  he  failed  to  carry  it  out  he  would 
himself  be  shot  or  undergo  some  commensurate  punishment; 
he  has  only  to  show  that  he  acted  under  a  lawful 4'/b 
order,  or  rather  that  he  believed  he  was  so  acting. 
He  does  not,  even  have  to  point  to  a  specific  order 
to  kill  the  deceased;  it  is  enough  if  he  can  show 
that  he  was  acting  according  to  normal  military 
practice  when  he  killed  the  deceased  (cf.  Hawton  and 
Parker,  (1861)  4  Irv.  58). 
Hume  considers  the  defence  in  relation  to 
magistrates  and  judges  executing  bad  laws,  such 
as  those  against  witches;  in  relation  to  soldiers 
carrying  out  orders;  and  in  relation  to  officers  of 
Court  executing  orders  or  killing  persons  who  resist 
them  in  the  execution  of  their  duty  (Hume,  i.  53-5, 
195-217).  The  only  category  of  importance  at  the 
present  day  is  that  of  the  soldier. 
The  basis  of  the  defence  is  probably  public  policy, 
and  that  would  explain  why  an  order  may  be  lawful 
according  to  the  municipal  law  of  a  particular  country, 
and  yet  be  unlawful  according  to  international  law. 
Policemen,  messengers-at-arms,  and  soldiers  act  as 
instruments  of  the  law  and  of  the  State,  and  it  would  be 
impossible  for  the  State  to  punish  them  for  so  acting. 
A  public  executioner  cannot  be  charged  with  the  murder 
of  the  condemned  man,  or  a  Sheriff-officer  with  theft 
or  embezzlement  of  goods  which  he  poinds  and  sells 
under  a  Court  order.  In  acting  as  they  do  these 
officials  are  carrying  out  the  law,  and  the  law  can 
hardly  punish  them  for  doing  so.  Nor  can  a  soldier 
be  convicted  of  murder  when  he  kills  an  enemy  soldier 
according  to  the  usages  of  war,  since  he  does  so  on 
the  command  of  the  State.  Even  if  he  acts  contrary 
to  the  usages  of  warhi.  s  own  State  can  hardly  prosecute 
him  if  it  authorised  his  action. 
This  protection  extends  beyond  specific  acts  done 
in  pursuance  of  specific  orders;  it  extends  to  anything 
done  in  the  course  of  the  accuse  dis  duty.  A  soldier 47'7 
or  policeman  must  be  allowed  a  certain  discretion  in 
carrying  out  his  duties  -  his  every  move  cannot  be 
specifically  ordered  by  a  superior  authority.  So 
long  therefore  as  he  acts  in  the  ornlinary  course  of 
his  employment  and  within  the  general  rules  laid  down 
for  his  conduct,  he  is  acting  as  an  instrument  of 
the  State,  and  is  entitled  to  protection  even  if, 
on  occasion,  he  is  over-zealous.  The  protection 
may  extend  to  acts  which  are  not  strictly  legal,  in 
the  sense  that  they  have  not  been  explicitly  or 
implicitly  authorised  by  any  lawful  order. 
It  may  also  extend  to  actings  in  pursuance  of  an 
illegal  order,  for  it  is  necessary  for  the  proper 
functioning  of  bodies  like  the  police  and  the  army 
that  they  be  disciplined  and  obedient  -  theirs  not  to 
reason  why.  They  will  therefore  be  excused  for  obey- 
ing  any  order  which  is  in  fact  illegal,  provided  at  any 
rate  that  it  is  not  blatantly  so.  It  is  bad  public 
policy  to  encourage  soldiers  to  disobey  orders  because 
they  think  them  improper.  And  looked  at  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  individual  soldier  or  policeman 
it  is  unfair  to  train  a  man  in  automatic  obedience, 
and  then  to  penalise  him  for  acting  in  the  way  the 
State  itself  has  trained  him  to  act  (cf.  Hume,  i.  54-5). 
Hume  suggests  that  someone  who  carries  out  an 
unlawful  order  is  excused  because  he  is  'entitled  to 
repose  in  confidence  of  the  skill  andattention  of  his 
superior',  and  because  'He  intended  to  do  a  lawful  act, 
and  was  justifiable  in  thinking  it  such:  The  error  in 
that  respect  is  thus,  as  to  him,  an  error  in  point  of 
fact  only;  and  it  ought  therefore  to  excuse  him,  as 
that  sort  of  error  does  in  other  cases'  (Hume,  i.  54). 
This  seems,  however,  to  be  a  very  strained  application 
of  the  law  of  mistake  -  to  believe  wrongly  that  an 
order  is  lawful  is  surely  an  error  of  law.  Nonetheless, 4'/8 
it  may  be  of  importance  to  show  that  the  soldier 
believed,  and  was  justified  in  believing,  that  the 
order  he  was  carrying  out  was  lawful.  A  soldier 
might  not  be  justified  (or  even  excusable)  in  carrying 
out  an  order  known  to  him  to  be  unlawful,  for  example, 
an  order  by  a  junior  officer  which  he  knew  to  be 
contrary  to  the  order  of  a  superior,  unless  he  acted 
under  actual  coercion.  But  the  limits  of  the 
defence  are  by  no  means  clear. 
The  cases. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  above  statement  of  the 
law  is  oorne  out  by  the  modern  cases,  and  I  turn  now 
to  consider  them. 
The  first  is  the  case  of  Hawton  and  Parker  ((1861) 
4  Irv.  58).  A  boatswain  of  the  Royal  Navy  was  sent 
out  on  a  dark  night  in  a  boat  with  an  armed  crew  of 
marines  in  order  to  intercept  a  trawler.  The  boatswain 
ordered  the  marine  to  fire  on  the  trawler.  He  fired 
blank  shots  first  and  then  fired  live  shots  intended 
to  go  wide  of  the  trawler;  in  fact  one  of  them  killed 
a  member  of  the  Trawler's  crew.  The  boatswain  and 
the  marine  were  charged  with  murder,  but  the  Crown 
only  asked  for  a  conviction  of  culpable  homicide. 
The  marine  pleaded  that  he  had  acted  under  the  boat- 
swain's  orders,  and  the  boatswain  pleaded  that  he  had 
acted  in  accordance  with  normal  naval  practice.  It 
was  argued  that  the  marine  was  absolutely  bound  to  obey 
the  ooatswain  unless  he  was  ordered  to  do  something 
obviously  grossly  criminal,  and  that  the  boatswain's 
order  was  not  obviously  criminal,  since  it  was  in 
accord  with  naval  practice.  The  Lord  Justice-General, 
Lord  M'Neill,  told  the  jury:  - 4'19 
'Subordinate  officers  or  privates  were  not 
persons  who  were  entitled  to  consider  whether 
the  rules  to  which  they  had  been  accustomed 
were  imported  into  this  duty  C  of  suppressing 
trawlers],  unless  that  were  explained  to  them 
by  their  superior  officers.  One  of  the 
prisoners  in  this  case  had  a  certain  command, 
the  other  was  in  the  position  of  a  subordinate;. 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  the  subordinate  to  obey  his 
superior  officer,  unless  the  order  given  was  so 
flagrantly  and  violently  wrong  that  no  citizen 
could  be  expected  to  obey  it...  if,  when  the 
prisoners  fired  the  shots  with  the  view  of  making 
the  fishermen  yield  to  legal  authority,  they 
were  acting  in  accordance  with  the  usage  of  the 
naval  service,  they  were  not  guilt  of  any 
violation  of  the  law'  (at  pp.  '71-2). 
His  Lordship  added  that  if  the  jury  thought  the 
accused  had  deviated  from  the  rules  of  the  service, 
or  that  'in  acting  according  to  the  rules  of  the 
ser&ice,  they  had  failed  to  use  due  caution'  (at  p.  73) 
they  should  convict.  The  question  of  negligence  arose 
because  the  shots  had  been  intended  to  go  wide  of  the 
trawler,  and  it  was  by  accident,  or  carelessness, 
that  they  had  instead  hit  a  member  of  the  trawler's 
crew.  This  aspect  of  the  case  was  to  some  extent 
subsumed  in  the  general  question  of  naval  practice. 
Presumably  if  the  accused  had  acted  recklessly  it 
might  have  been  said  that  they  were  not  acting  in 
accordance  with  practice,  but  it  seems  to  have  been 
assumed  that  if  naval  practice  authorised  firing  it 
would  be  very  difficult  to  convict  the  accused  on  the 
ground  that  only  careful  and  accurate  fining  designed 
not  to  injure  anyone  was  authorised.  It  would  have 
been  very  difficult  to  hold  otherwise.  If  a  man  is 
justified  in  doing  an  inherently  dangerous  act,  he 
can  hardly  be  convicted  because  the  act  caused  harm, 
unless  it  can  be  shown  that  he  did  the  act  in  a  manner 
more  likely  to  cause  harm  than  the  normal  approved 
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The  case  of  Macpherson  (Edinburgh  High  Court,  18 
Sep.  1940,  unrepd.  -  see  Sheppard,  1941  J.  C.  67,69) 
suggests  that  a  soldier  who  exceeds  his  orders  and  acts 
recklessly  may  be  protected  if  he  acted  honestly 
and  with  the  intention  cC'carrying  out  what  he  believed 
to  be  his  duty.  Macpherson  was  on  leave  and  drunk 
when  he  saw  a  car  during  an  air  raid  alert  which  he 
thought  was  travelling  too  quickly  and  had  its 
lights  insufficiently  dimmed.  He  called  on  it  to 
stop,  and  when  it  failed  to  do  so  he  fired  at  it, 
killing  the  occupant  who  was  the  Assistant  Chief 
Constable  of  Edinburgh.  The  case  was  treated  as 
one  of  simple  culpable  homicide  on  the  issue  of  reckless- 
ness  and  not  of  military  duty,  since  Macpherson  was  not 
in  fact  on  duty  at  the  time  of  the  shooting.  But  the 
Lord  Justice-Clerk,  Lord  Aitchison,  observed  in  his 
charge  to  the  jury  that, 
'Even  in  a  case  where  the  soldier  was  on 
leave  and  had  no  specific  duty  to  perform, 
if  you  are  able  to  say  that  the  accused  acted 
under  a  mistaken  sense  of  duty  and  that  he  had 
some  reasonable  cause  for  what  he  did,  you  would 
be  entitled  to  acquit  him'. 
These  observations  appear  to  have  been  based  on  the 
general  law  of  mistake  -a  man  who  reasonably  believes 
that  he  is  acting  under  orders  or  in  accordance  with 
proper  military  practice  is  entitled  to  be  treated  as 
if  he  were  in  fact  so  acting.  As  Lord  Aitchison  said, 
'It  won't  do  for  a  soldier  on  leave  to 
discharge  a  loaded  rifle  in  the  public  street 
and  take  human  life  and  then  seek  to  evade  the 
responsibility  for  his  act  by  saying  that  he 
thought  he  was  doing  his  duty.  You  must  ask 
yourself  whether  thereizere  any  reasonable  grounds, 
such  as  might  influence  a  man  in  his  sober  senses, 
for  the  accused  acting  as  he  did'. 
The  mistake  here  is  of  course  an  error  of  fact,  and 
distinguishable  from  the  case  of  a  soldier  acting 481 
under  an  order  he  wrongly  believes  to  be  lawful.  The 
legality  of  a  practice  of  shooting  at  cars  which  did 
not  stop  when  challenged  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
considered  in  Macpherson. 
The  question  of  homicide  committed  in  pursuance 
of  an  illegal  order  was  considered  in  the  case  of 
Sheppard  (1941  J.  C.  67).  The  accused  was  a  private 
under  the  immediate  command  of  a  lance-corporal 
withuhom  he  was  taking  a  British  prisoner  from  one  camp 
to  another.  The,  lance-corporal  left  the  accused  alone 
with  the  prisoner  for  a  short  time  in  a  railway  station, 
having  warned  him  to  stand  no  nonsense,  and  to  shoot 
if  necessary  to  prevent  the  prisoner  escaping,  as  the 
prisoner  had  previously  tried  to  escape.  The  prisoner 
tried  to  escape  and  the  accused  killed  him.  He  was 
charged  with  culpable  homicide,  and  succeeded  in  the 
defence  that  he  was  acting  in  the  course  of  his  duty. 
Lord  Robertson  told  the  jury  that  they  could  take  the 
view  that, 
'If  the  circumstances  were  such  as  to  require 
the  accused,  for  the  due  execution  of  his  duty, 
to  shoot  in  order  to  keep  this  man  in  custody, 
then  the  homicide  was  justifiable...  It  would 
be  altogether  wrong  to  judge  his  actings,  so 
placed,  too  meticulously  -  to  weight  them  in 
fine  scales.  If  that  were  to  be  done,  it  seems 
to  me  that  the  actings  of  soldiers  on  duty 
might  well  be  paralysed  by  fear  of  consequences 
with  great  prejudice  to  national  interests' 
(at  p.  71). 
The  Crown  sought  to  prove  that  the  accused  had  been 
ordered  not  to  shoot  British  prisoners,  in  that  general 
orders  of  that  nature  had  been  posted.  in  his  camp.  They 
also  produced  an  Army  Council  Instruction  of  later  date 
than  the  shooting,  to  show  that  it  was  not  army  practice 
to  shoot  British  prisoners.  If  they  had  succeeded 
in  proving  the  accused's  knowledge  of  such  an  order 482 
or  practice,  he  might  have  been  convicted,  since  it 
would  probably  have  been  unreasonable  for  him  to  prefer 
the  order  of  an  absent  lance-corporal  to  a  general 
order  from  his  headquarters,  especially  in  a  question 
of  shooting  someone.  But  had  he  been  ordered  to  shoot 
by  a  senior  officer,  he  might  still  have  been  excused 
for  doing  so,  even  if  he  had  known  that  the  order  was 
contrary  to  a  general  order.  The  matter  may  resolve 
itself  into  one  of  degree,  depending  on  the  circumstances, 
and  in  particular  on  the  rank  of  the  officer  who  gives 
the  illegal  order.  The  question  becomes  one  whether 
the  accused  could  reasonably  consider  himself  bound  to 
obey  the  order  last  given  by  an  officer  on  the  spot, 
and  whether  he  could  be  reasonably  expected  to  risk  the 
consequences  of  disobedience.  Such  a  situation 
approaches  one  of  true  coercion,  since  the  soldier 
would  be  placed  in  a  dilemma  in  which  it  would  be 
unreasonable  to  saddle  him  with  responsibility  for  his 
superior's  illegal  orders,  and  in  which  he  might  be 
said  to  have  been  'coerced'  by  his  superior  orders. 
(The  case  of  Ensign  Maxwell,  in  1807,  -  Buch.,  2d.  Part  3- 
may  be  noted  in  this  connection.  The  accused  was  an 
officer  at  a  prison  where  prisoners  of  war  were  detained. 
There  were  orders  issuing  from  the  Adjutant  General 
allowing  prisoners  to  be  killed  if  they  tried  to  escape, 
and  setting  out  certqin  other  rules  which  were  to  be 
enforced.  The  commander  of  the  prison  instituted  a 
system  whereby  force  might  be  used  by  an  officer 
on  a  report  by  a  sentinel  that  the  prisoners  were 
creating  a  disturbance  or  had  ignored  an  order  put  their 
lights  out.  The  accused  ordered  a  private  to  shoot  into 
the  prisoners'  room,  apparently  following  this  practice. 
The  private  refused  at  first  because  he  did  not  think 
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he  obeyed,  and  one  of  the  prisoners  was  killed. 
The  private  was  not  charged,  but  the  accused  officer 
was  charged  with  murder,  and,  pleaded  justification,  a 
plea  in  which  he  failed,  partly  at  least  because  of 
evidence  that  the  prisoners  had  not  been  disobeying  any 
rules.  In  the  course  of  his  charge,  Lord  Hope  said 
that  the  shooting  would  be  justifiaAe  if  the  accused 
acted  under  specific  orders,  or  if  'in  the  general 
discharge  of  his  duty,  he  was  placed  in  circumstances 
which  gave  him  discretion  and  called  upon  him  to  do 
what  he  did'  (at  p.  58).  On  the  question  of  acting 
under  orders  Lord  Hope'said,  'be  these  orders  right 
or  wrong,  he  was  bound  to  obey...  There  is  some 
restriction,  however,  even  upon  this;  because,  if  an 
officer  was  to  command  a  soldier  to  go  out  to  the 
street,  ana  to  kill  you  or  me,  he  would  not  be  bound 
to  obey.  It  must  be  a  legal  order  given  with 
reference  to  the  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed; 
and  thus  every  officer  has  a  discretion  to  disobey 
orders  against  the  known  laww  of  the  land'  (at  p.  58) 
which,  like  the  more  modern  statements  leaves  the 
matter  to  be  dealt  with  according  to  the  circumstances 
of  each  case.  ) 484 
Chapter  12:  Self-Defence. 
The  rules  governing  the  plea  of  self-defence 
belong  to  the  law  of  homicide  and  of  assault,  and  I  do 
not  propose  to  consider  them  in  detail.  My  concern 
with  these  rules  and  with  their  development  is  directed 
to  discovering,  why  the  law  accepts  the  plea  of  self- 
defence,  and  in  particular  to  considering  the 
relationship  between  self-defence  and  that  type  of 
necessity  which  is  created  by  the  operation  of  physical 
factors.  The  modern  law  of  self-defence  is  fairly 
clear,  but  its  relationship  to  the  law  as  set  out  by 
Hume  is  not,  and  since  in  the  absence  of  very  much 
case-law  on  the  subject  Hume  is  still  frequently 
cited  in  arguments  on  self-defence,  I  have  thought  it 
worthwhile  to  analyse  his  concept  of  self-defence  in 
some  detail. 
The  term  'self-defence'. 
Two  things  require  to  be  said  at  the  outset  about 
the  term  'self-defence'.  Firstly,  it  is  a  misleading 
term.  Its  literal  meaning  would  confine  it  to 
situations  in  which  a  man  acted  in  order  to  defend  his 
own  person;  but  it  is  used  to  cover  acts  in  defence 
of  persons  other  than  oneself,  and  also  acts  in  defence 
of  things  other  than'  personal  safety,  such  as  chastity 
or'  property.  Secondly,  it  is  used  both  to  describe 
a  fact  and  to  make  a  legal  judgment.  'He  acted  in 
self-defence'  may  mean  only  'He  acted  for  the  purpose 
of  defending  himself'  ;  or  it  may  mean  'He  acted  for 
the  purpose  of  defending  himself  and  was  justified  in 
doing  so,  having  regard  to  all  the  circumstances'. 
Whether  any  situation  is  one  of  self-defence  in  the 
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situation  is  one  of  self-defence  in  the  second  meaning 
involves  questions  of  law,  and  depends  on  the  rules 
regarding  self-defence  in  the  legal  system  in  the  context 
of  which  the  statement  is  made.  A  Scot  and  an  American 
might  agree  that  in  a  particular  situation  a  man  was 
acting  in  self-defence  in  the  first  sense,  and  disagree 
about  whether  he  was  justified  in  so  doing.  A  man  has 
no  absolute  right  to  act  in  self-defence;  his  only 
right  is  to  act  in  justifiable  self-defence;  and  the 
justification  of  his  act  in  law  depends  on  rules  of  law. 
Types  of  situation  in  which  a  man  may  act  in  self-defence. 
It  is  convenient  to  consider  self-defence  in  a 
number  of  different  types  of  situation,  and  it  will 
avoid  prolixity  if  these  situations  are  set  out  initially 
and  given  names  for  the  purpose  of  later  reference. 
They  are  as  follows: 
Type  A.  Self-defence  against  a  justifiable 
attack.  The  condemned  man  who  tries  to  kill  his 
executioner  is  acting  in  self-defence;  so  is  the  robber 
who  defends  himself  against  his  victim  while  the 
latter  is  acting  in  justifiable  self-defence  against  the 
robber's  initial  attack.  This  type  of  case  can  be 
dealt  with  briefly,  as  self-defence  in  such  situations 
is  clearly  unjustifiable.  Whatever  the  moral  rights 
and  wrongs  in  any  case,  a  man  cannot  be  legally  entitled 
to  interfere  to  prevent  an  executioner  carrying  out  the 
law.  And  if  the  law  allows  a  person  to  defend  himself 
against  an  assailant  it  cannot  allow  the  assailant 
to  kill  him  just  because  he  exercised  his  right  of 
self-defence  and  so  put  the  assailant's  life  in  danger. 
It  must  be  as''.  cr±minal  to  kill  someone  who  is  resisting 
the  attempt  to  kill  hin,  as  it  is  to  kill  someone  who 
offers  no  resistance.  The  fact  that  the  resistance 486 
may  endanger  the  life  of  the  attacker  is  irrelevant 
unless  the  resistance  ceased  to  be  justifiable. 
TeB.  Self-defence  against  an  unjustified  and 
unprovoked  attack.  This  is  the  situation  of  the  man  who 
defends  himself  against  an  attack  for  which  he  is  in  no 
way  responsible,  as  where  he  is  set  upon  by  robbers. 
This  is  the  situation  which  Hume  and  Alison  describe 
as  self-defence  against  a  felon  (Hume,  i.  21'1-22, 
Alison,  i.  132-6). 
Type  C.  Self-defence  against  an  unjustified 
but  provoked  attack,  i.  e.  self-defence  where  both 
parties  are  to  some  extent  to  blame  for  the  situation 
of  danger.  This  is  the  most  commonsituation  in 
practice,  and  may  be  further  divided  into  the  following 
types  of  situation:  - 
Where  the  victim  initiated  the 
situation  by  a  wrongful  act  of  a  minor  nature,  by  'some 
offence  of  word  or  deed,  real  or  conceived,  which 
has  kindled  anger  on  the  spot,  and  led  at  last,  to 
a  mortal  strife'  (Hume,  i.  222). 
Type_C(2).  Where  the  accused  initiated  the 
situation  by  a  wrongful  act,  but  the  victim  retaliated 
in  an  unjustifiable  way  and  put  the  accused's  life  in 
danger.  The  facts  in  such  situations  will  approximate 
to  one  of  the  two  following  examples:  (i)  The  accused 
slaps  the  victim's  face  and  the  latter  retaliates 
unjustifiably  by  attacking  the  accused  with  a  lethal 
weapon  and  the  accused  kills  him  in  order  to  save  his 
own  life.  (ii)  A  robber  attacks  a  shopkeeper  and  the 
latter  retaliates  in  self-defence.  The  shopkeeper, 
however,  exceeds  the  bounds  of  justifiable  resistance 
and  in  so  doing  puts  the  robber's  life  in  danger,  and 
the  robber  kills  him  in  self-defence.  A  legal  system 
may  treat  (i)  as  justifiable  and  (ii)  as  unjustifiable, 
or  treat  both  as  justifiable  or  unjustifiable,  but  it 48'l 
cannot,  it  is  submitted,  hold  that  (ii)  is  justifiable 
and  (i)  not. 
Hume's  treatment  of  self-defence. 
Type  B  cases. 
The  rules.  Hume  is  favourably  disposed  to  this 
type  of  self-defence,  and  deals  quite  fully  with  it 
(Hume,  i.  21`7-22).  He  does  not  look  on  the  man  who 
defends  himself  against  a  felon  as  doing  something  the 
law  grudgingly  permits,  but  as  exercising  his  rights 
as  a  citizen,  in  that  he  is  not  only  entitled  but  even 
encouraged  to  kill  his  assailant.  Hume  takes  as  an 
example  the  man  who  'being  on  the  highway,  and  alone, 
is  suddenly  thrust  at  with  a  sword  from  behind,  or 
has  a  pistol  fired  in  his  face,  by  one  who  springs 
out  on  him  from  the  side  of  the  way'  (Hume,  i.  218). 
Such  a  man,  being  innocent  of  all  blame,  has  no,  duty 
to  try  to  escape  from  the  assault,  but  'is  rather 
called  on,  instantly,  and  without  shrinking,  to  stand 
on  his  defence'  (ib.  ).  He  is  entitled  to  suppose 
the  worst  of  his  attacker,  and  even  'though  the  assail- 
ant  give  back  on  the  resistance,  yet  still  the  innocent 
party  is  not  for  this  obliged  immediately  to  desist... 
he  may  pursue  nevertheless,  and  use  his  weapon,  until 
he  be  completely  out  of  danger'  (ib.  ). 
The  accused  in  a  type  B  situation  need  only  show 
that  he  acted  for  the  purpose  of  defending  himself, 
without  showing  also  that  what  he  did  was  necessary 
for  that  purpose.  His  plea  will  not  be  defeated  juät 
because  he  dontinued  his  defence  after  it  was  no  longer 
necessary  to  preserve  himself  from  imminent  danger; 
nor  because  he  could  have  saved  himself  from  danger 
by  escape.  He  must  not,  of  course,  continue  his  'defence' 
once  the  assailant  is  secured,  and  he  himself  completely 488 
out  of  all  danger,  since  he  can  then  no  longer  be  said 
to  be  defending  himself  at  all,  but  is  acting  out  of 
'deliberate  cruelty  or  revenge'  (ib.  cf.  Joseph  and 
Maxwell  Allison,  (1838)  2  Sw.  16'?,  Graham,  1958  S.  L.  T. 
160).  But  so  long  as  he  is  genuinely  defending 
himself,  he  is  not  bound  to  use  only  the  minimum  force 
necessary  to  preserve  his  life  from  imminent  danger, 
but  is  entitled  to  go  some  length  to  'mak  siccart 
that  he  is  free  from  any  possible  danger. 
These  rules  are  different  from  the  rules  laid  down 
by  Hume  for  type  C  situations,  where  he  restricts  the 
right  of  self-defence  to  the  use  of  the  minimum  force 
necessary  to  save  one's  life,  and  where  'the  survivor 
must  have  given  back,  and  done  all  that  in  him  lay  to 
take  himself  out  of  the  affray'  (Hume,  i.  217;  cf. 
Macdonald,  p.  106). 
what  may  be  defended.  According  to  Hume  a  person 
may  kill  to  save  his  own  life  or  that  of  ,  others,  to 
prevent  rape,  and,  in  some  circumstances,  to  preserve 
his  property.  (Hume  does  not  specifically  mention 
the  prevention  of  sodomy,  and  it  can  be  distinguished 
from  rape  both  because  the  definition  of  the  latter 
requires  resistance  from  the  woman  before  she  can 
complain  to  the  criminal  law,  or,  presumably,  evade  the 
civil  consequences  of  adultery,  and  because  of  the 
historical  veneration  of  female  virginity.  Killing 
in  defence  of  male  chastity  seems  to  have  been  regarded 
as  justifiable  in  Roman  law  -  cf.  D.  48.8.1($)  - 
'Item,  divus  Hadrianus  rescripsit  eum,  qui  stuprum  sibi 
vel  suis  per  vim  inferentem  occidit,  dimitten  dum'. 
It  was  explicitly  declared  to  be  justifiable  in  Rabbinic 
law  -  Mishna,  Sanhedrin,  8.7.  Neither  Roman  nor  Jewish 
law  was  quoted  in  the  modern  case  of  M'Cluskey,  1959 
S.  L.  T.  (Notes)  26,  where  it  was  held  that  such 
killing  was  not  justifiable.  ) 489 
As  Hume  points  out  (Hume,  i.  220),  both  Roman 
and  Jewish  law  permit  the  killing  of  a  thief,  or  at 
any  rate  of  a  housebreaker;  but  they  both  regard  this 
as  an  application  of  the  right  to  kill  in  defence  of 
life.  A  nocturnal  thief  may  be  killed  because  one 
cannot  see  whether  or  not  he  is  armed  or  what  his  intentions 
are,  and  because  it  is  reasonable  to  fear  that  he  will 
do  violence;  a  daylight  thief  may  be  killed  only  if 
he  does  in  fact  use  violence.  (cf.  D.  48.8.9  -  'Eurem 
nocturnum  si  quis  occiderit,  ita  demum  impune  feret, 
si  parcere  ei  sine  periculo  suo  non  potuit',  and  Cicero, 
Pro  Milone,  III,  9,  where  he  says  that  a  nocturnal 
thief  can  be  killed  in  any  circumstances,  but  a  daylight 
one  only  if  he  defends  himself  with  weapons  -  cf.  Hume, 
i.  221.  Cf.  also  Rashi's  Commentary  on  Exod.  22,2. 
which  prohibits  the  killing  of  a  thief  'if  the  sun  shone 
upon  him'  -  Rashi  treats  the  phrase  as  metaphorical, 
and  as  meaning  that  it  is  illegal  to  kill  a  thief  If 
it  is  clear  that  the  latter  did  not  intend  to  kill 
the  owner  even  if  he  resisted  him,  whatever  the  time 
of  day.  )  Killing  a  nocturnal  housebreaker  is  explicitly 
recognised  as  justifiable  homicide  by  the  Scots  Act 
of  1661,  c.  217  (cited  by  Hume  as  c.  22  -  The  Act  was 
repealed  by  the  Statute  Law  Revision  (Scotland)  Act, 
1906,6  Edw.  VII,  c.  38),  and  Hume  accepts  this  as 
being  the  law.  But  he  explains  it,  in  line  with  the 
Roman  and  Jewish  attitudes,  on  the  ground  that  the  house- 
holder  is  entitled  to  assume  that  the  intruder  intends 
to  commit  murder,  rape,  hamesucken,  or  to  set  fire 
to  the  house,  all  dangers  which  go  beyond  a  mere  threat 
to  property.  Again,  Hume  considers  it  justifiable 
to  kill  a  daylight  thbf  where  there  is  reasonable 
apprehension  of  similar  danger.  The  difference  between 
the  nocturnal  and  daylight  thief  is  that  the  mere  fact 
of  daylight  stealing  does  not  make  it  reasonable  for  the 4yO 
owner  to  apprehend  such  dangers  (Hure,  i.  221).  It 
must  be  said,  however,  that  Hume  is  not  altogether 
clear  on  this  matter.  He  seems  to  be  moving  towards 
the  view  that  only  danger  to  life  can  justify  killing, 
but  he  does  not  explicitly  state  this  as  his  opinion. 
At  one  point  he  says  trat  the  householder  invaded  by 
night  cannot  be  absolutely  enjoined  by  law  not  to 
kill  the  invader,  although  'tenderness  for  the  life  of 
another  may  indeed  suggest  to  one  to  endeavour,  by 
cries  and  otherwise,  to  deter  him  from  his  purpose, 
before  proceeding  to  make  use  of  higher  means'  (ib.  220), 
and  he  thinks  that  a  man  may  have  a  right  to  kill  an 
escaping  thief  in  order  to  rescue  his  property  (ib.  222). 
In  the  case  of  Jilliam  Williamson  (7  Sep.  1801, 
Hune,  i.  220-1),  the  accused  lay  in  wait  for  a  thief 
who  had  robbed  his  bleachfield  on  earlier  occasions, 
and  killed  him  as  he  was  entering  an  outhouse.  He  was 
acquitted,  and  Hume  remarks  that  the  case  goes  further 
than  is  warranted  by  his  view  of  the  law.  Alison 
considers  it  'hardly  reconcileable  with  the  principles 
of  law'(Alison,  i.  105).  The  rule  that  there  is  no 
right  to  kill  merely  in  defence  of  property  can  be 
regarded  as  having  been  finally  settled  by  the  case  of 
Jas.  Craw  ((1327)  Syme,  188  and  210)  who  was  convicted 
of  3,  illing  a  poacher  who  died  after  having  been  caught 
in  a  spring-gun  set  by  Craw.  The  position  regarding 
housebreakers,  however,  remains  unclear  (see  infra,  500). 
Hume's  reasons 
Although  Hume's  tendency  to  restrict  the  right  of 
self-defence  to  the  defence  of  life  -  or  chastity  -  shows 
thtt  there  is  some  similarity  between  his  views  on  self- 
defence  and  the  law  of  necessity,  Hume  does  not  base 
the  right  of  self-defence  against  a  felon 
on  necessity.  He  talks,  it  is  true,  of  'the  necessary 491 
defence  of  one's  life,  against  an  attempt  feloniously 
to  take  it  away'  (Hume,  i.  217),  but,  as  we  have  seen, 
he  allows  the  person  who  is  attacked  to  exceed  what 
is  necessary  in  order  to  save  himself  from  imminent 
peril.  The  right  of  self-defence  is  thought  of  as 
an  independent  right,  grounded  in  the  law  of  nature 
(Hume,  i.  218).  This  right  exists  where  the  assail- 
ant  'is  no  true  man,  to  be  contended  with  on  equal 
terms,  but  a  foul  criminal,  found  in  the  commission 
of  a  high  felony,  and  the  fit  object,  therefore,  of 
extreme  and  summary  justice'  (ib.  218). 
This  combines  two  ideas.  The  first  is  that  the 
felon,  by  his  actings,  has  broken  the  law,  and  so  has 
forfeited  his  right  to  be  protected  by  it.  More  crudely, 
he  set  out  to  attack  somebody,  and  so  laid  himself 
open  to  counter-attack.  The  second  idea  is  that  the 
citizen  who  kills  a  felon  in  self-defence  is 
acting  as  an  officer  of  the  law;  he  is  not  just 
defending  himself,  he  is  administering  'extreme  and 
summary  justice'.  (ib.  )  (It  should  of  course  be  remembered 
that  when  Hume  wrote  rape  and  theft  were  capital  offences.  ) 
This  accounts  for  Hume's  apparent  enthusiasm  for  the 
defence.  The  law  has  scant  sympathy  for  the  felon 
and  sheds  no  tears  over  his  death.  Even  if  the  felon 
was  not  committing  a  capital  offence,  there  is  still 
the  feeling  that  society  is  well-rid  of  the  miscreant, 
and  that  it  would  be  churlish  and  hypocritical  to  be  too 
severe  on  the  accused.  (Cf.  Donnedieu  de  Vabres,  p. 
230,  where  he  points  out  that  a  person  who  acts  in 
self-defence,  'a  rendu  service  a  la  societe'.  ) 
Hume  also  speaks  of  the  indignation  and  resentment 
a  woman  is  entitled  to  feel  at  an  attempt  to  rape  her, 
and  suggests  that  the  right  of  third  parties  to  kill 
the  intending  ravisher  rests  on  their  right  to  partake 
of  this  resentment  (Hume,  i.  218).  But  if  this  is 492 
the  basis  of  the  right,  whether  or  not  the  killing  was 
justifiable  would  depend  on  whether  in  fact  the  accused 
acted  under  the  influence  of  resentment,  and  the  plea 
of  self-defence  would  in  effect  become  a  plea  of 
provocation.  Nor  would  it  be  possible  to  distinguish 
between  a  resentment  which  operated  to  prevent  rape, 
and  one  which  operated  to  kill  the  ravisher  after  the 
rape  had  been  completed.  If  a  man  is  entitled  to 
defend  himself  or  a  third  party  he  is  entitled  to  do  so 
whether  in  indignation  or  cold  blood,  and  coversely, 
if  he  is  not  entitled  to  do  so,  he  does  not  become 
entitled  because  he  feels  indignant.  What  is  important 
is  not  the  indignation,  but  whether  the  accused  was 
entitled  to  feel  indignant;  for  if  he  was  not,  the 
indignation  can  only  mitigate  his  punishment,  it 
cannot  exculpate  him. 
Type  C  cases. 
Hume's  treatment  of  type  C  situations,  and  in 
particular  of  type  C(1)  situations  blurs  the  distinction 
between  types  B  and  C(1),  although  he  makes  the 
distinction  explicitly  both  at  the  outset  of  his  whole 
treatment  of  self-defence  (Hume,  i.  217),  and  at  the 
outset  of  his  treatment  of  type  C  cases  (ib.  222).  He 
describes  type  C  situations  as  'self-defence  on  a  sudden 
quarrel'  (ib),  but  adds  that  'wherever  it  appears  that 
either  in  the  origin  or  progress  of  the  quarrel, 
or  in  the  ultimate  strife,  there  was  any  thing  faulty 
or  excessive  on  the  part  of  the  survivor;  here  for 
the  sake  of  correction  and  example,  the  judge  inflicts 
a  suitable  punishment,  though  it  be  true  that  he  did 
not  kill  out  of  wickedness  or  malice,  but  only  to  save 
his  own  life,  and  really  believing  that  he  could  not 
otherwise  escape'  (ib.  223).  (Hume  seems  to  regard 
type  C  self-defence  more  in  the  nature  of  an  excuse  than 493 
a  justification  -  for  example,  he  does  not  allow  that 
third  parties  have  a  right  to  kill  to  prevent  the  death 
of  one  of  the  parties  to  a  quarrel  -  Hume,  i.  218.  ) 
This  means  that  a  plea  of  self-defence  cannot 
succeed  in  type  C(2)  situations,  and  also  makes  it 
impossible  to  justify  the  application  of  different 
rules  to  type  C(1)  from  those  applied  to  type  B. 
If  the  accused  must  have  remained  blameless  throughout, 
the  only  difference  between  type  B  and  type  C(l) 
is  that  in  the  former  the  deceased's  first  assault 
was  in  itself  su-Cficiently  villent  to  endanger  the 
accused's  life,  while  in  the  latter  there  was  no 
danger  to  life  at  the  outset  and  so  no  immediate  need 
to  kill  in  self-defence.  But  if  'the  accused's 
conduct  remains  exemplary  throughout,  once  the 
situation  reaches  the  stage  of  danger  to  his  life,  it 
will  be  indistinguishable  from  a  type  B  situation. 
It  may  be  said  that  in  type  C(l)  the  accused  has  a 
chance  to  escape  at  an  early  stage  before  the  danger 
to  his  life  develops,  but  in  that  event  the  distinction 
between  the  two  types  is  not  one  of  kind  based  on  the 
felonious  nature  of  the  attack  in  type  B,  but  simply 
one  of  fact,  depending  on  the  degree  of  actual  necessity, 
so  that  both  types  of  self-defence  require  to  be 
justified  by  necessity.  Moreover,  the  requirement 
of  exemplary  conduct  on  the  part  of  an  accused  in  a 
type  C(l)  situation  means  that  if  he  does  not  retreat 
when  he  can,  he  is  not  entitled  to  succeed  in  his  plea 
of  self-defence  at  all,  so  that  if  he  is  entitled  to 
succeed,  the  situation  must  have  been  indistinguishable 
from  that  in  type  B  cases. 
If  these  two  types  are  indistinguishable,  which 
rules  are  to  apply  -  the  rules  of  strict  necessity 
said  to  apply  to  self-defence  in  a  quarrel,  or  the  less 
strict  rules  said  to  apply  to  self-defence  against  a 494 
felon?  It  appears  from  the  examples  given  by  Hume  of 
type  C(1)  situations  that  the  strict  rules  are  to  be 
applied.  It  seems  as  if  in  talking  of  type  B  situations 
Hume  was  carried  away  by  his  sympathy  for  the  innocent 
man  who,  when  attacked  by  felons,  stands  up  and  defends 
himself,  out  that  when  he  came  to  actual  cases  bind 
examples,  he  fell  back  on  the  principle  of  necessity. 
He  gives  the  following  example  when  discussing  the  rule 
that  a  man  may  not  kill  in  self-defence  unless  escape  is 
impossiole  -  one  of  the  requirements  of  necessity  -  'One, 
for  instance,  is  assaulted  at  mid-day,  on  the  street, 
where  he  may  easily  retire,  and  find  shelter  among  the 
bystanders;  but  instead  of  doing  so,  he  deliberately 
waits  to  receive  the  onset,  and  will  not  give  back' 
(Hume,  i.  226),  and  says  that  such  a  man  is  not  acting 
in  justifiable  self-defence.  It  seems,  therefore, 
that  the  man  surprised  on  the  highway  by  night  is 
entitled  to  stand  on  his  defence,  not  because  of  any  natural 
right  to  kill  a  foul  criminal,  but  simply  because  he 
has  no.  reasonable  chance  of  escaping. 
Hume's  insistence  on  the  complete  innocence  of  the 
accused  means,  of  course,  that  he  does  not  recognise  any 
right  of  defence  in  type  C(2)  situations,  and  means  in 
effect  that  he  does  not  allow  self-defence  in  a  quarrel, 
despite  the  fact  that  that  is  how  he  describes  his  type 
C(1)  cases.  Hume  takes  his  rejection  of  type  C(2)  so 
far  that  he  holds  that  a  man  who  tweaks  the  nose  of  another 
is  not  entitled  to  defend  himself  if  that  other  retaliates 
by  running  at  him  with  a  drawn  sword  (Hume,  i.  233).  (In 
the  case  of  Lieutenant  Robertson  -  January,  1758, 
Laclaurin's  Cases,  No.  r68  -  R.  twitched  a  fellow-officer 
on  the  nose  after  having  suffered  a  prolonged  course  of 
verbal  provocation  from  him.  The  latter  picked  up  a 
poker,  and  then  ran  at  R.  with  a  sword,  and  R.  killed  him. 
R.  was  acquitted  on  a  combined  defence  of  accident, 
absence  of  mallice,  and  self-defence.  Hume  concedes 4y5 
that  on  the  whole  there  was  not  much  injustice  done, 
but  takes  the  view  that  this  was  not  a  case  of  justifiable 
self-defence,  because  R.  started  the  fight  -  Hume,  1.23,1) 
A  Humean  theory. 
From  the  above  critique  of  Hume's  treatment  of  self- 
defence  there  emerges  a  simple  and  consistent  theory.  A 
man  is  entitled  to  kill  an  assailant  in  order  to  save 
life  or  chastity,  when  he  reasonably  apprehends  that 
these  are  in  danger,  and  where  there  is  no  other  way  of 
averting  the  danger.  The  plea  becomes  one  of  necessity, 
and  the  only  problem,  and  it  is  not  discussed  by  Hume,  is 
how  a  legal  system  which  refuses  to  allow  the  plea  of 
necessity  in  circumstances  of  physical  necessity  can  allow 
it  in  circumstances  of  self-defence.  The  answer  lies  in 
Hume's  insistence  on  the  innocence  of  the  accused,  and, 
conversely,  on  the  guilt  of  the  victim.  As  Hall  says,  'In 
self-defence,  the  defender  injures  the  creator  and  embodi- 
ment  of  the  evil  situation;  in  necessity,  he  harms  a 
person  who  was  in  no  way  responsible  for  the  imminent 
danger,  one  who,  indeed,  might  himself  have  been  imperilled 
by  it'  (Hall,  p.  401).  As  we  have  seen,  one  of  the  principal 
difficulties  in  the  case  of  physical  necessity  is  that 
of  determining  which  of  a  number  of  innocent  lives  is 
to  be  sacrificed.  In  self-defence  this  problem  does 
not  arise  since  one  of  the  persons  involved  is  to  blame 
for  the  situation.  The  point  is  not  that  anyone  who 
commits  a  crime  forfeits  his  right  to  the  protection  of 
the  law  but  that,  once  the  stage  of  necessity  has  been 
reached,  and  only  then,  the  law  is  able  to  resolve  the 
impasse  by  reference  to  the  legal  guilt  or  innocence 
of  the  parties  involved. 
The  law  since  Hume. 
Ty-00  B  cases. 
Hume  himself  recognised  the  absence  of  authority 
for  his  distinction  between  types  B  and  C(l),  and 
said  of  his  treatment  of  type  B,  'These  observations 496 
I  only  offer  as  my  own  sentiments,  which  are  not  indeed 
contradicted  by  any  thing  on  record,  but  do  not  rest 
oft  any  judgment  of  our  Supreme  Court'  (Hume,  i.  218). 
He  notes  also  that  lawyers  in  Scotland  and  abroad 
deal  mostly  with  type  C  situations  (ib.  ).  He  does, 
however,  refer  in  a  note  to  the  case  of  John  Symons 
(30  Aug.  1810,  Hume,  i.  228,  Burnett,  p.  44). 
Symons  was  attacked  in  the  street  by  the  deceased 
who  struck  him  with  his  fists  and  feet.  Symons  drew 
his  sword  and  the  deceased  ran  off,  but  Symons 
pursued  and  killed  him.  Hume  explains  Symons' 
acquittal  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  type  B  case. 
The  case  is  not,  however,  clear  authority  for  this  view. 
Symons  pleaded  self-defence,  provocation,  the  right 
to  pursue  and  apprehend  the  deceased,  and  that  he  acted 
under  such  great  perturbation  of  mind  as  to  be  insensible 
of  what  he  was  doing;  and  his  acquittal  proceeded 
on  both  the  first  and  last  of  these  pleas  (Burnett,  p.  45). 
Burnett  (at  pp.  39ff.  )  and  Alison  (Alison,  i.  133ff.  ) 
both  retain  Hume's  distinction  between  types  B  and  C, 
but  offer  no  examples  of  the  former  other  than  Symons, 
of  which  they  both  disapprove.  Burnett  says  in  terms 
at  one  point  that  the  rules  of  necessity  apply  to  all 
cases  of  self-defence  (at  p.  42),  and  Alison  stresses 
the  difficulty  of  succeeding  in  a  plea  of  self-defence 
in  any  situation  at  all  (Alison,  i.  100). 
In  the  case  of  James  Forrest  ((1837)  1  Sw.  404), 
the  accused  was  a  foreman  in  charge  of  some  buildings 
which  housed  women  servants.  He  killed  one  of  a  group 
of  intruders  who  were  trying  to  break  into  the  women's 
quarters,  and  pleaded  both  self-defence  and  accident. 
This  was  a  type  B  situation,  but  Lord  Moncrieff  directed 
the  jury  in  general  terms  applicable  to  any  form  of 
self-defence,  telling  them  that  'if  you  think  he  fired 49'r 
intentionally,  you  will  then  consider  whether  he  had 
reason  to  fear  immediate  danger  to  his  own  life,  or 
to  the  safety  of  those  in  his  house'  (at  p.  418). 
In  the  case  of  Robert  Li'Annaly  ((1836)  1  Sw.  210) 
the  accused  killed  his  father,  and  the  jury  were 
directed  that  in  order  to  succeed  in  his  plea  of  self- 
defence  he  must  show  that  what  he  did  was  absolutely 
necessary,  and  that  escape  was  impossible,  although 
there  was  no  suggestion  that  the  accused  was  to  blame 
for  the  initial  situation  which  arose  out  of  an  attack 
by  the  father  on  the  accused's  mother. 
Macdonald  disregards  type  B  cases  entirely,  and 
sets  out  the  type  C  rules  as  applicable  to  all  cases.  of 
self-defence  (Macdonald,  106),  and  this  almost  certainly 
is  the  modern  law. 
Type  C  cases. 
It  is  impossible  to  trace  the  development  of  the 
law  on  this  matter  in  view  of  the  almost  complete 
absence  of  reported  cases  prior  to  1938.  (In  1826 
However  it  was  regarded  as  settled  law  in  the  case  of 
David  Landale  ((1826)  Shaw,  163)  that  the  reluctant 
partner  in  a  duel  might  succeed  in  a  plea  of  self- 
defence,  despite  Hume's  outright  refusal  to 
countenance  the  plea  in  cases  of  duelling  -  Hume,  i.  230-2.  ) 
In  the  case  of  Kizileviczius  (1938  J.  C.  60)  the 
accused  punched  his  father,  and  when  the  latter  made 
to  pick  up  a  poker,  he  hit  him  several  times,  instead 
of  trying  to  take  the  poker  from  him.  Some  time 
later,  the  father  approached  the  accused  with  a  flat- 
iron  in  his  hand,  and  the  accused  took  the  iron  from 
him,  and  beat  him  to  death  with  it.  At  best  this  was 
a  type  C(2)(i)  case  (in  fact  the  accused  was  convicted 
of  culpable  homicide),  but  Lord  Jamieson  directed  the 
jury  that  if  they  thought  the  accused  had  acted  in 
necessary  self-defence  they  could  acquit  him  (at  p.  62). 498 
There  was  no  suggestion  that  the  accused  was  not  entitle3d 
to  plead  self-defence  at  all  because  of  his  part  in  the 
events  leading  up  to  the  death. 
In  Robertson  and  Donoghue  (Edinburgh  High  Court, 
28-30  Aug.  1945,  on  appeal,  17  Oct.  1945,  unrepd.  ) 
a  plea  of  self-defence  was  advanced  by  two  men  who 
had  broken  into  a  cafe  and  killed  the  proprietor. 
They  failed  in  their  plea,  but  on  appeal  Lord  Normand, 
the  Lord  Justice-General,  said  '...  although  an  accused 
person  may  commit  the  first  assault  and  may  be,  in 
general,  the  assailant,  he  is  not  thereby  necessarily 
excluded  from  a  plea  of  self-defence.  If  the  victim 
in  protecting  himself  or  his  property,  uses  violence 
altogether  disproportionate  to  the  need,  and  employs 
savage  excess,  then  the  assailant  is  in  his  turn 
entitled  to  defend  himself  against  the  assault  by  his 
victim...  the  victim  of  an  assault  who  in  resisting  the 
assailant  begins  to  overpower  him  does  not  become 
merely  by  the  success  of  his  resistance  an  assailant 
in  his  turn'.  Lord  Moncrieff  said  that  'Such 
an  intruder  has  only  a  duty  withdraw  and  can  rarely 
have  occasion  for  self-defence'.  But  whatever  the 
qualifications  -  and  auaere  if  'savage'  excess  is 
a  higher  standard  than  the  'cruel'  excess  standard 
applied  in  other  cases  of  self-defence,  in  which  there 
is  also  a  duty  to  withdraw  (Doherty  19511  J.  C.  1),  - 
the  case  is  authority  for  the  view  that  a  plea  of  self- 
defence  may  succeed  in  type  C(2)(ii)  situation. 
Macdonald's  repetition  of  Hume's  requirement  that  the 
accused  should  not  have  started  the  trouble  (Macdonald, 
p.  106)  cannot  stand-with  either  Kizileviczius  or 
Robertson. 
The  modern  law,  then,  is  not  concerned  with  the 
origin  of  the  situation.  If  the  accused  was  in  danger 499 
of  his  life  by  reason  of  an  unjustified  assault  -  however 
much  provoked  -  at  the  time  of  the  fatal  blow  and  could 
save  himself  only  by  killing  the  'assailant',  he  is 
entitled  to  succeed  in  his  plea  of  self-defence.  All 
that  is  left  of  the  distinction  between  type  B  and  type 
C  cases,  or  of  that  between  type  C(1)  and  type  C(2) 
is  that  a  jury  will  no  doubt  regard  the  accused  most 
favourably  if  the  case  is  one  of  type  B,  and  least 
favourably  if  it  is  of  type  C(2).  This  development 
means  that  the  sole  basis  of  the  right  of  self- 
defence  is  necessity,  and  it  becomes  very  difficult 
to  justify  any  distinction  between  the  treatment 
of  physical  necessity  and  self-defence.  It  is  only 
by  viewing  the  last  moments  of  the  situation  in 
isolation  that  the  deceased  in  type  C(2)(ii)  situations 
can  be  said  to  have  created  the  necessity  by  his  own 
wrong:  on  a  commonsense  overall  view  it  is  the  accused 
who  was  responsible  for  the  situation.  But  the  Scots 
Courts  have  not  considered  the  relation  between 
self-defence  and  necessity. 
What  seems  to  have  happened  is  that  so  much 
stress  has  been  laid  on  the  requirement  of  necessity, 
that  the  requirement  of  innocence  has  been  forgotten. 
Perhaps  also,  the  stress  on  necessity  has  made  the  rules 
regarding  self-defence  so  stringent  that  it  seems  reason- 
able  to  allow  the  defence  to  succeed  wherever  an  accused 
comes  within  them,  whatever  the  surrounding  circumstances. 
In  practice  the  modern  law  seems  to  work  well.  Type 
C(2)(ii)  situations  are  very  rare.  The  refusal  . 
to  distinguish  between  types  C(1)  and  C(2)  avoids  having 
to  assess  responsibility  in  situations  where  the  facts 
are  usually  confused,  and  where  usually  both  parties 
are  to  some  extent  to  blame,  whoever  sparked  off  the 
final  situation.  A  complete  rejection  of  type  C(2) 500 
cases  is  so  harsh  as  to  be  unworkable:  one  cannot 
prevent  a  man  succeeding  in  a  plea  of  self-defence 
if  the  jury  feel  sufficiently  sympathetic  towards 
him,  as  they  may  well  do  in  many  type  C(2)(i)  cases. 
What  may  be  defended. 
The  tendency  to  concentrate  on  necessity,  and 
to  refer  to  the  passages  in  Hume  which  deal  with 
self-defence  in  a  quarrel,  encourages  the  view  that 
homicide  is  justifiable  only  in  defence  of  life. 
The  present  position  is  not  altogether  clear,  but 
it  is  probably  the  law  that  homicide  is  justifiable 
only  to  save  life  or  to  prevent  rape.  It  is  true 
that  in  Crawford  (1)50  J.  C.  67)  Lord  Keith  included 
resistance  to  a  housebreaker  as  one  of  the  classic 
instances  of  self-defence  (at  p.  71),  but  it  is  extremely 
unlikely  that  homicide  in  defence  of  property  would  be 
considered  justifiable  in  modern  times,  and  Macdonald 
is  correct,  it  is  submitted,  in  saying  that  'it  is 
personal  danger,  and  not  patrimonial  loss,  which 
justifies  homicide'  (Macdonald,  p.  107). 
This  view,  it  is  submitted,  is  supported  by  the 
most  recent  case  on  the  subject,  that  of  M'Cluskey 
(Court  of  Criminal  Appeal,  24  Feb.  1959,  as  yet  unread. 
except  in  1959  S.  L.  T.  (Notes)  26).  The  accused  was 
charged  with  murder  and  pleaded  self-defence.  He 
said  that  he  had  assaulted  the  deceased  while 
resisting  an  attempt  by  the  latter  to  commit  sodomy 
with  him.  The  trial  Judge  refused  to  direct  the  jury 
that  if  they  accepted  the  accused's  story  they  could 
acquit  him  on  the  ground  of  self-defence,  and  the  accused, 
who  was  convicted  of  culpable  homicide,  appealed  against 
this  refusal.  The  Appeal  Court  did  not  deal  squarely 
with  the  legal  question  before  them  -  was  the  trial 
Judge  right  in  refusing  to  direct  the  jury  that  resitance 501 
to  attempted  sodomy  could  found  a  successful  plea  of 
self-defence?  Instead  they  were  at  pains  to  point 
out  that  there  had  in  fact  only  been  a  threat  of 
sodomy  (the  deceased  had  made  an  indecent  suggestion 
to  the  accused  and  then  gripped  him  by  the  waist  and 
pushed  him  towards  a  bed),  and  they  also  assumed  that 
sodomy  could  always  be  prevented  by  means  short  of 
killing.  But  the  ratio  of  their  decision,  'it  is 
submitted,  was  not  that  the  facts  did  not  amount  to 
attempted  sodomy,  or  that  it  was  not  in  the  circumstances 
necessary  for  the  accused  to  kill  to  prevent  the  sodomy 
(this  latter  would  probably  have  been  an  irrelevant 
ratio,  so  to  speak,  since  the  factual  necessity  would 
have  been  a  jury  question  and  the  ground  of  appeal 
was  that  the  matter  had  not  been  left  to  the  jury), 
but  that  the  facts  did  not  amount  to  a  situation  in 
which  the  adcused's  life  was  in  danger.  Lord  Russell 
set  out  danger  to  life  as  a  necessary  condition  for  a 
successful  plea  of  self-defence,  and  the  Lord  Justice- 
General  quoted  Hume's  remains  on  the  necessity  of 
danger  to  life,  made  with  reference  to  self-defence 
in  a  quarrel,  as  applying  to  the  instant  case,  which 
was  clearly  a  case  of  resistance  to  a  felony. 
In  the  course  of  his  opinion  the  Lord  Justice- 
General  said: 
'Murder  is  still  one  of  the  most  serious  crimes 
in  this  country,  for  no  man  has  a  right  at  his 
own  hand  deliberately  to  take  the  life  of  another. 
Indeed  it  is  because  of  this  principle  of  the 
sanctity  of  human  life  that  the  plea,  -.  of  self- 
defence  arises.  Just  because  life  is  so 
precious  to  all  of  us,  so  our  law  recognises  that 
an  accused  man  may  be  found  not  guilty  even  of 
the  serious  crime  of  murder  if  his  own  life 
has  been  endangered  by  an  assailant...  But  I 
can  see  no  justification  at  all  for  extending 
this  defence  to  a  case  where  there  is  no 
apprehension  of  danger  to  the  accused'  s  life,  and 
indeed,  very  little  evidence  of  any  real  physical 
injury  done  to  the  accused  himself,  but  merely  a #Y  502 
threat,  pushed  no  doubt  quite  far,  but  nonetheless 
only  a  threat,  of  an  attack  upon  the  appellant's 
virtue... 
Where  an  attack  by  an  accused  person  on 
another  man  has  taken  place  and  where  the  object 
of  the  attack  has  been  to  ward  off  an  assault 
upon  hin  it  is  essential  that  the  attack  should 
be  made  to  save  the  accused's  life  before  the 
plea  of  self-defence  can  succeed'. 
It  is  true  that  the  existence  of  a  right  to  kill 
in  defence  of  property  is  not  inconsistent  with 
the  last  sentence  quoted,  and  it  is  true  that  the 
Court  did  not  refer  in  their  judgments  to  the  authorities 
quoted  to  them  in  support  of  the  view  that  homicide 
can  be  justified  if  committed  in  defence  of  property, 
or,  more  generally,  in  the  prevention  of  a  felony 
(Hume,  i.  219-22),  Alison,  i.  136),  but  it  seems 
implicit  in  the  Lord  Justice-General's  language  that 
self-defence  can  be  justified  only  by  danger  to  life. 
In  any  event,  it  seems  impossible  that  a  twentieth 
century  legal  system  should  allow  a  man  to  kill  to 
defend  his  property  but  not  to  defend  himself  against 
sodomy. 
Lord  Clyde  specifically  allowed  for  the  continued 
operation  of  the  plea  of  self-defence  by  a  woman  resist- 
ing  rape,  saying  that  rape,  unlike  sodomy,  required  a 
complete  absence  of  consent  on  the  part  of  the  woman. 
The  precise  logic  of  this  is  not  clear,  but  it  appears 
that  the  exception  for  rape  was  thought  of  as  being  a 
corollary  from  the  definition  of  rape  with  its 
requirement  of  resistance  to  the  utmost  by  the  victim. 
If  then,  we  put  rape  on  one  side  as  an  unique 
exception,  it  is  submitted  that  the  result  of  M'Cluskeq 
is  that  homicide  can  only  be  justified  by  the  necessL  ty 
to  save  life  from  an  unlawful  attack.  If  this  is  so 
then  Scots  law  is  in  line  with,  if  nibt  indeed  in 
advance  of,  the  law  laid  down  in  the  European  Convention 503 
of  Human  Rights  to  the  effect  that:  - 
'Art.  2(l)  Everyone's  right  to  life  is 
protected  by  law.  No-one  shall  be  deprived  of 
his  life  intentionally  save  in  the  execution 
of  a  sentence  of  a  Court  following  his  conviction 
of  a  crime  for  which  this  punishment  is  provided 
by  law. 
(2)  Deprivation  of  life  shall 
not  be  regarded  as  inflicted  in  contravention 
of  this  Article  when'  it  results  from  the  use 
of  force  which  is  no  more  than  absolutely 
necessary  -  (a)  in  defence  of  any  person  from 
unlawful  violence; 
(b)  in  order  to  effect  a  lawful 
arrest  or  to  prevent  the  escape  of  a  person 
lawfully  detained; 
(c)  in  action  lawfully  taken  for 
the  purpose  of  auellin  a  riot  or  insurrection' 
(Text  taken  from  (19515  45  American  Journal 
of  International  Law,  Supplement  of  Documents, 
pp.  24-5.  )  (The  United  Kingdom  is  a  party 
to  this  convention  which  was  signed  at 
Roms  in  1950,,  but  unlike  e.  g.  West  Germany  -  see 
Schonke-Schroder,  p.  273  -  has  not  pqssed 
legislation  bringing  it  into  effect.  ) 
The  phrase  'defence  of  any  person  from  unlawful 
viölence'  can  be  read  to  include  the  case  of  a  man 
resisting  sodomy  or  a  woman  resisting  rape,  but  it 
clearly  excludes  the  defence  of  property,  and  again, 
it  is  submitted  that  the  Courts  of  a  signatory  to  the 
convention  can  hardly  continue  to  maintain  a  right  to 
kill  in  defence  of  property,  especially  if  they 
restrict  the  right  to  kill  in  defence  of  a  person 
from  unlawful  violence  to  resistance  to  rape  or 
homicidal  assault. 504 
Chapter  13:  Provocation. 
The  rules  regarding  provocation,  like  those  of 
self-defence,  form  part  of  the  law  of  homicide  and  of 
assault.  They  are  treated  here  only  in  outline,  and 
only  in  relation  to  homicide.  They  are  regarded 
as  falling  within  the  scope  of  this  thesis  because 
they  illustrate  the  operation  of  certain  basic 
principles  and  attitudes,  and  because  they  are 
of  interest  as  displaying  certain  widespread 
confusions. 
Provocation  is  perhaps  the  typical  plea  in 
mitigation,  and  homicide  under  provocation  the  typical 
case  of  voluntary  culpable  homicide.  Provocation 
is  a  plea  in  mitigation  of  intentional  killing; 
and  it  operates  because  someone  who  kills  under 
-provocation  does  not  kill  deliberately  or  out  of 
wickedness;  his  intention  to  kill  'arises  from 
sudden  passion  involving  loss  of  self-control  by 
reason  of  provocation'  (A.  G.  for  Ceylon  y.  Perera, 
[1953]A.  C.  200,  Lord  Goddard,  C.  J.  at  p.  206). 
Like  other  pleas  in  mitigation,  provocation  is 
concerned  with  motive,  with  the  reason  for  the  act, 
rather  than  with  intention. 
In  order  to  deal  with  the  problems  raised  by 
the  Scots  law  of  provocation  it  is  convenient  to  distinguish 
three  types  of  situation,  though  there  may  be  little 
effective  difference  between  the  first  two.  These  we: 
(1)  Cases  in  which  the  accused  was  in  danger  of 
his  life,  and  acted  in  self-defence,  but  did  so  in  such 
a  way  that  his  killing  of  the  deceased  was  not  justifiable. 
(2)  Cases  in  which  the  accused  was  defending 
himself  against  an  attack  which  was  serious,  but 
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C3)  Cases  in  which  there  glas  no  serious  attack 
on  the  accused,  but  he  acted  while  deprived  of  self- 
control  as  a  result  of  the  -provocative  behaviour  of  the 
deceased  or  of  someone  else.  This  grouoo  comprises 
three  types  of  situation:  -  (i)  a  minor  assault 
by  the  deceased  on  the  acc.  Ased;  (ii)  --)rovocation 
'jy  insulting  words  or  gestures  or  other  insulting 
behaviour  on  the  part  of  the  deceased;  (iii) 
provocation  by  such  behaviour  on  the  part  of  someone 
other  than  the  deceased. 
(1)  Provocatioýi  and  seIf'-defence. 
The  law  in  Hume  and  Alison. 
Hume  states  that  where  a  man  acts  in  defence 
of  his  life  in  circumstances  where  his  action  is 
not  justifiable  -  because  he  acted  excessively 
or  because  he  started  the  quarrel  (Hume,  i.  22.592-32)  - 
he  is  guilty  of  culpable  homicide.  Hume  deals  with 
such  cases  under  Ghe  head  of  self-defence  and  not  in  his 
section  on  provocation,  although  he  talks  of  provocation 
in  connection  with  some  of  the  cases  he  mentions  (e.  g. 
Ensign  Hardie,  Jun.  9,1101,  Hu:.  e,  i.  223)  .  In 
dealing  with  cases  in  ;  jhich  the  accused  started  tne 
quarzel,  he  does  not  go  on  to  ask  if  the  deceased's 
retaliation  led  to  loss  of  control  by  the  accused 
(Hume,  i.  232).  He  is  not  altogether  clear  whether 
the  line  of  arguient  is  'He  could  have  escaped  or  he 
started  the  trouble  and  his  action  is  therefore 
not  altogether  justifiable,  so  we  convict  him  of 
culpable  homicide',  or  'He  was  attacked  and  acted 
under  provocation,  being  excited  and  agitated,  and  so 
is  guilty  only  of  culpable  homicide'.  His  use  of 
phrases  like  'absolute  and  entire  justification'  in 
talking  of  cases  of  excessive  retaliation  (Hune,  i.  227) 506 
suggest  the  former  approach,  as  if  there  were  a  full 
justification  leading  to  acquittal  where  the  accused's 
retaliation  was  not  excessive,  and  a  less  full  one 
leading  to  conviction  for  culpable  homicide  where  it 
was  excessive.  But  Hume  also  talks  in  terms  of 
'provocation'  and  'resentment'  in  dealing  with  cases 
of  unjustifiable  self-defence  (Hume,  i.  223ff.  ). 
Alison  at  one  point  classes  together  persons  who 
are  'provoked,  or  placed  in  circumstances  of  real  or 
supposed  danger,  '  as  having  a  duty  to  exercise 
self-control,  and  as  guilty  of  culpable  homicide,  'where 
that  control  has  not  been  exerted,  or  the  belief  of 
danger  was  not  real'  (Alison,  i.  92).  But  he  later 
enunciates  a  separate  proposition  that  'Culpable 
homicide  is  committed  by  an  undue  precipitance,  or 
the  unjustifiable  use  of  lethal  weapons,  in  defence 
of  life  or  property'  (Alison,  i.  100).  He  cites 
many  cases,  and  does  not  use  the  word  'provocation' 
until  he  comes  to  talk  of  English  law  (Alison,  i.  100-108). 
(But  he  does  talk  of  'perturbation'  when  discussing  the 
case  of  John  Symons,  26  Aug.  1810,  at  p.  104.  )  Fcrr 
Alison  the  culpable  homicide  conviction  comes  abtut 
because  a  prima  facie  case  of  self-defence  is  partially 
defeated  by  the  accused's  excessive  reaction  (Alison,  i.  103), 
and  not  because  the  accused  acted  while  deprived  of 
self-control.  A  certain  degree  of  excess  reduces 
the  effect  of  the  plea  of  self-defence  from  acquittal 
to  conviction  for  'culpable  homicide;  a  greater 
degree  of  excess  destroys  its  effect  altogether  and 
results  in  a  conviction  for  murder.  Alison  is  concerned 
with  'whether  the  homicide  will  be  justifiable  or 
culpable'  (Alison,  i.  107),  and  not  with  whether  it  is 
murder  or  culpable  homicide.  This  approach,  which 
views  the  plea  of  'provocation'  as  a  plea  of 50'7 
'unjustifiable  self-defence  in  mitigation',  led  to  a 
confusion  which  remained  in  the  law  until  1950 
(see  Crawford,  1950,  J.  C.  67,  criteing  Hillan,  193'1 
J.  C.  53). 
It  might  be  quite  feasible  to  make  unjustifiable 
self-defence  a  valid  plea  in  mitigation  whether  or  not 
the  accused  lost  control  as  a  result  of  the  attack 
made  on  him.  A  man  can  stand  his  ground  and  fight 
instead  of  taking  advantage  of  an  opportunity  to 
escape  whether  or  not  he  is  so  provoked  by  the  attack 
as  to  have  lost  self-control.  If  escape  were 
impossible,  he  would  be  acquitted,  and  would  not  have 
to  show  that  he  lost  control;  and  it  may  be  said  that 
if  escape  was  impossible  he  should  be  convicted  of 
culpable  homicide,  even  if  he  did  not  lose  self-control. 
The  modern  law. 
The  tendency  of  the  modern  law  is  to  allow  the 
plea  of  provocation  only  where  the  accused  has  lost 
control  -  but  the  idea  that  provocation  is  a  form 
of  unjustifiable  self-defence  is  not  altogether  dead. 
The  passage  in  which  Macdonald  deals  with  provocation 
in  homicide  is  very  confused,  but  the  only  clear 
statements  he  makes  are  that  excessive  retaliation 
in  the  face  of  real  danger  amounts  only  to  culpable 
homicide  if  done  in  heat  and  without  thought,  and  that 
'provocation  such  as  would  deprive  a  reasonable  man 
of  the  power  of  self-control'  will  reduce  the  charge 
from  murder  to  culpable  homicide  where  a  plea  of  self- 
defence  would  fail  because  the  accused  started  the 
trouble,  or  because  his  retaliation  was  excessive,  or 
because  he  did  not  escape  when  this  was  possible 
(Macdonald,  pp.  93-4).  Macdonald  seems  to  be  saying 
that  the  plea  of  provocation  will  only  apply  where  the 
accused  acts  in  defence,  either  against  a  murderous 
attack,  or  against  an  attack  which  is  serious  but  not 508 
murderous. 
The  modern  law  thus  requires  than  even  where  the 
accused  is  acting  unjustifiably  in  se1fi-defence,  he 
must  show  that  he  acted  in  the  heat  of  the  moment, 
under  provocation,  although  in  fact  it  is  usually 
assumed  that  anyone  in  this  position  did  act  under 
the  stress  of  the  provocation  constituted  by  the  assault 
made  on  him. 
In  Kizileviczius  (1938  J.  C.  60),  in  which  the  accused 
killed  his  father  after  disarming  him  of  a  weapon  with 
which  he  was  threatening  him,  Lord  Jamieson  distinguished 
three  pleas  open  to  the  accused  -  self-defence  leading 
to  acquittal;  self-defence  leading  to  a  conviction 
of  culpable  homicide;  provocation  leading  to  a 
conviction  of  culpable  homicide.  Lord  Jamieson  said 
that  the  third  was  very  like  the  second,  and  that  the 
second  -  which  is  the  plea  of  unjustifiable  self- 
defence  -  required  both  danger  to  the  accusedts  life 
and  that  he  should  have  acted  in  heat  without  thought, 
but  he  did  treat  the  second  and  third  as  distinct. 
The  confusion  between  self-defence  and  provocation 
which  is  expressed  in  the  idea  of  a  plea  of  unjustifiable 
self-defence  in  mitigation  was  criticised  in  Crawford 
(1950  J.  C.  6'J),  where  it  was  said  that  self-defence 
could  operate  only  in  exculpation,  and  that  the  plea 
in  mitigation  was  one  of  provocation,  The  modern 
law  is  probably  therefore  that  whether  or  not  the 
accused's  life  was  in  danger,  the  charge  will  be  reduced 
to  one  of  culpable  homicide  only  if  he  acted  under 
loss  of  self-control  induced  by  provocation;  although 
in  fact  in  such  a  situation  the  law  more  or  less  a  ssa  me  s 
that  the  accused  acted  under  provocation.  Accordingly 
it  becomes  unnecessary  to  have  a  special  category  for 
cases  in  which  the  accused's  life  was  endangered, 
and  such  cases  can  be  treated  as  similar  to  cases  where 509 
the  accused  was  subjected  to  a  substantial  attack 
or  threat  of  force. 
(2)  Provocation  by  serious  assault. 
Its  nature. 
In  his  section  on  provocation  Hume  deals  only 
with  provocation  by  serious  assault,  and  seems  to  consider 
this  a  different  question  from  that  of  unjustifiable 
self-defence.  Where  the  accused's  life  was  not  in 
danger,  it  is  essential  that  he  should  have  lost 
control.  Culpable  homicide  under  provocation  arises 
where  the  accused  'is  not  actuated  by  wickedness  of 
heart,  or  hatred  of  the  deceased,  but  by  the  sudden 
impulse  of  resentment,  excited  by  high  and  real 
injuries'  (Hume,  i.  239). 
This  type  of  provocation  is  described  by 
Macdonald  (at  p.  94)  in  a  passage  adopted  in  Kizilevizcius 
(1938  J.  C.  60,63)  as  follows:  'being  agitated  and 
excited,  and  alarmed  by  violence,  I  lost  control  over 
myself,  and  took  life,  when  my  presence  of  mind  had 
left  me,  and  without  thought  of  what  I  was  doing'. 
This  passage  is  regarded  as  an  authoritative  expression 
of  the  law,  and  is  frequency  quoted  by  Judges  in 
directing  juries.  But  it  may  be  questioned  if  it 
accurately  represents  the  law;  in  particular  one  can 
conceive  of  cases  in  which  an  accused  might  well  succeed 
in  a  plea  of  provocation  although  he  could  not  say 
that  he  acted  without  thought  of  what  he  was  doing. 
Indeed,  had  he  so  acted  it  would  probably  have  been 
unnecessary  to  plead  provocation;  he  would  have  been 
entitled  to  an  acquittal  on  the  ground  that  the  killing 
was  involuntary.  The  description  given  by  Macdonald 
slurs  the  distinction  between  voluntary  and  involuntary 
homicide,  and  takes  no  account  of  the  fact  that 510 
provocation  is  a  defence  to  intentional  killing.  The 
plea  is  not  designed  for  someone  who  kills  automatically, 
but  for  someone  who  is  so  provoked  by  the  deceased  that 
he  sees  red,  and  determines  on  the  spot  that  he  will 
'swing  for  the  bastard',  like  the  husband  who  kills 
his  wife's  paramour  on  hearing  of  their  adultery. 
Macdonald  does  not  seem  to  have  appreciated  this  -  he 
suggests,  for  example,  that  in  testing  whether  there 
has  been  the  requisite  degree  of  provocation  one 
should  ask  if  the  accused  can  be  said  to  have  had 
q  murderous  purpose  -  but  again,  unless  there  was 
a  murderous  purpose,  or  murderous  recklessness,  there 
is  no  need  to  invoke  the  plea  of  provocation  at  all. 
Its  rules. 
The  rules  regarding  this  sort  of  provocation  show 
that  it  is  very  much  influenced  by  ideas  of  self- 
defence.  Indeed,  it  is  thought  of  as  a  form  of 
unjustifiable  self-defence,  self-defence  against 
serious  assault  and  not  against  danger  to  life  itself. 
The  position  is  this:  the  accused  was  grossly  assaulted, 
he  retaliated  in.  order  to  defend  himself  from  bodily 
harm;  but  he  killed  his  assailant,  and  therefore, 
since  the  adcused's  life  was  not  in  danger,  he  mdst 
have  exceeded  the  limits  of  justifiable  self-defence; 
bdt  if  he  acted  under  the  provocation  of  the  attack, 
he  will  only  be  convicted  of  culpable  homicide. 
That  this  is  the  position  will  be  clearer  if  we 
consider  some  of  the  rules  regarding  provocation. 
These  rules  are:  (a)  the  provocation  must  be  by  'real' 
injury,  (b)  the  retaliation  must  not  have  been  grossly 
excessive,  (c)  it  is  important  to  consider  who  started 
the  quarrel. 
(a)  The  provocation  must  be  by  !  eal'injury  - 
'real'  being  a  suitably  ambiguous  word  combining  the 511 
meanings  of  'physical'  and  'substantial'  (R.  C.  Evid. 
of  Faculty  of  Advocates,  Q.  5662-3).  It  must  be  physical 
because  without  physical  attack  there  can  be  no 
question  of  self-defence  at  all:  it  must  be  substanö.  al 
because  otherwise  there  would  be  no  need  for  any 
defensive  action.  So  Hume,  Alison,  and  Macdonald, 
all  exclude  insulting  words  or  disgusting  behaviour, 
and  even  minor  assaults,  as  r&evant  provocation. 
(Hume,  i.  247-8.  Alison,  i.  12.  Macdonald,  p.  93); 
and  Hume  specifically  rejects  the  then  current  English 
view  that  a  assault  might  amount,  to  provocation 
(Hume,  i.  247-8). 
(b)  There  must  be  some  equivalence  between  the 
mode  of  retaliation  or  resentment,  and  the  provocation 
given  (Macdonald,  p.  93;  Mancini  v.  D.  P.  P.,  [1942] 
A.  C.  l,  Lord  Chancellor  Simon  at  p.  9).  Exact 
equivalence  cannot  be  demanded,  because  if  the  accused 
killed  the  deceased  while  retaliating  exactly  to  the 
deceased's  assault  on  him,  the  deceased's  assault 
must  have  been  murderous,  and  so  the  accused  would  be 
entitled  to  acquittal  on  a  plea  of  self-defence 
(cf.  Kenny,  para.  119).  The  requirement  depends  on 
the  idea  of  unjustifiable  self-defence  to  assault; 
if  the  accused's  retaliation  was  grossly  excessive  he 
is  guilty  of  murder,  if  it  was  excessive  but  not  grassy 
so,  then  if  he  was  provoked,  he  is  entitled  to  a  verdict 
of  culpable  homicide.  And  from  this  it  followq  that 
the  assault  on  the  accused  must  have  been  substantial, 
since  otherwise  his  retaliation  must  have  been  excessive. 
This  approach  cannot  be  justified  if  the  only 
important  element  in  provocation  is  loss  of  control, 
for  then  the  relation  of  retaliation  to  provocation 
would  be  important  only  as  a  guide  to  credibility-- 
a  jury  would  be  unlikely  to  believe  that  a  slap  on  the 
face  so  provoked  the  accused  that  he  could  not  stop 512 
himself  cleaving  the  victim's  head  with  a  hatchet. 
But  if  loss  of  control  is  what  matters,  and  they  do  believe 
the  unlikely  story,  they  should  then  be  able  to  sustain 
the  plea.  If,  however,  the  analogy  with  self-defence 
is  important,  they  would  have  to  reject  the  plea 
because  of  the  obvious  gross  inequivalence  of  the 
retaliation  (cf  Kenny,  loc.  cit.  Macdonald  seems 
to  have  realised  this  when  he  said  that  a  'murderous' 
purpose'  is  unlikely  to  be  presumed  where  the 
retaliation  is  roughly  equivalent  -  Macdonald,.  p.  93). 
(c)  There  is  authority  that  it  is  important  to 
consider  whether  the  accused  or  the  deceased  started 
the  trouble,  although  it  will  not  be  fatal  to  the 
accused's  plea  that  he  was  the  originator  of  the 
situation  (Hume,  i.  248;  M'Guiness,  193'7  J.  C.  37, 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison  at  p.  40).  This  idea 
is  clearly  linked  to  the  idea  that  the  plea  of 
provocation,  like  that  of  self-defence,  may  be  defeated 
if  the  accused  brought  the  trouble  on  himself  (Hume,  i. 
240;  M'Guiness,  supra). 
(d)  The  rule  that  A  may  plead  provocation  where 
he  has  killed  B  under  the  provocation  of  the  latter's 
attack  on  C  (Jas.  M'Ghie,  Jan.  17,1791,  Hume,  i.  246; 
cf.  R.  v.  Harrington,  '(1886)  10  Cox  C.  C.  370),  can  be 
explained  by  the  analogy  with  the  similar  rule  that  A 
may  kill  B  in  order  to  save  C's  life. 
(3)  Provocation  and  loss  of  self-control. 
In  this  section  I  consider  the  rule  that  wherever 
an  accused  is  provoked  so  as  to  lose  his  capacity 
for  self-control,  he  is  guilty  only  of  culpable 
homicide.  If  such  a  rule  is  recognised,  the  fact 
that  in  any  :  particular  case  the  provocation  took  the 
form  of  a  serious  assault  will  be  irrelevant  (since  the 
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and  the  rules  set  out  above  will  give  way  to  the 
more  general  rules  applying  to  provocation  leading  to 
loss  of  control,  whatever  the  nature  of  the  provocation. 
The  special  rules  applied  because  of  the  self-defence 
analogy  can  be  disregarded  whether  or  not  the  facts 
are  analogous  to  self-defence. 
Should  such  a  rule  be  recognised? 
The  law  of  provocation  has  to  balance  two  conflict- 
ing  considerations.  It  must  allow  for  the  fact  that 
it  is  not  in  accord  with  ordinary  moral  attitudes 
to  brand  the  person  who  kills  under  extreme  provocation 
as  a  murderer,  a  consideration  perhaps  weakened  by 
the  restriction  of  capital  punishment,  but  still  strong, 
since  it  will  continue  to  be  felt  that  the  law 
should  recognise  the  inappropriateness  of  classing  such 
a  person  with  deliberate  murderers.  Failure  to  make 
allowance  for-this  and  for  the  sympathy  naturally  felt 
with  a  man  who  gives  way  to  violence  under  the  pressure 
of  provocation  will  bring  the  law  into  disrepute,  and 
may  also,  as  Hume  points  out,  '  lead  to  juries  acquitting 
altogether  in  cases  of  provocation  (Hume,  i.  240). 
There  is  much  to  be  said,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  individual  accused,  for  the  argument  that  a  man  who 
acts  when  he  is  unable  to  control  himself,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  guilty  of  killing  at  all.  This  was  the  vv 
taken  by  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison  in  Gilmour 
(1938  J.  C.  1)  when  he  said  that  if  the  accused  'acted 
in  the  first  transport  of  his  passion  without  appreciating 
to  the  full  extent  what  he  was  doing'  the  jury  would 
not  'hold  him  criminally  responsible  for  the  death 
that  occurred',  but  would  convict  him  only  of  assault 
(p.  3).  Presumably,  if  he  did  not  appreciate  what-he 
was  doing  at  all,  he  would  be  entitled  to  complete 
acquittal.  (Gilmour  was-strongly  criticised  in  Hill  - 514 
1941  J.  C.  59  -  and  in  Delaney  -  1945  J.  C.  138  -  by  Lord 
Patrick  and  Lord  Moncrieff  respectively;  but  in  M'Cluskey 
-  Glasgow  High  Court,  20  and  21  Jan.  1959,  Lord  Strachan 
directed  the  jury  that  they  could  bring  in  a  verdict  of 
guilty  of  assault  on  a  charge  of  murder  to  which  the 
defence  was  that  the  killing  had  been  occasioned  by 
an  attempt  of  the  deceased  to  commit  sodomy  on  the 
accused.  The  other  cases  were  cases  of  husbands 
killing  their  wives'  paramours.  ) 
On  the  other  hand,  the  law  cannot  deal  as  lenientýy 
with  the  person  who  acts  without  full  appreciation 
of  his  deeds  by  reason  of  provocation,  as  it  can  with 
someone  who  is  in  such  a  condition  by  reason  of  errcr 
or  mental  disease.  It  is  generally  recognised  that 
there  is  a  duty  to  retain  one's  self-control,  and  to 
endeavour  not  to  give  way  to  passion.  Any  undue 
extension  of  the  plea  of  provocation  will  weaken  the 
strength  of  this  duty,  and  it  is  important  for  the 
law  to  discourage  people  from  giving  way  to  passion, 
by  imposing  some  punishment  on  those  who  do  give  way 
to  it.  It  was  for  this  reason  that  Hume  felt  that 
it  would  be  wrong  to  allow  all  assaults  to  rank  as 
provocation,  and  felt  that  the  law  as  set  out  by  himself 
was  'more  suitable  to  the  fervent  temper  of  the  Scottish 
people'  (Hume,  i.  249).  Hume  thus  recognises  that 
'what  is  "provocation"  sufficiently  "gross"  to 
transform  murder  into  manslaughter....  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  dealt  with  by  the  Courts  by  means  of 
purely  legal  analysis,  i.  e.  without  taking  into  account 
the  attitudes  and  needs  of  contemporary  society  and 
of  the  different  groups  within  it'  (H.  Mannheim, 
Group  Problems  in  Crime  and  Punishment,  p.  268). 
If  then,  contemporary.  attitudes  in  Scotland 
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to  cases  of  serious  assault,  the  law  should  accept  this 
and  modify  or  develop  its  concept  of  provocation 
accordingly.  English  law  has  now  developed  to  the 
extent  that  provocation  may  be  constituted  by  'anything 
done  or  said'  (Homicide  Act,  1,  )57,5  dc  6  Eliz.  II,  c.  ll, 
s.  3),  and  it  seems  unlikely  that  Scottish  attitudes 
today  are  different  from  English  ones.  The  circumstances 
in  which  the  ordinary  man  would  feel  that  loss  of  self- 
control  was  partially  excusable  are  clearly  not 
restricted  to  cases  of  serious  assault.  Many 
situations  can  be  imagined  which  would  illustrate  this, 
but  it  will  be  sufficient  to  notice  the  one  mentioned 
to  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital  Punishment  by  the 
Faculty  of  Advocates:  the  situation  of  the  victim 
of  a  blackmailer  who  is  exasperated  into  killing  his 
oppressor.  The  provocation  of  blackmail,  as  the 
Faculty  pointed  out,  may  be  much  more  extreme  than  that 
of  blows  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Faculty  of  Advocates,  Q.  5664). 
In  considering  the  conflict  between  the  plea  of 
provocation  and  the  deterrent  purpose  of  the  law 
it  is  also  important  to  remember  a  fact  so  obvious  that 
it  is  sometimes  forgotten  -  the  accused  who  succeeds 
in  a  plea  of  provocation  is  not  acquitted,  he  is 
convicted  of  culpable  homicide,  a  crime  for  which  he 
can  receive  a  very  severe  sentence.  To  insist  on 
the  principle  of  deterrence  being  given  full  weight 
twice  over  -  in  deciding  what  amounts  to  provocation  as 
well  as  in  restricting  the  effect  of  a  successful 
plea  of  provocation  -  may  well  be  to  tip  the  balance 
too  far  against  the  accused. 
Acceptance  of  the  general  rule  that  any  provocation 
causing  loss  of  self-control  should  operate  in  mitigation 
would  be  in  accord  with  the  general  tendency  of  Scots 
law  to  give  weight  to  any  feature  which  shows  that 516 
the  accused  did  not  act  of  wickedness  or  malice.  The 
view  that  a  killing  may  be  intentional  and  not  murder 
because  of  'the  extent  of  malice  under  which  Cthe 
accused]-was  actuated'  (Kane,  (1892)  3  Wh.  386,  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  Macdonald  at  p.  388),  and  the  idea  that 
there  are  different  categories  of  homicide,  run  through 
the  19th  century  homicide  cases,  and  influenced  Scots 
attitudes  to  diminished  responsibility  and  intoxication 
(cf.  supra,  chs.  9  and  10).  It  seems  reasonable  to 
adopt  the  same  broad  approach  to  the  question  of 
provocation,  but  it  must  be  admitted  that  in  fact 
provocation,  like  diminished  responsibility  and  intox- 
ication  themselves,  has  come  to  be  hedged  round  with 
legal  technicalities. 
Does  Scots  law  recognise  the  rule? 
The  special  case  of  adultery.  Hume,  Alison,  and 
Macdonald  all  recognise  one  exception  to  the  rule  that 
only  provocation  of  the  nature  of  serious  assault  is 
relevant.  They  all  recognise  that  a  husband  who 
kills  his  wife  or  her  paramour  under  the  provocation 
of  finding  them  in  adultery  is  guilty  of  only  culpable 
homicide  (Hume,  i.  248;  Alison,  i.  113;  Macdonald,  97). 
Hume  calls  this  a  'peculiar  case',  and  it  is  still 
regarded  as  special.  (It  is  indeed  highly  peculiar 
in  the  scheme  of  law  laid  down  by  these  authors. 
For  it  lacks  any  element  of  physical  assault,  and  does 
not  permit  of  any  measurement  of  the  equivalence  between 
provocation  and  retaliation  -  cf.  Kenny,  para.  119. 
There  is  no  suggestion,  for  example,  that  discovery 
of  adultery  in  some  circumstances  may  palliate  assault 
but  not  homicide,  but  simply  an  independent  rule 
that  a  husband  discovering  his  wife  in  adultery  is 
guilty  only  of  culpable  homicide  if  he  kills  her  or  her 
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control  induced  by  the  discovery.  Presumably  the  same 
rule  applies  in  the  case  of  a  wife  killing  her  husband 
or  his  mistress  in  such  circumstances,  but  there  are 
no  reported  cases  of  this.  ) 
The  scope  of  this  'peculiar  case'  has  been  somewhat 
extended  in  recent  years,  but  no  inference  can  be  drawn 
from  the  extension  which  would  be  applicable  to  the  law 
of  provocation  in  general.  It  is  the  law  to  day  that 
a  husband  provoked  by  hearing  a  confession  of  adultery 
is  in  the  same  position  as  one  who  finds  his  wife 
committing  or  about  to  commit  adultery  (Hill,  1941,  J.  C. 
59;  Delaney,  1945  J.  C.  138;  both  single  Judge 
decisions),  but  that  does  not  mean  that  Scats  law 
recognises  any  other  form  of  verbal  provocation.  (It 
was  suggested  to  the  Royal  Commission  on  Capital 
Punishment  that  the  Scots  Courts  might  follow  the 
contrary  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  Holmes  v.  D.  P.  P. 
[1946  A.  C.  588,  but  that  this  was  unlikely  -  cf.  R.  C. 
Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper,  Supp.  Memo.  13.  It  can  now  be 
regarded  as  impossible  since  Holmes  is  no  longer  law  in 
England  -  Homicide  Act,  supra,  s.  3.  )  This  extension 
was  effected  by  treating  'discovery  of  adultery'  as 
equivalent  to  'finding  in  adultery',  and  by  pointing 
out  that  adultery  might  be  discovered  through  confession. 
As  Professor  Smith  remarks,  this  verbal  provocation 
is  therefore  at  best  restricted  to  provocation  by  giving 
information,  and  does  not  include  provocation  by  words 
of  insult  (T.  B.  Smith,  'Capital  Punishment',  1953 
S.  L.  T.  (News),  19'7,199).  It  is  submitted  that  it  is 
probably  restricted  to  information  regarding  marital 
infidelity,  and  that  the  Courts  would  be  loth  to  extend 
it,  e.  g.  to  information  that  the  deceased  had  just 
assaulted,  or  even  killed,  the  accused's  wife,  or  any 
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In  Callender  (1958  S.  L.  T.  24),  a  case  of  assault, 
Lord  Guthrie  extended  the  exception  to  include  the  case 
of  a  husband  finding  his  wife  in  bed  with  her  Lesbian 
paramour,  because  he  regarded  Lesbianism  as  constituting 
as  serious  an  infringement  of  the  duty  of  a  wife  as  does 
adultery.  The  exception  is  based  on  the  idea  of  marital 
duty,  and  so  cannot  extend  beyond  the  relationship  of 
husband  and  wife.  This  shows  up  the  artificiality 
of  the  exception,  and  the  need  for  an  extension  of  the 
general  law  in  order  to  make  it  possible  to  take  into 
account  other  equally  provoking  situations,  even  of-this 
limited  kind.  As  Macaulay  pointed  out,  a  man  may  be  as 
inflamed  at  the  sight  of  his  fiancee  in  bed  with  someone 
else  as  at  the  sight  of  his  wife  in  such  a  situation. 
Macaulay  went  on  to  say  'That  a  worthless,  unfaithful, 
and  tyrannical  husband  should  be  guilty  only  of  man- 
slaughter  for  killing  the  paramour  of  his  wife,  and  that 
an  affectionate  and  high-spirited  brother  be  guilty  of 
murder  for  killing,  in  a  paroxysm  of  rage,  the  seducer 
of  his  sister,  appears  to  us  as  inconsistent  and 
unreasonable'  (Macaulay,  p.  502). 
(i)  Provocation  by  minor  assault.  It  is  probably 
the  law  today  that  any  assault,  although  of  a  minor- 
nature,  may  constitute  provocation.  Macdonald  follows 
Hume  in  saying  that  minor  blows  will  not  palliate 
homicide  (Macdonald,  p.  93),  but  the  Royal  Commission 
on  Capital  Punishment  were  of  opinion  that  Hume's  strict 
views  would  not  be  followed  today  (R.  C.  para.  131),  and 
Professor  Smith  agrees  with  them  (T.  B.  Smith,  op.  cit. 
loc.  cit.  ).  This  in  itself  greatly  diminishes  the 
element  of  self-defence  in  provocation,  and  makes  it 
easier  to  extend  provocation  to  cover  words  or  gestures. 
If  killing  may  be  palliated  by  a  minor  assault  on  the 
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loss  of  control,  rather  than  because  he  was  defending 
himself  from  attack.  It  will  be  no  longer  plausible 
to  exclude  the  plea  of  provocation  on  the  ground  that 
the  accused's  retaliation  was  grossly  excessive,  since 
such  an  exclusion  will  bring  us  back  to  the  Humean 
position.  If  a  man  is  so  provoked  by  a  punch  that 
he  loses  control  and  beats  his  assailant  to  death 
with  a  poker  it  is  hardly  logical  to  refuse  to 
reduce  the  crime  to  culpable  homicide  because  he  lost 
control  to  such  a  great  extent  as  to  be  incapable 
of  stopping  short  of  killing  the  deceased.  Such  a 
rule  would  mean  that  the  more  the  accused  lost  control, 
the  more  likely  would  he  be  to  be  convicted  of  murder, 
which  would  be  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  any  attempt 
to  base  the  law  of  provocation  on  ideas  of  self-defence. 
The  emphasis  on  loss  of  control  in  provocation, 
like  that  on  necessity  in  self-defence,  makes  the 
question  of  who  started  the  quarrel  much  less 
important.  Juries  will  doubtless  still  be  less 
inclined  to  sustain  a  plea  of  provocation  on  the 
part  of  someone  who  initiated 
. 
the  quarrel,  even  if, 
at  the  time  of  the  killing,  he  was  deprived  of  self- 
control  as  the  result  of  provocation,  but  they  will  not 
be  barred  from  sustaining  the  plea  on  this  ground.  (In 
the  case  of  Forbes,  Edinburgh  High  Court,  22-4  Sept. 
1958,  Lord  Wheatley  left  a  plea  of  provocation  to  the 
jury  in  a  case  in  which  the  accused  had  killed  a  watch- 
man  in  the  course  of  a  theft.  ) 
(ii)  Provocation  other  than  by  blows.  The 
question  here  is  whether  loss  of  control  caused  by 
provocative  words,  gestures,  or  tithe=  actings,  not 
amounting  to  assault  or  the  threat  of  assault,  can  be 
the  basis  of  a  successful  plea  of  provocation.  Any 
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law  does  not  generally  recognise  provocation  other 
than  by  assault,  they  are  exception;;;  if  they  are 
not  exceptions  this  can  only  be  because  the  law  does 
recognise  provocation  by  words  etc.  in  cases  other  than 
the  adultery  ones.  In  any  event,  as.  has  been  noted, 
they  concern  words  as  a  source  of  information,  and  not 
as  insults. 
Although  the  advisability  of  extending  provocation 
beyond  cases  of  physical  assault  has  been  widely 
recognised  (cf.  R.  C.  app.  11(f),  and,  so  far  as 
insulting  acts  are  concerned,  the  Fourth  Report 
of  Her  Majesty's  Commissioners  on  the  Criminal  Law 
of  1839,  Parl.  Papers,  1839,  xix,  235,  Digest,  Art. 
41,  and  Report  of  Commission  on  Draft  Code  of  18'/9, 
C.  -2345,24-5,  Draft  Code,  s.  l'j6)  Scots  law  has 
traditionally  set  its  face  against  allowing  'insulting 
words  or  disgusting  conduct'  to  operate  as  provocation 
(Hume,  '  i.  248;  Alison,  1.18;  Macdonald,  p.  93). 
Macdonald  repeats  Hume's  example  of  throwing  the  contents 
of  a  chamber  pot  in  a  man's  face  as  being  insufficient 
to  amount  to  provocation,  and  the  rejection  of  mere 
words  or  gestures  follows  a  fortiori  from  this.  The 
Scots  attitude  seems  based  on  the  view  that  'Sticks 
and  stanes  may  break  your  banes,  but  words  will  never 
hurt  you'. 
Despite  this,  the  Lord  Advocate  somewhat  surprisingly 
opposed  the  application  to  Scotland'  of  section  3  of  the 
Homicide  Act  which  allows  a  jury  to  take  into  account 
'things  said  or  done'  when  considering  a  plea  of 
provocation  (5  8c  6  Eliz.  II,  c.  ll,  8.3).  His 
opposition  was  based  on  the  view  that  the  section 
expressed,  what  was  already  the  law  of  Scotland,  and 
he  told  the  House  of  Commons  that  'There  is  nothing 
that  I  have  been  able  to  find  which  would.  indicate 
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provocation  by  words  to  a  jury  t  (Hansard,  House  of 
Commons,  28  Jan.  195'/,  Vol.  563,  Col.  `788).  He 
added  that  'It  is  quite  conceivable  that  a  person 
might  lose  all  reason  by  seeing  something'  in  which 
case  the  question  of  provocation  would  be  left  to  a 
jury.  The  discussion  of  this  question  before  the 
Royal  Commission  and  in  Parliament  seems  to  have  been 
bedevilled  by  an  undue  concentration  on  the  cases 
involving  confessions  of  adultery.  Even  on  the 
limited  question  of  confessions  of  adultery  the 
Commission  recommended  legislation  to  clarify  the 
position  in  Scotland  (R.  C.  Rec.  6.  cf.  R.  C.  para.  131- 
2,153),  but  the  Lord  Advocate  may  have  been  right 
in  regarding  such  legislation  as  unnecessary,  although 
it  would  have  done  no  harm,  especially  as  Lord  Cooper 
expressed  doubts  as  to  the  applicability  or  otherwise 
of  Holmes  cL1946]  A.  C.  588)  in  Scotland. 
So  far  as  the  general  law  is  concerned,  the  Lord 
Advocate's  statement  leaves  Hume,  Alison,  and  Macdonald 
out  of  account.  His  Lordship  offered  the  House 
no  authority  for  his  view  of  the  law,  and  there  is  no 
conclusive  authority  for  it.  What  little  authority 
there  is  rests  on  three  cases,  none  of  which  is 
satisfactory  as  authority  fot'  the  wide  proposition  that 
provocation  may  be  constituted  by  words  or  actings 
other  than  assaults. 
The  first  case  is  that  of  M'Guiness  (1937  J.  C.  3'/) 
which  in  fact  involved  an  element  of  assault.  The 
deceased  had  entered  a  house  occupied  by  the  four 
accused,  had  used  language  calculated  to  lead  to 
violence,  and  had  threatened  them  with  a  btton.  - 
He  was  disarmed  and  put  out  of  the  house.  He  then 
created  a  disturbance  and  challenged  one  of  the  accused 
to  fight,  whereupon  all  four  came  out  and  attacked  him. 522 
He  was  killed  by  a  combination  of  stab,  poker,  and 
hatchet  wounds.  Lord  Aitchison,  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
told  the  jury  that  the  best  direction  he  could  give  them 
was  a  'perfectly  general'  one,  and  he  directed  them  that 
if  they  found  that  the  accused  'were  provoked  in  a  real 
and  substantial  sense,  so  that  it  was  only  natural  and 
human  that  they  should  retaliate'  (at  p.  40),  they 
should  bring  in  a  verdict  of  culpable  homicide.  This 
dictum  is  wide  enough  to  cover  any  form  of  provocation.. 
but  it  was  given  as  a  general  direction,  and  should  be 
read,  it  is  submitted,  in  its  context,  which  was, 
or  could  be  regarded  as,  one  of  threatened  violence. 
It  must  also,  it  is  submitted,  be  read  in  its 
historical  context,  the  context  of  Glasgow  High  Court 
in  the  1930's,  when  Judges  and  juries  were  extremely 
loth  to  convict  of  anyone  of  murder.  (So  far  did 
this  unwillingness  go  that  in  the  first  murder  trial 
of  the  notorious  Patrick  Carraher  the  jury  were  directed 
that  the  absence  of  provocation  by  the  victim  might 
lead  them  to  take  the  view  that  the  accused  had  not 
acted  deliberately  in  killing  him,  and  so  entitle  them 
to  reduce  the  charge  to  one  of  culpable  homicide  - 
see  Trials  of  Patrick  Carraher,  ed.  Blake,  p.  117.  ) 
Such  a  wide  statement,  in  any  event,  can  probably 
not  be  regarded  as  expressing  Lord  Aitchison's 
considered  view  on  the  whole  question  of  provocation, 
especially  as  apparently  no  authorities  were  cited  to 
him.  His  Lordship  clearly  felt  that  the  facts  in 
M'Guiness  could  aiount  to  provocation,  but  it  cannot  be 
assumed  that  he  thought  that  any  other  facts  which  fitted 
his  'perfectly  general'  direction  would  also-amount  to 
provocation. 
The  second  case  is  an  unreported  case  referred  to 
by  Professor  Sraith  in  his  article  on  'Capital  Punishment' 523 
in  1953  Scots  Law  Times  (1953  S.  L.  T.  19'/,  199).  It 
was  a  case  in  1940  in  which  the  accused  was  a  Dunkirk 
survivor  whom  the  victim  had  called  a  'bloody  Dunkirk 
harrier',  and  'a  sympathetic  if  self-willed  jury 
refused  to  convict'  (ib.  ),  which  suggests  that  they 
were  directed  to  disregard  the  verbal  provocation  but 
refused  to  do  so.  In  any  event  the  facts  are 
exceptional,  and  even  if  the  jury  were  directed  that 
they  might  take  the  provocation  into  accouht,  it  is 
unlikely  that  the  Courts  would  follow-such  an  exceptional 
unreported  case,  or  treat  it  as  authority  for  the 
general  principle  that  words  of  abuse  can  constitute 
provocation.  -(I  have  been  unable  to  trace  this  case.  ) 
The  third  case  is  that  of  Crawford  (1950  J.  C.  6'/). 
Crawford  killed  his  father  after  what  he  believed  to 
be  a  threat  by  the  latter.  The  accused  had  frequently 
quarrelled  with  his  father  but  had  only  once  been 
assaulted  by  him,  and  that  had  been  many  years  previously, 
when  he  was  only  sixteen.  His  plea  of  self-defence 
was  withdrawn  from  the  jury,  but  the  presiding  Judge 
(Lord  Mackay)  left  to  them  a  plea  of  provocation 
cuased  by  many  years  of  domestic  unhappiness.  His 
Lordship  had  his  doubts  about  whether  this  could 
amount  to  provocation,  but  took  the  view  that  as 
provocation  was  not  a  special  defence  he  should  leave 
it  to  the  jury;  he  seems  also  to  have  thought  that 
it  might  be  possible  to  regard  the  facts  as  amounting 
to  a  'constant  terrification'  lasting  up  to  the  time 
of  the  fatal  assault  (see  Extract  of  Proceedings,  Glasgow 
High  Court,  3  May,  1950).  The  appeal  in  Crawford 
was  directed  against  the  trial  Judge's  refusal  to 
leave  the  special  defence  of  self-defence  to  the  jury, 
and  so  was  not  directly  concerned  with  the  sufficiency 
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of  diminished  responsibility  to  support  the  jury's 
verdict  of  culpable  homicide.  But  Lord  Cooper  in 
the  course  of  his  opinion  said,  'I  assume  in  the 
appelant's  favour  that  the  culpability  of  his  action 
falls  to  be  reduced  because  of  his  physical  and  mental 
state,  coupled,  with  the  provocation  which  the  jury 
may  have  been  entitled  to  infer  from  his  unhappy  home 
life'  (at  p.  71).  This  does  suggest  a  much  broader 
view  of  provocation  than  that  taken  by  the  Institutional 
writers,  but  it  is  obiter,  and  is  not  even  expressed 
as  a  definite  dictum.  It  is  submitted  that  it  is 
unlikely  that  it  represented  Lord  Cooper's  considered 
views  on  the  matter,  especially  as  his  Lordship  did  not 
consider  the  relation  of  such  a  defence  to  the  rule 
that  where  provocation  is  pled  in  palliation  of  an 
assault,  the  assault  must  be  shown  to  have  followed 
immediately  on  the  provocation  (Macdonald,  p.  94), 
so  that  a  long  course  even  of  persecution,  and  a  fortidri 
of  unhappiness,  would  not  be  enough-unless  coupled 
with  a  final  provocative  act. 
Since  section  3  does  not  apply  to  Scotland  the 
position  remains  doubtful.  The  mere  fact  of  its  non- 
application  may,  if  anything,  tell  against  its  acceptance 
in  Scotland  -  the  Court  cannot  refer  to  Hansard  to 
see  why  it  was  not  applied,  and  the  obvious  approach 
.  would  be  to  read  the  Act  as  meaning  that  Parliament  did 
not  intend  to  interfere  with  Scots  law  on  this  matter 
by  amending  it  in  the  same  way  as  it  amended  the  law  of 
England.  (The  Lord  Advocate's  reason  for  not  applying 
the  section  to  Scotland  even  'for  the  removal  of  doubt', 
so  to  speak,  was  that  to  do  so  would  mean  'that  it 
night  be  said  that  a  judge,  in  circumstances  in  which  he 
felt  that  there  was  an  opportunity  for  a  verdict  of 
culpable  homicide  rather  than  a  verdict  of  murder,  but 525 
there  did  not  exist  either  provocation  by  words  or 
provocation  by  actions,  would  be  bound  to  withdraw  the 
possibility  of  culpable  homicide  from  the  jury'  - 
Hansard,  supra  Col.  786-7  -  which  I  do  not  understand. 
If  there  is  provocation  neither  by  words  nor  actings 
there  is  no  provocation,  and  no  alteration  of  the  law 
of  provocation  is  going  to  affect  the  matter.  Nor 
is  the  law  of  provocation  going  to  affect  any  other 
ground  on  which  a  murder  charge  might  be  reducible 
to  one  of  culpable  homicide.  )  Professor  Smith's  view 
in  1953  was  that  words  of  insult,  as  against  verbal 
information,  had  always  been  regarded  as  insufficient 
to  constitute  provocation  (T.  B.  Smith,  op.  cit.  loc.  cit.  ). 
In  1957,  he  said  of  section  3  that  'In  the  English  law 
of  murder  now,  as  in  Scotland,  rigid  categori:  Es  of 
provocation  have  been  discarded'  (T.  B.  Smith,  'Malice 
in  Murderland',  1957  S.  L.  T.  (News),  129,130),  but  this 
remark  follows  on  a  discussion  of  Holmes  (supra)  and  may 
be  restricted  to  adultery  cases.  Professor  Smith's 
view  in  his  textbook  (in  1955)  was  that  'Verbal 
provocation  of  the  nature  of  mere  vulgar  abuse  will 
generally  not  be  accepted  as  sufficient'  (T.  B.  Smith, 
732),  and  this  may  well  represent  the  law.  I  would 
suggest  that  it  may  be  the  law  that  words  of  insult  will 
be  accepted  as  provocation  in  exceptional  circumstances 
(such  as  that  of  the  'Dunkirk  harrier'),  but  'mere 
vulgar  abuse'  never,  if  by  that  term  is  meant  just 
abusive  language  having  no,  particular  relation  to  th 
circumstances  of  the  accused.  I  find  it  difficult  to 
envisage  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  treating  a 
direction  by  a  trial  Judge  that  the  jury  should  disregard 
provocative  words  as  a  misdirection  in  law,  but  on  the 
other  hand,  it  will  always  be  open  to  a  trial  Judge  to 
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circumstances  of  the  case  verbal  provocation  can  amount 
to  provocation  in  law.  Whatever  the  books  say,  the 
jury  always  have  the  last  word  if  they  wish  to  reduce  a 
murder  charge  to  one  of  culpable  homicide.  Furthermore, 
if  it  is  still  the  law  that  murder  requires  malice, 
a  Judge  need  only  direct  the  jury  that  if  they  find  the 
accused  was  not  actuated  by  malice  they  may  reduce  the 
charge,  and  to  indicate  to  the  jury,  or  leave  it  to  them 
to  deduce,  that  the  presence  of  provocation  may  denote 
the  absence  of  malice.  On  the  narrower  question 
of  the  law  of  provocation  I  would  submit,  however, 
that  the  'written  law'  still  is  that  words  of  insult, 
however  pointedly  directed  at  the  accused's  particular 
susceptibilities,  do  not  constitute  provocation,  and 
that  the  same  applies  to  insulting  actions. 
(iii)  Third  party  provocation.  If  loss  of  control 
is  taken  as  the  only  important  element  in  provocation, 
and  the  question  who  started  the  trouble  regarded  as 
unimportant,  there  is  no  reason  to  confine  provocation 
to  provocation  by  the  deceased.  Provocation  by  A 
which  causes  B  to  lose  control  and  kill  C  could  then 
operate  to  reduce  B's  crime  to  culpable  homicide, 
just  as  provocation  by  C  could  have  done.  Thus,  as 
Professor  Smith  points  out  ('M4aline  in  Murderland', 
1957  S.  Z.  T.  (News)  129,130)  Iago's  statements  to 
Othello  could  rank  as  provocation,  since  they  gave  him 
information  regarding  Desdemona's  adultery  which  led 
him  to  kill  her  while  suffering  from  loss  of  control 
as  a  result  of  discovering  her  adultery.  Provocation 
does  not  justify  homicide  (as  Donnedieu  de  Vabres 
points  out,  if  A  kills  a  husband  in  order  to  prevent 
the  latter  killing  the  wife  he  has  discovered  in 
adultery,  A's  action  is  justifiable  -  Donnedieu  do 
Vabres,  p.  232),  it  only  operates  as  a  mitigating  factor. 527 
That  being  so,  it  should  be  concerned  solely  with  tba 
accused's  state  of  mind,  should  look  at  the  situation 
solely  from  the  accused's  point  of  view:  and  from 
Othello's  point  of  view  Iago's  lies  were  just  as 
provocative  as  a  true  confession  from  Desdemona  would 
have  been. 
One  can  figure  other  situations  in  which  an  accused 
may  be  taunted  into  killing  someone  in  circumstances 
in  which  the  taunter  cannot  be  charged  with  murder 
because  the  accused  must  be  regarded  as  a  free  agent, 
but  in  which  at  the  same  time  it  would  be  unfair  not 
to  allow  the  taunts  to  rank  as  provocation.  Suppose 
A  meets  B.  who  many  years  earlier  killed  A's  mother, 
and  C,  who  has  a  grudge  of  his  own  against  B. 
Suppose  C  reveals  B's  guilt  to  A  and  expresses  the  view 
that  A  should  now  kill  B-  so  far,  if  A  kills  B  he  is 
guilty  of  murder.  But  suppose  C  expresses  contempt  for 
A's  reluctance  to  kill  B,  casts  scorn  on  A's  devotion 
to  his  mother,  taunts  A  with  cowardice,  and  so  on, 
until  A  gives  way  under  the  pressure  and  kills  B. 
Surely,  in  such  circumstances,  if  the  law  recognises 
provocation  by  words  at  all,  it  should  sustain  a  plea 
of  provocation  by  A.  (This  may  sound  fantastic,  but 
such  a  situation  might  arise  if,  e.  g.  B  was  a  former 
concentration-camp  guard  who  had".  tortured  A's  mother 
to  death  and  escaped  punishment.  ) 
The  degree  of  provocation. 
Whatever  the  law  is  regarding  the  nature  of  the 
provocation  it  will  recognise,  it  must  also  decide  what 
degree  of  provocation  it  will  recognise  as  sufficient 
to  reduce  murder  to  culpable  homicide.  In  particular 
it  must.  decide  whether  provocation  is  to  be  measured 
by  reference  to  the  particular  accused,  or  by  reference 
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that  he  in  fact  was  provoked  to  loss  of  control  by  the 
actings  of  the  deceased,  or  must  he  show  in  addition 
that  a  reasonable  man  would  have  been  so  provoked? 
Is  the  test  subjective  or  objective? 
It  is  rather  paradoxical  to  talk  of  the  reasonable 
man  in  this  connection,  and  to  ask  ';  7ould  the  reasonable 
man  have  been  provoked  to  the  extent  of  losing  control 
of  himself?  '  This  is  because  (i)  if  it  can  be  said 
that  the  reasonable  man  would  have  lost  control,  then 
the  accused  behaved  as  a  reasonable  man,  and,  generally, 
to  behave  as  a  reasonable  man  is  to  fulfil  all  one's  legal 
duties;  and  (ii)  it  is  strange  to  talk  of  the 
provoked  reasonable  man,  of  the  extent  to  which  a 
reasonable  man  is  likely  to  lose  his  reason,  and  of 
what  constitutes  reasonable  action  on  the  part  of  a 
man  who  is  ex  hyp6thesi  suffering  from  an  inability 
to  control  his  actions  by  the  use  of  his  reason.  The 
question  really  is  'Mould  the  average  man  have  lost 
control?  ',  or  rather  'Was  it  to  be  expected  that  a 
normal  average  man  would  lose  control  as  a  result  of 
the  provocation  offered?  ' 
The  test  of  the  reasonable  man. 
The  arguments  for  and  against  the  reasonable  man 
test  can  best  be  appreciated  in  the  light  of  examples, 
and  I  would  therefore  offer  the  following  examples  of 
cases  in  which  the  reasonable  man  test  excludes  a  plea 
of  provocation  -I  am  assuming,  of  course,  that  the 
provocation  in  question  is  of  a  nature  recognised  by 
the  law,  and  that  the  only  question  is  one  of  degree. 
In  Bedder  v.  D.  P.  P.  ([19543  1  W.  L.  R.  1119)  the 
accused  was  an  impotent  man  who  had  unsuccessfully 
tried  to  have  intercourse  with  a  prostitute.  She 
jeered  at  him  for  his  failure,  hit  him,  and  kicked  him; 
he  lost  control  and  stabbed  her  to  death.  The  House 529 
of  Lords  held  that  as  the  prostitute's  conduct  would 
not  have  provoked  the  reasonaole  man  into  killing 
her,  the  accused's  conviction  of  murder  must  stand, 
since  the  fact  of  his  impotence  could  not  be  taken 
into  account. 
The  second  example  was  given  by  Mr.  A.  Greenwood, 
M.  P.  in  one  of  the  debates  on  the  Homicide  Act  (Hansar(% 
House  of  Commons,  15  Nov.,  1956,  Vol.  560,  Col.  1165). 
Two  Yugoslavs  were  working  on  a  farm  in  England;  one 
had  fought  with  the  partisans  and  all  his  family 
had  been  killed  by  the  Germans;  the  other  had  been 
a  Quisling.  One  day  the  partisan  broke  down  and 
wept  over  the  fate  of  his  family,  and  the  Quisling 
jeered  at  him  for  this.  The  partisan  picked  up  an 
axe  and  killed  the  Quisling.  The  partisan  was 
convicted  of  murder  and  hanged,  no  doubt  at  least  partly 
because  of  the  nature  of  the  provocation  offered. 
But  even  if  verbal  provocation  is  admitted,  as  it 
now  is  in  England,  he  would  still  be  guilty  of  murder 
if  the  degree  of  provocation  were  tested  by  reference 
to  a  similar  situation  involving  two  Englishmen.  It 
is  clear  that  justice  requires  that  the  peculiar 
relationship  of  the  two  men  to  each  other,  one  a 
partisan  and  one  a  Quisling,  should  be  taken  into 
account  in  considering  the  defence  of  provocation. 
The  arguments  in  favour  of  the  reasonable  man  test. 
The  reason  given  for  the  adoption  of  the  test  is  that 
'if  it  were  not  so  there  might  be  circumstances  in 
which  a  bad-tempered  man  would  be  acquitted  and  a  good- 
tempered  man  would  be  hanged,  which,  of  course,  is 
neither  lawaoer  sense'  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Lord  Cooper, 
Q.  5367).  It  is  submitted,  with  the  greatest  respect, 
that  this  argument  is  itself  neither  law  nor  sense. 
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of  convicting  him  of  culpable  homicide  and  not  of 
murder.  And,  as  is  pointed  out  by  Mr.  J.  W.  C.  Turner 
in  Russel  on  Crime  (11th  edn.  p.  608),  there  can 
never  be  any  question  of  hanging  the  good-tempered  man. 
If  the  good  and  bad  tempered  man  are  thought  of  as 
being  the  two  extremes  on  either  side  of  the  reasonable 
man,  the  good  man  will  never  need  to  invoke  the  plea 
of  provocation,  because  he  will  never  be  provoked  into 
killing  anyone.  If  the  good-tempered  man  is  the 
reasonable  man,  he  will  be  provoked  only  by  what 
would  provoke  the  reasonable  man,  and  so  will  never  be 
hanged.  The  good  tempered  man  cannot  be  hanged  on  the 
objective  test,  and  no  man,  good  or  bad  tempered,  can 
be  hanged  on  the  subjective  test,  if  he  was  in  fact 
provoked  so  as  to  lose  control.  The  good-tempered 
man  cannot  be  aff  ected  by  the  extension  of  a  rule  of 
law  which  at  its  narrowest  is  sufficient  to  protect  him. 
The  real  objection,  of  course,  is  to  allowing  the 
bad-tempered  man  to  use  his  bad  temper  as  an  excuse. 
But  to  refuse  to  allow  this  'may  be  in  effect  to 
inflict  punishment  not  so  much  in  respect  of  the  particular 
act  of  deliberate  malice,  as  of  a  want  of  habitual 
control  over  a  mind  naturally  impetuous  and  ready  to 
break  forth  on  slight  occasions'  (Fourth  Report  of 
Her  Majesty's  Commissioners  on  Criminal  Law  of  1839, 
Parl.  Papers,  1839,  xix;  Digest,  Art.  43,  n.  (i)).  It 
would  be  as  illogical  as  punishing  a  drunk  man  for  his 
drunkenness  by  convicting  him  of  murder,  which,  of 
course,  is  what  the  law  sometimes  does. 
Even  if  we  accept  that  the  law  has  a  duty  to  curb 
the  bad-tempered,  and  that  a  man  cannot  plead  his  'want 
of  habitual  control  over  a  mind...  ready  to  break  forth 
on  slight  occasions',  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the 
law  must  adopt  the  test  of  the  reasonable  man  in  its 
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giving  way  to  temper,  and  losing  control  in  circumstances 
in  which  it  would  be  unfair  wholly  to  blame  one  for 
doing  so.  The  scope  of  the  plea  of  provocation  can 
be  restricted,  and  the  principle  of  deterrence 
sufficiently  satisfied,  it  is  submitted,  by  asking  if 
the  accused  made  any  effort  to  control  himself.  (This 
requirement,  incidentally,  might  result  in  the  conviction 
for  murder  of  indignant  husbands  who  as  the  law  now 
stands  are  convicted  only  of  culpable  homicide.  ) 
He  would  have  to  satisfy  the  jury  that  he  did  not  just 
'fly  off  the  handle'  and  indulge  his  temper  because 
that  was  the  easiest  way  of  reacting  to  the  situation: 
he  would  have  to  show  that  he  was  provoked  beyond  his 
endurance.  It  seems  unfair  to  ask  that  he  should  go 
further  and  show  that  he  was  provoked  beyond  the 
endurance  of  the  reasonable  man,  i.  e.  in  practice, 
show  that  he  was  provoked  beyond  what  the  Judge  or 
jury,  sitting  in  the  calm  atmosphere  of  the  Court, 
think  would  have  been  the  extent  of  their  endurance. 
The  arguments  against  the  objective  test.  (i)  As 
Mr.  J.  W.  C.  Turner  points  out,  the  decision  in  Bedder 
(supra)  is  'one  more  illustration  of  the  way  in  which  a 
point  of  evidence  has  been  allowed  to  slide  into  a 
point  of  law  and  the  inevitable  mischief  which  thereby 
results'  (Russell  on  Crimes,  11th  edn.  P.  594).  It 
is,  in  fact,  the  most  obvious  example  of  the  operation 
of  the  principle  of  disfacilitation  (supraiyD). 
Instead  of  being  used  as  a  way  of  testing  the  truth 
of  the  accused's  statement  that  he  lost  self-control, 
the  reasonable  man  has  been  turned  into  an  objective 
standard  of  self-control.  Even  if  the  jury  believe 
that  the  accused  in  fact  lost  control  to  an  extreme 
degree,  and  that  he  killed  because  of  this,  they  must 
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reasonable  man  would  have  lost  control  to  that  degree, 
a  result  which,  it  is  submitted,  is  clearly  unjust, 
especially  when  what  is  in  question  is  not  the  objective 
rightness  of  what  was  done,  but  the  degree  of  punish- 
ment  which  should  be  inflicted  on  the  particular 
accused.  If  the  accused's  alleged  loss  of  self- 
control  was  something  which  the  jury  feel  was  quite 
unusual  and  unexpected  in  the  circumstances  this  may 
properly  lead  them  to  refuse  to  believe  that  he  did 
lose  control,  but  if  they  do  believe  it,  its  unexpected- 
ness  seems  unimportant  -  even  the  law  must  recognise 
that  the  unexpected  can  happen. 
(ii)  The  objective  test  is  also  open  to  the 
criticism  that  it  refuses  to  recognise  that  certain 
groups  of  people  are  more  susceptible  to  certain  types 
of  provocation  than  are  others.  Even  within  the 
principle  of  disfacilitation,  so  to  speak,  its  standard 
is  too  impersonal  -  it  deals  always  with  'the 
reasonable  man',  the  man  on  top  of.  a  tram  in  Sauchiehall 
Street,  instead,  for  example,  of  dealing  with  the 
reasonable  Yugoslav  in  a  case  in  which  the  accused  is 
a  Yugoslav,  or  the  reasonable  impotent  man,  in  a 
case  in  which  the  accused  is  impotent.  Any  reasonable 
person  -  in  the  non-legal  meaning  of  the  word  - 
would  consider  the  accused  in  the  two  examples  given 
as  being  more  deserving  of  sympathy  than  a  normal  man 
like  Kizilevizcius  who  disarmed  and  killed  his 
father  (Kizileviczius,  1938  J.  C.  60)  or  the  four 
accused  in  VI'Guiness  (1937  J.  C.  3'7)  who  wantonly 
slaughtered  the  deceased  because  he  had  challenged 
one  of  them  to  a  fight.  It  is,  with  respect,  wrong  to 
say,  as  did  the  House  of  Lords  in  Bedder  (r1954]  1  W.  L.  R. 
1119,  Lord  Simonds,  L.  C.  at  p.  1123)  that  'It  would  be 
plainly  illogical  not  to  recognise  an  unusually 
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a  matter  to  be  taken  into  account  but  yet  to  recognise 
for  that  purpose  some  unusual  physical  characteristic'. 
Let  us  assume  that  the  standard  is  the  even-tempered 
man  -  why  must  it  be  the  even-tempered  potent  healthy 
average  Scotsmarc.  Of  course  such  a  person  is  not 
going  to  kill  someone  who  says,  'You're  the  scum 
of  the  earth,  you  dirty  Jew',  but  that  is  no  reason 
for  refusing  a  priori  to  accept  that  such  a  remark 
might  in  some  circumstances  provoke  a  survivor  of 
Belsen  into  killing  the  person  who  said  it;  conversely 
the  fact  that  a  Glaswegian  might  be  provoked  into 
doing  violence  by  being  called  a  'f...  g  Billy  boy' 
(cf.  M'Guiness  supra),  does  not  mean  that  a  negro  who 
reacts  violently  to  such  a  remark  is  entitled  to  claim 
the  same  degree  of  loss  of  self-control  through 
provocation,  just  because  he  happens  to  stand  trial 
for  murder  in  Glasgow.  If  the  examples  seem 
somewhat  far-fetched  and  ludicrous,  that  is  because  the 
objective  test,  taken  these  lengths,  is  far-fetched  and 
ludicrous. 
(iii)  The  purpose  of  the  plea  of  provocation  is 
to  enable  the  law  to  take  cognisance  of  the  plight  of 
the  individual  accused  and  to  override  to  some  extent 
the  principle  of  deterrence.  This  purpose  will  be 
defeated  by  the  laying  down  of  general  rules  ab  ante 
as  to  the  circumstances  in  which  a  plea  of  provocation 
can  be  accepted.  It  is  the  purpose  of  the  law  'to 
curb  and  repress  a  jealous,  choleric,  or  quarrelsome 
humour,  so  far  as  this  can  be  done  without  injustice 
in  the  particular  case'  (Hume,  i.  249),  and  justice 
in  each  particular  case  requires  an  investigation  of  the 
circumstances  of  that  case,  and  an  assessment  of  the 
position  of  the  particular  accused;  it  cannot  be  done 
by  ignoring  the  particular  case  and  concentrating 
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is  replaced  by  a  legal  fiction.  Just  as  the  trivial 
nature  of  the  provocation  offered,  the  unexpectedness 
of  the  accused's  loss  of  control  may  help  the  jury 
to  disbelieve  his  story,  so  the  fact  that  he  was 
impotent,  or  a  Negro,  or  the  fact  that  the  deceased 
was  a  prostitute,  or  a  member  of  the  Ku  Klux  Klan, 
may  help  them  to  understand  why  the  accused  reacted 
as  he  dia,  and  lead  them  to  believe  his  story. 
The  Scots  law. 
The  law  of  Scotland  has  never  considered  this 
problem.  The  Crown  Agent  told  the  Royal  Commission 
that  the  test  was  the  reaction  of  the  particular 
accused  (R.  C.  Evid.  of  Crown  Agent,  Q.  1934);  this 
was  specifically  contradicted  by  Lord  Cooper  who  said 
that  the  laws  the  same  as  in  England  (R.  C.  Evid.  of 
Lord  Cooper,  Q.  5366?,  Macdonald  also  adopts  the 
objective  test  (Macdonald,  p.  93).  Professor  Smith 
suggests  that  Scots  law  may  avoid  the  grosser 
absurdities  of  the  objective  test  by  taking  into 
account  the  special  features  of  the  situation  -  i.  e. 
by  applying  the  test  not  of  the  reasonable  potent, 
but  of  the  reasonable  impotent  man,  in  a  situation 
like  that  in  Bedder  (supra),  but  it  is  only  a 
tentative  suggestion.  He  says,  'In  Scotland,  it  may 
this  italics]  be  competent  to  consider  factors  which 
make  the  particular  accused  more  sensitive  to  certain 
forms  of  insult  than  would  the  ordinary  Scotsman  -  as, 
for  example,  taunts  regarding  religion,  race,  colour 
or  physical  deformity'  (T.  B.  Smith,  'Malice  in  Murder- 
land',  1957  S.  L.  T.  129,130).  But  he  rejects  the 
wholly  subjective  approach  (T.  B.  Smith,  p.  731). 
This  solution,  it  is  submitted,  is  unsatisfactory, 
although  it  is  preferable  to  a  purely  objective 
approach.  For  how  are  we  to  decide  which  of  the 53  5 
features  in  any  situation  is  to  be  regarded  as 
sufficiently  special  to  be  taken  into  account?  For 
example,  is  the  reaction  of  a  Belfast  Catholic  to 
religious  provocation  to  be  measured  by  the  standards 
of  the  reasonable  Belfast  Catholic,  the.  reasonable 
Edinburgh  Catholic,  the  reasonable  Irishman,  the 
reasonable  Ulsterman,  etc.?  It  may  be  possible 
to  exclude  the  accused's  unusual  pugnacity  from 
consideration,  but  apart  from  that  it  is  very  difficult 
to  find  a  resting-place  between  the  wholly  subjective 
test  and  the  Bedder  test. 
The  situation,  as  in  the  question  of  the  nature 
of  the  provocation  recognised  by  the  law,  appears  to  be 
that  if  the  law  is  to  be  found  by  asking  what  the 
Courts  will  probably  decide  in  fact,  then,  on  my 
prediction,  the  law  is  as  laid  down  in  Bedder.  But 
if  one  applies  the  principles  of  Scots  law,  and  in 
particular  the  principle  that  the  absence  of  malice 
or  wickedness  reduces  murder  to  culpable  homicide, 
then  logically  Scots  law  must  adopt  the  wholly 
subjective  test.  But  then,  one  of  the  few  things 
one  can  say  with  assurance  about  Scots  criminal  law 
is  that  it  is  not  logical. 
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Chapter  14:  Criminal  Negligence. 
I-  CULPABLE  HOMICIDE. 
Introduction. 
The  most  important  and  the  commonest  crime  of 
negligence  is  involuntary  culpaole  homicide,  and  the 
problems  of  criminal  negligence  are  best  studied  by 
reference  to  that  crime.  Involuntary  culpable 
homicide  is,  of  course,  completely  different  in  kind 
from  voluntary  culpable  homicide  which  is  just  murder 
committed  under  such  mitigating  circumstances  as  operate 
to  reduce  the  appropriate  penalty  from  death  or  life 
imprisonment  to  some  lesser  punishment.  Involuntary 
culpable  ho#icide  -  and  when  the  term  'culpable 
homicide'  is  used  in  this  chapter  it  is  used  to  mean 
involuntary  culpable  homicide  -  is  the  causing  of 
death  unintentionally  but  either  with  a  degree  of 
negligence  which  is  regarded  as  sufficient  to  make  tie 
homicide  culpable  in  the  circumstances,  or  in 
circumstances  in  which  the  law  regards  the  causing  of 
death  as  criminal  even  in  the  absence  of  any  negligence. 
It  will  be  useful,  I  think,  to  set  out  the  various 
kinds  of  unintentional  homicide  without  employing  the 
rather  confused  terminology  of  Scots  law.  They  were 
set  out  by  Maimonides  in  the  twelfth  century  as  follows: 
'There  are  three  types  of  slayers  without 
intent  . 
One  slays  inadvertently  and  in  complete 
unawareness... 
Another  slays  inadvertently  in  a  manner  that 
is  almost  an  accident,  such  as  when  the  death  is 
the  result  of  some  unusual  circumstance,  uncommon 
amid  the  greater  part  of  human  events... 
Still  another  slays  inadvertently  but  in  a 
manner  that  approximates  wilfulness  because  there 55'/ 
is  present  a  circumstance  tantamount  to 
negligence,  or  because  he  should  have  been 
careful  but  was  not'  (Maimonides,  Book  of  Torts, 
5.6.1-3,  trans.  H.  Klein,  in  Yale  Judaica 
Series,  the  Code  of  Maimonides,  Vol.  XI,  p.  212). 
An  example  of  the  first  type  would  be  a  man 
falling  off  a  roof  quite  accidentally  and  knocking 
over  and  killing  a  passer-by  on  whom  he  fell.  Here 
it  can  hardly  be  said  that  the  death  is  caused  by  an 
act  of  the  falling  man  at  all.  The  second  type 
covers  cases  where  death  results  from  an  act  of  the 
accused,  but  in  circumstances  where  the  fatal  result 
is  not  reasonably  foreseeable,  and  so  where  no  question 
of  objective  carelessness  arises.  An  example  would 
be  the  case  where  a  slight  slap  caused  death  because 
the  victim  slipped  and  broke  his  neck,  or  because  he 
suffered  from  an  unusual  physical  condition  unknown 
to  his  assailant,  which  rendered  such  a  slap  fatal. 
The  third  type  includes  all  the  various  degrees 
of  negligence,  and  can  be  divided  according  to  the 
number  of  degrees  of  negligence  recognised  by  the  legal 
dystem  in  question.  Scots  law  appears  to  recognise 
two  main  degrees  of  negligence  -  gross  negligence, 
and  negligence  which  is  not  so  gross.  The  second 
degree  is  measured  by  the  same  standard  as  is  used 
in  civil  claims  for  reparation,  by  reference  to  the 
care  exercised  by  the  reasonable  man.  The  first 
degree  cannot  be  measured  by  reference  to  any  standard 
at  all.  It  is  usually  described  as  gross,  or  palpable, 
or  wicked,  or  even  just  as  criminal.  Into  which 
degree  a  particular  case  falls  is  a  question  of  fact, 
a  question  for  the  jury,  and  the  only  help  they  are 
given  by  the  Judge  is  by  way  of  the  epithets  just 
mentioned,  which  are  hardly  more  than  vituperative 
and  have  no  definite  meaning.  Presumably  the  jury 538 
simply  look  at  the  facts,  and  then  look  again,  and  come 
to  a  decision.  The  simplest  way  for  them  to  decide 
would  probably  be  for  them  to  imagine  they  were  witness- 
ing  the  situation  under  examination,  for  example,  the 
situation  in  which  the  accused  drove  his  car  into  a  group 
of  people.  If  their  imagined  reaction  is  'What  a  care- 
less  way  to  drive',  then  they  will  find  that  the 
accused's  negligence  was  of  the  less  gross  variety. 
If  their  reaction  is  'What  a  bloody  stupid  way  to  drive' 
they  will  find  that  the  accused  was  grossly  negligent. 
This  second  type  of  negli,;  ence  is  often  referred  to  as 
recklessness,  but  it  must  be  distinguished  from  an  even 
grosser  degree  of  carelessness,  the  degree  which  is 
so  gross  as  to  amount  to  that  'wicked  and  deliberate' 
recklessness  which  is  considered  as  equivalent  to 
intention,  and  whose  presence  may  make  even 
unintentional  homicide  murder  (cf.  supra  295 
The  present  law  of  Scotland  is  that  where  the 
homicide  is  caused  in  the  course  of  lawful  conduct 
the  negligence  must  be  of  the  gross  type  before  the 
killing  can  be  treated  as  criminal,  but  where  the  death 
is  caused  in  the  course  of  unlawful  conduct  it  will  be 
culpable  homicide  even  in  the  absence  of  any  negligence, 
provided  it  falls  within  Laimonides'  second  type 
of  unintentional  slaying.  It  is  accordingly  necessary 
to  consider  the  law  of  culpable  homicide  in  two 
separate  compartments  -  homicide  in  the  course  of  lawful 
conduct,  and  homicide  in  the  course  of  unlawful  conduct. 
Homicide  in  the  course  of  lawful  conduct. 
The  old  law. 
Hume  states  that  'It  is  culpable  homicide,  where 
slaughter  follows  on  the  doing  even-of  a  lawful  act; 
if  it  is  done  without  that  caution  and  circumspection 
which  may  serve  to  prevent  harm  to  others'  (Hume,  i.  233), 539 
which  just  means  that  any  negligent  homicide  is 
criminal.  Hume  gives  the  following  as  examples  of 
culpable  homicide  -  'if  a  man  leave  his  fowling-piece 
loaded,  and  afterwards  kill  in  trying  the  lock,  having 
forgot  the  condition  in  which  he  left  the  piece:  Or 
if  in  driving  any  carriage  through  the  streets  of  a 
town,  the  driver  quit  his  horses,  and  they  run  off 
with  the  carriage,  and  a  passenger  is  killed:  Or 
if  workmen  on  the  roof  of  a  building  by  the  side  of  a 
highway  throw  down  slates  or  rubbish,  without  timely 
warning  to  the  passenger.  '  In  all  these  examples, 
Hume  says,  'there  is  a  want  of  that  serious  and 
considerate  regard  to  the  safety  of  one's  neighbour, 
which  justly  makes  one  answerable  for  the  consequences, 
and  punishable  to  such  an  extent  as  may  serve  to  correct 
so  faulty  a  habit  of  mind,  in  one's  self  or  others' 
(Hume,  i.  192-3).  There  is  no  suggestion  that  the 
want  of  regard  must  be  gross  or  palpably  wicked. 
The  progress;  of  this  type  of  culpable  homicide  can 
be  traced  through  the  19th  century  cases,  of  which 
there  is  a  great  variety.  Carelessness  by  chemists 
in  dispensing  drugs  (e.  g.  Robt.  Henderson  and  WJm.  Lawson, 
(1842)  1  Broun  360;  Edmund  Wheatley,  (1853)1  Irv.  225) 
by  builders  in  erecting  buildings  (e.  g.  John  Wilson, 
(1852)  1  Irv.  85;  Alex.  Dickson,  (1847)  Ark.  352), 
by  persons  conducting  blasting  operations  (e.  g.  Jas. 
Finney  (1848)  Ark.  432,  John  Drysdale  and  Ors.,  ib.  440), 
by  pit  managers,  miners,  and  other  persons  in  charge 
of  machinery  (e.  g.  Geo.  Stenhouse  and  Archibald  M'Kay, 
(1852)  1  Irv.  94;  Thos.  Hamilton,  (1874)  3  Coup.  19; 
Robt.  Young,  (1839)  2  Sw.  376),  and,  of  course,  by  drivers 
of  vehicles,  and  in  particular  of  railway  engines,  can 
all  be  found  in  the  nineteenth  century  reports.  The 
standard  of  care  required  was  simply  'due  care  and 
circumspection'.  In  the  case  of  James  Donald  Clark 540 
((18'/7)  3  Coup.  4/2),  who  was  charged  with  causing  death 
by  leaving  explosives  in  a  dangerous  place,  the  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  said  simply  that  if  it  was  the  accused's 
duty  to  keep  the  explosives  in  a  store  and  not  where 
he  in  fact  had  left  them,  then  'if  that  was  his  duty, 
and  if  he  neglected  it,  he  was  guilty'  (at  p.  507). 
The  locus  classicus  of  the  nineteenth  century 
law  of  culpable  homicide  is  the  charge  to  the  jury 
in  the  case  of  Wm.  Paton  and  Rich.  M'Nab  ((1845)  2 
Broun  525).  The  accused  were  a  railway  superintendent 
and  driver  respectively,  and  were  charged  with  culpable 
homicide  after  an  accident  caused  by  their  use  of  a 
defective  rail-:  gay  engine  to  carry  a  passenger  who  had 
missed  the  ordinary  train  fror  Glasgow  to  Edinburgh 
by  a  special  train.  The  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  Lord  Hope, 
said  that 
'The  degree  of  blame,  which  will  constitute 
this  crime,  varies  with  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to 
substantiate  a  charge  of  culpable  homicide, 
either  that  there  should  be  any  intention  to  do 
to  another  the  injury  which  has  occurred,  or 
that  the  party  should  even  know  that  another  is 
actually  exposed  to  risk,  as  in  the  case  of  a  carter 
who  neglects  his  duty  and  runs  down  a  child, 
though  he  may  not  know  that  any  child  is  actually 
near  him. 
The  general  rule  is,  that  every  person, 
placed  in  a  situation  in  which  his  acts  may 
affect  the  ti;  afety  of  others  must  take  all  pre- 
cautions  to  guard  against  the  risk  to  them  arising 
from  what  he  is  doing...  and  if  that  has  been 
omitted,  which  common  sense  and  ordinary  reflectin 
as  to  the  situation  of  others  required,  which 
their  duty  to  the  law  required  for  the  safety 
of  others,  the  guilt  is  clear'  (at  pp.  533-4). 
The  standard  there  set  out  is  the  same  as  the 
present-day  standard  in  civil  law,  and  indeed  Lord 
Hope's  statement  of  the  duty  of  care  sounds  very  like 
Lord  Atkin's  famous  statement  of  the  law  in  Donoghuev. j)41 
Stevenson.  (1932  S.  C.  (H.  L.  )  31,44). 
The  onl,  '  difficulty  in  the  nineteenth  century  cases 
was  that  although  culpable  homicide  consisted  merely 
of  the  negligent  causing  of  death,  it  was  common  to 
libel  as  an  alternative  charge  either  culpable  and  reck- 
less  neglect  or  merely  culpable  neglect,  and  often  both 
were  libelled.  This  was  done  even  when  the  act 
involved  was  not  strictly  lawful.  In  one  case  a 
nursemaid  who  killed  a  child  by  giving  it  laudanum 
for  the  purpose  of  keeping  it  quiet  was  charged  with 
culpable  homicide,  and  also  with  'culpable  and  negligent 
or  culpable  and  reckless  administration  of  laudanum  to 
a  child  to  the  injury  of  the  health  or  danger  of  the 
life  of  such  child',  and  her  plea  to  culpable  and 
negligent  administration  was  accepted  by  the  Crown 
(Jean  Crawford,  (1847)  Ark.  394.  In  Eliz.  Hamilton, 
in  similar  circumstances,  only  a  charge  of  culpable 
homicide  was  brought  -  (1857)  2  Irv.  138).  The 
position  of  the  alternative  charges  was  discussed  in 
Thos.  Henderson  and  Ors.  ((1850)  J.  Shaw,  394),  where 
the  charges  were  of  culpable  homicide,  and  culpable  and 
reckless  neglect  of  duty  by  a  ship's  officer  causing  the 
wreck  of  the  ship  and  loss  of  life.  The  Lord  Justice- 
Clerk  told  the  jury  that  there  was  no  difference 
between  the  charges,  and  described  the  introduction  of 
the  two  charges  as  'inexpedient  and  tending  to  distract 
and  confuse  the  mind  of  the  jury'  (at  p.  437).  The 
jury  however  remained  determinedly  confused,  and 
convicted  one  accused  of  culpable  and  reckless 
neglect  and  another  of  culpable  but  not  reckless  neglect, 
and  the  Court  took  those  distinctions  into  account  in 
passing  sentence. 
The  'confusion'  shown  in  Henderson  has  persisted 
in  the  law  of  culpable  homicide,  and  foreshadows  the 542 
present-day  distinctions  between  culpable  homicide 
and  the  statutory  crime  of  causing  death  by  reckless 
driving  (Road  Traffic  Act,  1956,4  &5  Eliz.  II,  c.  6/ 
s.  8.  of.  Paton,  1936  J.  C.  19,  Andrews  v.  D.  P.  P., 
[1937]  A.  C.  5`%6).  The  two  crimes  of  which  the 
accused  were  convicted  in  Henderson  were  both 
considered  less  serious  than  culpable  homicide,  so  that 
'reckless'  conduct  is  regarded  as  something  less  than 
the  type  of  conduct  necessary  for  a  conviction  of 
culpable  homicide,  although  the  latter  was  said  to  be 
committed,  'whenever  a  person  unintentionally  committed 
an  act  whereby  the  life  of  another  was  lost,  or  where 
he  failed  to  perform  his  duty  when  charged  with  the 
preservation  of  life,  without  having  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  such  neglect,  and  life  was  lost  in  consequence' 
(Henderson,  sum,  at  p.  43'1),  i.  e.  when  culpable 
neglect  results  in  death. 
In  two  subsequent  cases  it  was  argued  that  it  was 
incompetent  to  libel  the  crime  of  causing  death  by 
culpable  neglect  as  an  alternative  to  culpable 
homicide  since  both  crimes  were  the  same.  The  Court 
rejected  the  arguments  holding  that  although  they 
might  be  right  in  principle  there  were  conclusive 
authorities  against  them  (Robt.  Lonie,  (1862)  4  Irv.  204; 
Jos.  Calder,  (1877)  3  Coup.  494).  In  one  case  the 
Crown  stated  specifically  that  'the  charge  might  have 
been  culpable  homicide  only,  but  in  practice  it  has 
been  found  convenient,  to  state  the  charge  in  the  alter- 
native  and  less  serious  form'  (Jos.  Calder,  supra  at 
p.  495).  In  other  words  the  Crown  found  it  convenient 
to  offer  the  jury  an  opportunity  of  convicting  the  accused 
of  something  less  than  culpable  homicide,  in  order 
to  obviate  the  chance  of  their  acquitting  him 
altogether  because  of  their  dislike  of  convicting  of 
culpable  homicide  where  death  was  caused  by  the  accused 543 
while  acting  lawfully.  The  alternative  form  of 
charge  does  not  seem  to  have  been  used  after  1887, 
but  its  place  is  now  taken  by  statutory  charges  in 
the  road  traffic  cases,  which  are  the  only  important 
modern  examples  of  'lawful-act'  culpable  homicide. 
The  law  does  not  appear  to  have  changed  through- 
out  the  nineteenth  century,  but,  apart  from  traffic 
cases,  this  type  of  culpable  homicide  gradually 
disappeared  from  the  reports,  perhaps  because  of  a 
number  of  unsuccessful  prosecutions  (e.  g.  Thos.  Hamilton 
and  1c(nr.,  (1874)  3  Coup.  19,  Geo.  Armitage,  (1885)  5 
Coup.  675,  James  Donald  Clark,  (1877)  3  Coup.  4'/2  and 
506,  John  Faill  and  Ors.,  (1877)  3  Coup.  49'%).  In  1903, 
however,  Lord  M'Laren  said  in  a  case  in  which  the  charge 
was  one  of  culpable  homicide  by  negligently  dispensing 
poison  that  '...  it  would  be  a  very  dangerous  doctrine 
to  lay  down  that  a  man  who  by  mistake  caused  the  death 
of  another  was  free  from  all  blame,  and  from  liability 
to  punishment  merely  because  he  was  able  to  say  that 
he  meant  no  harm,  and  only  neglected  all  the 
precautions  that  experience  has  shewn  to  be  necessary 
in  the  handling  of  poisons'  (Wood,  (1903)  4  Adam  150 
at  p.  160).  But  it  is  quite  clear  that  Lord  i'Laren 
encouraged  the  jury  to  acquit  the  accused,  and  so  to 
avoid  acting  on  his  definition  of  the  crime  of 
culpable  homicide. 
The  modern  law. 
'Lawful  act'  culpable  homicide  seems  almost 
to  have  disappeared  from  the  law  except  for  traffic 
cases.  The  reasons  for  this  are  in  the  main  extra- 
legal.  It  is  true  that  the  use  of  explosives,  and 
the  management  of  factories  and  mines,  are  now  governed 
by  statute  so  that  it  is  possible  to  deal  with  them 
without  reference  to  the  common  lave  -  indeed  even fatal  accidents  caused  by  carelessness  are  normally 
followed  only  by  statutory  prosecutions  (e.  g.  Wilson  v. 
M'Fadyean,  1954  J.  C.  107):  but  road  traffic  is  also 
regulated  by  statute,  and  common  law  prosecutions  far 
culpable  homicide  caused  by  reckless  driving  are  still 
common.  No  one  would  be  taken  seriously  who  suggested 
that  whenever  a  fatal  factory  or  mine  accident  was  caused 
by  gross  negligence,  the  manager  or  foreman  or  other 
person  responsible  should  be  charged  with  culpable 
homicide.  But  on  principle  and  on  nineteenth  century 
authority  such  a  charge  would  be  quite  proper;  and 
such  charges  could  be  brought  where  an  employer  failed 
to  employ  competent  staff  or  to  instruct  his  staff 
properly  (e.  g.  Thos.  Rowbotham  and  Ors.  (1855)  2  Irv. 
89,  Wm.  Baillie,  (1870)  1  Coup.  442),  or  even  where  he 
allowed  the  use  of  dangerous  machinery  which  injured 
a  stranger  (cf.  Vim.  Paton  and  Richd.  II'Nab,  (1845) 
2  Broun  525,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  at  p.  534). 
One  reason  for  the  absence  of  such  prosecutions 
in  this  century  is  the  complex  nature  of  modern 
factories  and  mines  which  makes  it  very  difficult  to 
single  out  the  negligent  party.  The  negligence 
may  be  far  removed  in  time  and  place  from  the  death  - 
the  immediacy  of  the  traffic  accident  is  lacking, 
and  the  feeling  of  indignation  aroused  by  that  immediacy 
is  dissipated  by  the  complexity  of  the  situation  in  a 
factory.  Another  reason  is  probably  the  reluctance 
of  the  authorities  to  brand  a  respectable  factory 
owner  or  senior  employee  as  a  common  law  criminal, 
especially  where  the  circumstances  are  not  such  as  to 
arouse  any  immediate  indignation  which  might  counter- 
balance  this  reluctance.  It  is  accordingly  the 
present  practice,  if  not  the  present  law,  that  an 
employer  who  causes  the  death  of  a  workman  by  gross 
carelessness,  for  example  by  leaving  a  dangerous 545 
machine  unfenced,  or  by  allowing  the  use  of  a  system 
of  working  so  bad  that  its  use  is  'obvious  folly' 
(cf.  Morton  v.  Wm.  Dixon,  Ltd.,  1909  S.  C.  80'?  )l  is  not 
guilty  of  culpable  homicide,  or  indeed  of  any  common 
law  crime.  No  doubt  if  such  a  charge  were  brought, 
the  standard  of  negligence  necessary  for  conviction 
would  be  that  gross,  palpable,  and  wicked,  negligence 
required  in  traffic  cases,  and  it  would  be  very 
difficult  to  establish  this  degree  of  negligence 
in  the  absence  of  anything  akin  to  the  situation  of 
the  reckless  driver  careering  down  the  road  at  speed 
and  running  into  his  victim. 
The  modern  law  on  this  subject  must  therefore  be 
sought  in  the  traffic  cases.  In  the  nineteenth 
century,  as  we  have  seen,  the  standard  of  care  imposed 
by  the  criminal  law  was  the  same  as  that  imposed  by 
the  civil  law  -  reasonable  care.  Signs  of  modern 
developments  can,  however,  be  seen  in  the  case  of 
Vim.  Dreyer  and  Vim.  Tyre  ((1885)  5  Coup.  680)  which  arose 
out  of  a  shipping  collision.  The  accused  were  charged 
with  culpable  homicide,  or  culpable  and  reckless 
negligence  -  sic  -  by  members  of  a  ship's  crew  in 
failing  to  keep  a  proper  lookout.  Lord  Young  directed 
the  jury  that 
'....  the  law  upon  this  subject  undoubtedly 
is,  that  any  person  who  is  in  a  situation  charged 
with  a  duty  which  involves  the  safety  of  human 
life,  must  observe  care  and  caution  in  the  dis- 
charge  of  his  duty,  or  at  least  an  absence  of  gross 
negligence  and  recklessness.  I  put  it  to  you 
in  that  way,  gentlemen,  because  it  is  not  any 
slight  fault  or  neglect  which  will  make  a  man  a 
criminal;  it  must  be  a  notable  and  serious 
fault  or  neglect  by  a  man  upon  whose  care  and 
caution  the  safety  of  human  life  depends' 
(at  p.  686). 5+6 
Lord  Young  requires  more  than  ordinary  negligence, 
he  requires  'gross  negligence'.  The  reason  for  this 
development  was  clearly  a  feeling  of  sympathy  with 
the  sailors,  a  feeling  that  'it  is  hard  to  impute 
crime,  and  it  will  require  exceptional  circumstances 
to  impute  crime,  to  a  man  who  is  present  at  his  post, 
on  the  spot  where  his  duty  requires  him  to  be, 
attending  to  his  duty  to  the  best  of  his  ability, 
and  to  nothing  else'  (ib.  at  p.  687).  The  benefit 
of  this  attitude  has  now,  however,  been  extended  to 
motor  car  drivers  driving  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the 
criminal  provisions  of  the  Road  Traffic  Acts. 
Dreyer  and  Tyre  did  not  establish  any  definite 
change  in  the  law.  In  1907,  for  example,  an  engine 
driver  who  failed  to  adhere  to  the  proper  method  of 
driving  in  a  snowstorm  and  as  a  result  ran  into  a 
station  and  killed  twenty-two  people,  was  charged 
simply  with  failing  to  take  the  necessary  precautions 
and  killing  the  victims.  The  words  'reckless'  and 
'negligent'  do  not  appear  in  the  indictment,  and  the 
report  of  the  Judge's  charge  is  unhelpful  (Gourlay, 
(1907)  5  Adam,  295). 
The  next  case  of  interest  is  Waugh  v.  Campbell 
(1920  J.  C.  1).  The  accused  was  charged  with 
driving  'recklessly  and  negligently',  contrary  to 
section  1  of  the  Motor  Car  Act  of  1903  (3  Edw.  VII, 
c.  36);  he  had  taken  a  blind  corner  on  the  wrong 
side  of  the  road,  without  sounding  his  horn,  and  had 
collided  with  a  car  coming  in  the  opposite  direction. 
The  Sheriff-substitute  acquitted  him  on  the  ground  that 
there  was  nothing  to  show  either  recklessness  or 
negligence,  since  at  the  time  the'  road  had  seemed 
clear.  The  High  Court  reversed  this  decision,  and 
held  that  there  had.  been  negligence  within  the 547 
meaning  of  the  Act,  but  they  took  the  opportunity 
to  observe  that  the  statutory  negligence  differed  from 
common  law  negligence,  and  that  the  Sheriff  had  erred 
in  applying  the  common  law  requirement  of  moral  blame. 
This  case  sets  the  tone  for  the  modern  law  in  that 
it  states  clearly  that  there  are  two  types  of  road 
traffic  negligence  (or  rather  at  least  two  types  - 
the  Court  do  not  appear  to  have  been  concerned  with  the 
fact  that  the  accused  was  charged  with  both  recklessness 
and  negligence,  while  the  statute  prohibited  reckless 
or  negligent  driving)  -  one,  a  minor  degree  of 
negligence,  is  a  statutory  offence;  the  other,  a 
gross  degree  of  negligence,  is  a  common  law  offence. 
Lord  Salvesen  pointed  out  that  'the  statutory 
offence  may  be  constituted  merely  by  negligence, 
although  the  judge  who  tries  the  case  thinks  the 
negligence  was  not  gross  negligence  and  involved 
no  moral  blame'  (at  p.  6),  although  it  is  not  clear 
what  sort  of  blame  his  Lordship  thought  attached  to 
common  law  negligence.  He  also  specifically 
distinguished  the  civil  and  criminal  standards, 
saying  'We  are  quite  familiar  with  cases  in  which  drivers 
are  found  liable  by  a  jury  for  negligence  involving 
loss  of  life  or  injury  to  person,  and  yet  the  public 
prosecutor  would  never  dream  of  bringing  a  complaint' 
(at  p.  5).  (His  Lordship  also  showed  a  remarkable 
lack  of  prescience  when  he  said  that  the  best  way  to 
remedy  the  apparent  contradiction  between  the  common 
and  statutory  law  would  be  to  alter  the  statute  to 
conform  with  the  common  law,  since  'It  may  have  been 
that,  when  the  statute  was  framed,  a  motor  car  was 
looked  upon  as  an  instrument  of  greater  danger 
to  the  public  than  we  are  now  accustomed  to  consider 
it,  and  I  think  it  would  be  better  if  legislation 548 
with  regard  to  motor  cars  were  brought  more  up  to  date' 
-  at  p.  5.  ) 
Althoughthere  was  no  argument  or  citation  of 
authorities  on  the  common  law  in  Waugh,  the  dicta 
are  in  accord  with  the  twentieth  century  attitude 
to  traffic  cases.  There  may,  however,  have  been  some 
doubt  on  the  matter  in  the  1920's,  and  in  1931  a  short 
extract  from  a  charge  by  lord  Alness  in  a  culpable 
homicide  case  was  reported.  His  Lordship  said  'At 
one  time  in  our  law  it  was  quite  sufficient  to 
establish  a  charge  of  culpable  homicide  that  any  fault 
on  the  part  of  the  accused  resulting  in  the  death  of 
a  fellow  human  being  had  been  established.  I  do  not 
think  that  that  is  the  law  today...  The  carelessness 
which  the  Crown  must  prove,  according  to  our  conception 
of  the  law  today,  in  a  case  of  this  kind,  must  be 
gross  and  palpable  carelessness'  (Cranston,  1931  J.  C.  28). 
This  standard  was  approved  by  the  Court  of  Criminäl 
Appeal  in  the  case  of  Paton  (1936  J.  C.  19),  where  it 
was  said  that  there  must  be  'gross,  or  wicked,  or 
criminal  negligence,  something  amounting,  or  at 
any  rate  analogous  to,  a  criminal  indifference  to 
the  consequences'  (Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison  at  p. 
22).  The  Court  were  rather  reluctant  to  set  such  a 
high  standard,  and  Lord  Aitchison  went  so  for  as  to 
suggest  that  this  'unfortunate  modification'  of  the 
old  law  should  perhaps  be  reconsidered.  Yet  the 
only  authority  quoted  to  the  Court  was  Cranston,  and 
there  seems  to  have  been  nothing  to  prevent  them 
reconsidering  the  matter  there  and  then.  One.  can 
only  surmise  that  the  strict  standard  had  become 
very  generally  accepted,  perhaps  because  of  the  refusal 
of  juries  to  convict  drivers  except  in  extreme  cases. 
The  standard  in  Paton  is  not  only  extreme,  it  is 
also  rather  vague.  It  is  clear  that  recklessness 549 
sufficient  to  entail  conviction  for  reckless  driving 
under  section  11  of  the  Road  Traffic  Act  1930  (20 
and  21  Geo.  V.,  c.  43),  or  to  entail  conviction 
for  causing  death  by  reckless  driving  under  section  8 
of  the  1956  Act  (4  &5  Eliz.  II.  c.  60,  is  not 
sufficient  to  entail  conviction  for  culpable  homicide, 
but  that  is  all  that  is  clear.  (Cf.  Andrews  v.  D.  P.  P. 
[19371A.  C.  576.  It  might  be  arguable  that  sections 
11  and  8  lay  down  two  standards,  that  of  recklessness, 
and  that  of  driving  without  due  care  and  attention, 
and  that  although  carelessness  of  the  second  standard 
would  not  be  enough  for  culpable  homicide,  carelessness 
of  the  first  would.  But  it  is  not  clear  why  the  same 
section  should  impose  the  same  penalty  for  two  different 
degrees  of  offence,  and  in  any  event  the  Courts  seem  to 
take  the  view  that  recklessness  under  the  section  is 
something  less  than  the  gross  carelessness  required 
for  a  common  law  conviction.  Charges  under  section  11 
often  recite  both  halves  of  the  section,  and  no 
distinction  is  made  between  them  on  conviction  -  of. 
Archibald  v.  Beiller, 
_ 
1931  J.  C.  34.  )  To  say  that 
there  must  be  criminal  negligence  before  there  can 
be  a  conviction  for  culpable  homicide  is  tautologous, 
unless  the  word  'criminal'  is  used  emotively;  to 
say  there  must  be  gross,  or  wicked,  or  palpable, 
negligence,  is  just  to  say  that  there  must  be  negligence, 
and  to  add  an  expletive.  The  assessment  of  negligence 
is  very  much  a  jury  question,  and  therefore  there  can 
be  no  definite  categories  of  negligence.  All  that 
Paton  means  is  that  the  jury  ought  not  to  convict  of 
culpable  homicide  unless  they  feel  the  accused  has 
been  very  careless  indeed.  Juries,  are  of  course, 
only  too  willing  not  to  convict  drivers  of  culpable 
homicide,  and  the  modern  development  of  the  law 
probably  owes  a  great  deal  to  the  fact  that  whereas 550 
nineteenth  century  Judges  and  juries  did  not  drive 
railway  engines  but  were,  on  the  contrary,  passengers, 
and  modern  Judges  and  juries  do  drive  cars,  and  are 
easily  moved  by  arguments  of  the  'There  but  for  the 
grace...  '  kind.  Before  they  will  convict  they  must 
be  convinced  that  the  accused  behaved  in  a  way  that 
they  would  not  behave,  and  that  is  why  they  must  be 
convinced  he  behaved  'wickedly'  and  'criminally'. 
The  development  is  also  due  to  the  tendency  of 
juries,  a  tendency  already  present  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  to  adopt  the  halfway  house  of  convicting 
on  a  lesser  alternative  charge,  wherever  they  are 
offered  such  an  alternative.  This  tendency  is  all 
the  more  marked  where  the  lesser  alternative  is  only 
a  statutory  offence,  and  so  lacks  the  'moral  turpitude' 
of  culpable  homicide  -a  tendency  recognised  by  the 
recent  creation  of  the  statutory  offence  of  causing 
death  by  reckless  driving  (4  &5  Eliz.  II,  c.  67,  s.  8) 
which  enables  juries  to  convict  of  this  offence, 
which  carries  a  penalty  of  five  years'  imprisonment, 
where  formerly  they  could  only  convict  of  culpable 
homicide,  or  of  reckless  driving  which  carries  only 
two  years'  imprisonment. 
Homicide  in  the  course  of  unlawful  conduct. 
Involuntary  homicide  is  divided  in  Scotland  into 
casual  homicide  and  culpable  homicide;  casual 
homicide  is  defined  as  homicide  done  when  the  person 
causing  death  was  'lawfully  employed,  and  neither 
meaning  harm  to  anyone,  nor  having  failed  in  the 
due  degree  of  care  and  circumspection  for  preventing 
mischief  to  his  neighbour'  (Hume,  i.  194;  Alison,  i. 
139);  it  is  then  assumed  that  any  homicide  which 
is  not  casual  must  be  culpable  (cf.  Rutherford,  1947 551 
J.  C.  1).  As  a  result  there  is  said  to  be  absolute 
liability,  so  to  speak,  wherever  death  is  caused  in 
the  course  of  unlawful  conduct,  and  it  is  no  defence 
that  the  death  was  unforeseen  and  in  the  highest 
degree  unforeseeable.  Although  Hume  at  times  seems, 
like  Alison,  to  adopt  this  approach  (Hume,  loc.  cit.  ) 
there  are  indications  that  he  regarded  absolute 
liability  as  restricted  to  cases  where  there  was 
not  merely  an  unlawful  purpose,  but  a  purpose  to  do  some 
bodily  harm.  He  says  that  homicide  'by  misadventure, 
without  any  intention  to  kill,  and  in  an  unforeseen 
and  unlikely  way;  but  withal  in  pursuance  of  a  purpose 
to  do  some  sort  of  bodily  harm'  is  culpable  even  where 
'the  death  is  an  extraordinary  event,  such  as  no  one... 
can  fairly  be  presumed  to  have  contemplated  or  to  have 
thought  of  as  a  probable  or  even  a  possible  event' 
(Hume,  i.  234).  Alison  and  the  modern  law  do  not 
appear,  however,  to  restrict  the  scope  of  absolute 
liability  in  this  way,  although  the  two  modern  cases 
(Rutherford,  supra;  and  Bird,  1952,  J.  C.  23)  both 
contain  an  element  of  assault.  Macdonald  states 
simply  that  'Homicide  by  the  doing  of  an  unlawful 
act,  where  death  could  not  reasonably  be  foreseen 
as  the  probable  consequence  of  the  act'  is  culpable 
(Macdonald,  p.  96). 
The  result  of  these  statements  is  that,  far  from 
it  being  true  that  there  is  nothing  akin  to  the 
doctrine  of  constructive  malice  in  Scotland  (cf.  R.  C. 
para.  92),  there  is  a  clear  doctrine  of  constructive 
negligence,  a  'felony-culpable  homicide'  rule,  so  to 
speak,  (cf.  Hall,  p.  494),  whereby  any  death  caused 
during  the  commission  of  a  crime  is  automatically 
culpable  homicide,  irrespective  of  the  mens  rea  of  the 
killer,  or  of  the  probability  of  the  fatal  result. 
Glanville  Williams  has  pointed  out  that  we  'should... 552 
recognise  that  every  charge  of  involuntary  manslaughter 
requires  proof  of  the  requisite  degree  of  criminal 
negligence,  and  that  this  negligence  always  means 
negligence  as  to  the  death  -  not  negligence  as  to  a 
consequence  short  of  death'  (Glanville  Williams, 
'Constructive  Manslaughter',  [19571  Cr.  L.  R.  293,301). 
To  convict  someone  of  culpable  homicide  because  it  was 
foreseeable  that  his  actings  might  frighten  his  victim 
although  it  was  not  foreseeable  that  they  would 
kill  him  (cf.  Bird,  supra  ),  is  to  convict  him  of 
constructive  culpable  homicide.  The  above  statements 
of  Scots  law  go  further  even  than  this;  they  do  not 
require  the  likelihood  of  any  injury,  but  merely 
that  at  the  time  he  caused  the  death  the  accused 
should  have  been  unlawfully  employed. 
If  this  is  the  law,  its  implications  are  considerable, 
not  to  say  fantastic,  and  I  turn  now  to  see  if  it  is 
possible  to  avoid  stating  the  law  in  such  general 
terms  as  it  is  stated  by  Macdonald. 
Unlawful  employment. 
No  attempts  have  been  made  to  define  'unlawful' 
in  the  phrases  'unlawful  employment',  unlawful  act' 
etc.  One  would  expect  the  word  to  mean  'criminal', 
but  there  are  dicta  which  suggest  that  it  means  more 
than  that.  In  Geo.  Broadley  ((1884)  5  Coup.  490), 
Lord  Moncrieff  said  that  the  rule  of  absolute 
liability  applied  where  'a  person  is  engaged  in  an  un- 
lawful  act,  or  in  the  discharge  of  a  lawful  act  in  an 
unlawful  way'  (at  p.  492).  In  Bird  (supra)  it  was 
apparently  regarded  as  sufficient  that  'no  justification 
in  law  or  in  fact  or  in  common  sense  could  be  assigned 
to  the  conduct  proved  against  the  appellant'  (at  p.  27). 
I  would  submit,  however,  that  'unlawful'  does  mean 
'criminal'.  Broadley  was  a  case  in  which  one  sailor 553 
pushed  another  overboard  in  the  course  of  a  fight, 
and  in  Bird  there  was  at  least  one  minor  assault. 
It  is  hardly  conceivable  that  it  should  be  casual 
homicide  if  a  man's  gun  goes  off  in  his  hand  while 
he  is  going  through  a  hedge  and  kills  someone  if 
the  man  is  lawfully  on  the  land,  and  culpable  homicide 
if  he  happens  to  be  a  trespasser  (cf.  Alison,  i.  140). 
It  is  not  clear  what  'the  disdharge  of  a  lawful 
act  in  an  unlawful  way'  means,  unless  it  just  means 
'performing  an  unlawful  act'.  Perhaps  driving  a 
motor  car  without  a  licence,  or  while  drunk,  is 
performing  a  lawful  act  in  an  unlawful  way  - 
although  it  is  more  like  an  unlawful  act  -  but  in 
neither  case  does  the  law  of  constructive  homicide  apply. 
It  seems  to  be  assumed  that  'unlawful  employment' 
and  'unlawful  act'  mean  the  same,  but  this  is  not  so, 
and  it  is  submitted  that  'unlawful  act'  is  preferable 
to  'unlawful  employment'  as  a  criterion  for  the 
application  of  the  rule  of  constructive  homicide. 
If  the  criterion  were  employment,  then  completely 
inadvertent  happenings  might  be  classed  as  culpable 
homicide.  If  a  window  cleaner  falls  off  a  ladder 
and  kills  someone  in  the  street,  he  is  not  guilty  of 
culpable  homicide  assuming  his  falling  was  not  itself 
negligent  -  not  merely  because  the  fall  is  not 
criminal,  but  because  it  can  hardly  be  described  as  his 
act  at  all  -  he  slays  in  complete  inadvertence  (cf. 
su  ra,  s'3L-7).  If  he  were  not  a  window  cleaner,  but 
a  housebreaker,  he  would  have  caused  death  while 
unlawfully  employed,  but  not  by  an  unlawful  act, 
and  he  could  not,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  be  convicted  of 
culpable  homicide.  Again,  'if  a  person's  gun  burst 
in  his  hand,  and  kill  his  neighbour',  that  is  casual 
homicide  (Alison,  i.  140)  -  surely  it  cannot  become 
culpable  homicide  if  the  person  did  hot  have  a  licence 554 
for  the  gun,  or  was  carrying  it  for  the  purpose  of 
poaching. 
I  would  further  pubmit  that  the  act  must  be  in 
itself  unlawful,  and  not  be  unlawful  merely  because 
it  forms  part  of  an  unlawful  employment.  It  is  not 
easy  to  distinguish  between  an  act  unlawful  in  itself 
and  one  rendered  unlawful  because  of  its  context  , 
if  only  because  no  act  is  unlawful  in  itself,  but  the 
point  I  wish  to  make  will  become  clear  if  we  consider 
the  unreported  case  of  Finnigan  (Glasgow  High  Court, 
5-6  March  1958).  Finnigan  wrenched  a  gas  meter  from 
its  supply  pipes  in  order  to  steal  its  contents,  and 
as  a  result  two  people  in  an  adjoining  house  were 
killed  by  an  escape  of  gas.  Finnigan  was  probably 
grossly  careless,  and  no  question  of  constructive 
guilt  arose  with  regard  to  him.  But  suppose  he  had 
removed  the  meter  with  the  utmost  care,  according  to 
the  approved  official  method  of  doing  so,  but  quite 
unforeseeably  had  caused  a  fatal  escape  of  gas. 
Would  he  have  been  guilty  of  culpable  homicide?  It 
is  submitted  that  he  would  not,  because  what  he  did 
would  be  in  itself  lawful  -  if  a  Gas  Board  official 
had  removed  the  meter  carefully,  but  accidentally 
caused  a  fatal  escape,  the  official  would  not  have  been 
guilty  of  any  crime,  and  it  is  submitted  that  the 
same  result  should  be  reached  where  the  removal  occurs 
in  pursuit  of  a  criminal  purpose. 
Macaulay  offers  an  even  more  extreme  example  of  the 
difficulty  of  regarding  such  cases  as  culpable  homicide. 
He  says  'A  heaps  fuel  on  a  fire,  not  in  an  imprudent 
manner,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  the  chance  of  harm 
is  not  worth  considering.  Unhappily  the  flame 
bursts  out  more  violently  than  there  was  reason  to 
expect.  At  the  same  moment  a  sudden  puff  of  wind 555 
blows  Z's  light  dress  towards  the  hearth.  The  dress 
catches  fire,  and  Z  is  burned  to  death'.  Would  that 
be  culpable  homicide,  Macaulay  asks,  if  'the  fuel 
which  caused  the  flame  to  burst  forth  was  a  will, 
which  A  was  fraudulently  destroying?  '  (Macaulay,  P.  508). 
Or,  I  would  add,  if  the  fire  was  criminal  for  any 
other  reason?  And  if  fraudulent  destruction  of  a 
will  was  a  crime  yesterday,  but  is  not  one  today, 
would  A's  guilt  of  culpable  homicide  depend  on 
whether  the  accident  happened  yesterday  or  today? 
There  is  no  Scots  authority  on  this  question 
except  in  cases  of  abortion  (e.  g.  Rae,  (1888)  2  Wh.  62), 
in  which  death  is  usually  foreseeable,  and.  in  cases 
of  assault;  and  I  would  submit  that  if  constructive 
culpable  homicide  is  to  be  retained  in  Scots  law, 
it  should  be  restricted  to  cases  of  abortion,  or  to 
cases  involving  assault,  such  as  assault  itself,  or 
rape  or  robbery.  (In  one  case  -  Jas.  Stewart  (1856) 
2  Irv.  359  -  where  the  accused  had  set  light  to  some 
railway  wagons  while  stealing  whisky  from  them,  Lord 
Justice-General  M'Neill  asked  tIs  it  more  illegal 
to  burn  when  the  man  is  stealing  than  when  he  is  not?  ', 
but  he  did  not  anwwer  his  questiotz,  saying  only,  'Thin 
may  be,  but  I  should  wish  more  authority  on  the  point'. 
No  authority  was  produced,  and  the  Crown  dropped  the 
charge  of  fire-raising.  It  is  submitted  that  it  is 
not  more  illegal  to  burn  or  kill  when  stealing  than 
when  not.  ) 
I  accordingly  turn  now  to  cases  of  assault,  in  the 
context  of  which  this  branch  of  the  law  has  developed. 
Death  caused  by  assault. 
The  victim's  condition.  Before  dealing  with  the 
different  types  of  cases  it  should  be  noted  that  there 556 
is  one  important  rule  which  applies  to  them  all  - 
that  is  the  rule  that  the  assailant  'takes  his  victim 
as  he  finds  him'.  This  means  that  in  estimating  the 
likelihood  of  a  fatal  result  we  consider  the  actual 
physical  condition  of  the  victim,  so  than  an  assault 
which  would  not  be  remotely  likely  to  be  fatal  in  the 
case  of  an  ordinary  man,  will  be  regarded  as  fore- 
seeably  fatal  if  the  particular  victim  was  suffering 
from  a  physical  condition  which  rendered  him  peculiarly 
susceptible  to  fatal  injury.  For  example,  a  slap 
is  not  likely  to  be  fatal  in  the  case  of  an  ordinary 
person,  but  it  may  be  foreseeably  fatal  in  the  case 
of  an  extremely  highly  strung  person  with  a  very  weak 
heart.  If  someone  slaps  and  kills  such  a  person, 
the  death  is  regarded  as  a  probable  result  of  the 
slap,  and  so  the  assault  is  regarded  as  foreseeably 
fatal.  And  this  is  so  whether  or  not  the  assailant 
knows  of  the  heart  condition. 
There  is  ample  authority  for  this  rule  (e.  g. 
Angus  Cameron,  (1811)  Hume,  i.  234;  Wm.  Brown,  (1879) 
4  Coup.  225;  Robertson  and  Donoghue,  Edinburgh  High 
Court,  28-30  Aug.  1945  unrepd.  ;  Rutherford,  1947 
J.  C.  1;  Bird,  1952  J.  C.  23),  but  it  rests  on  a 
paralogism.  In  Robertson  and  Donoghue  (Edinburgh 
High  Court,  28-30  Aug.  1945,  unrepd.  )  two  men 
attacked,  robbed,  and  killed,  an  elderly  cafe 
proprietor  who,  unknown  to  them,  and  indeed  to 
himself,  suffered  from  a  weak  heart.  Lord  Cooper 
told  the  jury,  'Now,  it  cannot  be  sufficiently 
emphasised..  that  if  an  intruder  or  aggressor, 
acting  from  some  criminal  intent  and  in  pursuance 
of  some  criminal  purpose,  makes  a  violent  attack  upon 
any  man  or  woman  he  must  take  his  victim  as  he  finds 
him.  It  is  every  whit  as  criminal  to  kill  a  feeble 557 
and  infirm  old  man,  or  a  newborn  infant  as  it  is  to 
kill  an  adult  in  the  prime  of  life'  (Judge's  Charge, 
p.  17).  In  Rutherford  (1947  J.  C.  1)  where  a  young 
man  was  charged  with  strangling  his  girl-friend,  there' 
was  a  suggestion  that  she  suffered  from  a  weak  heart 
but  for  which  she  would  not  have  died,  but  Lord  Cooper 
said  'It  is  no  answer  for  an  assailant  who  caused  death 
by  violence  to  say  that  his  victim  had  a  weak  heart 
or  was  excitable  or  emotional,  or  anything  of  that 
kind.  He  must  take  his  victim  as  he  finds  her.  It 
is  just  as  criminal  to  kill  an  invalid  as  it  is  to 
kill  a  hale  and  hearty  man  in  the  prime  of  life'  (at  p.  3). 
The  last  sentence  of  each  of  these  quotations  is 
indisputable,  just  as  it  is  indisputable  that  'that  may 
be  criminal  violence  in  the  case  of  a  frail  person.. 
which  would  not  be  such  in  the  case  of  a  person  in  good 
health'  (Macdonald,  p.  88;  cf.  Hume,  i.  238;  Thos. 
Breckinridge  (1836)  1  Sw.  153).  But  it  is  a  non- 
sequitur  to  say  that  therefore  'you  must  take  your 
victim  as  you  find  him',  with  respeft  to  any  sort 
of  physical  condition.  There  is  a  great  difference 
between  a  patent  weakness  such  as  infancy  or  old  age, 
which  the  accused  must  have  known  of  and  ought  to  have 
taken  into  account,  and  a  latent  condition  which  he 
cannot  be  expected  to  have  known  of  or  even  suspected. 
Responsibility  for  a  latent  condition  cannot  rest  on 
negligence,  and  must  be  constructive.  But  the  effect 
of  this  rule  is  that  the  law  is  enabled  to  pretend  to 
be  proceeding  on  the  ground  of  negligence,  and  pretend 
that  the  victim's  death  was  reasonably  foreseeable, 
since  it  is  reasonably  foreseeable  that  a  slight 
injury  may  kill  someone  with  a  weak  heart  -  what  the 
law  conveniently  forgets  is  that  it  is  only  foreseeable 
to  someone  who  knows  about  the  weak  heart. 558 
The  'real-  reason'  for  the  rule  is,  again,  the 
principle  of  disfacilitation.  As  Lord  Cooper  said 
in  Robertson,  'It  would  never  do  for  it  to  go  forth 
from  this  Court  that  housebreakers  or  robbers,  or 
others  of  that  character  should  be  entitled  to  lay 
violent  hands  on  a  very  old  or  very  sick  or  very  young 
man,  and,  if  their  victim  died  as  a  result,  to  turn 
round  and  say  that  they  would  never  have  died  if 
they  had  not  been  very  weak  or  very  old  or  very  young' 
(supra,  p.  8).  This  is  excellent  oratory.,  since  it 
combines  the  emotive  fear  of  robbers  with  the  additted 
responsibility  towards  the  very  old  or  very  young. 
But  in  Rutherford  (supra)  the  accused  was  not  a  robber 
or  a  housebreaker,  and  his  victim  was  to  all  appearances 
a  healthy  young  girl;  in  Bird  (supra)  the  accused 
was  neither  a  robber  nor  a  housebreaker,  and  the 
victim  died  from  trivial  injuries,  because  of  her 
weak  heart:  and  the  rule  was  applied  in  Doth  these 
cases. 
The  types  of  assault  cases. 
Assault  cases  fall  into  three  types  -  (i)  Those 
in  which  death  is  a  foreseeable  result  of  the  assault, 
although  the  foreseeability  may  not  be  so  great  as  to 
render  the  assault  reckless  and  so  murderous;  (ii) 
Those  in  which  the  assault  forms  part  of  or  is  carried 
out  in  pursuance  of  the  commission  of  another  crime, 
as  in  cases  of  robbery  and  rape;  (iii)  Those  in 
which  death  is  not  at  all  a  likely  result  of  the 
assault,  and  the  assault  is  not  connected  with  any 
other  crime. 
(i)  This  type  of  case  offers  little  difficulty, 
and  the  law  can  be  stated  by  reference  to  Lord  Moncrieff's 
dictum  in  Delaney  (1945  J.  C.  138),  where  he  said: 559 
'It  may  be  that  those  who  offer  violence, 
especially  violence  which  is  subject  to  be 
followed  by  death,  have  not  had  in  view  the 
taking  of  life.  They,  however,  are  not 
accidental  in  their  use  of  violence.  They 
are  responsible  for  the  violence  they  use  so 
far  as  the  violence  is  concerned;  and,  if 
consequences  follow  which  they  did  not  antici- 
pate  or  apprehend,  they  are  also  responsible 
for  these  consequences.  One  cannot  say  "I 
chose  to  exercise  violence  against  a  person 
against  whom  I  thought  I  had  a  grievance,  and 
it  was  merely  accidental  that  a  probable 
consequence  of  that  violence  followed"'  (at  p.  139). 
(ii)  The  clearest  example  of  this  type  of  case 
is  Vim.  Brown  ((1879)  4  Coup.  225).  Brown  tried  to 
steal  a  woman's  handbag,  and  in  pulling  at  the  bag 
he  swung  the  woman  round  so  that  she  fell  on  the 
pavement.  She  died  a  fortnight  later  from  'nervous 
shock  acting  upon  a  weak,  diseased  heart',  and 
from  her  injuries  which  were  slight.  Brown  had  not 
intended  to  hurt  her  at  all.  In  these  circumstances 
the  jury  were  directed  that  the  crime  was  culpable 
homicide,  and  indeed  were  told  that  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  charge  Brown  with  murder.  The 
ratio  of  Brown  is  the  simple  ratio  of  constructive 
malice,  applied  to  culpable  homicide  -  'anyone 
attacking  a  person  with  a  view  to  robbery'  is  guilty 
of  culpable  homicide  (Lord  Young  at  p.  226).  Indeed, 
Lord  Young's  reference  to  the  possibility  of  a  charge 
of  murder  suggests  that  he  regarded  the  case  as  one 
of  voluntary  culpable  homicide  -a  case  strictly 
murder  but  reduced  to  culpable  homicide  because  of  the 
clemency  of  the  Crown.  This  view  cannot,  however, 
stand  with  the  accdpted  rule  that  constructive  malice 
does  not  exist  in  Scotland  (cf.  R.  C.  para.  72),  and 
Brown  must  accordingly  be  treated  as  having  been 
constructively  negligent,  rather  than  as  having 
constructively  intended  to  kill  the  woman. 560 
(iii).  This  type  of  case  is  the  most  difficult, 
and  it  may  be  that  even  if  some  form  of  constructive 
culpable  homicide  is  to  be  retained  it  should  be 
restricted  to  cases  of  the  Brown  type.  For  the 
retention  of  this  type  means  that  wherever  an  assault, 
however  technical  and  lacking  in  malice,  causes  death, 
however  unforeseeable  and  exceptional  the  fatal  result, 
the  'assailant'  is  guilty  of  culpable  homicide. 
Two  modern  cases  fall  to  be  considered  under  this 
head. 
The  first  is  the  case  of  Rutherford  (1947  J.  C.  1), 
a  most  unusual  and  difficult  case,  but  one  of  great 
importance  because  of  the  Charge  of  the  presiding 
Judge,  Lord  Cooper.  The  facts  were  these:  R.  and 
his  girl  friend  went  into  a  park  in  the  early  hours 
of  the  morning;  the  girl  pestered  R.  with  requests 
to  kill  her;  eventually  he  put  his  tie  round  her 
throat  in  order  to  humour  her,  and,  in  his  own  words 
'only  meant  to  give  her  a  fright  and  see  if  it  would 
put  a  finish  to  her  nonsense  of  wanting  to  be  strangled' 
(Accused's  evidence,  Transcript  of  Proceedings, 
Edinburgh  High  Court,  3rd  and  4th  Oct.  1946,  p.  93). 
Now,  in  fact,  R.  had  probably  been  reckless,  and  he 
gave  evidence  that  he  gave  no  thought  to  the  risk 
when  he  put  the  tie  round  the  girl's  neck,  and  could 
not  remember  how  tightly  he  had  pulled  it  (;  Lb.  pp.  94-5), 
but  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk's  charge  proceeded 
on  the  view  that  the  degree  of  negligence  was  only 
important  in  deciding  if  the  crime  was  murder  or 
culpable  homicide,  and  that  R  could  not  be  acquitted. 
R's  defence  was  substantially  one  of  accident,  and 
if  such  a  defence  was  relevant  at  all  it  would  have 
been  left  to  the  jury  to  decide  on  the  facts  whether 
or  not  they  considered  R.  had  been  culpably  negligent, 561 
but  Lord  Cooper  directed  the  jury  that  the  case  could 
not  come  into  the  category  of  casual  homicide  on  any 
view  of  the  evidence. 
It  is  submitted,  however,  that  unless  we  regard 
R.  as  having  been  in  fact  culpably  negligent,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  case  to  take  it  out  of  the  class 
of  casual  homicide.  Lord  Cooper  quoted  Alison's 
definition  of  casual  homicidd  with  its  requirement 
that  the  accused  be  'lawfully  employed,  neither 
meaning  harm  to  any  one,  or  having  failed  in  the  due 
degree  of  care  and  circumspection  for  preventing 
mischief  to  his  neighbour'  and  told  the  jury  that 
'On  no  view  of  the  evidence  would  you  be  entitled  to 
accept...  that  this  is  a  case  of  misadventure  or  pure 
accident...  or  casual  homicide  as  known  to  the  law' 
(Rutherford,  1946  J.  C.  1,5;  cf.  Alison,  i.  139-40) 
Lord  Cooper  did  not  say  why  he  thought  the  case 
could  not  be  one  of  casual  homicide,  and  as  has  been 
pointed  out,  his  approach  suggests  that  it  was  not 
because  of  failure  in  the  due  degree  of  care.  But 
unless  R.  was  negligent  there  was  nothing  unlawful 
in  what  he  did.  It  is  not  unlawful,  however  improper, 
to  be  out  in  a  park  with  a  girl  at  night,  even  if 
fornication  is  in  the  air.  This  leaves  the  actual 
assault,  and  Lord  Cooper  dealt  with  this  by  saying 
that  the  girl's  having  consented  to  be  killed  was 
irrelevant,  since  consent  does  not  relieve  the  killer 
of  guilt.  But  this  is  to  put  the  matter  too  simply. 
Consent  cannot  affect  guilt  of  homicide,  but  it  can 
affect  guilt  of  assault.  To  'assault'  a  consenting 
vittim  is  not  a  crime  unless  the  assault  is  of  a 
serious  nature.  One  is  not  entitled  to  inflict 
serious  injury,  far  less  injuries  which  may  be 
fatal,  even  on  a  consenting  victim,  but  it  is  not  a 
crime  to  put  one's  hands  round  one's  girl  friend's 562 
neck,  unless  she  objects.  If  what  R.  did  was  not 
foreseeably  fatal  or  seriously  injurious,  the  girl's 
consent  would,  it  is  submitted,  have  rendered  it 
lawful.  R.  intended  only  to  pull  the  tie  round  the 
girl's  neck,  and  he  did  so  at  her  request.  According- 
ly,  unless  he  was  in  fact  culpably  negligent,  what 
he  did  was  lawful,  and  the  girl's  death  the  result  of 
a  lawful  act,  and  therefore  an  example  of  casual 
homicide.  (The  element  of  fright  is  not,  I  think, 
important  -  the  girl  did  not  die  of  simple  fright, 
and  it  is  probably  not  a  crime  to  frighten  someone 
by  a  lawful  act.  ) 
For  these  reasons  I  would  submit  that  Rutherford 
is  best  regarded  as  a  Delaney  type  of  case,  and  as 
depending  on  the  accused's  actual  negligence  ouoad 
the  likelihood  of  fatal  harm.  If  it  is  treated 
as  a  case  of  constructive  homicide  (and  I  concede 
that  that  was  probably  the  way  Lord  Cooper  sought  to 
treat  it)  the  scope  of  culpable  homicide  would  be 
extended  to  what  it  is  submitted  are  impossible 
lengths.  Suppose  in  the  course  of  a  boxing  match 
one  boxer  delivers  a  fair  blow  which  strikes  the  other 
knocking  him  quite  unexpectedly  into  the  ring-post 
and  even  more  unexpectedly  causing  him  to  crack  his 
skull  and  die.  Applying  the  reasoning  of  Rutherford 
one  could  say  that  consent  was  irrelevant,  since  the 
boxer  did  not  consent  to  be  killed,  and  that  accordingly 
as  the  death  occurred  in  the  course  of  an  unlawful 
act  -  an  assault  -  it  was  culpable  homicide.  The 
only  distinction  between  the  boxer  and  R.  would  be  the 
improper  nature  of  the  surrounding  circumstances  in  R's 
case,  and  that,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  cannot  be  the  ratio 
of  the  case.  For  if  it  were,  then  every  time  a  woman 
had  a  fatal  heart  attack  while  making  violent  love, 
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homicide  -  unless  he  were  her  husband,  in  which  case 
the  facts  would  fall  within  the  class  of  casual 
homicide.  Any  doctrine  of  constructive  guilt  is 
illogical  and  leads  to  difficulties,  but  none,  it  is 
to  be  hoped,  is  as  illogical  or  leads  to  such 
dificulties  as  these. 
The  second  modern  case  to  be  considered  is  that 
of  Bird  (1952  J.  C.  23).  B.  was  a  drunken  sailor 
who  believed  that  his  victim,  an  old  woman,  owed 
him  money.  He  pursued  her  and  her  daughter  for 
about  half  a  mile,  making  such  a  nuisance  of  himself 
and  causing  such  apprehension,  that  the  victim  sent 
her  daughter  for  the  police.  Eventually  the  victim 
tried  to  get  into  a  passing  car,  B.  pulled  her  out, 
and  she  fell  down  dead.  Her  injuries  were  trivial, 
but  she  had  a  bad  heart,  and  it  was  likely  that  a 
slight  shock  might  kill  her  if  she  was  in  a  state  of 
physical  exhaustion  and  fear.  B.  was  charged  with 
culpable  homicide,  and  convicted.  In  his  charge  to  the 
jury  Lord  Jamieson  stated  that  any  death  following  on 
an  assault  was  culpable  homicide,  and  emphasised 
that  an  assault  did  not  need  to  be  anything  involvimg 
great  violence,  but  might  be  just  a  threatening  gesture. 
The  degree  of  violence,  he  said,  was  not  a  question 
for  the  jury,  but  was  something  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  assessing  sentence  (at  p.  25).  B's  conviction 
was  upheld  on  appeal,  although  the  matter  seems  to  have 
been  dealt  with  rather  summarily.  The  only  authority 
quoted  was  Brown  (supra)  which  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  case  since  Bird  was  not  bent  on  robbing  his 
victim  but  on  recovering  what  he  believed  she  owed  him. 
(That  the  Lord  Justice-General  regarded  this  belief 
as  being  without  any  justification  does  not  matter 
unless  the  belief  is  to  be  characterised  as  unreasonable, 
and  no  attempt  seems  to  have  been  made  to  do  this.  ) 564 
It  was  argued  for  Bird  that  the  jury  should  have  been 
specifically  directed  that  in  order  to  convict  they  must 
find  that  B  killed  the  woman  in  the  course  of  unlawful 
conduct.  The  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  such  a 
direction  was  unnecessary  because  'no  justification  in 
law  or  in  fact  or  in  common  sense,  could  be  assigned 
to  the  conduct  proved  against  the  appellant'  (at  p.  27), 
a  phrase  which  raises  many  difficulties  about  what 
constitutes  justification,  and  whether  it  need  be  in 
law,  or  only  in  fact,  or  in  common  sense,  none  of  which 
difficulties  was  considered  by  the  Court.  The  other 
factor  which  weighed  with  the  Court  was  that  death 
followed  on  a  course  of  conduct  'well  calculated 
to  induce  great  apprehension  in  the  mind  of  any 
reasonable  woman'  (ib.  ).  That  is  to  say,  they 
held  that  apprehension  was  foreseeable,  or  perhaps 
that  B  must  be  deemed  to  have  intended  to  cause  great 
apprehension,  and  upheld  the  conviction  of  homicide, 
presumably  on  the  ground  that  where  an  accused  intends 
some  harm  and  causes  death  he  is  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide  (cf.  Hume,  i.  234). 
Bird  can,  I  think,  be  best  considered,  and  its 
consequences  best  appreciated,  in  the  light  of  the 
following  example.  John  is  waiting  at  the  street 
corner  for  his  habitually  unpunctual  girl  friend  Mary. 
He  has  been  waiting  some  time  and  has  become  angry  and 
impatient.  He  sees  Mary  at  last  approaching  and 
decides,  partly  as  a  joke,  partly  to  'teach  her  a 
lesson',  to  give  her  a  fright.  He  slips  into  a  door- 
way,  and  as  Mary  passes  him,  he  jumps  out  at  her, 
makes  a  threatening  noise,  and  pulls  her  round  by 
the  arm.  She  slips  and  falls,  catches  her  head 
against  the  kerb,  and  is  killed:  or,  alternatively, 
she  dies  of  shock  because,  unknown  to  John,  she  has 565 
a  weak  heart,  and  was  tired,  having  been  rushing 
in  order  not  to  be  too  late  for  their  meeting. 
If  we  look  at  the  bare  bones  of  this  case  and  that 
of  Bird,  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  them.  Both 
had  grievances  against  their  victims  -  it  would  hardly 
make  any  difference  to  John's  case  if  his  grievance 
was  unjustified  in  that  Mary  had  been  unavoidably 
delayed,  or  in  that  he  had  mistaken  the  time  of 
meeting  and  she  was  in  fact  on  time  -  both  committed 
assaults  from  which  minor  harm  was  to  be  expected, 
both  in  fact  killed  their  victims.  It  might  be  said 
that  Bird's  assaults  were  more  violent  and  prolonged 
than  John's,  and  the  latter's  were  not  calculated 
to  cause  any  great  damage,  but  according  to  Lord 
Jamieson  -  and  his  charge  was  not  criticised  in  any 
way  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  -  the  degree  of  violence 
is  irrelevant  to  guilt,  whatever  effect  it  may  have 
on  punishment. 
If,  however,  we  clothe  the  bare  bones  with  the 
flesh  of  the  surrounding  circumstances,  a  difference 
can  be  discerned  between  the  cases.  For  the  general 
picture  in  Bird  is  of  a  drunken  sailor  rudely  and 
vi6lently  molesting  a  poor  old  woman,  while  the 
general  picture  in  John's  case  is  of  a  decent  young 
man  playing  a  prank  on  his  girl.  In  other  words 
there  is  an  element  of  'badness'  about  Bird  which  is 
absent  from  John's  case.  If  John  had  been  really 
angry  with  Mary  and  determined  to  discipline  her, 
albeit  by  minor  violence,  then  he  too  might  have  been 
guilty  of  culpable  homicide. 
Conclusion. 
I  would  submit,  with  diffidence  and  respect,  that 
involuntary  homicide  is  only  culpable  when  committed 
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because  they  exhibit  an  element  of  wickedness.  In 
the  'lawful-act'  cases  this  disapproval  is  excited  by 
the  quality  of  the  negligence  itself,  which  is  gross, 
wicked,  and  'criminal'.  In  the  Delaney  type  of  case, 
the  position  is  much  the  same,  but  any  lack  of 
criminality  in  the  negligence  is  supplemented  by  the 
criminality  of  the  assault,  which  is,  ex  hypothesi, 
a  serious  one. 
When  we  turn  to  Brown  we  have  to  transfer  the 
wickedness  to  the  killing  from  the  accused's  ulterior 
motive  of  robbery.  This  transfer  is  analogous  to  the 
transfer  made  in  Anglo-American  law  by  the  doctrine 
of  constructive  malice,  an  analogy  which  explains 
Lord  Young's  view  that  Brown  could  have  been  a  case 
of  murder.  Where,  however,  there  is  no  ulterior 
criminal  purpose,  and  the  assault  in  itself  is  not 
serious  or  wicked,  the  wickedness  has  to  be  derived 
from  the  surrounding  circumstances,  seen  as  a  whole. 
If  the  whole  picture  arouses  disapproval,  then  the 
case  is  one  of  culpable  homicide;  if  it  does  not, 
the  case  is  one  of  casual  homicide. 
This,  it  must  be  admitted,  is  not  a  legal 
criterion,  and  is  extremely  vague;  but  it  appears  to 
me  to  be  the  only  way  to  avoid  convicting  John  of 
culpable  homicide.  It  also  explains  what  the  Court 
had  in  mind  in  talking  of  the  lack  of  justification 
in  law,  fact,  or  commonsense,  for  Bird's  action.  In 
the  absence  of  this  justification,  the  action  aroused 
moral  disapproval  in  the  minds  of  the  Court  -  and  no 
doubt  of  the  jury  -  since  the  spectacle  of  a  drunk 
man  pestering  a  woman  does  arouse  moral  disapproval. 
In  John  the  initial  disapproval  aroused  by  seeing  a 
man  attack  a  woman  can  be  dispelled  by  the  surrounding 
circumstances  -  but  in  Bird  the  surrounding  circumstances 
did  not  'justify'  the  accused's  conduct. 567 
There  is  no  authority  for  the  view  I  am  putting 
forvar'd,  but  it  may  be  possible  to  gain  some  support 
for  it  from  a  comparison  of  two  old  cases  -  those  of 
Isabella  Livingstone  ((1842)  1  Broun  247)  and 
Isabella  Brodie  ((1846)  Ark.  45).  In  each  case  the 
accused  pushed  an  old  woman  who  fell  and  died 
unexpectedly  as  a  result.  Livingstone  was  charged 
with  culpable  homicide  and  acquitted  by  direction 
of  the  Court;  Brodie  was  charged  with  murder  and 
convicted  of  culpable  homicide.  It  was  said  in 
Livingstone  that  death  might  have  been  caused  by  a 
push  'which  might,  under  the  circumstances,  have  been 
given  without  any  intention  to  injure',  but  any  push 
unless  itself  unintentional,  must  be  intended  to  cause 
some  injury,  however  minimal,  and  so  must  constitute 
an  assault.  The  reason  for  the  acquittal,  whatever 
its  ratio,  was  probably  contained-in  the  surrounding 
circumstances;  the  push  had  been  given  after  the  deceased 
had  accused  Livingstone  of  having  taken  some  of  her 
brandy,  and  after  she  had  thrown  water  at  Livingstone. 
Brodie,  on  the  other  hand,  pushed  her  landlady  after 
a  quarrel  about  money,  and  after  the  latter  had'-told 
her  to  leave,  so  that  the  push  was  probably  actuated 
by  spite.  In  that  event,  there  would  be  an  element 
of  wickedness  present  in  Brodie  which  would  enable 
one  to  distinguish  it  from  Livingstone. 
In  Bird  itself  Lord  Jamieson  spoke  of  someone 
who  'having  a  grievance  against  a  man',  pushes  him 
down,  This  is'  not  an  altogether  satisfactory 
criterion  -  it  would  prevent  a  merely  playful  push 
from  amounting  to  culpable  homicide,  but  would  not 
exclude  cases  like  Ljvingstone  or  situations  like 
that  of  John  -  but  for  what  it  is  worth,  it  does 
support  my  view,  since  it  suggests  that  the  circum- 
stances  surrounding  the  push  are  important.  It 568 
suggests  that  it  is  not  enough  that  there  should  have 
been  a  technical  assault,  but  that  there  must  have 
been  an  assault  motivated  by  something  involving  a  degree 
of  actual  malice. 
(It  may  be  argued  that  my  view  conflicts  with  the 
rule  that  any  assault  which  causes  death  must  amount 
to  culpable  homicide,  and  can  never  result  in  a 
conviction  for  assault  only.  But  this  rule,  if  rule 
it  be,  rests  only  on  two  Charges  to  juries  in  cases 
involving  provocation  -  Hill,  1941  J.  C.  59  and  Delaney, 
1945  J.  C.  138  -  and  is  contrary  to  the  Charges  in  two 
other  provocation  cabes  -  Gilmour,  1938  J.  C.  1,  and 
LI'Cluskey,  Glasgow  High  Court,  20  and  21  Jan.  1959. 
Even  if  Hill  and  Delakiey  are  correct,  that  cannot 
affect  the  position  with  regard  to  negligent 
involuntary  homicide  so  as  to  make  it  impossible  to 
convict  only  of  assault  where  the  assault  has  quite 
unexpectedly  led  to  death.  At  the  same  time  it  must 
be  conceded  that  a  system  which  prefers  the  analogy 
between  a  drunk  driver  or  a  man  driving  a  car  he  has 
stolen  and  someone  driving  lawfully  to  that  between 
the  drunk  driver  or  car  thief  and  a  housebreaker  or 
robber,  may  well  prefer  the  apparent  similarity  between 
involuntary  and  voluntary  homicide  to  their  actual 
difference.  ) 
Some  comments  on  constructive  culpable  homicide. 
It  is  worth  considering  briefly  why  the  law  retains  a 
doctrine  of  constructive  culpable  homicide.  The  main 
'reason',  at  any  rate  in  the  assault  cases,  is  probably 
just  that  the  facts  look  like  those  of  murder,  and 
would  be  treated  as  murder,  but  for  the  accused's 
explanation  that  he  only  delivered  a  slight  blow, 
and  did  not  intend  any  serious  injury.  To  strangle 
someone,  to  pull  someone  out  of  a  moving  car,  to  push 
someone  against  a  sharp  object,  to  strike  someone  a 569 
blow  which  kills  him,  are  all,  so  to  speak,  prima 
facie  murder.  The  first  reaction  of  the  man  in  the 
street  is  to  say  'He's  murdered  him',  and  to  expect  a 
trial  for,  and  conviction  of,  murder  to  follow  the 
apprehension  of  the  assailant.  As  a  result  the 
accused  must  in  fact,  whatever  the  position  in  law, 
displace  this  prima  facie  conclusion,  and  show  that 
the  death  of  the  deceased  was  a  pure  accident.  But 
the  law,  like  the  man  in  the  street,  is  chary  of 
accepting  'excuses'  from  an  accused  person,  chary  of 
believing  him  when  he  says  he  did  not  mean  to  do  what 
he  did,  especially  when  it  is  clear  that  he  was  guilty 
of  some  crime.  In  other  words,  the  principle  of 
disfacilitation  operates  to  make  it  impossible 
for  any  criminal  to  escape  the  consequence  of  his 
crime  by  showing  that  these  consequences  were 
unforeseeable. 
The  only  counter  to  this  attitude  is  the  dis- 
inclination  to  hang  the  accused,  with  its  concomitant 
disinclination  to  convict  him  of  murder.  As  a 
result  he  is  convicted  of  culpable  homicide,  and  it 
is  felt  that  as  he  might  well  have  been  convicted 
of  murder,  he  is  lucky  to  have  got  off  as  lightly 
as  he  did,  and  that  it  does  not  lie  in  his  mouth  to 
complain  about  his  conviction  -  'after  all,  he  killed 
him,  didn't  he'.  It  is  because  of  their  similarity 
to  the  circumstances  of  a  typical  murder  that  the 
assault  cases  are  not  so  obviously  illogical  or 
perverse  as  those  involving  other  crimes,  such  as 
housebreaking. 
In  legal  language  these  popular  paralogisms  become 
the  principle  of  general  mens  rea.  The  accused  is 
ex  hypothesi  guilty  of  a  crime,  say  assault,  and  so 
has  shown  that  he  possesses  mens  rea.  We  have 570 
therefore  the  actus  raus  of  homicide,  coupled  with  'that 
currupt  and  evil  intention,  which  is  essential... 
to  the  guilt  of  any  crime'  (Hume,  i.  21).  It  is 
interesting  that  this  idea  of  mens  rea  as  a  moral,  or 
rather  an  immoral,  disposition,  would  probably 
exonerate  John,  in  the  example  given  above,  since  no 
wicked  disposition  is  revealed  in  the  case  of  a 
trill,  friendly,  or  playful  blow,  even  if  it  does 
cause  death.  But  a  rule  of  law  may  develop  in  a  way 
which  pays  no  attention  to  the  principle  behind  it, 
and  the  rule  of  constructive  homicide  may  have 
developed  as  follows:  persons  who  cause  death  while 
committing  crimes  are  clearly  of  a  wicked  disposition 
or  they  would  not  commit  crimes;  assault  is  a  crime; 
any  blow  or  threatening  gesture  constitutes  an 
assault;  therefore  death  following  on  even  a  slight 
blow,  or  on  a  gesture,  is  culpable  homicide.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  the  law  has  not  developed  in  this  way, 
but  it  cannot  be  clearly  asserted  that  it  has  not 
done  so. 
So  far  as  crimes  other  than  assault  are  concerned, 
there  is  also  a  confusion  in  thinking  about  causal 
relationships.  Death  occurring  in  the  course  of  a 
theft  is  treated  as  having  been  caused  by  the  theft,  add 
so  as  the  result  of  the  wicked  disposition  displayed 
by  the  theft,  on  the  naive  sine  qua  non  view  that  bit 
for  the  theft  there  would  have  been  no  death.  This 
is  'as  illogical  as  to  say  that  if  a  postman  while 
engaged  in  the  operation  of  delivering  letters  meets 
with  an  accident  in  the  street,  this  is  necessarily 
the  consequence  of  his  delivering  letters'  (Yorkshire 
Dale  Steamship  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Minister  of  War  Transport, 
[1942)  A.  C.  691,  Visc.  Simon,  L.  C.,  at  p.  696).  This 
approach  gains  some  strenth,  however,  from  the  fact 571 
that  it  can  be  regarded  as  a  generalisation  of  the 
accepted  slogan  that  'you  must  take  your  victim  as  you 
find  him'  into  the  who  commits  a  crime  does  so  at  h 
own  risk  and  must  take  the  consequences.  ' 
Another  reason  for  picking  on  the  theft  as  the 
cause  of  the  death  is,  of  course,  that  theft  is  a 
cause  the  law  can,  or  at  any  rate  ought  to  be  able 
to,  do  something  about.  It  is  not  interested  in  the 
fact  that  the  death  was  cuased  by  a  physical  weakness 
in  the  victim  because  it  cannot  prevent  people  being 
physically  weak,  but  it  is  concerned  with  its  having 
been  caused  by  a  crime  because  it  is  its  job  to 
prevent  crimes.  If,  therefore,  'For  any  given  person, 
the  cause  of  a  given  thing  is  that  one  of  its 
conditions  which  he  is  able  to  produce  or  prevent' 
(R.  C.  Collingwood,  'On  the  so-called  Idea  of  Causation', 
in  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1937-8, 
p.  85,  at  p.  92;  cf.  supra  71  ),  it  seems  plausible 
for  the  laut  to  regard  the  theft  as  the  cause  of  the 
death.  But  the  plausibility  is  specious  since  the 
theft  is  not  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  death  in 
any  relevant  sense.  If  A  is  involved  in  a  collision 
while  returning  from  a  meeting,  his  having  gone  to  the 
meeting  is  not  a  cause  of  the  accident,  for  legal 
purposes,  whether  the  meeting  was  legal  or  illegal. 
The  reason  for  a  man's  presence  at  the  place  of  an 
accident  is  not  a  relevant  cause  of  the  accident  whether 
that  reason  be  that  he  was  about  to  steal  something 
or  that  he  was  going  to  London  to  see  the  Queen. 
The  most  convincing  reason  for  the  existence  of 
constructive  culpable  homicide  is  that  by  punishing 
thieves,  bagsnatchers,  rapers,  and  the  like,  for 
causing  death  accidentally,  the  law  is  discouraging  them 
from  committing  these  crimes  by  adding  to  the  risks 572 
involved  for  them,  and  is  reassuring  the  community  that 
if  honest  persons  are  killed  by  criminals  the  law  will 
not  let  their  deaths  go  unpunished,  but  will  do  some- 
thing  to  show  that  the  community  will  not  stand  for 
this  sort  of  thing.  To  make  an  exception  even  for 
purely  accidental  deaths  in  such  circumstances 
might  be  regarded  as  weakening  the  deterrent  power 
of  the  law,  and  its  force  as  an  expression  of  popular 
indignation  at  such  happenings.  Hume  deals  with  the 
matter  with  refreshing  frankness  when  he  says  that  the 
accused  in  an  assault  case  is  blameable  'in  that  he 
offers  any  violence  to  the  person  of  his  neighbour, 
and  would  be  liable  to  some  censure  on  that  account, 
even  if  no  further  harm  ensued...  so,  for  the  sake  of 
example,  and  to  satisfy  the  public,  and.  the  relations 
of  the  deceased,  the  aggressor  shall,  within  certain 
bounds,  be  held  answerable  for  the  fhtal  consequence, 
which  will  here,  without  much  inquiry  be  presumed  to 
have  been  owing  to  great  indiscretion  on  his  part' 
(Hume,  i.  234). 
This  presumption  may  often  be  justifiable,  but 
that  will  be  because  the  act  in  question  was  in  fact 
dangerous,  and  not  merely  because  it  was  criminal.  If 
the  facts  do  not  show  any  indiscretion  on  the  part  of 
the  criminal  he  should  not  be  convicted  of  culpable 
homicide  -a  result  which  Hume  implicitly  accepts  by 
requiring  the  presumption  of  indiscretion  as  a 
condition  of  conviction.  Modern  law  seems  to  go 
further,  and  to  require  conviction  even  where  an 
inquiry  into  the  facts  reveals  an  absence  of  indiscretion 
with  regard  to  the  fatal  consequences.  This,  in 
Macaulay's  words,  is  'To  pronounce  Lsomeonei 
guilty 
of  one  offence  because  a  misfortune  befell  him  while 
he  was  committing  another  offence'  and  is  'surely  to 573 
confound  all  the  boundaries  of  crime'  (Macaulay,  p.  508). 
In  any  event  it  is  probably  not  the  case  that  unlawful 
acts  are  on  the  whole  in  fact  more  dangerous  than 
lawful  ones:  it  is  statistically  clearly  false  to 
say  that  theft,  rape,  or  even  moderate  assaults,  are 
more  likely  to  lead  to  death,  than  are  such  'lawful' 
acts  as  driving  a  motor  car  drunkenly,  or  even  driving 
it  at  all. 
It  should  be  noted  finally  that  even  if  'unlawful- 
act'  culpable  homicide  is  restricted  to  cases  where  the 
accused  has  been  negligent,  this  will  not  be  wholly 
satisfactory  unless  the  degree  of  negligence  required 
for  conviction  is  the  same  as  that  in  the  'lawful  act' 
cases.  For  if  a  lesser  degree  of  negligence  is 
sufficient  where  it  occurs  while  the  accused  is 
acting  unlawfully,  his  conviction  will  not  depend  on 
his  negligence  but  on  his  unlawful  actings,  and  he 
will  again  in  effect  be  punished  for  one  offence 
because  he  was  at  the  time  committing  another  offence  - 
he  will  be  punished  for  an  offence  requiring  gross 
negligence  because  he  was  negligent  to  a  minor  degree 
while  committing  another  offence.  A  consistent 
system  would  have  either  to  regard  all  deaths  caused 
by  negligence  as  culpable  homicide,  or  to  regard 
only  those  caused  by  gross  negligence  as  culpable 
homicide  whether  or  not  the  person  causing  death 
was  lawfully  employed  at  the  time. 
(It  is  perhaps  only  fair  to  add,  after  this  attack 
on  the  law,  that  culpable  homicide  is  an  offence  which 
varies  greatly  in  gravity  according  to  the  circum- 
stances  of  each  particular  offence,  and  that  anyone 
convicted  of  culpable  homicide  in  cases  where  death 
was  not  foreseeable  and  his  conduct  not  regarded  as 
grossly  criminal,  would  receive  a  very  light  sentence, 574 
or  perhaps  none  at  all.  In  one  case  a  fine  of  1/- 
was  imposed  -  Robt.  Bruce,  (1855)  2  Irv.  65,  and  in 
another  the  accused  was  given  an  absolute  discharge  - 
Shand,  Edinburgh  High  Court,  16  Jan.  1J59,  unrepd. 
This,  however,  only  serves  to  show  the  unsatisfactory 
state  of  the  law  -  if  such  persons  are  not  regarded  as 
really  culpable  why  should  the  law  pretend  that  they 
are  guilty  of  culpable  homicide,  and  proceed  to  record 
against  them  a  conviction  on  indictment  for  what  is, 
at  least  prima  facie,  a  very  serious  crime?  ) 
II  -  OTHER  CRIMES  OF  NEGLIGENCE. 
The  law  regarding  the  negligent  commission  of 
crimes  other  than  culpable  homicide  has  not  been  much 
developed  in  Scotland,  and  is  of  little  practical 
importance  today.  There  is  a  dearth  of  authority 
and  particularly  of  modern  authority,  and  it  is 
impossible  to  formulate  any  clear  general  principles. 
It  is  not  quite  clear,  for  example,  whether,  and  if 
so,  when,  a  negligent  act  can  be  criminal  even  if  it 
produces  no  actual  harmful  results,  nor  is  it  clear 
whether  the  principles  of  constructive  homicide  apply 
to  other  crimes  of  negligence.  It  is  not  possible 
to  set  out  a  comprehensive  list  of  crimes  which  can 
be  committed  negligently  -  as  it  is  in  England  (cf. 
Gl.  Williams,  para.  301)  -  nor  is  it  possible  to 
affirm  that  the  negligent  creation  of  certain  harms 
is  criminal,  whatever  the  mode  of  creation.  The 
approach  by  way  of  types  of  harms  is  probably  the 
simplest,  however,  and  I  propose  to  adopt  it  and  to 
consider  the  subject  of  criminal  negligence  under 
four  heads  -  negligent  injury  to  the  person;  the 
negligent  creation  of  danger  to  the,  -:  person;  negligent 
injury  to  property;  the  negligent  creation  of  danger 
to  property. 575 
Injury  to  person. 
It  is  almott  certainly  still  the  law  that  it  is 
criminal  to  cause  injury  to  the  person  by  negligence 
of  the  requisite  degree.  There  are  quite  a  number 
of  cases  which  are  authority  for  this  proposition  (e.  g. 
Alex.  Dickson;  (1847)  Ark.  352,  David  Balfour  (1850) 
J.  Shaw  377;  Arch.  Grassom,  (1884)  5  Coup.  483),  the 
latest  of  which  is  Phipps,  in  1905  (4  Adam  616),  where 
the  accused  was  charged  with  assault,  and  alternatively 
with  the  infliction  of  injury  by  the  reckless  discharge 
of  loaded  guns.  Lord  Ardwall  rejected  the  argument 
that  the  alternative  charge  disclosed  no  crime,  and 
told  the  jury,  'There  have  been  several  cases  where 
a  verdict  of  reckless  discharge...  of  firearms  was  found 
justified  in  our  law  where  the  result  was  quite  outwith 
the  expectation  of  the  accused...  on  an  occasion  when 
crime  was  the  last  thing  present  in  the  accused's  mind, 
at  a  wedding  festivity,  the  accused  had  fired  off  a 
gun  loaded  blank  by  way  of  a  salute,  and  injured  a 
member  of  the  public  passing  by  who  was  struck  by 
the  cotton  wool,  and  conviction  followed'  (at  p.  631). 
The  cases  are  by  no  means  restricted  to  firearms, 
and  include  cases  of  negligent  driving  of  railway 
engines  (e.  g.  Thos.  Smith,  (1853)  1  Irv.  271),  and 
of  the  negligent  use  of  explosives  (e.  g.  Jas.  Finney, 
(1848)  Ark.  432).  It  was  recognised  as  a  general 
rule  in  the  19th  century  that  culpable  neglect  of  duty 
resulting  in  injury  to  the  person,  was  a  crime;  and 
this  is  probably  still  the  law,  although  the  standard 
of  culpability  necessary  for  conviction  is  now  much 
higher. 
Macdonald  recognises  Phipps  as  authority  for  the 
existence  of  the  crime  of  causing  injury  by  culpable 
breach  of  duty  in  his  section  on  'culpable  neglect  of 576 
duty'  (Macdonald,  p.  142),  but  in  another  part  of 
his  book  he  says,  rather  misleadingly,  'Assault... 
differs  from  culpable  homicide  insofar  as  injuries 
happening  from  carelessness,  however  culpable,  are 
not  assaults'  (Macdonald,  p.  115).  This  is  quite 
correct,  but  the  comparison  with  culpable  homicide 
suggests  that  they  are  not  crimes  at  all,  which  is 
incorrect.  The  true  correlative  of  assault  is  not 
culpable  homicide  but  murder;  the  correlative  of 
culpable  homicide  is  the  infliction  of  injury  by 
culpable  neglect  of  duty,  and  this,  it  is  submitted, 
is  a  crime  in  itself.  'Reckless  disregard  of  the 
safety  of  the  public  which  in  fact  does  injure  someone' 
(9uinn  v.  Cunningham,  1956  J.  C.  22,  Lord  Justice-General 
at  p.  26)  is  a  crime.  The  quotation  comes  from  a 
road  traffic  case,  but  it  is  submitted  that  the 
principle  is  not  confined  to  such  cases.  In  fact, 
however,  prosecutions-for  this  crime  are  almost 
unknown  at  the  present  time,  probably  because  the  most 
common  examples  are  dealt  with  under  the  road  traffic 
legislation.  (Quinn  v.  Cunningham  was  a  common  law  pro- 
secution  because  at  the  time  it  was  brought  pedal 
cyclists  were  not  subject  to  the  careless  driving 
provisions  of  the  Road  Traffic  Acts.  ) 
The  standard  of  negligence  necessary  for  conviction 
is  that  gross  negligence  required  by  Paton  (1936  J.  C.  19) 
for  the  conviction  of  motorists  for  culpable  homicide. 
The  crime  is  thought  of  as  a  lesser  alternative  to 
culpable  homicide,  and  was  often  so  charged  in  the  19th 
century,  and  the  development  of  the  modern  standard 
of  negligence  in  culpable  homicide  applies  to  it  as  well. 
(Cf.  Thos.  Smith,  (1853)  1  Irv.  271,  Lord  Deas  at  p.  282, 
and  Quinn  v.  Cunningham,  supra,  Lord  Justice-General 
at  p.  25.  ) 577 
(There  are  no  cases  which  deal  with  the  question 
of  constructive  negligence  in  cases  where  injury  is 
carelessly  or  accidentally  caused  by  someone  unlawfully 
employed.  If  a  gas-meter  thief  causes  a  läak  which 
injures  the  householder  is  the  former  guilty  of  culpably 
causing  injury  even  if  his  carelessness  was  less  than 
that  of  the  Paton  standard?  The  rule  should  be  that 
in  cases  where  he  would  be  guilty  of  culpable 
homicide  if  he  caused  death,  he  will  be  guilty  of 
culpably  causing  injury  if  in  fact  he  only  causes 
injury.  The  question  of  constructive  negligence  does 
not  arise  in  the  more  common  case  of  an  assault  which 
turns  out  unexpectedly  to  be-more  serious  than  was 
intended.  Assault  to  severe  injury  and  assault  to 
the  danger  of  life  are  thought  of  as  merely  aggravated 
forms  of  the  crime  of  assault,  so  that  for  a  conviction 
of  the  aggravated  crime  it  is  necessary  only  to  show 
some  intentional  injury  followed  in  fact  by  severe 
injury  or  danger  to  life.  The  question  of  the  like- 
lihood  of  the  unintended  result  may  affect  the  sentence 
imposed,  but  does  not  affect  the  conviction  for  the 
aggravated  offence.  The  point,  however,  seems  never 
to  have  been  taken  in  a  reported  case.  ) 
Danger  to  the  person. 
Macdonald  divides  the  cases  under  this  head  into 
three  types  -  traffic  cases;  cases  involving  firearms; 
and  other  cases  (Macdonald,  pp.  141-2),  and  it  will  be 
convenient  to  follow  this  classificttion. 
Traffic  cases.  Alison  stated  that  'Furious  or 
improper  driving  along  the  high  road  is  in  itself  a 
police  offence;  and  if  it  leads  to  injury  to  the  persons 
or  property  of  others,  becomes  the  fit  object  of  higher 
criminal  punishment'  (Alison,  i.  625),  but  it  seems  now 
to  be  recognised  that  actual  injury  to  the  person  is 
not  necessary.  (And  also  that  injury  to  property 578 
is  in  itself  insufßcient  -  see  infra.  &_Y8 
.)  In  David 
Smith  ((1842)  1  Broun  240)  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Hope 
observed  -  obiter,  as  the  case  involved  the  discharge 
of  firearms  -  that  'Furious  driving  upon  a  public  road, 
even  when  no  passengers  are  to  be  seen  upon  it,  is  an 
offence,  although  it  may  not  be  worthwhile  to  try  the 
case  in  the  Court  of  Justiciary,  unless  some  person  has 
been  injured'.  In  M'Allister  v.  Abercrombie  ((1907) 
5  Adam,  366)  it  was  said  that  reckless  driving  was 
not  a  crime  'unless  there  is  danger  to  the  lieges', 
and  Macdonald  accepts  that  danger  is  sufficient 
without  actual  injury. 
'Danger  to_the_lieges'as_a_degree_of  negligence. 
Generally  speaking  'danger  to  the  lieges'  is  regarded 
as  a  result  of  carelessness,  and  the  crime  charged 
is  that  of  culpable  neglect  of  duty  whereby  certain 
persons  are  in  fact  put  in  danger.  In  modern  law, 
at  any  rate  in  the  traffic  cases,  where  only  gross 
negligence  is  criminal,  whatever  the  result,  'danger 
to  the  lieges'  seems  to  be  regarded  as  a  description 
of  the  degree  of  negligence  required  for  conviction, 
and  not  as  a  result  of  the  negligence.  As  such  a 
ßescription  it  is  regarded  as  equivalent  to  gross  and 
wicked  negligence,  usually  called  recklessness  (cf. 
Paton,  Quinn  v.  Cunningham,  supra).  It  is  not  a  crime 
to  cause  actual  danger  or  even  injury  unless  by 
driving  to  the  danger  of  the  lieges  -  i.  e.  in  a  grossly 
negligent  manner.  If  the  lieges  are  in  fact  endangered 
by  driving  which  is  not  as  negligent  as  this  no  common 
law  crime  has  been  committed.  In  Quinn  v.  Cunningham 
(supra)  a  pedal  cyclist  was  charged  with  riding  his 
cycle  'in  a  reckless  manner  and  causing  it  to  collide 
with  and  knock  down  F.  C.....  whereby  both  sustained 
slight  injuries'.  The  charge  was  held  to  be 579 
irrelevant  because  it  did  not  specify  that  the  reck- 
lessness  was  'to  the  danger  of  the  lieges'.  The 
Lord  Justice-General  said  'There  is  all  the  difference 
in  the  world  between  a  reckless  act  which  in  fact 
happens  to  result  in  injury  and  a  reckless  disregard 
of  the  safety  of  the  public  which  in  fact  does  injure 
someone'  (at  p.  26).  The  double  use  of  'reckless' 
makes  this  a  little  confusing,  but  in  its  context 
the  meaning  is  clear  -  mere  carelessness  is  not 
criminal  even  if  it  causes  injury,  but  carelessness 
of  the  degree  'to  the  danger  of  the  public'  is  criminal 
if  it  injures  someone.  This  only  concerns  cases  of 
actual  injury,  and  there  is  no  reported  case  in  which 
an  accused  has  been  convicted  of  the  common  law  crime 
of  reckless  driving  in  the  absence  of  actual  injury, 
but  the  reasoning  in  Quinn  sug;  ests  that  it  is  criminal 
to  drive  'to  the  danger  of  the  lieges'  even  if  none  of 
the  lieges  is  endangered.  It  is  strange  to  talk 
of  driving  which  in  fact  endangers  the  lieges  but  is 
not  'to  their  danger',  and  also  of  driving  which  is  'to 
their  danger'  but  does  not  endanger  them,  and  it  would 
have  been  better  if  the  Court  in  Quinn  had  merely  said 
that  careless  driving  was  not  a  crime  at  common  law 
unless  the  carelessness  was  gross.  But  they  wished 
to  use  the  statutory  short  form  of  charge  in  order  to 
show  that  the  charge  in  Quinn  was  irrelevant,  and  the 
statutory  form  is  'recklessly  to  the  danger  of  the 
lieges'  (Summary  Jurisdiction  (Scotland)  Act,  1954,2 
and  3  Eliz.  II,  c.  4$,  Second  Sch.  Pt.  II).  So  they 
held  that  the  charge  was  bad  because  it  did  not 
include  these  words.  At  the  same  time,  as  someone 
had  been  injured,  however  slightly,  and  this  was 
narrated  in  the  charge,  they  felt  constrained  to 
treat  these  words  as  describing  the  degree  of  recklessness 580 
and  not  its  result.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  one 
may  drive  to  the  danger  of  the  lieges  without  endanger- 
ing  them,  and  endanger  them  without  driving  to  their 
danger.  Fortunately,  the  matter  is  unlikely  to  arise 
often,  since  even  pedal  cyclists  are  now  subject  to 
the  careless  driving  provisions  of  the  Road  Traffic 
Acts  (Road  Traffic  Act,  1956,4  &5  Eliz.  II,  c.  67,  s.  ll). 
Firearms.  The  case  of  David  Smith  ((1842)  1 
Broun  240))  in  which  the  accused  fired  into  an 
inhabited  house  'to  the  imminent  danger  of  the  lives' 
of  certain  persons,  is  authority  for  the  proposition 
that  it  is  a  crime  to  endanger  the  lieges  by  the  reckless 
discharge  of  firearms,  and  it  is  so  accepted  by 
Macdonald.  There  is  no  authority  to  suggest  that 
imminent  actual  danger  is  unnecessary  -  or  indeed  that 
it  is  necessary. 
Other  cases.  Macdonald's  view  is  that,  'In  other 
cases,  in  order  to  make  a  relevant  charge  of  danger 
to  the  lieges,  it  may  be  necessary  to  specify  that 
injury  resulted  to  some  of  them'  (Macdonald,  p.  142). 
The  authorities  are  conflicting.  In  Robert  Young; 
((1839)  2  Sw.  376)  the  accused  was.  in  charge  of  a 
diving-bell  which  was  faulty,  as  a  result  of  which 
certain  persons  were  killed.  He  was  charged  with 
culpable  homicide,  and  also  with  culpable  neglect  of 
duty  'whereby  lives  are  lost,  or  injury  suffered,  or 
the  safety  of  the  lieges  put  in  danger'.  It  was 
argued  that  the  last  alternative  was  irrelevant,  an 
argument  which  was  opposed  by  the  Crown  who  asked  the 
Court  to  decide  the  matter  on  relevancy.  The  Court, 
however,  declined  to  do  so  since  they  regarded  the  last 
alternative  as  unnecessary  and  the  matter  as  speculative. 
In  David  Smith  (s,,  ra)  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk  referred 
to  You  n  and  said  -  after  talking  about  furious  driving  - 581 
'If  by  the  argument  which  was  stated  in  the  case  of 
Young,  it  is  meant  that  in  order  to  constitute  an 
indictable  offence,  there  must  be  injury  to  the  person, 
this  is  clearly  erroneous.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  doctrine  merely  is  that  there  must  be  a  completed 
act  on  the  part  of  the  panel,  then,  in  the  present 
case,  a  sufficient  result  has  been  set  forth  in  the 
alleged  act  of  firing  into  an  inhabited  house'  (at  p.  142). 
This  suggests  that  it  is  a  crime  to  endanger  the  lieges 
by  an  intentional  act,  such  as  firing  a  gun  or  driving 
a  car,  but  not  by  a  negligent  omission,  such  as  fail- 
ing  to  take  care  of  a  piece  of  machinery.  But  this 
is  a  difficult  distinction  -  careless  driving  consists 
in  the  negligent  omission  to  take  care,  and  an  omission 
to  perform  a  duty  may  be  equivalent  to  an  act  -  and  has 
not  been  developed  beyond  this  remark  of  Lord  Hope. 
In  two  subsequent  cases  of  neglect  ofýduty,  Alex.  Dickson 
((1847)  Ark.  352)  and  Jas.  Finney  ((1848)  Ark.  432), 
alternative  charges  of  injuring  the  lieges  or  putting 
them  in  danger  of  their  lives  went  unchallenged.  On 
the  other  hand  a  charge  of  putting  lives  in  danger 
was  rejected  as  irrelevant  in  Thos.  Simpson  ((1864)  4 
Irv.  490),  a  case  of  failure  to  make  a  coal  mine  secure, 
and  this  case  is  relied  on  by  Macdonald. 
In  principle  there  seems  no  reason  for  treating 
firearm  cases  as  special.  David  Smith  (supra)  suggests 
that  traffic  cases,  firearm  cases,  and  other  cases, 
were  all  regarded  as  depending  on  the  same  principles, 
but  it  is  necessary  to  treat  traffic  cases  as  special 
today,  because  of  their  historical  development,  and 
because  Judges  do  consider  them  as  forming  a  tract  of 
authority  on  their  own.  But  the  only  specialty  about 
firearms  is  their  great  and  obvious  danger  -  if  any 
other  activities  which  involve  equal  danger  are  indulged 582 
in,  there  is  no  reason  for  refusing  to  regard  them  as 
criminal  just  because  they  do  not  involve  firearms. 
If  it  is  a  crime  to  endanger  the  lieges  by  the  grossly 
negligent  use  of  firearms,  it  should  be  equally  a 
crime  to  endanger  them  by  the  grossly  negligent  use  of 
explosives  or  of  bows  and  arrows,  or  by  grossly  negligently 
throwing  stones  from  a  roof  into  a  crowded  street, 
or  indeed  by  endangering  them  in  any  other  grossly 
negligent  fashion. 
Injury  to  property. 
Here  again  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  matter 
with  regard  to  three  types  of  injury  -  injury  by  fire; 
injury  by  careless  driving;  other  forms  of  injury. 
Fire-raising.  Before  1887  there  were  two 
distinct  types  of  fire-raising  -  wilful  fire-raising, 
which  consisted  in  the  intentional  burning  of  certain 
specified  subjects  and  was  a  capital  offence,.  and 
culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  which  was  the  name 
given  to  intentional  burning  of  any  subjects  other 
than  the  specified  ones,  and  also  to  the  reckless 
burning  of  any  subjects.  The  distinction  between 
subjects  ceased  to  be  important  when  wilful  fire- 
raising  ceased  to  be  capital  (Criminal  Procedure 
(Scotland)  Act,  1887,50  &  51  Vict.  c.  35,  s.  56), 
and  it  is  now  competent  to  charge  a  person  with  wilful 
fire-raising  for  intentionally  setting  fire  to  any 
subjects  (Angus,  (1904)  4  Adam  640).  Since  1887 
culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  has  not  been 
defined,  and  cases  of  fire-raising  have  been  rare. 
The  existence  of  the  crime  of  culpable  and  reckless 
fire-raising  -  if  it  does  still  exist  -  means  that  it 
is  a  crime  to  set  fire  to  property  other  than  intentionally. 
But  the  degree  of  recklessness  required  seems  to  be 
the  same  as  that  which  renders  unintentional  killing 583 
murder  -a  reckless  disregard  of  the  consequences. 
Hume  says  that  the  recklessness  must  be  'of  that  high 
degree  "ut  luxuriae  auf  Bolo  sit  proximal',  (Hume,  i.  128).. 
Reckless  fire-raising  was  described  in  one  case  as 
fire-raising  'in  such  a  state  of  reckless  excitement 
as  not  to  know  or  care'  what  one  was  doing  (Geo.  MacBean, 
(1847)  Ark.  292,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  at  p.  293),  and 
in  Angus  (supra)  it  was  said  that  the  element  of  wilful- 
ness  was  always  present  in  culpable  and  reckless  fire- 
raising  (sum,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  at  p.  644).  In 
one  case,  Arch.  Phaup  ((1846)  Ark  176),  it  was  suggested 
that  it  night  be  culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  to 
drop  a  match  into  a  whin  bush  as  a  result  of  which  a 
house  was  burnt,  which  suggests  something  much  less 
than  the  MacBean  standard,  but  the  suggestion  was  made 
by  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk  after  the  Crown  had  dropped 
the  only  charge  in  the  case  -  one  of  wilful  fire-raising. 
It  seems  accordingly  that  it  is  not  a  crime  to  damage 
property  by  fire  unless  öne  does  so  either  intentionally 
or  with  that  extreme  degree  of  recklessness  which  is 
regarded  as  equivalent  to  intention  in  cases  of  homicide. 
Hume  applies  his  ideas  of  general  mens  rea  to 
wilful  fire-raising,  in  the  same  way  as  he  does  to 
murder,  so  that  it  is  wilful  fire-raising  to  shoot  at 
someone  if  the  shot  sparks  off  a  fire  which  burns  a 
house  instead  of  killing  the  victim  as  intended  (Hume, 
i.  24),  or  to  set  fire  to  non-capital  subjects  and  burn 
capital  ones,  where  such  a  result,  although  unintended, 
was  so  likely  as  to  indicate  utter  indifference  as  to 
the  result  (at  p.  130).  But  this  only  means  that 
wilful  fire-raising,  like  murder,  may  be  committed 
unintentionally,  if  done  with  that  'wicked  and  reckless 
indifference'  which  is  regarded  as  equivalent  to  intention 
(cf.  su  ra  ,. 
Qo). 584 
There  is  hardly  any  law  on  the  question  of 
constructive  culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising.  In 
James  Stewart  ((1856)  2  Irv.  359)  the  accused  carelessly 
set  fire  to  a  truck  while  stealing  some  whisky  from  it. 
He  was  charged  with  culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  - 
he  could  not  have  been  charged  with  wilful  fire-raising 
because  it  was  not  capital  to  burn  a  truck  -  and  the 
Lord  Justice-General  said,  'Is  it  more  illegal  to  burn 
when  the  man  is  stealing  than  when  he  is  not?  This 
may  be,  but  I  should  wish  more  authority  on  the  point' 
(at  p.  365).  No  authority  was  forthcoming  and  the 
Crown  dropped  the  charge.  In  Robert  Smillie,  ((1883) 
5  Coup.  287),  however,  Lord  Young  described  culpable 
and  reckless  fire-raising  as  setting  fire  'while  engaged 
in  some  illegal  act',  or  'while  in  such  a  state  of 
reckless  excitement  as  not  to  care  what  he  is  doing' 
(at  p.  291).  The  analogy  with  constructive  culpable 
homicide  is  obvious,  but  it  is  not  at  all  certain  that 
culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising  can  be  regarded  as 
being  'on  all  fours'  with  culpable  homicide.  The 
relation  between  culpable  and  reckless  and  wilful  fire- 
raising,  influenced  as  it  is  by  the  restriction  of  the 
latter  to  certain  specified  subjects,  is  different  from 
that  between  culpable  homicide  and  murder;  and  the 
recklessness  in  culpable  and  reckless  fire-rgisiing 
has  generally  been  regarded  as  requiring  to  be  of  a 
very  high  degree  indeed,  while  in  the  19th  century 
any  carelessness  was  sufficient  for  culpable  homicide. 
It  may  be  that  a  modern  authoritative  definition  of 
the  two  types  of  fire-raising  would  make  them  analogous 
to  murder  and  culpable  homicide  respectively,  and  such 
a  definition  would  be  reasonable.  But  unless  and  until 
it  is  made  it  would  be  dangerous  to  draw  any  analogies 
from  homicide  to  fire-raising.  That  means  that  we  must 585 
seek  for  the  law  regarding  negligent  fire-raising  within 
the  boubdaries  of  the  cases  on  fire-raising,  and  they 
indicate  that  negligent  fire-raising  is  not  criminal, 
even  if  the  negligence  is  gross,  so  long  as  it  is  not 
so  gross  as  to  amount  to  that  wilful  disregard  which 
is  regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  intention  (cf.  supra  27o 
and  that  there  is  no  sufficient  authority  for  the  view 
that  constructive  culpable  and  reckless  fire-raising 
is  analogous  to  constructive  culpable  homicide,  if 
indeed  it  exists  at  all. 
Traffic  cases.  Alison  suggests  that  improper 
driving  is  a  crime  if  it  leads  to  injury  to  property 
(Alison,  i.  625),  but  the  cases  he  cites  all  involve 
injury  to  person  as  well  as  to  property.  In 
LV  Allister  v.  Abercrombie  ((1907)  5  Adam  366)  a  charge 
of  driving  recklessly  and  injuring  a  horse  and  cart 
was  dismissed  as  irrelevant  in  the  absence  of  any 
averment  of  danger  to  the  lieges.  The  Court  in 
II'Allister  seem  to  have  regarded  danger  to  the  lieges 
as  a  result  which  must  follow  reckless  driving  before 
there  can  be  a  crime,  and  not  as  a  description  of  the 
degree  of  negligence  necessary  to  make  reckless  driving 
criminal,  whatever  its  result.  (Cf.  quinn  v. 
Cunningham,  1956  J.  C.  22,  discussed  supra  g77.  ) 
But  in  either  event,  the  mere  existence  of  injury  to 
property  does  not  make  the  driving  criminal,  so  that 
it  is  not  a  crime  to  injure  property  by  negligent 
driving,  although  such  injury  may  be  part  of  the 
species  facti  of  the  crime  of  driving  recklessly  to 
the  danger  of  the  lieges. 
Other  cases.  There  is  no  authority  to  suggest- 
that  it  is  a  crime  to  injureproperty  in  any  other  way 
unless  the  injury  is  wilful  and  malicious  -  i.  e. 586 
intentional,  or  displaying  that  'deliberate  disregard 
of,  or  even  indifference  to,  the  property'  which  is 
regarded  as  equivalent  to  intention  (Ward  v.  Robertson, 
1938  J.  C.  32,  Lord  Justice-Clerk  at  p.  36). 
Danger  to  property. 
Macdonald  states  that  it  is  an  offence  'to  set 
fire  to  combustibles  in  or  near  buildings  in  a  reckless 
manner,  so  as  to  cause  danger  of  injury  to  life  or 
property'  (Macdonald,  p.  82),  and  there  was  a  conviction 
on  such  a  charge  in  the  case  of  Jas.  Fleming  in  1848 
(Ark.  519).  But,  as  was  pointed  out  in  the  case  of 
Jas.  Martin  ((1876)  3  Coup.  274)  to  set  fire  to 
combustibles  is  itself  a  crime,  apart  from  the  danger, 
which  is  only  an  aggravation  of  the  crime.  It  seems 
on  the  whole  that  it  is  not  a  crime  to  endanger 
property  negligently,  even  by  raising  fire. 587 
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